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Emptores (g), can only be created by the Crown. The expression, however, is generally used to describe a perpetual rentcharge in fee simple (h).
The word "farm" will include woodlands forming part of an estate, though not in the occupation of the tenant (i).
The description of property as "well supplied with water" has been held to indicate a natural supply, and to be a misdescription in a case where the supply was derived from the borough waterworks subject to the usual rates (k).
A "beerhouse" is a place where beer is sold to be consumed on the premises (1), as opposed to a "beershop," which is a place where beer is sold to be consumed off the premises (m). Upon the sale of a beer-shop "with the off beer licence attached. thereto," there is no obligation on the vendor to procure from the magistrates the temporary authority (under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 44) for the purchaser to carry on the business until the next special sessions for transferring licences, and there is no implied warranty by the vendor either that such interim protection will be obtained or that the licence will be ultimately transferred (n).
(g) 18 Edw. 1, c. 1.
(h) Bradbury v. Wright (1781), 2 Doug. 624.
(i) Portman v. Mill (1839), 3 Jur. 356.
(k) Leyland v. Illingworth (1860), 2 De G. F. J. 248.
(1) Pease v. Coats (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 688.
(m) London and Suburban Land and Building Co. v. Field (1881), 16 Ch. D. 645.
(n) Tadcaster Tower Brewery Co. v. Wilson,  1 Ch. 705. As to conviction indorsed on the licence, see In re Ward and Jordan's Contract,  1 I. R. 73.
Notwithstanding that it is the duty of the vendor to describe the estate with accuracy and minuteness in the contract, mere puffing expressions or statements of value on the part of the vendor, which are in effect an expression of his own opinion, will not avoid the contract.
Thus, the statement that a house is stantial" (o), or is "well built" (p), or is a residence for a family of distinction" (q), are merely commendatory statements which do not amount to a misdescription. So, too, a purchaser was held to his contract where the property, which was really worth about £200 a year, was described as of the "estimated value of £400" (r). On the other hand, the statement that the property is let to "a most desirable tenant" is not a mere expression of opinion, but amounts to an implied assertion that the vendor knows no facts leading to the conclusion that the tenant is not desirable (s).
Again, when property was described as "ripe for immediate development," which could not in fact be used as building land without going to very great expense, the purchaser was held to be entitled to rescind the contract (t).
(0) Johnson v. Smart (1860), 2 Gif. 151.
(p) Kennard v. Ashman (1894), 10 T. L. R. 214; and cf. Green v. Symons (1897), 13 T. L. R. 301.
(q) Magennis v. Fallon (1829), 2 Moll. 587.
(r) In re Hurlbalt and Chaytor's Contract (1888), 57 L. J. Ch. 421.
(8) Smith v. Land and House Property Corporation (1884), 28 Ch. D. 7.
(t) Baker v. Moss (1902), 66 J. P. 360; and see In re Puckett and Smith's Contract, , 2 Ch., at p. 264.
The expression eligible is the ordinary auctioneer's expression, and no importance need be attached to it (u).
Frequently the particulars of sale are accompanied by a plan, which will control any inaccuracy or ambiguity in the description of the property (v). If the plan is stated to be "for the purpose of delineation only," this would seem to mean merely that it is not true to scale (x).
AS TO TIMBER, GROWING CROPS, AND FIXTURES.
If the contract does not state that the timber or other trees on the estate are to be paid for separately, they will be included in the contract (y). If, however, they are to be paid for by the purchaser, it should be accurately stated for what trees he has to pay; and if it be merely stipulated that timber is to be paid for, the purchaser will have to pay for trees not strictly timber, if considered so according to the custom of the country (2). Wood is not timber until of twenty years' growth (a), and the term timber includes oak, elm and ash, and by local
(u) Hope v. Walter,  1 Ch. 258.
(v) Nene Valley Drainage Commissioners v. Dunkley (1876), 4 Ch. D. 1; Re Lindsay and Forder's Contract (1895), 72 L. T. 832.
(x) Freeman and Taylor's Contract (1907), 97 L. T. 39. If it is not desirable that the plan should control the description, it should be stated to be "for greater clearness but not so as to restrict or enlarge the description herein before contained." (y) Higginson v. Clowes (1808), 15 Ves. 516.
(z) Duke of Chandos v. Talbot (1731), 2 P. Wms. 606. (a) Foster and Peacock v. Leonard (1582), Cro. Eliz. 1.
custom, birch, beech and other trees (b); and the expression timber and timberlike trees has been held to include sound pollards (c).
Where timber upon a copyhold estate, or upon an estate part freehold and part copyhold, is to be paid for separately, it should be borne in mind that if the contract is sufficiently explicit upon the point, the timber upon the copyhold portion of the property will be included in the valuation, even though the copyhold portion cannot be distinguished from the freehold, and the purchaser will be compelled to take it subject to the right of the lord and custom of the manor. But if the contract for the purchase of the timber be separate from that of the estate, the purchaser will be entitled to such possession of it as will entitle him to fell and remove it (d).
If no mention is made as to separate payment for common fixtures, they will be included in the contract, unless the contrary may be gathered from the context (e).
If the property be in hand, and nothing be said in the contract as to growing crops thereon, they will belong to the purchaser from the day fixed for completion (ƒ).
(b) Duke of Chandos v. Talbot (1731), 2 P. Wms. 606; Aubrey v. Fisher (1809), 10 East, 446 ; Dashwood v. Magniac,  3 Ch. 306.
(c) Rabbett v. Raikes (1803), Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, 17th ed., 691; Channon v. Patch (1826), 5 B. & C. 897. (d) Crosse v. Lawrence (1852), 9 Hare, 462.
(e) Colegrave v. Dias Santos (1823), 2 B. & C. 76; Manning v. Bailey (1848), 2 Exch. 46.
(f) Dart's Vendors and Purchasers, p. 285.
DUTY OF THE PURCHASER.
The purchaser is not bound to disclose any fact exclusively within his knowledge which might reasonably be expected to influence the price of the subject to be sold, e.g., the existence of a mine under the property (g); and no deceit can be implied from the mere silence of the purchaser (h). "Mere silence as regards a material fact which the one party is not under an obligation to disclose to the other, cannot be a ground for rescission or a defence to specific performance" (i). But a single word, or even a gesture, from the purchaser, intended to induce the vendor to believe the existence of a non-existing fact which might influence the price of the subject to be sold, would be sufficient ground for a court of equity to refuse a decree for specific performance of the agreement (k).
So a fortiori would a contrivance on the part of the purchaser who is better informed than the vendor of the real value of the property to be sold, to hurry the vendor into an agreement without giving him the opportunity of being fully informed of its real value ().
(g) See Turner v. Harvey (1821), Jac. 169; and see Fox v. Mackreth (1788), 2 Bro. C. C. 400.
(h) Coaks v. Boswell (1886), 11 App. Cas. 235, 236.
(i) Turner v. Green,  2 Ch. 205; Seddon v. North Eastern Salt Co.,  I Ch., at p. 236.
(k) Turner v. Harvey (1821), Jac. 169; Walters v. Morgan (1860), 3 De G. F. J. 724; Davis v. Ohrly (1898), 14 T. L. R. 260. (1) Walters v. Morgan, supra; and cf. Scott v. Coulson,  2 Ch. 453, where the contract was entered into upon the basis of a common affirmative belief" which proved to be mistaken.