PART XXV.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

314. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence, and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment, who receives or retains in his possession anything obtained by any offence punishable on indictment, or by any acts wheresoever committed, which, if committed in Canada after the commencement of this Act, would have constituted an offence punishable upon indictment knowing such thing to have been so obtained. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 82. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 91 (Imp.).

The words in italics are new. See s. 627, post, as to indictment of receivers in certain cases; also ss. 715, 716, 717 as to trial, and s. 3, ante, as to what constitutes "having in possession." See remarks under next section.

Obtaining by false pretenses is punishable by three years, s. 359; but knowingly receiving anything so obtained is punishable by fourteen years.

Receiving property obtained by any indictable offence abroad is punishable under this section; s. 355 is limited to theft and the thief himself.

at

that

Indictment against a receiver of stolen goods.A. B., on one silver tankard, of the goods and chattels of J. N. before then unlawfully stolen, did unlawfully receive and have, he the said A. B. at the time when be so received the said silver tankard as aforesaid, then well knowing the same to have been stolen.

Any number of receivers at different times of stolen property may be charged with substantive felonies in the same indictment, s. 627, post.

And where the indictment contains several counts for larceny, describing the goods stolen as the property of dif ferent persons, it may contain the like number of counts, with the same variations, for receiving the same goods: R. v. Beeton, 1 Den. 414. It is not necessary to state by whom the stealing was committed: R. v. Jervis, 6 C. & P. 156; and, if stated, it is not necessary to aver that the principal

has not been convicted: R. v. Baxter, 5 T. R. 83. Where an indictment charged Woolford with stealing a gelding, and Lewis with receiving it knowing it to have been "so feloniously stolen as aforesaid," and Woolford was acquitted, Patteson, J., held that Lewis could not be convicted upon this indictment, and that he might be tried on another indictment, charging him with having received the gelding knowing it to have been stolen by some person unknown : R. v. Woolford, 1 M. & Rob. 384; 2 Russ. 556.

An indictment charging that a certain evil-disposed person feloniously stole certain goods, and that C. D. and E. F. feloniously received the said goods knowing them to be stolen, was holden good against the receivers, as for a substantive felony: R. v. Caspar, 2 Moo. 101. The defendant may be convicted both on a count charging him as accessory before the fact and on a count for receiving: R. v. Hughes, Bell, 242. The first count of the indictment charged the prisoner with stealing certain goods and chattels; and the second count charged him with receiving "the goods and chattels aforesaid of the value aforesaid so as aforesaid feloniously stolen." He was acquitted on the first count but found guilty on the second: Held, that the conviction was good: R. v. Huntley, Bell, 238; R. v. Craddock, 2 Den. 31.

that C. D. on

at

Indictment against the principal and receiver jointly.one silver spoon and one table-cloth, of the goods and chattels of A. B., unlawfully did steal, and the jurors aforesaid, do further present, that J. S. afterwards, on the goods and chattels aforesaid, so as aforesaid stolen, unlawfully did receive and have, he the said J. S. then well knowing the said goods and chattels to have been stolen.

Indictment against the receiver as accessory, the principal having been convicted.- that heretofore, to wit, at the general sessions of the

holden at

on

it was presented, that one J. T. (continuing the for

mer indictment to the end; reciting it, however, in the past and not in the present tense :) upon which said indictment the said J. T., at aforesaid, was duly convicted of the theft aforesaid. And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present, that A. B. after the committing of the said theft as aforesaid, to wit, on

the goods and chattels aforesaid, so as aforesaid stolen, unlawfully did receive and have, he the said A. B. then well knowing the said goods and chattels to have been stolen.

Indictment against a receiver where the principal offence is obtaining under false pretenses.—

at

on

one silver tankard of the goods and chattels of J. N. then lately before unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly obtained from the said J. N. by false pretenses, unlawfully did receive and have, he the said A. B. at the time when he so received the said silver tankard as aforesaid, then well knowing the same to have been unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly obtained from the said J. N. by false pretenses.

The indictment must allege the goods to have been obtained by false pretenses, and known to have been so; it is not enough to allege them to have been "unlawfully obtained, taken and carried away": R. v. Wilson, 2 Moo. 52.

At common law receivers of stolen goods were only guilty of a misdemeanour, even when the thief had been convicted of felony: Fost. 373.

The goods must be stolen goods when they are received. If the owner has resumed possession, though the receiver does not know it, there is no receiving of stolen property: R. v. Villensky [1892], 2 Q. B. 597; see s. 318 post; R. v. Schmidt, Warb. Lead. Cas. 180.

There may be a criminal receiving from a first receiver: R. v. Reardon, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 31.

The goods must be so received as to divest the possession out of the thief: R. v. Wiley, 2 Den. 37. But a person

having a joint possession with the thief may be convicted as a receiver: R. v. Smith, Dears. 494. Manual possession is unnecessary; it is sufficient if the receiver has a control over the goods: R. v. Hobson, Dears. 400; R. v. Smith, Dears. 494; see ante, s. 3, and post, s. 317, as to the words having in possession." The defendant may be convicted of receiving although he assisted in the theft: R. v. Dyer, 2 East, P. C. 767; R. v. Craddock, 2 Den. 31; R. v. Hilton, Bell, 20; R. v. Hughes, Bell, 242. But not if he actually stole the goods: R. v. Perkins, 2 Den. 459. Where the jury found that a wife received the goods without the knowledge or control of her husband, and apart from him, and that he afterwards adopted his wife's receipt, no active receipt on his part being shown, it was held that the conviction of the husband could not be sustained; R. v. Dring, Dears. & B. 329; but see R. v. Woodward, L. & C. 122.

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There must be a receiving of the thing stolen, or of part of it; and where A. stole six notes of £100 each and having changed them into notes of £20 each, gave some of them to B.: it was held that B. could not be convicted of receiving the said notes, for he did not receive the notes that were stolen R. v. Walkley, 4 C. & P. 182. But where the principal was charged with sheep-stealing, and the accessory with receiving "twenty pounds of mutton, parcel of the goods," it was held good: R. v. Cowell, 2 East, P. C. 617, 781. In the last case the thing received is the same, for part, as the thing stolen, though passed under a new denomination, whilst in the first case nothing of the article or articles stolen have been received, but only the proceeds thereof. And, says Greaves' note, 2 Russ, 561, it is conceived that no indictment could be framed for receiving the proceeds of stolen property. The section only applies to receiving the chattel stolen, knowing that chattel to have been stolen. In the case of gold or silver, if it were melted after the stealing an indictment for receiving it might be supported, because it would still be the same chattel though

altered by the melting; but where a £100 note is changed for other notes the identical chattel is gone and a person might as well be indicted for receiving the money for which a stolen horse was sold, as for receiving the proceeds of a stolen note.

The receiving must be subsequent to the theft. If a servant commit a larceny at the time the goods are received both servant and receiver are principals, but if the goods are received subsequently to the act of larceny it becomes a case of principal and receiver: R. v. Butteris, 6 C. & P. 147; R. v. Gruncell, 9 C. & P. 365; R. v. Roberts, 3 Cox, 74.

The receiving need not be lucri causa; if it is to conceal the thief, it is sufficient: R. v. Richardson, 6 C. & P. 365; R. v. Davis, 6 C. & P. 177.

There must be some evidence that the goods were stolen by another person, R. v. Densley, 6 C. & P. 399; R. v. Cordy 2 Russ. 556.

A husband may be convicted of receiving property which his wife has stolen, R. v. McAthey, L. & C. 250, if he receive it knowing it to have been stolen.

The principal felon is a competent witness to prove the larceny: R. v. Haslam, 1 Leach, 418. But his confession is not evidence against the receiver, R. v. Turner, 1 Moo. 347, unless made in his presence and assented to by him: R. v. Cox, 1.F. & F. 90. If the principal has been convicted the conviction, although erroneous, is evidence against the receiver until reversed: R. v. Baldwin, R. & R. 241.

To prove guilty knowledge other instances of receiving similar goods stolen from the same person may be given in evidence, although they form the subject of other indictments, or are antecedent to the receiving in question: R. v. Dunn, 1 Moo. 146; R. v. Davis, 6 C. & P. 177; R. v. Nicholls, 1 F. & F. 51; R. v. Mansfield, Car. & M. 140. But evidence cannot be given of the possession of goods stolen from a different person: R. v. Oddy, 2 Den. 264; see now s.