Attorneys applying to be admitted and re-admitted. be supplied with clerks of respectability and good character. "In concluding a retrospect of the past year, it might be considered presumptious to point out more fully the services which this society has rendered to the body of law clerks, since its commencement. Its records for seven years will attest the extent and utility of its exertions. Entering originally upon an undertaking of doubtful issue, it has silenced unmerited opposition, and secured patronage and success. While it has provided an asylum against vicissitude and want, it has promoted habits of industry and perseverance-the surest safeguards against them, and, relying, on the approbation of the profession, it again respectfully ventures to solicit their powerful support, founded on the hope that it has already effected something towards deserving it. [We are glad thus to afford space for the very satisfactory statement of the progress of this useful society, and earnestly recommend it to the continued and further support of all branches of the profession. ED.] Chadwick, James Wm., Long Ashton. 25 Garratt, James, Ely Place, Holborn; Sidmouth; and Peckham Bye. Grover, John Logan, 9, Weston Street, Pen- Gore, Arthur, 51, and 31, Oxford Street. Knight, Joel, Haverfordwest. Price, Liscombe, Red Lion Street, Wapping. Simpson, Wm. Robert, 8, Red Lion Street, Seaman, Lewis, Otley. Swinford, Henry Knott, Margate; France; Saunders, Joseph, George Greenham, near Taylor, David Passmore, 9, Stringer's Build- Williams, Benjamin Price, Luton. Wynne, Llewelyn, Manchester Street, Manchester Square. Affidavit filed at the Master's Office on the 2nd Parsons, Henry, North Petherton. Forrester, Gilbert Davis, Lincoln's Inn Fields; COMNON PLEAS. Downes, Peter Joseph, 42, Primrose Hill, Sa- Hodgson, Edward, 6, Symond's Inn; 5, Cecil lisbury Square. Evans, Wm., Martin, Gloucester, Street, Strand; 13, Hatfield Street, Blackfriars. ATTORNEYS APPLYING TO BE ADMITTED QUEEN'S BENch. Anstis, Bernard, 5, Beaufort Buildings; and Abbott, Charles James, 36, Gower Street. Bircham, Merrick Bircham, 8, Devonshire Bisgood, Thomas, 21, College Place, Camden Bramley, Thomas Charlesworth, 3, Camden Matthew Anstis, Liskeard; assigned to Ed- Francis Pendor and James Genn, Falmouth. Francis John Gunning, Cambridge; assigned Charles John Showbridge, South Square. 26 Attorneys applying to be Admitted.-Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor. Berry, Edward, Leicester; Sidmouth Street; Bartlett, Robert Henry William, 31, Francis Bond, James Wilfrid, Basingstoke; and Picca- Brownlow, Richard, Bolton. Birch, Andrew Robert, Ashton-under-Lyne. Barrett, George, 9, South Square. Beaton, Charles, 45, Gower Place; and Bath. Beckitt, Henry Hugh, 50, Burton Street; Beanlands, Benjamin, Leeds. Samuel Stone, Leicester. Samuel Craddock, Shepton Mallett; assigned Edmund Haworth, Bolton; assigned to Adain William Slater, Manchester. Richard Maychell, Bolton-le-Moors; assigned to W. Christopher Chew, Manchester; assigned to William Hugh Myers, Manchester. William Barrett, Gray's Inn. Robert Cook, Bath. Alexander Thompson, Manchester. William Beckitt, Doncaster. George Sheppard, Otley. Bluck, Edward, Sheffield; Manchester; Lin- Robert Rodgers, Liverpool; assigned to John. coln's Inn Fields. Clark, William Fox, Beverley. Catchpole, William Smith, 19, Coleman Street. Cock, Peter, 15, Everett Street; and Truro. Colley, William, 57, Upper Seymour Street; Cook, Henry, Kingston-upon-Hull. Coombs, Thomas, the younger, Dorchester; Davies, Edmund William, 46, Drummond Morris, Manchester, John William Fleetwood, Penkridge; assigned Meaburn Staniland, Boston. John James Coulton, the elder, King's Lynn. George Delmar, 46, Lincoln's Inn Fields. Richard Holier Atkinson, Southampton Build- Baker Gabb and William Woodhouse Secre- [To be continued.] SUPERIOR COURTS. Lord Chancellor's Court. PROMISSORY NOTE.-LEGAL INTEREST.-CON- A. advanced to B. 1600l., minus the interest of Review, that the transaction was protected by the 7th section of the act 3 & 4. W: 4, c. 98, which allows any interest to be taken on bills or notes not having more than three months to run. cision of the Court of Review: and the petiThis was an appeal by petition from a detioner, Mr. Reuben Terrewest, a solicitor, stated among other things that he had presented a petition to the Court of Review,. claiming a lien on a sum of 2631. therein mentioned, in respect of a debt due to him Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor. 27 note in question was given as a security for a pre-existing debt, and that no money was actually advanced thereon; that the debt mentioned in the note was money lent long before, for an indefinite time, not exceeding eighteen months, in consideration of the borrower agreeing to pay interest, at the rate of 104. per cent. per annum, and that a series of such notes should be given and renewed every three months, and that the note in question was the last of the series of five such notes, and that such notes were required by the lender merely as a shift and contrivance to evade the usury laws; and the Court did thereupon adjudge and decree that the contract for such loan was usurious, and the note was void, and that the said petition should be dismissed with costs. The appellant insisted that the said judgment and decree are erroneous in matter of law." The petitioner being advised that this special case was founded on an erroneous principle, and that he would be thereby excluded from all benefit of appeal on the construction of the said act; and being further advised that said special case consisted of assumptions not warranted by the facts proved, and that it was also defective and insufficient; he therefore prayed that his appeal may be heard otherwise than by special case, or together with the special case, or on the original petition, or in any other mode that would admit of an effectual appeal. from the bankrupt, Mr. John Poynter, upon applied for a special case, for the purpose of apthe following promissory note: "London, pealing, and one of the judges of the said Court 26th August, 1835. 1600.-Three months granted a case, setting forth, after a short inafter date I promise to pay Mr. R. Terrewest, troductory statement, "That the Court, having or order, one thousand six hundred pounds, fully heard and considered the proofs and allevalue received. John Poynter, 92, Guildford,gations of the parties, found that, in fact, the Street, &c." and thereby praying to be paid the said 2637., and to be at liberty to go before the commissioner and prove for the balance which might be due to him after such payment of the sum of 11377. 18. 8d. the amount remaining due on the said promissory note at the date of the issuing of the fiat against the bankrupt; that on the hearing of the said petition, the assignees impeached the validity of the said debt on the ground of usury, upon evidence furnished by the petitioner, and which was to the effect that Mr. Poynter applied to petitioner to raise a loan of 15007. for him, on mortgage of certain estates; but there being some difficulty as to the title to the estates, petitioner offered to lend 1600/., to be repaid out of the proceeds of estates which Mr. Poynter was about to sell. The petitioner was to discount a note for him for three months, at 10 per cent., including the cost of an insurance on Mr. Poynter's life; and when the note was made, he stopped out of the 1600. a sum of 3007. which he had before advanced, together with interest on the whole sum for the three months, at 10 per cent. per annum; and he then told Mr. Poynter that if he wished to have the note renewed at the end of three months, he would renew it at the same rate of discount for twelve or eighteen months. If the estates were sold before three months, petitioner was to be paid, but if not, the understanding was that he would renew the note. Petitioner took the note under the new act (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 98),a in July, 1834. He contended at the hearing of his said petition, that the said note was within the protection of that statute. But the said Court dismissed the petition with costs, on the ground of usury. The petitioner a By the 7th section it is enacted, "that no bill of exchange or promissory note made payable at or within three months after the date thereof, or not having more than three months to run, shall not by reason of any interest taken thereon or secured thereby, or any agreement to pay or receive or allow interest in discounting, negotiating, or transferring the same, be void, nor shall the liability of any party to any bill of exchange or promissory note be affected by reason of any statute or law in force for the prevention of usury, nor shall any person or persons drawing, accepting, endorsing, or signing any such bill or note, or lending or advancing any money, or taking more than the present rate of legal interest in Great Britain and Ireland respectively, for the loan of money on any such bill or note, be subject to any penalties under any statute or law relating to usury, or any other penalty or forfeiture, any thing in any law or statute relating to usury to the contrary notwithstanding." b Deac. 590. Mr. Wigram and Mr. Anderdon for the appellant.-The Court of Review found that there was an agreement to forbear demanding payment for eighteen months. There was no proof of such agreement. The Court below drew an erroneous conclusion from the evidence. There was a verbal understanding that the appellant would renew the note at the same rate of discount, and for the same period, if the bankrupt wished, but not after eighteen months, being in hopes the bankrupt would by that time have sold his estates. The note was clearly within the 7th section of the Act 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 98. The appellant did not resort to any contrivance to evade the law, but he availed himself of the protection the law gave him. They relied on the cases of Holt v. Miers, and Ea parte Knight.e Mr. Swanston and Mr. Russell for the assig nees of the bankrupt.-The special case found that there was an agreement to renew the note every three months for eighteen months, which was a contrivance to evade the laws against usury, and to take 10 per cent. per annum interest on the loan, instead of making one note for the whole period. There was no money advanced on this note-the money had been 28 Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor ; Queen's Bench. lent on a former note. The seventh section of the act was confined to existing bills and notes, and was intended to protect a bona fide transaction. They cited the case of Barrington v. Collis.f The Lord Chancellor stopped Mr. Wigram in his reply. His Lordship read the material parts of the special case, and taking the facts as therein stated, he did not find any contract between the appellant and the bankrupt for a loan independently of the note; nor was there any contract not to demand the amount of the note when it became payable. There was an undertaking, that was admitted, that the money would not be called for, if the borrower wished the note to be renewed, but no contract to that effect binding on the party, no contract that could be enforced in this Court, or that could be a defence to an action brought on the note when it became payable. The note was given and renewed on that understanding. In holding this transaction to be within the 7th section of the Act, as he certainly did, he did not feel that he was over-ruling any of the cases cited. His Lordship read the 7th section of 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 98, and after pointing out its several provisions, said, that, in every view of it, these notes were within its protection. There was nothing in the section confining the advance of the money to the time of giving the note, and if the doctrine of the Court of Review in its judgment in this case were to be received, no person could gain time for paying a debt due from him by giving a note for it, payable with interest above five per cent. Would the original note, made on the advance of the money, payable in three months, with interest more than the rate of five per cent. per annum, become illegal, because the lender, instead of demanding the money at the expiration of three months, allows it to remain at the same rate of interest? There was nothing in the subsequent dealings of these parties to make the transaction illegal, as it was not originally illegal. That was his lordship's view of this statute, and if this construction was right, it was not necessary for him to say any thing of the cases. Referring to the case of Holt v. Miers, his lordship observed that there was a contract in that case, which made it a much stronger case than this, in which there was no contract. As to that part of the special case which stated that the parties resorted to a contrivance to evade the laws against usury, that was true; they did resort to the protection which the statute declared them entitled to against the laws against usury. Concurring fully in the decision in Holt v. Miers, he would reverse the decision of the Court of Review in this case, and hold that this was a legal debt. The decision appealed from was reversed. No costs. Queen's Bench. COPYHOLD.-MANDAMUS. The steward of a manor belonging to the Crown is by the 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, the proper person to grant admittance to such manner, and if he refuses to grant it, this Court will issue a inandamus to him to compel him to admit. Quære, whether a writ of mandamus will lie to the steward of any other than a Crown manor to admit a person claiming a right to be tenant of such manor. There was The Attorney General appeared to shew in this case, calling upon the defendant to cause against a rule which had been obtained shew cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to admit on the roll, as a copyholder, a person who claimed to have a right to be a tenant of the manor. a preliminary objection on which this rule must be discharged. The manor of Richmond was a Royal manor, of which the Queen sort could not be directed to the steward, but, was the lady. In the first place, a rule of this according to a decision made last Term, it must be directed to the lord or lady of the manor, whose interests were chiefly to be affected by the proceeding. If that rule was, as it must be, adopted in this case, there could from this Court to the Queen. The party not be any mandamus, for none could issue applying for this mandamus would not be without a remedy, for if he had suffered any thing from not being admitted on the roll, he night proceed by a petition of right; for it was a rule that wherever there would be, as between subject and subject, a remedy by mandamus or action, there must, as between a subject and the Crown, be a petition of right. On these grounds the rule must be discharged. the facts of this case were known to the stewSir W. Follett, in support of the rule.-All ard, and had been communicated to the Lords of the Treasury, who ought to have decided without compelling the party to come to this Court. amounts to this, that in all the manors of the The argument on the other side Crown, the tenants are to be without any remedy for any right of which they may be deprived. There is no precedent to be found to compel the tenants of the manors of the Crown to have recourse to a petition of right, either for the inspection of deeds, or for admission on the rolls. But if there is any doubt as to ordinary manors, there is none as to the manors of the Crown. It is clear not only that the steward is bound to admit, and can be compelled to do so, but that he is the only person bound to perform the duty, and that the Crown has no power to grant or refuse admittance. In re Poynter, ex parte Terrewest, at West-The lord may have an action for the fine payaminster, Nov. 4th, 1839. f 5 Bing. N. S. 332. ble on admittance, but he cannot refuse the admittance itself if rightfully demanded. Any person in the exercise of the office of steward may admit the person claiming to be tenant, and with respect to this manor the right is completely and distinctly vested in the steward Superior Courts: Queen's Bench: Q. B. Practice Court. 29 Lord Denman delivered judgment.-In this case cause had been shewn on Saturday against a rule for issuing a mandumus to the defendant, commanding him to admit a person as tenant on the court rolls of this manor. One objection raised to the application was, that the rule ought not to have been served upon the defendant, but upon the lady of the manor; and then it was further objected, that as the Queen was the lady of the manor here, no pended altogether on the first objection. There are, no doubt, many cases in which the mandamus has been directed to the steward only, but it does not appear that in any of those cases the objection was taken. But as to the manors of the Crown, it appears that by the 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, the steward is the statutable officer to act for the Crown in these matters; and as a mandamus may issue to him if he is the proper person to be called upon, the Court is of opinion that in this instance he is so, and that the writ ought to go. Rule absolute.-The Queen v. The Steward of the Manor of Richmond, M. T. 1839. Q. B. F. J. Queen's Bench Practice Court. RE-ADMISSION OF ATTORNEY.-NOTICE. TERM. by the express terms of an act of parliament. That statute is the 10 G. 4, c. 50, by the 8th section of which all the rights of the Crown, in its manors &c. are vested in the Commissioners of the Land Revenues, who are thereby invested with the management of these revenues. The leases therefore must be made under the authority of the commissioners. The 14th sec. provides that the steward shall be appointed by the commissioners with power to hold courts and perform all things belong-writ of mandamus could issue. The case deing or incident to his office. The steward of this manor is now appointed under the statute. The party therefore claiming admittance must apply to the steward, and cannot properly apply to any other person. The interference of the Crown in any way, would therefore be utterly nugatory. There is no direct authority on the point, but the case of Rowe v. Brenton,a shews that under ordinary circumstances, the steward is the proper person to be applied to, for Lord Tenterden there said, "The party is not without his remedy; for he may apply for a mandamus against the steward." In the same manner, Holroyd v. Breare,b also shews that the steward is recognised as a judicial officer, and that trespass will not lie against him for an act done by his bailiff under his order. To compel him to do anything therefore, application must be made to this Court for a mandamus. There is no reason whatever to make the Queen a party to this proceeding. In Watkins on Copyholds,c it is said that the lord cannot have an interest in the matter of the admittance, for that his fines must be paid by any tenant whatever, and that the steward is the only person by whom Ogle applied on the 2d day of term for leave the admittances are managed. In Comyn's to lodge an affidavit on the part of the appliDigest,d it is said that a mandamus lies to an cant at the Master's office now, instead of inferior officer, and the steward of a manor is before the first day of the term. The applimentioned. The King v. Fletcher Rigge, Esq., cant was an attorney desirous of being re-adThe King v. Rennett, and The King v. Med-mitted. He had given his notice of his intenhurst, were all decided independently of this objection, which has now been raised for the first time. In Rogers v. Jones, a mandamus was issued, directed to the steward. [Lord Denman, C. J.-It seems to have been a common practice to issue these writs to the steward, but it is not shewn that the practice has been held good against the objection.] In Lord Cokes' Treatise,i the steward is treated as an independent officer whose acts are valid of themselves, and it is said that he doth act indifferently between the lord and the tenant. On the principles of the common law, therefore, the steward is the proper person to whom to direct a mandamus for admittance as tenant. But if any possible doubt could exist upon that point, it is clear that by the terms of this sta- EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEY.—ADMISSION OF tute, he is the proper person in a case where any manor of the Crown is concerned. Cur, adv. vult. The affidavit for re-admission should be lodged the day before the commencement of term at latest, though, under special circumstances, it may be lodged after the commencement of the term. tion to apply for re-admission, but from the Littledale, J., allowed the affidavit to be ATTORNEY.-NOTICE. Unless there is strong reason to believe that a person will not be able to come up to be examined and admitted pursuant to notices given, this Court will not allow the effect of the notices to be extended to another term. Humfrey applied for leave to extend the notices of a gentleman, who was an articled clerk, from the present to the next term, s. 3. |