tenant in tail provided that the execution is before enrolment. If the consent of the protector is given by a separate instrument, the consent must be clearly signified on the face of that deed, and it is provided by s. 43 that a separate deed must be executed either on or before the day on which the assurance is made. A consent once given cannot be

revoked (h).

Base Fee. The effect of a disentailing deed duly enrolled, to which the protector is not a party, is to create a base fee (i), that is to say, an estate which is good against all persons who, by force of any estate tail vested in the person making the disposition, claim the lands entailed but is not effectual against the remaindermen.

If a tenant in tail makes an assurance to a third party without the consent of the protector, he may subsequently enlarge the base fee so created into a fee simple, under s. 19 of the Act, either after the protector's death or during his lifetime, with his consent (k).

Moreover, a base fee, conveyed to a third party who enters into possession of the property, is enlarged into a fee simple by the lapse of twelve years from the death of the protector (1). On the other hand, a conveyance in fee by a tenant in tail, otherwise than by deed enrolled, creates a quasi-base fee subject to

(k) Bankes v. Small (1887), 36 Ch. D. 716; and see In re Drummond and Davie's Contract, [1891] 1 Ch. 524.

(1) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 6.

be defeated by the entry of the issue in tail. It has the same effect as if the tenant in tail had merely granted away his life estate, and consequently the estate of the grantee is not enlarged into a fee simple by his possession until twelve years after the death of the grantor (m).

Where the tenant in tail in possession has not conveyed away his rights, as in the last-mentioned case, but has allowed a trespasser to remain in possession of the property, the rights of the issue and remainderman are barred after twelve years from the time such possession is taken (n).

Married Women.-A married woman, who is protector of a settlement, may consent to a disposition by the tenant in tail as if she were a feme sole (0), that is to say, a deed acknowledged is not required, but, unless her life estate is limited to her for her separate use or is made separate estate by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the concurrence of the husband is necessary (p). A married woman who is tenant in tail can only disentail by a deed acknowledged with the concurrence of the husband (9), unless she acquired a title to the entailed property after the passing of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, or was married after that date (r). A married woman may bar an equit

(m) Morgan v. Morgan (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 99.

(n) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, ss. 21, 22; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 9; Murray v. Watkins (1890), 62 L. T. 796.

(0) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 45.

(p) Ibid., s. 24; 7 Edw. 7, c. 18, s. 3.

(q) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 40.

(r) In re Drummond and Darie's Contract, [1891] 1 Ch. 524.

able estate tail although she is restrained from anticipation (s).

Copyholds.-Copyholds are within the Act; but a disposition of an estate at law is to be made by surrender, and of an equitable estate by surrender or deed. Where the consent is given by deed, it must be executed by the protector and produced to the lord of the manor at or before the time when the surrender is made by which the disposition is effected, and then entered on the court rolls. And if such consent is not given by deed it must be given to the person taking the surrender by which the disposition is effected (t).

Equitable tenants in tail of copyholds are empowered to dispose of their interests by deed, in the same manner as freeholds, and the deed must be entered on the court rolls; and if a protector consent by a distinct deed, such deed must be executed by the protector on or before the day on which the disposition is executed by the equitable tenant in tail, and must be entered on the court rolls of the manor (u).

An enfranchisement made to a tenant in tail in possession bars the entail (x).

A disposition by a tenant in tail of either legal or equitable estate in copyholds requires enrolment on the court rolls only (y), and must be entered

(8) Cooper v. Macdonald (1877), 7 Ch. D. 288.
(t) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, ss. 51, 52.

(u) Ibid., s. 53.

(x) Re Hart (1889), 41 Ch. D. 547.

(y) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 54.

on the court rolls within six months after its execution (2).

It has been doubted whether a mere declaration of trust duly enrolled is a "disposition" within the meaning of the Act so as to bar an estate tail (a).

Bankrupts and Convicts.-The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, empowers the trustee in bankruptcy to deal with any property to which a bankrupt is entitled

as tenant in tail in the same manner as the bankrupt might have dealt with the same: and it is enacted that ss. 56-73 of the Fines and Recoveries Act shall extend to and apply to proceedings in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act (b).

The trustee in bankruptcy of a tenant in tail can bar the entail, even after the decease of the bankrupt (c).

In the case of a felon the administrator has no power to bar the entail; but the convict, although he cannot alienate, may execute an effectual disentailing deed and thus enable the administrator to sell the fee (d).

SECTION 4.

DOWER.

Nature of Dower.-Dower is the estate of a widow in the lands of a husband who has died intestate, and amounts to a life interest in one-third of the

(z) Green v. Paterson (1886), 32 Ch. D. 95.

(a) Ibid., at p. 108, sed quære.

(b) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 56 (5).

(c) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 65.

(d) Re Gaskell and Walters, [1906] 2 Ch. 1.

rents and profits. attached to a legal estate of inheritance in possession held either in severalty or in common (e). Dower in gavelkind land is one moiety of the rents and profits so long as the widow remains chaste and unmarried. The right to dower so far as régards women married since January 1st, 1834, is regulated by the Act to amend the law relating to dower (f).

At common law dower only

Widow when Entitled.-That Act provides that when a husband dies beneficially entitled to land for an interest which shall not entitle his widow to dower out of the same at law, and such interest, whether wholly equitable or partly legal and equitable (g), shall be an estate of inheritance in possession, or equal to an estate of inheritance in possession (other than an estate in joint tenancy), then his widow shall be entitled in equity to dower out of the same land (h).

Where the husband has an estate in fee simple subject to an executory limitation over in certain events, the widow is entitled to dower, notwithstanding that the executory limitation has taken effect (i). The widow of a tenant in tail in possession is of course dowable, even although there be no issue.

Where a husband has been entitled to a right of entry or action in any land, and his widow would be

(e) Co. Lit. 31 a.

(f) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105. (g) Cf. In re Michell, [1892] 2 Ch. 87.

(h) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, s. 2.

(i) Smith v. Spencer (1856), 4 W. R. 729.