The same writer says1 :

"The circumstances of the poorer plebeians were such as to make it almost impossible to avoid borrowing. Their scanty means were dependent on the regular cultivation of their little acres, and on each operation of the agricultural year being performed in proper rotation and at the proper season. But this was every now and again interfered with by wars, which detained them from home at seed-time or harvest, practically rendering their farms unproductive, and leaving them and their families in straits for the commonest necessaries of life. A poor peasant, in such a case, had no alternative but to apply to a capitalist for a loan either of corn or money. It was not to be had without security. failing all [else] the debtor had to yield himself to his creditor in de facto servitude per acs et libram. And, again-"Not content with the slave's work he exacted from his debtor, the creditor too often treated him as if really and truly a slave, and not a Roman citizen.

.

For

"To such a height did the system grow, that often these free bondmen might be reckoned by thousands, and that the saying was almost justified that every patrician's dwelling had become a private prison-house. [Livy, vi. 36.] it so happened, owing to causes already explained, that for a long time it was almost exclusively in patrician hands that capital had accumulated, so that they were the lenders and oppressors, and the poor plebeians the borrowers and oppressed.”

T. BATY.

(To be continued).

1 Roman Law, p. 92.

335

LAW.

Manchuria.

The Anglo-German Convention of last October-which it was hoped might be a means of securing the territorial and political integrity of China-has not had long to wait for an opportunity of shewing whether it can prevent one member of the concert of Powers from taking isolated action in order to obtain exclusive territorial and trading advantages for itself in Chinese territory; for such must be admitted to be the effect of the negotiations between Russia and China with reference to Manchuria, whether a temporary or a permanent arrangement is contemplated. The wording of the Convention is wide enough to apply to Manchuria no less than any other province of China; and although it has been stated on behalf of the German Foreign Office that Manchuria is excluded from the scope of the agreement, and that consequently the contingency does not arise upon which the contracting parties are to be at liberty to consider how they can protect their interests, and this view seems to be shared perhaps reluctantly by our own Foreign Office, Japan has declared that she reads the words of the treaty in their fullest application. The United States have also already declared to all the other Powers, who have been taking joint action in the military expedition to Peking and the negotiations now proceeding there, that they consider it inexpedient for the Chinese to make any independent arrangement with any foreign Power while those negotiations are in progress.

The chief interest accordingly of the two recently issued Blue Books (China No. 1 and No. 2, 1901) lies in the declarations and actions of Russia with regard to China from the outset of the troubles. In July last, Count Lamsdorff

stated that the policy of Russia in dealing with the situation created by the anti-foreign outbreak in China was in complete agreement with the fundamental principles. already accepted by the Powers as bases of policy towards China, namely: (1) maintenance of the union between the Powers; (2) maintenance of the existing system of government in China; (3) exclusion of anything that might lead to the partition of China; (4) the re-establishment by common effort of a legitimate central government capable of assuring order and security by the country. A little later the Russian Foreign Minister opposed the suggestion of Japan being given a "mandate" for independent action at Peking which might found a right to an independent solution or other privileges.

On July 20th the British Foreign Office was informed by the Russian representative that the view of his Government regarding "the ulterior military measures which may eventually have to be taken in China" was that there should be unity of action between the international detachments of troops in Chinese territory (which subsequent explanation showed to be Pechili only) but that elsewhere each Power could act for itself where its interests

are concerned, e.g., Russia would take independent military action in the north of China bordering on her own territory and the railway. On August 8th the Russian troops occupied Niu-chwang (a treaty port), and took over the administration; but this was stated by Count Lamsdorff to be only a temporary measure, and the Russian representative here informed our Foreign Office that although the progress of events had forced Russia to occupy Niu-chwang and to send troops into Manchuria, as soon as the country was pacified they should be withdrawn, provided that such action did not meet with obstacles caused by the proceedings or the Powers Again, on September 10th and on February 6th, the

Russian Foreign Minister renewed his previous assurances to the British Ambassador that Russia had no intention to take advantage of the present crisis to extend her territory and influence at the cost of China by permanently occupying territory on the right bank of the Amur, and declared that Russia had neither made, nor was making, any permanent arrangement or convention with China which would give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate in South Manchuria, but that a modus vivendi was being arranged between the local Chinese civil authorities and the Russian military authorities there.

In spite of these categorical assurances there are circumstantial rumours of negotiations between Russia and the Chinese Government, in which concessions of exclusive police or military rights in Manchuria and exclusive trading rights in the Russo-Chinese frontier provinces are demanded, which, coupled with the actions of the Russian military authorities in occupying and administering Manchuria and questioning the right of British men-of-war to visit the Blonde islands in the Gulf of Pechili, may well cause suspicion of a virtual Russian protectorate being established over Manchuria. The modern protectorate differs in very little from territorial sovereignty, now that protecting states generally claim the right to administer justice to all persons including subjects of other states, and to treat the territory as their own for most purposes as regards other Powers. If other Powers follow suit, the commercial treaties may become valueless by the partition of China into exclusive spheres of influence. But, after the expressed adherence of the Powers acting in concert at Peking to the principle of maintaining the territorial integrity of China stated in the Anglo-German agreement, any one or more of those Powers would seem to be acting within their rights if they should

adopt the line of policy suggested by the circular note of the United States Government, and if on the ground of that common principle and the common commercial interests of the world in China they should refuse to recognise the validity of any arrangements made between any one Power and China until the future position of China towards the Powers collectively after the recent outbreak has been settled. Similar action by Great Britain in 1878 at the end of the Russo-Turkish war obtained the settlement of the Eastern question at the Congress of Berlin; and a similar general international arrangement might secure the peaceful development of China on the basis of the "open door" policy--which is merely upholding the treaty rights already existing.

Submarine Cables.

In view of the already vast system of submarine telegraph cables, and the undertakings of a British Pacific cable and a French Marseilles-Algiers cable, it may be worth while to recall the fact that the safety of these cables in war has no guarantee in International law beyond the resolutions of the Institute of International Law adopted at their Brussels Conference in 1879, namely, that submarine cables uniting two neutral countries should be held inviolable, that it is desirable that when telegraphic communication by their means has to cease owing to a state of war the belligerents should strictly confine themselves to measures necessary for preventing the use of the cables, and that such measures should cease or their consequences be made good at the earliest possible moment after the cessation of hostilities. In the course of the discussion at the Conference it was declared impossible to neutralise such cables or to guarantee their safety in war farther than this, as the exigencies of war might require interference with cables connecting two