community or of the poffeffor, diffufe a fatisfaction on the beholders, conciliate friendship and regard, and are praised from the immediate pleasure, which they communicate to the perfon poffeft of them. This fection too is very entertaining, and contains feveral beautiful illuftrations drawn from celebrated characters both in ancient and modern times.

4

In the eighth fection our author treats of qualities immediately agreeable to others, fuch as politenefs, wit, the lively fpirit of dialogue in converfation, eloquence, modefty, decency, &c. and fhews that, abftracted from any regard to utility or beneficial tendencies, they conciliate affection, promote efteem, and greatly inhance the merit of the poffeffor. He clofes this fection in the following manner. Amongst the other virtues, fays he, we may alfo give CLEANLINESS a place; fince it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconfiderable fource of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but fmaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneafy fenfation, which it exites in others; we may, in this inftance, feemingly fo trivial, clearly difcover the origin of moral diftinctions, about which the learned have involved themselves in fuch mazes of perplexity and error.'

But befides all the agreeable qualities, the origin of whofe beauty we can, in fome degree, explain and account for, there ftill remains fomething myfterious and unaccountable, which conveys an immediate fatisfaction to the fpectators, but how, or why, or for what reafon, they cannot pretend to determine. There is a MANNER, a grace, a genteel nefs, an I-know-not-what, which fome men poffefs above others, which is very different from external beauty and comelinefs, and which, however, catches our affection almost as fuddenly and powerfully. And tho' this manner be chiefly talked of in the paffion betwixt the fexes, where the concealed magic is eafily explained, yet furely much of it prevails in all our eftimation of characters, and forms no inconfiderable part of perfonal merit. This clafs of virtues, therefore, must be trufted entirely to the blind but fure teftimony of tafte and fentiment; and must be confidered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philofophy, and make her fenfible of her narrow boundaries and flender acquifitions.",

"We

We approve of another, because of his wit, politnefs, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality he poffeffes, although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of thefe accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us the fentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments which we form concerning morals.'

The ninth fection, which is the conclufion of the whole, our author introduces with obferving that it may appear furprifing, that any man, in fo late an age, fhould find it requifite to prove, by elaborate reafonings, that VIRTUE or PERSONAL MERIT confifts altogether in the poffeffion of qualities, ufeful or agreeable to the person himfelf or to others. It might be expected, fays he, that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractifed enquirers concerning morals, and been received, from its own evidence, without any argument or difputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind fo naturally claffes itfelf under the divifion of useful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that it is not eafy to imagine, why we should ever feek farther, or confider the question as a matter of nice research or enquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable muft poffefs thefe qualities with regard either to the perfon himself or to others, the compleat delineation or defcription of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a fhadow is caft by the fun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the fhadow is cast, be not broken and uneven, nor the furface, from which the image is reflected, difturbed and confused, a juft figure is immediately prefented, without any art or attention. And it seems a reasonable prefumption, that fyftems and hypothefes have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, fo fimple and obvious, could fo long have escaped the most elaborate fcrutiny and examination.

But however the cafe may have fared with philofophy; in common life these principles are still implicitely maintained; nor is any other topic of praife or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or fatire, any applause or cenfure of human action and behaviour. If we obferve men, in every intercourfe of bufinefs or pleasure, in each conference and converfation, we fhall find them no where, except in the fchools, at any lofs upon this fubject.

" And

And as every quality, which is ufeful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common life, admitted under the denomination of virtue or perfonal merit; fo no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural unprejudiced reafon, without the delufive gloffes of fupertition and falfe religion. Celibacy, fafting, penances, mortification, felf-denial, humility, filence, folitude and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reafon are they every where rejected by men of fenfe, but becaufe they ferve to no manner of purpofe; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of fociety; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encreafe his power of felf-enjoyment? We obferve, on the contrary, that they crofs all thefe defirable ends; fupify the understanding, and harden the heart, cbfcure the fancy and fower the temper. We juftly therefore transfer them to the oppofite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any fuperftition force fufficient, amongst men of the world, to pervert entirely thefe natu ral fentiments. A gloomy hair-brained enthufiaft, after his death, may have place in the calendar; but will scarce ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and fociety, except by thofe who are as delirious and difmal as himself."

Our author does not enter into that vulgar difpute concerning the degrees of benevolence or felf-love, which prevail in human nature; a difpute, which, as he justly obferves, is never likely to have any ifiue, both because men, who have taken party, are not eafily convinced, and becaufe the phænomena, which can be produced on either fide, are fo uncertain, and subject to fuch a variety of interpretations, that it is impotlible accurately to compare them, or draw any determinate conclufion from them. He thinks it fufficient for his purpofe, if it be allowed that there is fome benevolence, however small, infufed into our bofor fome fpark of friendship for human kind, fome particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and ferpent. "Let thefe generous fentiments, fays he, be fuppofed ever fo weak; let them be hardly fufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they must ftill direct the determinations of the mind, and where every thing elfe is equal, produce a cool preference of what is ufeful and ferviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A moral diftinction, therefore, immemediately arifes; a general fentiment of blame and appro

;

bation;

bation; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable averfion to thofe of the other.'

Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all thofe paffions that are vulgarly comprehended under the denomination of felf-love, are excluded from our author's theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too weak, but because they have not a proper direction for that purpofe. The notion of morals, fays he, implies fome fentiment, common to all mankind, which recommends the fame object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the fame opinion or decifion concerning it. It alfo implies fome fentiment, fo univerfal and comprehenfive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of perfons the most remote, an object of cenfure or applaufe, according as they agree or difagree with that rule of right which is eftablished. Thefe two requifite circumstances belong alone to the fentiment of humanity here infifted on. The other paffions produce, in every breaft, many ftrong fentiments of defire and averfion, affection and hatred; but thefe neither are felt so much in common, nor are fo comprehenfive, as to be the foundation of any general fyftem and established theory of blame or approba.ion.

When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adverfary, he is understood to speak the language of felf-love, and to exprefs fentiments peculiar to himself, and arifing from his particular circumftances and fituation but when he beftows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious, or depraved, he then fpeaks another language, and expreffes fentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular fituation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others:" he muft move fome univerfal principle of the human frame,' and touch a fring, to which all mankind have an accord and fymphony. If he means, therefore, to exprefs; that this man pofleffes qualities, whofe tendency is pernicious to fociety, he has chofen this common point in view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in feme degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the fame elements as at prefent, it will never be altogether indifferent to the good of mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the tendencies of characters and manners. And tho' this affection of humanity may not generally be efteemed fo ftrong as ambition or vanity, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any

general

general fyftem of conduct and behaviour. One man's ambition is not another man's ambition; nor will the same event or object fatisfy both: but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one; and the fame object touches this paffion in all human creatures.

But the fentiments which arife from humanity, are not only the fame in all human creatures, and produce the fame approbation or cenfure; but they also comprehend all human creatures: nor is there any one, whofe conduct and character is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of cenfure or approbation. On the contrary those other paffions, commonly denominated selfish, both produce different fentiments in each individual, according to his particular fituation; and alfo contemplate the greateft part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern. Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever expreffes contempt mortifies and difpleafes me but as my name is known but to a small part of mankind, there are few, that come within the fphere of this paffion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or difguft. But if you represent a tyrannical, infolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world; I foon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of fuch a conduct, and feel the fentiment of repugnance and difpleafure towards it. No character can be fo remote as to be, in this light, altogether indifferent to What is beneficial to fociety or to the perfon himfelf muft ftill be preferred. And every quality or action, of every human being, muft, by this means, be ranked under fome class or denomination, expreffive of general cenfure or applause.

me.

What more, therefore, can we ask to diftinguish the fentiments, dependant on humanity, from those connected with any other paffion, or to fatisfy us why the former is the origin of morals, and not the latter? Whatever con duct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures alfo the applaufe of all mankind, by affecting the fame principle in them: but what serves my avarice or ambition pleases only these paffions in me, and affects not the avarice or ambition of the rest of mankind.. No conduct, in any man, which has a beneficial tendency, but is agreeable to my humanity, however remote the person: but every man, fo far removed as neither to cross nor ferve my avarice and ambition, is altogether indifferent to those pas fions. The diftinction, therefore, betwixt thefe different

Species