thus held, he can, like any other person wrongfully deprived of his liberty, obtain his release on habeas corpus. * As to the removal from the state of the fugitive from justice in a way other than that which is provided by the second section of the fourth article of the constitution, which declares that "a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime," and the laws passed by congress to carry the same into effect,—it is not perceived how that fact can affect his detention upon a warrant for the commission of a crime within the state to which he is carried. The jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment is found is not impaired by the manner in which the accused is brought before it. There are many adjudications to this purport cited by counsel on the argument, to some of which we will refer. [Reviewing several.] There is, indeed, an entire concurrence of opinion as to the ground upon which a release of the appellant in the present case is asked, namely, that his forcible abduction from another state, and conveyance within the jurisdiction of the court holding him, is no objection to his detention and trial for the offense charged. They all proceed upon the obvious ground that the offender against the law of the state is not relieved from liability because of personal injuries received from private parties, or because of indignities committed against another state. It would indeed be a strange conclusion, if a party charged with a criminal offense could be excused. from answering to the government whose laws he had violated, because other parties had done violence to him, and also committed an offense against the laws of another state. Affirmed. Bradley and Harlan, JJ., dissenting. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 8 S. Ct. 1204, 32 L. Ed. 283. * * ** (U. S. Sup. Ct., 1893.) Surrender on One Charge and Conviction on Another. Error to the supreme court of Georgia to reverse a conviction on an indictment for forgery. He had been surrendered by the governor of New York and brought to Georgia on requisition, to answer an indictment for being a common cheat and swindler. After his arrival he was indicted and convicted on the present charge. JACKSON, J. The proposition advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in error in support of the federal right claimed to have been denied him, is, that, inasmuch as interstate rendition can only be effected when the person demanded as a fugitive from justice is duly charged with some particular offense, or offenses, his surrender upon such demand carries with it the implied condition that he is to be tried alone for the designated crime, and that in respect to all offenses other than those specified in the demand. for his surrender, he has the same right of exemption as a fugitive from justice extradited from a foreign nation. This proposition as sumes, as is broadly claimed, that the states of the union are independent governments, having the full prerogatives and powers of nations, except what have been conferred upon the general government, and not only have the right to grant, but do, in fact, afford to all persons within their boundaries an asylum as broad and secure as that which independent nations extend over their citizens and inhabitants. ** If a fugitive may be kidnapped or unlawfully abducted from the state or country of refuge, and be, thereafter, tried in the state to which he is forcibly carried, without violating any right or immunity secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States, it is difficult to understand upon what sound principle can be rested the denial of a state's authority or jurisdiction to try him for another or different offense than that for which he was surrendered. If the fugitive be regarded as not lawfully within the limits of the state in respect to any other crime than the one on which his surrender was effected, still that fact does not defeat the jurisdiction of its courts to try him for other offenses, any more than if he had been brought within such jurisdiction forcibly and without any legal process whatever. To apply the rule of international or foreign extradition, as announced in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, to interstate rendition involves the confusion of two essentially different things, which rest upon entirely different principles. In the former the extradition depends upon treaty contract or stipulation, which rests upon good faith, and in respect to which the sovereign upon whom the demand is made can exercise discretion, as well as investigate the charge on which the surrender is demanded, there being no rule of comity under and by virtue of which independent nations are required or expected to withhold from fugitives within their jurisdiction the right of asylum. In the matter of interstate rendition, however, there is the binding force and obligation, not of contract, but of the supreme law of the land, which imposes no conditions or limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the state to which the fugitive is returned. Affirmed. Lascelles v. * ** Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 13 S. Ct. 687, 37 L. Ed. 549, B. 952. FORMER JEOPARDY. § 91. Old maxim. The life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense. U. S. Const., Amend. 5. Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. Mich. Const., Art. 6, § 29. No person, after acquittal upon the merits, shall be tried for the same offense. § 92. "Twice Put in Jeopardy." (Eng. Queen's Bench, 1592.) On Insufficient Indictment. William Vaux was indicted at the session before the justices of the peace of Northumberland for voluntarily murdering Nicholas Ridley by poisoning, and in discharge pleaded former indictment, trial, and acquittal before the justices of assize of the same county on the same charge. But the indictment in the former case, put in evidence here, appeared to be insufficient, principally because it did not allege that Ridley received and drank the poison. It was resolved by LORD WRAY, SIR THOMAS GAWDY, CLENCH, and FENNER, justices, that the reason of auterfoits acquit was because where the maxim of common law is that the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that auterfoits acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good plea; yet it is intendable of a lawful acquittal or conviction, for if the conviction or acquittal is not lawful, his life was never in jeopardy; and because the indictment in this case was insufficient, for this reason he was not legitimo modo acquietatus, and that is well proved, because upon such acquittal he shall not have an action of conspiracy, as it is agreed in 9 E. 4, 12 a. b. vide 20 E. 4, 6. And in such case in appeal, notwithstanding such insufficient indictment, the abettor shall be inquired of as it is there also held; and although the judgment is given that he shall be acquitted of the felony, yet this acquittal shall not help him, because he was not legitimo modo acquietatus; and when the law saith that auterfoits acquitted is a good plea, it shall be intended when he is lawfully acquitted; and that agrees with the old book in 19 E. 3, Corone 444, where it is agreed if the process upon indictment or appeal is not sufficient, yet if the party appears (by which all imperfections of the process are saved) and is acquitted, he shall be discharged; but if the appeal or indictment is insufficient (as our case is) there it is otherwise; but if one, upon an insufficient indictment of felony, has judgment, quod suspend' per coll', and so attainted, which is the judgment and the end which the law has appointed for the felony, there he cannot be again indicted and arraigned until this judgment is reversed by error; but when the offender is discharged upon an insufficient indictment, there the law has not had its end; nor is the life of the party, in the judgment of the law, ever in jeopardy; and the wisdom of the law abhors that great offenses should go unpunished, which was grounded without question upon these ancient maxims of law and state; maleficia non debent remanere impunita, et impunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquendi, et minatur innocentes qui parcit nocentibus; so if a man is convicted either by verdict or by confession upon an insufficient indictment, and no judgment thereupon given, he may be again indicted and arraigned, because his life was never in jeopardy, and the law wants its end; and afterwards, upon this new indictment, the said Vaux was tried and found guilty, and had his judgment and was hanged. Vaux's Case, 4 Coke 44a, B. 67. (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1885.) Former Information Charged no Offense. Defendant pleaded not guilty, previous conviction, and former jeopardy. The jury found guilty of burglary. "Inasmuch as the former information failed to charge the defendant with the commission of any crime, the court below was justified in instructing the jury that the pleas of former conviction and once in jeopardy could not be sustained." Affirmed. P. v. Clark, 67 Cal. 99, 7 Pac. 178. (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1808.) Former Fine on Confession before Justice, Without Notice to Injured Person. Defendant being arraigned on an indictment for assault and battery, and being inquired of by the clerk whether he was guilty or not guilty, said he was guilty, but added that he had informed a justice of the peace of the county of his offense, by whom he had been sentenced to pay a fine, etc. The COURT directed the clerk to enter the plea of guilty alone, observing that it had heretofore been solemnly determined that a conviction of a breach of the peace before a magistrate, on the confession or information of the offender himself was no bar to an indictment by the grand jury for the same offense. C. v. Alderman, 4 Mass. 477, B. 70. (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1841.) Prior Complaint Irregular. Defendant was indicted for stealing lumber, and testimony was introduced which the court charged the jury would warrant a conviction if believed. Then defendant proposed to prove a former conviction for the same offense; and the record produced showed that the complaining witness alleged that he had cause to believe and did believe that his lumber had been stolen by defendant, but did not charge that he had stolen it. On this complaint the justice had found defendant guilty, and fined him $10 and costs, which he paid. It is admitted that the further conviction was for the same offense. The court below ruled that the former proceedings were no bar, and defendant excepted. * # PUTNAM, J. * It is contended for the commonwealth, that the supposed former conviction was not only erroneous, but was merely void. In the case of C. v. Phillips, 16 Pick. 211, it was held that a conviction on a complaint in similar form to that which was used in the case at bar was erroneous. We cannot think that those proceedings before the magistrate were merely void. On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that the complainant intended to prosecute for a larceny. The defendant understood it so, and so did the magistrate. Now, the judgment that the defendant was guilty, although upon proceedings which were erroneous, is good until the same be reversed. This rule of criminal law is well settled. It was the right and privilege of the defendant to bring a writ of error and reverse that judgment; which writ would have been sustained by the case before cited of C. v. Phillips; but he might well waive the error, and submit to and perform the judgment and sentence, without danger of being subjected to another conviction and punishment for the same offense. Vaux's Case, 4 Coke 45; 2 Hale P. C. 251; 2 Hawk. c. 36, § 10 et seq. Exceptions sustained and defendant discharged. C. v. * ** Loud, 3 Metc. 328, 37 Am. Dec. 139, B. 72. (Eng. Assize at Liverpool, 1851.) By Mutual Consent. The prisoner was indicted for forging the acceptance to a bill of exchange for £154 16s. 3d. The jury had been sworn and charged to inquire into the guilt of the prisoner. Simon, for the prosecutor, had opened the case, when Monk, for the prisoner, having come into court during the opening of the learned counsel for the prosecution, informed his lordship that the prisoner was not prepared with his defense; upon which ERLE, J., discharged the jury from giving a verdict, observing that, with the consent of both parties, there was power to do so; and such consent being then given the trial was accordingly postponed to the following day. His lordship added that Parke, B., held the same opinion. R. v. Deane, 5 Cox C. C. 501, B. 69. (U. S. Sup. Ct., 1824.) Jury Discharged for Disagreement. Case certified for opinion on division of opinion of the circuit judges. The jury having been unable to agree on a former trial on this indictment, were discharged by the court without the defendant's consent; and on this ground he contended that he could not be put on trial again. STORY, J. * * We are of opinion that the facts constitute no legal bar to a future trial. The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put on his defense. We think, that, in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends. of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office. U. S. v. Perez, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 579, 2 B. & H. 357-n. (Mich. Sup. Ct., 1886.) Same. Respondent was prosecuted be |