stolen the jury may use that general knowledge which any man can bring to the subject, but if it depends on any particular knowledge of the trade by one of the jurymen this juryman must be sworn and examined as a witness: R. v. Rosser, 7 C. & P. 648. Under s-s. (b) the indictment must expressly allege that some person in the house was put in fear by the defendant: R. v. Etherington, 2 Leach, 671.

The observations, post, under the head "Burglary upon questions which may arise as to what shall be deemed a dwelling-house, will apply to the offence under this clause: 2 Russ. 78.

The value, if amounting to twenty-five dollars, had better always be inserted, as then, if no menace or threat, or no person in the house being put in fear, are proved, the defendant may be convicted of stealing in the dwellinghouse to the value of twenty-five dollars, under s-s. (a). If there is no proof of a larceny in a dwelling-house, or the dwelling house alleged, or if the goods stolen are not laid and proved to be of the value of twenty-five dollars, the defendant may still be convicted of simple larceny if the other aggravating circumstances are not proved.

The value is immaterial if some person was in the house at the time, and was put in bodily fear by a menace or threat of the defendant, which may either be by words or gesture: R. v. Jackson, 1 Leach, 267.

It is clear that no breaking of the house is necessary to constitute this offence; and it should seem that property might be considered as stolen in the dwelling-house, within the meaning of the statute, if a delivery of it out of the house should be obtained by threats, or an assault upon the house by which some persons therein should be put in fear. But questions of difficulty may perhaps arise as to the degree of fear which must be excited by the thief. Where, however, the prosecutor, in consequence of the threat of an armed mob, fetched provisions out of his house

and gave them to the mob, who stood outside the door, this was holden not to be a stealing in the dwelling house: R. v. Leonard, 2 Russ. 78. But Greaves adds: "It is submitted with all deference that this decision is erroneous; the law looks on an act done under the compulsion of terror as the act of the person causing that terror just as much as if he had done it actually with his own hands. Any asportation, therefore, of a chattel under the effects of terror is in contemplation of law the asportation of the party causing the terror": Note g, 2 Russ. loc. cit.

It does not appear to have been expressly decided under the repealed statute whether or not it was necessary to prove the actual sensation of fear felt by some person in the house, or whether fear was to be implied, if some person in the house were conscious of the fact at the time of the robbery. But it was suggested as the better opinion, and was said to have been the practice, that proof should be given of an actual fear excited by the fact, when committed out of the presence of the party, so as not to amount to a robbery at common law. And it was observed that where the fact was committed in the presence of the party, possibly it would depend upon the particular circumstances of the transaction whether fear would or would not be implied; but that clearly, if it should appear that the party in whose presence the property was taken was not conscious of the fact at the time, the case was not within that statute. But now, by the express words of the statute, the putting in fear must have been by an actual menace or threat: 2 Russ. 79; Archbold, 401.

A person outside a house may be a principal in the second degree to menaces used in the house; menaces used out of the house may be taken into consideration with menaces used in the house: R. v. Murphy, 6 Cox, 340.

Upon the trial of any offence mentioned in this section. the jury may, under s. 711, convict of an attempt to commit such offence.

Indictment under (b).—

one silver basin (of the value of twenty-five dollars) of the goods and chattels of J. N., in the dwelling house of the said J. N., situate unlawfully did steal; one A. B. then, to wit, at the time of the committing of the offence aforesaid being in the said dwelling-house, and therein by the said

(defendant) by a certain menace and threat then used by the said (defendant) then being put in bodily fear. (As

to value, see ante p. 387.)

STEALING BY PICKLOCKS, ETC. (New).

346. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who, by means of any picklock, false key or other instrument steals anything from any receptacle for property locked or otherwise secured.

This enactment is taken from the English draft code.

that A. B. on

at

Indictment.unlawfully did steal by means of a picklock (false key or other instrument) the sum of ten dollars, of the goods and chattels of C. D., from a receptacle for property locked and secured.

STEALING IN MANUFACTORIES.

347. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to five years' imprisonment who steals, to the value of two dollars, any woollen, linen, hempen or cotton yarn, or any goods or articles of silk, woollen, linen, cotton, alpaca or mohair, or of any one or more of such materials mixed with each other or mixed with any other material, while laid, placed or exposed, during any stage, process or progress of manufacture, in any building, field or other place. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 47. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 62 (Imp.).

Fine, s. 958. Injuring such goods, s. 499. post.

If you prove the larceny, but fail to prove the other circumstances so as to bring the case within the statute, the defendant may be found guilty of the simple larceny only.

Goods remain in "a stage, process or progress of manufacture," though the texture be complete, if they be not yet brought into a condition fit for sale: R. v. Woodhead, 1 M. & Rob. 549. See R. v. Hugill, 2 Russ. 517; R. v. Dixon, R. & R. 53.

Upon the trial of any offence mentioned in this section the jury may, under s. 711, convict the prisoner of an attempt to commit the same.

Indictment.

on

thirty yards of linen cloth, of the value of four dollars, of the goods and chattels of J. N., in a certain building of the said J. N., situate unlawfully did steal, whilst the same were laid, placed and exposed in the same building, during a certain state, process and progress of manufacture. (Other counts may be added, stating the particular process and progress of manufacture in which the goods were when stolen.)

FRAUD IN DISPOSAL OF GOODS FOR MANUFACTURE.

348. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' imprisonment, when the offence is not within the next preceding section, who, having been intrusted with, for the purpose of manufacture or for a special purpose connected with manufacture, or employed to make, any felt or hat, or to prepare or work up any woollen, linen, fustian, cotton, iron, leather, fur, hemp, flax or silk, or any such materials mixed with one another, or having been so intrusted, as aforesaid, with any other article, materials, fabric or thing, or with any tools or apparatus for manufacturing the same, fraudulently disposes of the same or any part thereof. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 48. 6-7 V. c. 40, s. 2 (Imp.).

Fine, s. 958.
Indictment.-

that A. B. on

at

having been intrusted with, for the purpose of manufacture,

a large quantity of, to wit

of felt, of the goods and chattels of C. D., fraudulently disposed of the same (or any part thereof).

STEALING FROM SHIPS, WHARVES, ETC.

349. Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who

(a) steals any goods or merchandise in any vessel, barge or boat of any description whatsoever, in any haven or in any port of entry or discharge, or upon any navigable river or canal, or in any creek or basin belonging to or communicating with any such haven, port, river or canal; or

(b) steals any goods or merchandise from any dock, wharf or quay adjacent to any such haven, port, river, canal, creek or basin. R. S. C. c. 164, s. 49. 24-25 V. c. 96, s. 63 (Imp.).

See sched. one, form F. F., under s. 611 post.

river.

on

Indictment for stealing in a vessel on a navigable twenty pounds weight of indigo of the goods and merchandise of J. N., then being in a certain ship called the Rattler upon the navigable river Thames, in the said ship, unlawfully did steal.

Indictment for stealing from a dock.

on

twenty pounds weight of indigo of the goods and merchandise of J. M., then being in and upon a certain dock adjacent to a certain navigable river called the Thames, from the said dock, unlawfully did steal.

The value is immaterial, and need not be laid. If the prosecutor fails to prove any of the circumstances necessary to bring the case within the statute, but proves a larceny, the defendant may be convicted of the simple larceny.

The construction of the old statutes was generally confined to such goods and merchandise as are usually lodged in ships, or on wharves or quays; and therefore where Grimes was indicted for stealing a considerable sum of money out of a ship in port, though great part of it consisted in Portugal money, not made current by proclamation, but commonly current, it was ruled not to be within the statute: R. v. Grimes, Fost. 79: R. v. Leigh, 1 Leach, 52. The same may be said of the present statute, by reason of the substitution of the words "goods or merchandise" for the words "chattel, money or valuable security" which are used in other parts of the Act: Archbold.

It would not be sufficient, in an indictment for stealing goods from any vessel on a certain navigable river, to prove in evidence that the vessel was aground in a dock in a creek of the river, unless the indictment were amended: R. v. Pike, 1 Leach, 317. The words of the statute are "in any vessel," and it is therefore immaterial whether the defendant succeeded in taking the goods from the ship or not, if there was a sufficient asportation in the ship to constitute larceny: 3 Burn, 254.