created by the law, the death so caused is the subject of manslaughter. In this case there was a duty imposed by the statute on the prisoner to provide medical aid for his infant child, and there was the deliberate intention not to obey the law,-whether proceeding from a good or bad motive is not material. The necessary ingredient to constitute the crime of manslaughter existed, therefore, in this case, and for that reason this conviction ought to be affirmed. * The other judges concurred. Conviction affirmed. R. v. Downes, 13 Cox C. C. 111, 45 L. J. m. c. 8, 1 Q. B. D. 8, 33 L. T. 675, 25 W. R. 278, 15 Moak. 161, B. 195, C. 102. ** * (Me. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1876.) Death of Wife from Exposure. Defendant, convicted of manslaughter, moved in arrest of judgment, and excepted to the ruling on this motion and to certain charges to the jury and refusals to charge. It was shown that deceased was the wife of defendant, was insane, a cripple, unable to move herself except by her hands, and would tear all the clothing from her body; that defendant kept her confined in a very open cold room in the house, day and night, with nothing to sleep on but husks and rags in filthy condition, with no covering but a piece of canvas from Jan. 18 to Feb. 9, 1875, with no fire or other artificial heat to warm the room. and with one light out of the window; that in this condition she was found by the neighbors, badly frosted, discolored, and affected with gangrene, of which she soon after died. BARROWS, J. # The defendant * The objects to the first count, because he says it contains no allegation that the condition of his wife, her necessities, and the facts alleged in that count as constituting the crime of manslaughter were known to him. The count alleges the relation which he sustained to the deceased, his duty to provide for her necessities, her own incapacity and his ability to do it, and that he did "feloniously and wilfully neglect and refuse to provide necessary clothing, shelter, and protection from the cold and inclemency of the weather" for her from the 19th day of January to the 9th day of February, the consequent sickness and death of the wife, and manslaughter by the defendant "in the manner and by the means aforesaid." objection is not sustained. The allegation of a wilful and felonious neglect and refusal to perform the duties devolved upon him by law in the premises of itself imports an allegation that he knew the necessities of his wife and the essential facts alleged in the count. It was not necessary to allege nor to prove that the defendant knew from day to day the effect which his brutal neglect was producing. If such knowledge could have been brought home to him, he should have been charged, not with manslaughter, but with murder. For further illustration of the doctrine that manslaughter may be committed by a negligent omission of duty, see R. v. Marriott, 8 Car. & P. 425; R. v. Edwards, Id. 611; R. v. Lowe, 4 Cox C. C. 449 [§ 11]; R. v. Plummer, 1 Car. & K. * * * 600; Nixon v. P., 2 Scam. 269. 65 Me. 257, F. 213. Affirmed. S. v. Smith, (Eng. C. C. R., 1893.) Neglecting Helpless Aunt. Defendant, an unmarried woman of 30 or 40 years, without occupation or means of her own, was convicted of manslaughter for the death of her aunt, who had a small income, with which she provided for herself and defendant, who alone lived with her. Deceased was found half dressed, reclining partly on her bed and partly on the ground; and the post mortum disclosed that she had been dead several days when discovered, and probably died of gangrene in the leg, from which she must have been unable to attend her wants for several days before death. Defendant lived in the house all this time, and took and lived on the provisions furnished by the tradesmen on the means of her aunt, yet gave no notice to the neighbors of her aunt's condition or needs, nor attended her; and exhaustion from want of food and drink apparently hastened if it did not cause the death. In the court below and here it was contended for the prisoner, that no legal duty required her to provide food or attendance for her aunt, and such duty can arise only from contract, common law, or statute. LORD COLERIDGE, C. J. We are all of opinion that this conviction must be affirmed. It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation without legal enforcement. There can be no question in this case that it was the clear duty of the prisoner to impart to the deceased so much as was necessary to sustain life of the food which she from time to time took in, and which was paid for by the deceased's own money for the purpose of the maintenance of herself and the prisoner; it was only through the instrumentality of the prisoner that the deceased could get the food. There was, therefore, a common law duty imposed upon the prisoner which she did not discharge. Nor can there be any question that the failure of the prisoner to discharge her legal duty at least accelerated the death of the deceased, if it did not actually cause it. There is no case directly in point; but it would be a slur upon and a discredit to the administration of justice in this country if there were any doubt as to the legal principle, or as to the present case being within it. The prisoner was under a moral obligation to the deceased from which arose a legal duty towards her; that legal duty the prisoner has wilfully and deliberately left unperformed, with the consequence that there has been an acceleration of the death of the deceased owing to the non-performance of that legal duty. It is unnecessary to say more than that upon the evidence this conviction was most properly arrived at. Hawkins, Cave, Day, and Collins, JJ., concurred. Conviction affirmed. R. v. Instan, [1893] 1 Q. B. 450, 17 Cox C. C. 602, 62 L. J. m. c. 86, 68 L. T. 420, 41 W. R. 368, 57 J. P. 282, B. 198. # # (Tex. Ct. of App., 1889.) Failure to Volunteer Help Beyond Line of Duty-Liability of Brakemen for Homicide by Engine.. The engineer, fireman, and brakemen, engaged in operating an engine on the Houston, E. & W. T. Ry., were jointly indicted for negligent homicide, in running the engine and tender backwards over and killing a child on the track, without ringing the bell, blowing the whistle, giving any warning, or looking to see if any person was in danger. The brakemen only were tried, were convicted, and appeal. WILLSON, J. As we view the evidence and the law applicable thereto, this conviction is not warranted. These appellants were brakemen. They had no control whatever of said engine and tender. They were riding upon the same for the purpose merely of performing their specific duties as brakemen, which duties had no connection with, or relation to the homicide. It was the exclusive duty of the engineer and fireman to operate the engine carefully; to look out for obstructions on the track; to give signals of danger when necessary. With these duties appellants were in no way concerned. They had no right to start the engine in motion, to blow the whistle, to ring the bell, to stop the engine, or otherwise to control its movements. They performed no act which connected them with the death of the child. It is only for a supposed omission of duty on their part that they have been convicted of negligent homicide. They omitted to look out for obstructions on the track. They might have seen the child in time to save its life, but they omitted to see him; or, if they did see him. they omitted to stop the train, or to signal the engineer to stop it. Were these omissions criminal, within the meaning of the statute defining negligent homicide? We think not; because to constitute criminal negligence or carelessness there must be a violation of some duty imposed by law, directly or impliedly, and with which duty the defendant is especially charged. Mr. Wharton says: "Omissions are not the basis of penal action, unless they constitute a defect in the discharge of a responsibility with which the defendant is especially invested." Whart. Hom. § 72. Again, this author says, in treating of omissions by those charged with machinery, etc.: "The responsibility of the defendant which he thus fails to discharge, must be exclusive and peremptory. A stranger who sees that unless a railway switch is turned, or the car stopped, an accident may ensue, is not indictable for not turning the switch or stopping the car. The reason for this is obvious. To coerce by criminal prosecution every person to supervise all other persons and things, would destroy that division of labor and responsibility by which alone business can be safely conducted, and would establish an industrial communism by which private enterprise and private caution would be extinguished. Nothing can be effectually guarded when everything is to be guarded by everybody. No ma chinery could be properly worked if every passer-by were compelled by the terror of a criminal prosecution to rush in and adjust everything that might appear to him to be wrong, or which was wrong, no matter how it might happen to appear. By this wild and irresponsible interference even the simplest forms of machinery would be speedily destroyed." Id. § 80. * Reversed. Anderson * * v. S., 27 Tex. App. 117, 11 S. W. 33, 11 Am. St. Rep. 189, 3 L. R. A. 644. "In Violation of Law." § 12. Interpretation. (Eng. Queen's Bench, 1598.) If a Statute Prohibits Anything Without Naming a Penalty, a violation of the statute is indictable, unless the statute indicates otherwise. This was stated by the court in a case in which a constable was indicted for refusing to raise a hue and cry after a burglar at night, and denied that he was bound to do so, because not bound to be in attendance at that time; but the indictment was held good. Crouther's Case, Cro. Eliz. 654, B. 95. * * (N. Car. Sup. Ct., 1884.) Same. Parker was indicted for selling liquor within two and one-half miles of Zion church, contrary to act of 1883, c. 166, § 7, providing that it shall be unlawful for any person to sell liquor within that distance, but providing no penalty for violation. In § 8 it is provided that "any person violating sections four, five, and six of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Defendant contended that no prosecution could be. maintained for violation of § 7 because of the facts above stated. He was convicted and assigns error. ASHE, J. If a statute prohibit a matter of public grievance, or command a matter of public convenience, all acts or omissions contrary to the prohibition or command of the statute, being misdemeanors at common law, are punishable by indictment, if the statute specify no other mode of proceeding. Arch. Cr. Law 2; 2 Hawk., ch. 25, § 4. There is no other mode of proceeding specified in the act; ergo, the defendant is indictable at common law. Affirmed. S. v. Parker, 91 N. Car. 650, Mi. 15. Acc. C. v. Chapman, § 5. Abusing any statutory privilege (right to vote), is a misdemeanor at common law. C. v. Silsbee, § 20; C. v. Callaghan, § 20. (Ohio Sup. Ct., 1861.) Attempt to Rape Child Consenting. Defendant bringing error from conviction on indictment for assault with intent to commit statutory rape on a consenting child under ten, the court discharged him; because the statutes have abolished all common law crimes, assault on a consenting party is an absurdity, and the statute on this matter (probably by inadvertent omission) covers only the completed act. Brinkerhoff, J., dissenting, on the ground that the assent of the child was void, as held in Hays v. P., 1 Hill (N. Y.) 351. Smith v. S., 12 Ohio St. 466, 80 Am. Dec. 355, F. 37. As to implied abrogation of common law offenses see §7; and Baker v. S. (Ohio), § 7.5 As to child's consent see R. v. Martin, § 29; R. v. Woodhurst, § 29, * * # * (N. Car. Sup. Ct., 1875.) Selling Liquor Without License. Judgment for defendant on special verdict. The state excepts. SETTLE, J. The letter of the law has been broken, but has the spirit of the law been violated? We shall remember that the reason of the law is the life of the law, and when one stops the other should also stop. What was the evil sought to be remedied by our statute? Evidently the abusive use of spirituous liquors, keeping in view at the same time the revenues of the state. The special verdict is very minute in its details, and makes as strong a case for the defendants as perhaps will ever find its way into court again. A physician prescribes the brandy as a medicine. for a sick lady, and directs her husband to get it from the defendants, who are druggists. It may be that a pure article of brandy, such as the physician was willing to administer as a medicine, was not to be obtained elsewhere than at the defendants' drug store. The doctor himself goes to the defendants and directs them to let the witness have the brandy as a medicine for his wife. And the further fact is found, which perhaps might have been assumed without the finding, that French brandy is an essential medicine, frequently prescribed by physicians and often used; and the farther and very important fact is established, that in this case it was bought in good faith as a medicine, and was used as such. After this verdict we cannot doubt that the defendants acted in good faith and with due caution, in the sale which is alleged to be a violation of law. In favor of defendants, criminal statutes are both contracted and expanded. 1 Bishop, § 261. Now unless this sale comes within the mischief which the statute was intended to suppress, the defendants are not guilty. Judgment * * affirmed. S. v. Wray, 72 N. Car. 253, B. 366, Mi. 209. (Ohio Sup. Ct., 1902.) Bicycle Racing. Defendant rode a racing bicycle at a speed of twenty miles per hour down the main street of a village, at dusk, without bell or other alarm, leaning forward. as is usual in bicycle racing. Many people were about the streets; and while so riding he collided with a pedestrian, who died of the injuries thus received. For this homicide defendant was indicted and convicted of manslaughter, and brings error. PRICE, J. To convict of manslaughter it is incumbent upon the state to establish that the killing was done "either upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally while the slayer was in the commission of some unlawful act. It is clear that from the facts and the instructions given the jury that Barrows was not killed by John * |