purchase (z). Again, to describe a farm as "lately in the occupation of A. B., at the annual rental of £290," would probably be held to be misleading if the vendor knew that nothing like that rent could now be obtained for it (a).

Any special rights conferred on tenants of the property and any extraordinary and onerous covenants to be performed by the reversioners should be disclosed. It would seem, however, that the purchaser cannot complain if the undisclosed rights of tenants are trifling in their character, and the purchaser might with a little exertion have discovered them (b). Thus, on the sale of a large property the non-disclosure of the fact that a yearly tenant of a small portion (about one-seventh) of the estate had given notice to quit was held to be immaterial (c).

Land tax and tithe rentcharge are burdens the existence of which is presumed (d). Consequently they need not be noticed in the agreement, and a purchaser is bound to take the estate subject to these charges, unless, indeed, the contract states the land tax to have been redeemed, or that the property. is free from tithe (e). On a sale of copyholds, the fines or customs of the manor need not be stated (ƒ), and if it is clear from the contract that the land, though freehold, is held of a manor, it is not necessary

(z) Dimmock v. Hallett (1866), L. R. 2 Ch., at p. 21.

(a) Ibid. at p. 27.

(b) Phillips v. Miller (1874), L. R. 10 C. P. 427.

(c) Davenport v. Charsley (1886), 54 L. T. 372.

(d) Dart, V. & P., pp. 398, 399.

(e) In re Ebsworth and Tidy's Contract (1889), 42 Ch. D. 23. (f) White v. Cuddon (1842), 8 Cl. & F. 766.

to refer to quit rents or heriots which may be a charge thereon.

Underlease.-An underlease must not be described

in the contract as a lease (g). But should the purchaser be aware that the vendor's interest is an underlease only, he will be bound, although the contract describe the interest as a lease (h), and where the vendor agreed to sell all his interest in a lease, the purchaser was compelled to accept an underlease for a term less by three days than the original term (i). Where the contract is for the sale of a leasehold ground rent it is not necessary to disclose the fact that there is a nominal reversion of one day outstanding, if this nominal reversion is held on trust for the vendor (k).

Inspection of Lease.-On the sale of leaseholds it is the duty of the vendor to disclose the existence of onerous and unusual covenants in the lease or to afford the purchaser a reasonable opportunity of examining the lease for himself. This duty of fact that the

disclosure is not affected by the

vendor's title is under the terms of the contract

to be accepted by the purchaser (1).

The question

(g) Madely v. Booth (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 718; In re Beyfus and Master's Contract (1888), 39 Ch. D. 110. Section 4 of the Conveyancing Act, 1892, has not altered this rule. See Broom v. Phillips (1896), 74 L. T. 459.

(h) Flood v. Pritchard (1879), 40 L. T. 873; Camberwell, etc. Society v. Holloway (1879), 13 Ch. D. 754; Henderson v. Hudson (1867), 15 W. R. 860.

(i) Waring v. Scotland (1888), 57 L. J. Ch. 1016.

(k) Re Scott and Eave's Contrací (1902), 86 L. T. 617. (1) Re Haedicke and Lipski's Contract, [1901] 2 Ch. 666.

whether a fair and reasonable opportunity of inspecting the lease has been given to the purchaser is one of fact depending on the particular circumstances of each case (m). When a lease contains the usual covenant to deliver up the premises in good repair at the end of the term, and any of the demised premises have been removed, the fact should be stated (n).

Other Property comprised in Lease.-With regard to leasehold property, it is always one of the most forcible objections to the title, that the premises bought are held with others under one and the same lease, at an entire rent and subject to entire covenants. Thus, where the property sold is held with other property at one entire rent (o) or where leasehold property which is sold in separate lots is held under one lease (p), it is incumbent on the vendor to state that fact in plain and distinct terms. The same rule applies to the case of the sale of an underlease of one of two houses comprised in an original lease common to both, and containing covenants by the lessee to repair, etc. (q).

(m) Molyneux v. Hawtrey, [1903] 2 K. B. 487. (n) Granger v. Worms (1814), 4 Camp. 83.

(0) Warren v. Richardson (1830), 1 You. 1.

(p) Sheard v. Venables (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 922. It is presumed the rule would apply even where one purchaser bought all the lots, since he might wish to resell them separately.

(q) Darlington v. Hamilton (1854), Kay, 550. The rule is not affected by s. 14 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, or s. 4 of the Conveyancing Act, 1892; cf. Cresswell v. Davidson (1887), 56 L. T. 811.

SECTION 2.

CONSTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR EXPRESSIONS USED IN CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND.

It may be convenient to examine the construction. which has been put on particular expressions employed in contracts for the sale of land.

An underlease generally means an underlease of the whole premises comprised in the original lease; while a derivative lease is a lease derived from the original lease, but only comprising part of the property (r).

A brick-built house is understood to mean a house brick-built in the ordinary sense of the word, not composed externally partly of brick and partly of timber and lath and plaster (s).

"Clear yearly rent" is understood to mean a rent free from all deductions usually paid by a tenant, but subject to such as are borne by a landlord, such as land tax (t).

Annual rental does not necessarily imply an annual tenancy at a net rent, but may refer to the aggregate gross rent derived from monthly tenancies, when the landlord pays rates and taxes (u), but annual rent would, it is presumed, mean net rent on a yearly tenancy.

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Ground rent" is understood to be a rent less than the rack-rent (x). It is the sum paid by the owner or builder of houses for the use of land to build on, and is therefore much under what it lets for when it has

(r) Brumfit v. Morton (1857), 3 Jur. (N.s.) 1201.

(8) Powell v. Doubble (1832), Sugden's Vendors and Purchasers, 29 (14th ed.).

(t) Tyrconnell v. Ancaster (1754), 2 Ves. 500.

(u) Re Edwards to Sykes & Co., Limited (1890), 62 L. T. 445. (x) Stewart v. Alliston (1815), 1 Meri. 26.

been built on (y). When a man buys a ground rent he buys the reversion of lands which are built upon, and for which the tenant is paying rent (z).

A "rentcharge" is, strictly speaking, a rent issuing out of land and charged thereon, with a power of distress (a). A rentcharge is distinguished from a rent service by the absence of any tenure between grantor and grantee (b). In the West of England rentcharges are frequently described as "ground rents," while in Manchester they are almost invariably called "chief-rents." A chief-rent is, strictly speaking, a quit-rent payable by a freehold tenant of a manor.

Formerly, if the power of distress were omitted in the deed creating the rent, it was known as a rent seck (c); but since the Act 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, which confers a statutory power of distress, a rent seck may be accurately described as a rentcharge.

A "yearly rent," charged on the rates of a corporation under s. 11 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (d), may be described as a rentcharge in the particulars of sale (e).

A "fee-farm rent" is properly a rent service reserved on a grant in fee (ƒ), which, since the Statute of Quia

(y) Bartlett v. Salmon (1855), 6 De G. M. & G. 41.

(2) Evans v. Robins (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 465.

(a) In re Lord Gerard and Beecham's Contract, [1894] 3 Ch., at p. 295, per CHITTY, J.

(b) Esdaile v. Stephenson (1822), 1 Sim. & St. 124; Shelford's Real Property Statutes, 9th ed., p. 105.

(c) Littleton, s. 218.

(d) 8 Vict. c. 18.

(e) In re Lord Gerard and Beecham's Contract, [1894] 3 Ch.

(f) Vide Hargrave's Edition of Co. Lit., p. 144.