that if it is, that the law under which it is brought before the court, sitting in this district, is of so inconvenient and dangerous a character that it should be altered. With the inconvenience of the law we have nothing to do; neither ought we to express any opinion as to whether the grounds on which the learned judge who gave the order to change the venue were slight or not, provided he had jurisdiction. The whole question rests on the interpretation of s. 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1869. That section is in these words: (His Lordship read the section.)

"We have only to ask whether, at the time this order was given, Judge Badgley was a judge who might hold or sit in the Court of Queen's Bench. If so, he had jurisdiction.

"But we are told that the statute evidently intended that the judge giving the order should be actually sitting in the district in which the offence is alleged to have taken place. There is no trace of any such intention in the statute and there is no rule of interpretation of statutes so well established as this, that where the words of a statute are clear and sufficient they must be taken as they stand. If courts take upon themselves, under the pretext of interpreting the law, to diminish or extend the clearly expressed scope of a statute, they are usurping the powers of the legislature, and assuming a responsibility which in no way devolves on them. In the particular case before us it does not appear clear to my mind that it was the intention of the legislature to limit the power to change the venue to a judge sitting in the district where the offence was said to be committed. In the first place, our statute goes far beyond the old law, which, I believe, is still unchanged in England. Not only is the power given here to a judge in chambers to change the venue, but he may do so before the bill of indictment is either laid or found. The object was to protect a man from being even put to trial by a prejudiced grand jury, and this could only be effectually

done by giving the power to any judge who could hold or sit in the court to change the venue, for it will be observed that in 1869, when the Act was passed, there were many districts in this Province in which there was no resident judge, and in Ontario the judges of the superior courts all live in Toronto, and, so far as I kuow, in each of the other Provinces, they live in the capital town. Unless, then, there was to be a particular provision for the Province of Quebec the law had to be drawn as we find it. Besides this the Court of Queen's Bench is not for the district but for the whole Province. The object of dividing the Province into districts is for convenience in bringing suits, but the jurisdiction of the court is general. This has never been doubted, and it has been the practice both in England and this country to bail in the place where the prisoner is arrested. In the case of Blossom, where the taking of bail was vigorously resisted by the crown, this court, sitting at Quebec, bailed the prisoner who was in jail here. This is going a great deal farther, but the power of the court to bail was not, and, I think, could not, be questioned. We are told that great inconvenience might arise if this statute be not restrained. This is really no valid objection to the law. There are no facultative acts which may not be abused one way or another. A discretionary power involves the possibility of its indiscreet exercise, but that is not ground for us to annul the law creating it. In this case the inconveniences referred to are not specially apparent -the prisoner arrested in Montreal was bailed there, and made his application to have the venue changed to the district where he resided and where he actually was. The order made by Mr. Justice Badgley could hardly then be used as a precedent for an abusive use of the statute. It must be understood that in saying this I do not refer to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the affidavit on which the order was given, which is not in any way before us, but solely to the circumstance of the accused being actually before the judge here. As the point is a new one, and as

questions of jurisdiction are always delicate, we would willingly have reserved it for the decision of all the judges; but the Act allowing us to reserve cases is unfortunately as much too narrow as the statute before us appears to Mr. Ritchie to be too wide in its phraseology. We can only reserve after conviction, and irregular reservations for the opinion of the judges have no practically good results. We must, therefore, give the judgment to the best of our ability, and I must say for my own part that I cannot see any difficulty in the matter. The words of the statute are perfectly unambiguous, and there is no reason to say that they lead to any absurd conclusion."

Sanborn, J.-"First, as to the jurisdiction. It is objected that the venue was improperly changed, and that this inquisition ought to be before the court at Quebec. If we are not legally' possessed of the inquisition of course we cannot entertain these motions to quash. This has been fully and exhaustively treated by the President of the court. It is merely for us to inquire: Had Mr. Justice Badgley the power to order the trial to take place here instead of in the district of Quebec where the accident occurred? The 11th section of the Criminal Procedure Act undoubtedly gives that power. He was a judge, entitled to sit at the court where the party was sent for trial. The jurisdiction of any of the judges of the Queen's Bench is not local for any district, but extends to all parts of the Province."

The words "he was a judge, entitled to sit at the court where the party was sent for trial," in Mr. Justice Sanborn's remarks appear not supported by the statute. It is the court at which the party charged with a crime was at first liable to be indicted, or any judge who might hold or sit in that court, who have jurisdiction in the matter, not the court where the party is sent for trial nor a judge who can hold and sit in such last mentioned court. Of course, in Brydges' case this distinction could not be made, as Mr. Justice

Badgley, who gave the order to change the venue, could sit in the court at Quebec as well as in Montreal, and in Montreal as well as in Quebec. But suppose that such an application is made to a judge who can hold or sit in a court of quarter sessions, at which the party charged is or is liable to be indicted; and there are not many cases where a party accused is not liable to be indicted before the court of quarter sessions; the statute gives jurisdiction only to the court of quarter sessions of and for the locality where the trial should take place, in the ordinary course of law, or to a judge thereof, and not to a court or judge of another locality; and the judge of the quarter sessions for Montreal, for instance, could not, in a case from the district of Quebec, order the trial to take place in Montreal, though he would be a judge entitled to sit at the court where the party was sent for trial.

See in Re Sproule, 12 S. C. R. 140, questions as to change of venue, and R. v. Martin, 16 Q. L. R. 281.

Change of venue allowed upon prisoner's solicitor's affi davit that from conversations he had had with the jurors, he was convinced of a strong prejudice against the prisoner: R. v. McEneany, 14 Cox, 87; see R. v. Walter, 14 Cox, 579.

Held, that 32 & 33 V. c. 20, s. 11, does not authorize any order for the change of the place of trial of a prisoner in any case where such change would not have been granted under the former practice, the statute only affecting procedure: R. v. McLeod, 5 P. R. (Ont.) 181.

The power so granted is purely discretionary, but, where application is made on the part of the accused, it will be a sufficient ground that persons might be called on the jury whose opinions might be tainted with prejudice, and whom the prisoner could not challenge: R. v. Russell, Ramsay's App. Cas. 199. See Ex parte Corwin, 24 L. C.

J. 104, 2 L. N. 364.

As to the carrying out of the sentence where venue has been changed, see post, s. 733, s-s. 4.

PART L.

ARRAIGNMENT. (Amended).

652. If any person against whom any indictment is found is at the time confined for some other cause in the prison belonging to the jurisdiction of the court by which he is to be tried, the court may by order in writing, without a writ of habeas corpus, direct the warden or gaoler of the prison or sheriff or other person having the custody of the prisoner to bring up the body of such person as often as may be required for the purposes of the trial, and such warden, gaoler, sheriff or other person shall obey such order. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 101. 30-31 V. c. 35 (Imp.).

"Prison" defined, s. 3.

RIGHT TO INSPECT DEPOSITIONS, ETC.

653. Every accused person shall be entitled at the time of his trial to inspect, without fee or reward, all depositions, or copies thereof, taken against him and returned into the court before which such trial is had, and to have the indictment on which he is to be tried read over to him if he so requires. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 180.

This is the 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 114, s. 4 of the Imperial Statutes. See s. 597, ante.

COPY OF INDICTMENT.

654. Every person indicted for any offence shall, before being arraigned on the indictment, be entitled to a copy thereof on paying the clerk five cents per folio of one hundred words for the same, if the court is of opinion that the same can be made without delay to the trial, but not otherwise. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 181.

At

The cost was ten cents by the repealed statute. common law, the prisoner was not entitled to a copy of the indictment in treason and felonies.

COPY OF DEPOSITIONS.

655. Every person indicted shall be entitled to a copy of the depositions returned into court on payment of five cents per folio of one hundred words for the same, provided, if the same are not demanded before the opening of the assizes, term, sittings or sessions, the court is of opinion that the same can be made without delay to the trial, but not otherwise; but the court may, if it sees fit, postpone the trial on account of such copy of the depositions not having been previously had by the person charged. R. S. C. c. 174, s. 182. 11-12 V. c. 42, s. 27 (Imp.).