SHAREHOLDER. See EMBEZZLEMENT, 3. SHIPPING. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1. 1. By a charter-party," fifteen. days" were to be allowed to the freighter of a ship, "for discharging at her destined port." The freighter ordered the ship to Hull. She was got into the Hull Docks on the 1st of February, and was on that day put in the charge of the dock company's officers, but from the crowded state of the docks she was not put in her berth, and did not begin discharging till the 4th:-Held, that the fifteen days were to be computed from the 1st, and that in such cases the days count from the time of the vessel's arriving in the dock, and being put in the management of the dock company's officers. Brown v. Johnson, 440 2. In reckoning the "fifteen days," the days are to be reckoned consecutively, and the Sundays not deducted, unless there be a custom to that effect; and in the absence of any custom, the word "days," and the words "running days," mean consecutive days. Ibid. 3. The general rule of law is, that days mean consecutive days, except Sunday is the first or the last day; but in commercial cases it is sometimes otherwise, because mercantile contracts are to be construed with reference to mercantile usage. Ibid. 4. By a charter-party a ship was to proceed to Honduras and there load," at one of the usual and customary ports or places of loading, including the rivers Ulna and Dulce," a cargo of mahogany and logwood. The freighter by letter directed the captain to proceed to Belize in the bay of Honduras, and address himself to Mr. S.," who will furnish you with a homeward cargo of mahogany and logwood, agreeable to charterparty." The captain took the ship to Belize, where Mr. S. put a small quantity of logwood on board and directed the ship to go to Ulna, where about half a cargo was put on board. Mr. S. then sent the ship to two other places of loading in Honduras, at which the cargo was completed:Held, that it was a question for the jury whether the ship was sent to Belize as her port of loading; and that if she was, the freighter was liable for the extra expenses of her going to all the other places for the residue of her cargo; but that, if Belize was not to be considered her port of loading, Ulna certainly was, and the freighter would at all events be liable for the extra expense of her going for cargo to other places after Ulna, as by the charter-party the freighter was to load at one of the usual ports or places of loading in Honduras. Ibid. SHIPS (DESTROYING). SIGNATURE. See AGREEMENT. SIGNING. See AGREEMENT. SILK TRADE (OFFENCES RELATING TO THE). See PERJURY, 12, 13. SLANDER. 1. The defendant spoke to the plaintiff's mistress words charging the plaintiff with irregularity in her conduct as a servant, in consequence of which the plaintiff lost her place. The only plea on the record was, Not guilty. It was held, that the defendant might, under that plea, disprove malice in the various methods by which it is usually disproved; yet that he could not be allowed to give evidence of the truth of the facts as rebutting the malice, because he had not pleaded that the facts were true. Rumsey v. Webb, 104 2. Though in such case the absence of the proof of special damage, (that the plaintiff thereby lost her place), cannot affect the verdict, yet the jury may consider it in assessing damages. Ibid. 3. The dismissal by the police commissioners of a police constable, in consequence of a report duly made to them of a censure uttered on such police-officer by a justice of the peace, is in itself sufficient evidence of special damage to sustain an action against the justice. Kendillon v. Maltby, 402 See INDICTMENT, 4.-PRACTICE, 1. Where, by a private act of Parliament, printed copies of it, printed by the Queen's printer, are made evidence, a defendant's counsel at Nisi Prius cannot make an objection, founded on that act, a ground of an application for a nonsuit, if the act has not been given in evidence on the part of the plaintiff, because it is not an act to be judicially noticed, and is only before the court when given in evidence. Greswold v. Kemp, 635 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See AGREEMENT. STEWARD (ENTRIES BY A DECEASED). See EVIDENCE, 1, 8. STIPULATED PRICE. See GOODS BADLY MADE. SUMMONS. See EVIDENCE, 19. SURGEON. See EVIDENCE, 18. 1. The plaintiff practised as physician and surgeon. On a case occurring in which the advice of a physician was considered necessary as well as the aid of a surgeon, he was called in. It appeared in evidence that he had performed for his patient some services which usually are in the province of a surgeon. The plaintiff sent his bill to the executors of his patient:-Held, that if the jury considered that the plaintiff had done any work as surgeon, they should find a verdict for him to the amount of the value of that service, Battersby v. Lawrence, 277 2. A physician cannot sue for his fees for any thing he has done as a physician, either in attending or in prescribing medicine for a patient; but if he acts as a surgeon, or in any other capacity than that of physician, he may maintain an action for a compensation for what he has done, provided he can shew that it was not done by him as a physician; and the fact that the plaintiff was not paid fees at the times when he was consulted, goes to shew that he was not acting as a physician. Little v. Oldaker, 370 TALES. See ISSUE FROM THE COURT OF CHANCERY, 1, 3. TERMINI. TITHES. See EVIDENCE, 2, 3, 4. VOL. I. TRAVERSE. If a defendant is bound by recognizance to appear and try his traverse, he cannot by surrendering himself in custody avoid the payment of the fees customary on the entering of a traverse. Reg. v. Bishop, 302 TREASON. See L. C. J. TINDAL'S Charge, p. 661.-POSTPONING TRIAL, 3. TRESPASS. See BEGIN (RIGHT TO), 1.-EVIDENCE, 6. 1. The defendants were partners in business as brewers; and one of them, in the name of the others, wrongfully ejected the tenant of a canteen, who held under a lease from the Board of Ordnance, they (the defendants) being sureties for the payment of his rent, and for his quiet tenantship. It was ruled that one partner has no right to involve another, unless in the ordinary course of their business, not, for instance, in a trespass, as above stated. Petrie v. Lamont, 93 2. The exception to this doctrine is in the case where the trespass is in the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership; and in such case the jury should find, not only whether the defendants were partners, but also whether, before the trespass, they all joined in ordering it, or whether, afterwards, they concurred, and received the benefit of it. Ibid. 3. Where one of the trespassers is servant to the others, it is a question for the jury, whether he acted merely as servant, or whether he were so implicated in the matter as to make himself a principal trespasser. Ibid. 4. A trespass was committed by the defendant's carriage driving against the plaintiff's gig; but the defendant was riding in a hired carriage at the time with hired horses and hired N. P. BBB 722 TRIAL (POSTPONING). postilions, yet as he made no remonstrance against the course which the drivers were taking till his admonition came too late:-Held, that he was liable in an action of trespass, as a co-trespasser with the postilions. M'Laughlin v. Pryor, 354 5. In an action of trespass it is competent for the jury to consider the words which the defendant used subsequently to the trespass, in coming to the conclusion whether he were a joint trespasser with those actually committing the mischief. Ibid. 6. Officers of the House of Commons, who have a warrant of the Speaker to take a person therein named, although they may have a right to enter his house (having been peaceably admitted) and to search the house, they have no right, in case they do not find him, to remain there to await his return; and if they stay several hours in the house for that purpose, they are trespassers ab initio. Howard v. Gossett, 380 7. The defendant let apartments in his house to the plaintiff, and on a dispute arising, he locked up one of the rooms in which there were certain wares and merchandize belonging to the plaintiff, and he kept the key, ordering the plaintiff's servant not to come on the premises again. The plaintiff himself left the house, and subsequently brought an action of trespass for the seizure of his goods: -Held, that there was not a sufficient seizure to support the action. Hartley v. Moxham, 504 8. Trespass will lie against a corporation aggregate for an act done by their agent within the scope of his authority, and in such an action it is not necessary to shew the appointment or authority of the agent under the seal of the corporation. Maund v. Monmouthshire Canal Co. TRIAL (POSTPONING). See POSTPONING TRIAL. 606 3. G. bought cotton goods of the plaintiffs to the amount of £816, and they were afterwards sold by R. to the defendants for £589. No other transactions were shewn between G. and R.:-Held, that the connexion between the plaintiffs and defendants was too remote to raise a cause of action, unless the jury were convinced that G. obtained the goods originally by fraud, and that the defendants bought them under circumstances which must have convinced them that the goods were so obtained. Ibid. USE AND OCCUPATION. VARIANCE. See AMENDMENT. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See AUCTION. 1. In a declaration, in an action for not completing a purchase of copyhold, it was alleged that, on the 27th of June, the plaintiffs "were ready and willing, at the office of the said steward of the said manor of N., to receive the residue of the said purchase-money, and then and there to surrender." This was denied by the plea:-Held, that 2. If a plaintiff, in his declaration, aver the performance of a condition precedent, and the defendant deny this by his plea, and the plaintiff reply matter of excuse for not performing the condition, this will be a departure. Ibid. 3. A purchaser had agreed to complete a purchase on the 27th of June. The solicitor, who was concerned for all parties, called on him on the 25th of June, and asked him if he would be ready to complete on the 27th:Held, that what the purchaser said in answer was not a privileged communication. Ibid. 4. A purchaser agreed that if the completion of the purchase "should be delayed on his part" beyond the 27th of June, he would pay interest. The vendor and his trustee were willing to complete on that day, but the purchaser was not prepared; but on the 28th of November, when the purchaser was ready, the vendor's trustee would not join:-Held, that the purchaser was liable to interest only from the 27th of June to the 28th of November. VENUE. See INDICTMENT, 6, 7. VERDICT. See INDICTMENT, 8. VOLUNTARY OATHS. Ibid. See OATHS (ADMINISTERING UNNECESSARY). VOTER. 1. A voter, having changed his residence since the last registration, cannot be indicted under the 2 Will. 4, c. 45, for swearing that he has still the same qualification, if the sheriff's deputy should omit, at the time the voter tenders his vote, to read over to him the specific qualification from the 511 register. Reg. v. Lucy, 2. If A., who is registered as an elector for a borough as a £10 householder, gives up the house in respect of which he is registered, and takes another of superior value within the same borough, after the registration and before the election, he loses his vote; and if before and at the time of the election a new tenant has taken possession of the house that A. has left, and is paying rent for it, the facts that a few articles of A.'s furniture remain in the house, and that A. retains one of the two keys of it, will make no difference. Bowler, Reg. v. 559 3. Semble, that an indictment against a voter for giving a false answer at the poll, which states, that at a certain election for a member of Parliament for the borough of S., the defendant appeared as a voter, and tendered his vote as such, and that he gave a false answer, that he had the same qualification for which he was put on the register, whereas in truth he had not, is bad, because it states all the matters by way of recital, and because it neither states the writ nor the precept for holding the election, nor that the defendant's name was ever on the register. Ibid. 4. A voter in a borough who was registered as a 107. householder in respect of a house in "E. Place," loses his vote if, after the registration and before the election, he removes to another house of equal value in E. Place, although the house to which he removes is in every respect within BBB 2 |