tion, for it esteems all other oaths unnecessary at least, and therefore will not punish the breach of them. For which reason, it is much to be questioned how far any magistrate is justifiable in taking a voluntary affidavit in any extrajudicial matter, as is now too frequent upon every petty occasion, since it is more than possible that, by such idle oaths, a man may frequently, in foro conscientia, incur the guilt and, at the same time, evade the temporal penalties of perjury."

"And Lord Kenyon, indeed, in different cases, has expressed a doubt, whether a magistrate does not subject himself to a criminal information for taking a voluntary extra-judicial affidavit.": 3 Burn's, Just. v. Oath.

Indictment.-The Jurors for our Lady the Queen present, that J. S. on . . . . at . . . . being one of the Justices of Our said Lady the Queen, assigned to keep the peace in and for the said county (or district), did unlawfully administer to and receive from a certain person, to wit, one A. B., a certain oath, touching certain matters and things, whereof the said J. S., at the time and on the occasion aforesaid, had not any jurisdiction or cognizance by any law in force at the time being, to wit, at the time of administering and receiving the said oath, or authorized, or required by any such law; the same oath not being in any matter or thing touching the preservation of the peace, or the prosecution, trial or punishment of any offence nor being required or authorized by any law of the Dominion of Canada, or by any law of the said Province of . . . . wherein such oath. has been so received and administered, and was to be used (if to be used in another Province add " or by any law of the Province of . . . . wherein the said oath (or affidavit) was (or is) to be used "); nor being an oath required by the laws of any foreign country to give validity to any instrument in writing or to evidence, designed or intended to be used in such foreign country; that is to say, a certain oath touching and concerning; state the subject-matter of the

oath or affidavit so as to show that it was not one of which the Justice had jurisdiction or cognizance, and was not within the exceptions.

A county magistrate complained to the bishop of the diocese of the conduct of two of his clergy and to substantiate his charge he swore witnesses before himself, as magistrate, to the truth of the facts: held, that the matter before the bishop was not a judicial proceeding, and therefore that the magistrate had brought himself within the statute against voluntary and extra-judicial oaths, and that he had unlawfully administered voluntary oaths, contrary to the enactment of the statute: R. v. Nott, Car. & M. 288, 9 Cox, 301.

In the same case, on motion in arrest of judgment, it was held, that an indictment under the statute (5 & 6 W. IV, c. 62, s. 13) is bad, if it does not so far set out the deposition that the court may judge whether or not it is of the nature contemplated by the statute; that the deposition and the facts attending it should have been distinctly stated, and the matter or writing relative to which the defendant was said to have acted improperly should have been stated to the court in the indictment, so that the court might have expressed an opinion whether the defendant had jurisdiction, the question whether the defendant had jurisdiction to administer the oath being one of law, and to be decided by the court; but the majority of the court thought that it was not necessary to set out the whole oath. Greaves, nevertheless, thinks it prudent to set it out at full length, if practicable, in some counts: 1 Russ, 193, note.

Upon the trial, to establish that the defendant is a justice of the peace, or other person authorized to receive oaths or affidavits, evidence of his acting as such will, prima facie, be sufficient: Archbold, 830.

And it is not necessary to show that he acted wilfully

in contravention of the Statute: the doing so, even inadvertently, is punishable: Id.

CORRUPTING JURIES AND WITNESSES.

154. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment who

(a) Dissuades or attempts to dissuade any person by threats, bribes or other corrupt means from giving evidence in any cause or matter, civil or criminal; or

(b) Influences or attempts to influence, by threats or bribes or other corrupt means, any juryman in his conduct as such, whether such person has been sworn as a juryman or not; or

(c) Accepts any such bribe or other corrupt consideration to abstain from giving evidence, or on account of his conduct as a juryman; or

(d) Wilfully attempts in any other way to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice. R. S. C. c. 173, s. 30. (Amended).

Sub-section (b) covers the common law offence of embracery 4 Blac. Comm. 140: sub-section (a) also was a common law misdemeanour; sub-sections (c) and (d), see 1 Russ. 265; form of indictment, 2 Chit. 235; fine in addition to or in lieu of punishment, section 958; verdict of attempt on an indictment for principal offence, section 711.

As to conspiracy to obstruct, pervert, prevent or defeat the course of justice, section 527, post.

COMPOUNDING PENAL ACTIONS.

155. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a fine not exceeding the penalty compounded for, who, having brought, or under colour of bringing, an action against any person under any penal statute in order to obtain from him any penalty, compounds the said action without any order or consent of the court, whether any offence has in fact been committed or not. R. S. C. c. 173, s. 31. (Amended).

This applies to qui tam actions. The words in italics

are new.

See Keir v. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 371; R. v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282; R. v. Mason, 17 U. C. C. P. 534: R. v. Best, 2 Moo. 124; Kneeshaw v. Collier, 30 U. C. C. P. 265; Windhill Local Board v. Vint, 17 Cox, 41, 45 Ch. D. 351, and cases there cited, as to compounding misdemeanours.

The repealed statute, chapter 173, section 31, R. S. C. applied only to the Province of Quebec and had " without

the permission or direction of the Crown" instead of "without order or consent of the court."

The court, under the above section 155, would probably require the consent of the Crown before giving its own

consent.

TAKING A REWARD FOR HELPING TO RECOVER PROPERTY STOLEN, ETC.

156. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to seven years' imprisonment who corruptly takes any money or reward, directly or indirectly, under pretense or upon account of helping any person to recover any chattel, money, valuable security or other property which, by any indictable offence, has been stolen, taken, obtained, extorted, converted or disposed of, unless he has used all due diligence to cause the offender to be brought to trial for the same. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 89; 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 101, (Imp.).

As to the meaning of the words "valuable security" and "property," see ante, section 3.

Indictment. The Jurors for Our Lady the Queen, present that A. B. on unlawfully and corruptly did take and receive from one J. N. certain money and reward, to wit, the sum of five dollars of the monies of the said J. N. under pretense of helping the said J. N. to recover certain goods and chattels of him the said J. N. before then stolen, the said A. B. not having used all due diligence to cause the person by whom the said goods and chattels were so stolen, to be brought to trial for the same.

It was held to be an offence within the repealed statute to take money under pretense of helping a man to goods stolen from him, though the prisoner had no acquaintance with the felon, and did not pretend that he had, and though he had no power to apprehend the felon, and though the goods were never restored, and the prisoner had no power to restore them: R. v. Ledbitter, 1 Moo. 76. The section of the repealed statute, under which this case was decided, was similar to the present section: 2 Russ. 575.

If a person know the persons who have stolen any property, and receive a sum of money to purchase such property from the thieves, not meaning to bring them to justice, he is within the statute, although the jury find that he did not

mean to screen the thieves, or to share the money with them, and did not mean to assist the thieves in getting rid of the property by procuring the prosecutrix to buy it: R. v. Pascoe, 1 Den. 456.

A person may be convicted of taking money on account of helping a person to a stolen horse, though the money be paid after the return of the horse: R. v. O'Donnell, 7 Cox, 337. As to the meaning of the words "corruptly takes": see R. v. King, 1 Cox, 36.

As to compounding crimes: see R. v. Burgess, Warb. Lead. Cas. 67; 16 Q. B. D. 141.

UNLAWFULLY ADVERTISING Reward.

157. Every one is liable to a penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars for each offence, recoverable with costs by any person who sues for the same in any court of competent jurisdiction, who

(a) Publicly advertises a reward for the return of any property which has been stolen or lost, and in such advertisement uses any words purporting that no questions will be asked; or

(b) Makes use of any words in any public advertisement purporting that a reward will be given or paid for any property which has been stolen or lost, without seizing or making any inquiry after the person producing such property; or

(c) Promises or offers in any such public advertisement to return to any pawnbroker or other person who advanced money by way of loan on, or has bought, any property stolen or lost, the money so advanced or paid, or any other sum of money for the return of such property; or

(d) Prints or publishes any such advertisement. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 90. The penalty is recoverable under section 929, post. Limitation, six months as to offence under (d), section 551.

FALSE CERTIFICATE OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE OF DEATH. 158 Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment, who knowingly and wilfully signs a false certificate or decla ration when a certificate or declaration is required with respect to the execution of judgment of death on any prisoner. R. S. C. c. 181, s. 19. It should come after

This section seems out of place.

section 946, post.

Fine in addition to or in lieu of punishment, section