not felt. A trader who is tenant in tail commits an act of bankruptcy, and by the assignment under the commission not only the interest vested in him is conveyed, but all remainders expectant upon it are destroyed for the benefit of his creditors, and the estate passes to his asignees free from all restriction. The courts have held the conveyance in bankruptcy to be a statutory barring of the entail- an enlarger of the estate tail to a fee, as indeed the Bankrupt Laws evidently intended.* Now, I would do that for honest landowners which the law at present permits to be done for insolvent tradesmen and their creditors. So, too, a man and his wife cannot convey an estate of the wife without a fine or a recovery, neither can the wife be barred of her dower without a similar proceeding. The reason is, the influence her husband may possess over her mind; and, consequently, a judge takes the woman, in these cases, into a private room, to examine her, first, as to whether she acts from fear, and then, when that is out of the case, whether she is influenced by favour and affection; and he also examines her as to any temporary increase of affection from any passing cause; and then, when she has purged herself of all temporary increase of affection, of all fear, and all love, she is allowed to give her consent. I would propose, in place of all this enquiry, not always very delicate, nor ever very satisfactory, to let husband and wife join in a common conveyance, with the

*

Of the bar to the issue in tail there can be no doubt; but there are decisions which lean against the operation of the Bankruptcy, to bar the remainders over, contrary to Blackstone's decided opinion (2 Com. 286, 361.) and, it should seem, to the plain intent of the Legislature. See Doe v. Clarke, 5 B. A. 458, and Jennings v. Tayleure, 3 B. A. 557, where it is considered that a base fee only passes in the remainder.

consent of a guardian to be appointed, or of the next male relative of the wife, who is not related to the husband, and not interested in either the succession or the conveyance.

Now, there is certainly nothing very real in a Fine; but as to Recoveries, I ask, do those persons who seem to hold by them, know at all what they avowedly proceed upon? They go upon the ground of compensation in value being made to the remainder-man, whose right they cut off, and who, but for this fictitious suit, would have a title to take the estate after the tenant-in-tail's decease. He is said to recover a compensation in value; and from whom does he get it? Why, the common vouchee, who is the Cryer of the Court of Common Pleas, and who, like the man at the Custom House obliged to take all the oaths other people do not like, lies groaning under the weight of all the liabilities he has incurred to every remainder-man, since he became cryer, and answerable for the millions of property, the rights to which, in remainder, have been barred, he not being worth a shilling. Locke says, that a madman is one who reasons rightly from wrong premises; so it is with the lawyers on recoveries, who argue very ingeniously, and even soundly and consistently, on the principle of the compensation, and whose conclusions could in no wise be impeached, if you once allowed the fact, that those in the remainder are compensated by the proceedings. Indeed, it happened to myself, not long ago, in a case where a very large estate was in question, to argue, and to prevail, respecting the effect of a recovery, on this very ground of compensation in value. I there had to contend that the claimant was barred by the recovery, in consequence of the compensation received from the vouchee,

though it was quite certain that, from the vouchee, there never was, nor ever could be, received a single shilling. My argument, on that occasion, did not excite a smile in the Court, because the principles of the law were known to be thus established, and the consequences were of serious import, be the premises ever so ludicrous. But, were I to use the same argument elsewhere, it would, if understood, be received with much less gravity. Put an end, then, to all such ridiculous forms, which have no earthly use but to raise a little money by way of fees; and which, beside creating expense and delay, and oftentimes preventing tenants in tail from passing their property by will, which they cannot if they die before suffering the recovery, give rise to a number of questions in law, often very puzzling, always dilatory and costly not rarely to mistakes in fact; as where I knew an estate go to the tenant in tail in remainder, instead of the recoveree's heir-at-law or devisee, which he fully intended it should, merely because in suffering the recovery an omission was made of one parcel.

Sir, I also would put an end to those imaginary Trusts in settlements for the purpose of preserving Contingent Remainders. It has been said that some Members of this House, who, during the Commonwealth retired to the country and employed themselves in conveyancing, invented those refinements which characterise what are called Strict Settlements. I repeat, that my object is not to touch the principle of the law of entails, as it now exists in this country, believing that owners of estates should not be laid under greater restrictions than they now are in disposing of them by will after their death, or by settlement upon marriages in their families. But let the purpose of the owner be accomplished more simply and more easily than can now be done. I would allow every man to settle or to devise his property to A. during his life, and after him to B. and C. in succession, making by plain words so many life estates, and giving a fee to the person who, by our present law, takes the first estate tail, not allowing the latter to have any power over the property until it became vested in possession, but requiring that, in order to affect it while in expectancy, he and the tenant for life should join in some simple conveyance, as a feoffment, whereby the settlement might, if the parties chose, be carried on. The property then would not be alienable an hour sooner than it now is, and it would be alienable without fine or recovery; and I would make the act, which the law now deems a discontinuance, as a feoffment in fee by tenant for life, absolutely void to all purposes, instead of making it a forfeiture of the particular estate of the feoffer, though void as a conveyance; so that I would get rid of the necessity of trustees being interposed to save the contingent uses from destruction.

Again, I would restore the Statute of Uses to what it was clearly intended to be. Our ancestors made that law, by which, if land were given to A. for the use of B., the latter was deemed the legal owner, the use being executed in him, just as if A. did not exist. It was justly observed by Lord Hardwicke, that all the pains taken by this famous law ended in the adding of three words to a conveyance. This has been said by conveyancers to be a severe remark,* but it is perfectly correct; for the Courts of Equity invented Second Uses or Trusts, by holding with the Courts

4

of Law that the statute did not apply to land given to A. to the use of B., in trust for C.; that it executed the use only in B., but not in C.; therefore the whole provision is evaded, by making the gift "to the use of B., in trust for C.;" and these three words send the whole matter into Chancery, contrary to the plain intent of the statute. It was also held that copyhold estates are not within the statute in any way; and there are other nice exceptions, but not much better grounded. Can there be any reason whatever for not making all such estates legal at once, and restoring them to the jurisdiction of the Common Law, by recognising, as the owner, the person to whom in reality the estate is given, and passing over him who is a mere nominal party?*

Another deviation from the principles I have laid down, and a great source of multiplicity of suits, is the law with respect to Agreements for sales, leases, and other conveyances. Thus, if I agree with a person to give him a lease, though he, under the agreement, becomes my tenant, he is my equitable tenant only, but not my legal tenant. He may be possessed of a written agreement, signed and sealed, for a lease of ten years, and may occupy under it, but he has no lease which a court of law can take notice of; and if an ejectment is brought, he must go out. He may go into a Court of Equity on his agreement, if that