think deprivation of the ownership of property is one of the essentials of larceny. But is it necessary that the intent shall be to deprive the owner of the whole property taken? Is not the animus furandi as manifestly shown when the intent is simply to deprive him of a partial though unsevered interest in the property? *The taking and asportation were with the intent of depriving the owner of property which was absolutely his and in his possession, and fraudulently placing it where the taker could assert a lien, or claim to hold it until certain charges were paid him by the owner. Per STONE, C. J. Affirmed. Fort v. S., 82 Ala. 50, 2 So. 477. (Eng. C. C. R., 1849.) To Sell to Owner. On indictment for stealing tallow, it appeared that Hall worked for Atkin, a tallowchandler, and during the noon-hour took some of Atkin's tallow, put it on the scales where tallow bought was weighed, and with another (who worked for a butcher of the town) came to Atkin and said the other had brought the tallow from the butcher and came to be paid for it. Verdict, guilty. For the defendant it was contended by Dearsley, that the case was ruled by R. v. Holloway, above. ALDERSON, B. If a man takes my bank note from me, and then brings it to me to change, does he not commit larceny? Dearsley. A bank note is a thing unknown to the common law, and therefore the case put could not be larceny at common law. LORD DENMAN, C. J. The taking is admitted. The question is whether there was an intention to deprive the owner entirely of his property; how could he deprive the owner of it more effectually than by selling it? To whom he sells it cannot matter. The case put of the bank note would be an ingenious larceny, but no case can be more extreme than this. PARKE, B. In this case there is the intent to deprive the owner of the dominion over his property, for it is put into the hands of an intended vendor, who is to offer it for sale to the owner, and if the owner will not buy it, to take it away again. The case is distinguishable from that of R. v. Holloway by the existence of this intent, and further by the additional impudence of the fraud. ALDERSON, B. I think that he who takes property from another intends wholly to deprive him of it, if he intend that he shall get it back again under a contract by which he pays the full value for it. Coleridge, J., and Coltman, J., concurred. Conviction affirmed. R. v. Hall, 3 Cox C. C. 245, 2 Car. & K. 947, T. & M. 47, 1 Den. C. C. 381, 18 L. J. m. c. 62, 13 Jur. 87, B. 696, C. 282, 3 New Sess. Cas. 407. (Eng. C. C. R., 1852.) Same. Prosecutor was a potato dealer and regularly bought bags of S. The keeper of his warehouse was M. On proof that M. laid bags out of the warehouse and S. then claimed pay for them, both were convicted of larceny, and the conviction approved on R. v. Hall [above]. Before Jervis, C. J., Alderson, B., Coleridge, J., Creswell, J., and Platt, B. R. v. Manning, 6 Cox C. C. 86, Dears. 21, 22 L. J. m. c. 21, 17 Jur. 28, 1 W. R. 40, C. 268. (Ark. Sup. Ct., 1894.) To Return to True Owner. On trial on indictment for stealing a mare, it appeared that defendant hired the mare of H. to ride to visit an uncle in an adjoining county, there traded it to prosecutor for a horse, and shortly afterward sold the horse; that prosecutor became suspicious that all was not right, and required defendant to stay at prosecutor's house over night till an investigation could be made; that in the morning he discovered that defendant and the mare were gone; and that defendant was captured with the mare on the way toward the place where he hired her. On the trial the defendant testified that he took the mare to return her to H., from whom he had hired her; and that he was 19 years old, was drunk when the trade was made, and did not realize what he was doing. The court refused to instruct the jury that if defendant took the mare from prosecutor to return her to her true owner, in an endeavor to correct the wrong he had done, he was not guilty of larceny. Refusal of this instruction was held error; because there was no intent to deprive the owner of his property, if this was defendant's purpose. Reversed. Gooch v. S., 60 Ark. 5, 28 S. W. 510. § 144. "Permanently." (Eng. C. C. R., 1820.) To Induce Owner to Call. The prisoner was tried and convicted of stealing a girl's bonnet and other articles of her apparel. He entered the house where they were at night, through an open window, and took the things to a haymow of his own, where he and the girl, whom he had seduced, had twice been before; and the jury found that his object was not to deprive the girl of the things, but to induce her to go again to the haymow. The judges held that the taking was not felonious. R. v. Dickinson, 1 Rus. & R. 420, B. 684, C. 358, F. 289. (Del. Ct. of Err. & App., 1854.) Horse Taken to Escape. Defendant, an indentured servant, was running away from his master; and, to make good his escape, mounted a horse he found hitched on the road, rode it to Wilmington, put it in a livery stable, and abandoned it. The court told the jury that felonious intent is where a man knowingly takes and carries away the goods of another, without any claim of right, with intent to deprive the owner of them, and convert them to his own use. But if he took the horse when he was running away, merely to facilitate his escape, and left him at the livery stable, without intent to deprive the owner of it, he ought to be acquitted. S. v. York, 5 Har. 493, F. 290. Acc. Rex v. Crump, 1 Car. & P. 658, B. 685. Ke. 284: Lucas v. S., 33 Tex. Cr. R. 290, 26 S. W 213, taking horse from range to ride to train and turning it loose. (Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., 1894.) To Escape. Defendant being confined at the county farm for gambling, approached the guard to borrow his pocketknife, then seized him and called out: "Come, on boys, now is the time to get your liberty;" and assisted by others, took the guard's gun and pistol and left him gagged and bucked. The gun and pistol were later given to friends, to be returned, or so defendant testified; but the person receiving them sold them. On trial for larceny, the jury asked for instruction as to what length of possession would constitute larceny; and the court answered: "The law fixes no length of time. A moment's possession is sufficient." On appeal the court held that while this answer was correct, it was insufficient, in view of the testimony as to fraudulent intent to appropriate to his own use at the time of taking. Reversed. Mahoney v. S., 33 Tex. Cr. R. 388, 26 S. W. 622. (Eng. Assize, 1840.) To Pledge and Ultimately Restore. The prisoner was indicted for stealing silver plate of his master of £18 value. It appeared that he was under butler for Lord Hay, took the plate from such as came to his hands in his service, and pledged it. The jury found him guilty but recommended mercy, on the ground that they believed he intended to replace it. Jones, for the prisoner submitted that the verdict amounted to an acquittal. Gurney, B., expressed no opinion on the point, but put the prisoner on trial on another indictment for a similar offense, and Jones argued to the jury the prisoner's good intentions. GURNEY, B. (in his summing up observed): You will say whether the prisoner stole this property or not. I confess I think that if this doctrine of an intention to redeem property is to prevail, courts of justice will be of very little use. A more glorious doctrine for thieves it would be difficult to discover, but a more injurious doctrine for honest men cannot well be imagined. R. v. Phetheon, 9 Car. & P. 552 (38 Eng. C. L. 324), C. 337, Mi. 811n. (Eng. C. C. R., 1858.) Same. Defendant was convicted of larceny of a box of plate worth £600, which prosecutrix had left with him, in a locked chest, for safe keeping, during her absence of a few days. He had opened the box and pawned the plate for £200. LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. The general proposition contended for by Mr. Cox is perfectly correct. To constitute larceny, there must be an intention on the part of the thief completely to appropriate the property to his own use; and if at the time of the asportation his intention is to make a mere temporary use of the chattels taken, so that the dominus should again have the use of them afterwards, that is a trespass, but not a felony; but that law does not apply to this case. Here there was abundant evidence of a larceny at common law; abundant evidence from which the jury might find that the prisoner feloniously stole the plate; and the jury have found a verdict of guilty. But they have recommended him to mercy, and accompanied that recommendation with a statement as to the prisoner's intention to return the stolen property. Now, I doubt whether what the jury say in giving their reason for recommending the prisoner to mercy, is to be considered as part of their finding; but even assuming it to be so, all that they say is, that he intended ultimately to return the property; not that at the time of the wrongful taking he originally intended to make a merely temporary use of it. [Coleridge, J., Crowder, J., Martin, B., and Watson, B., gave similar opinions.] Affirmed, Affirmed. R. v. Trebilcock, 7 Cox C. C. 408, Dears. & B. 453, 27 L. J. m. c. 103, 4 Jur. n. s. 123, 6 W. R. 281, B. 688, C. 339, Mi. 811n. Acc. Truslow v. S., 95 Tenn. 189, 31 S. W. 987; R. v. Medland, 5 Cox C. C. 292, C. 338, Ke 236. § 145. "Convert it to the Taker's Own Use." (Eng. C. C. R., 1815.) Taking to Destroy. On indictment for stealing a gelding, it was proved that defendant took it from prosecutor's stable and backed it into the shaft of an abandoned coal mine, and that one Howarth was about to be tried for having stolen it. It was objected that the taking appeared not to have been done with intention to convert it to the use of the taker, animo furandi et lucri causa. On case reserved after conviction, six of the judges held that taking lucri causa was not essential to constitute larceny, and that taking to deprive the owner wholly of his property was sufficient. But some of these six judges thought that in this case intent to protect Howarth by destroying the animal might be deemed a sufficient benefit or lucri causa. Five other judges thought the conviction wrong. R. v. Cabbage, Russell & R. 292, B. 682, 1 B. & H. 436, C. 344, Mi. 809. (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1883.) Same. Appeal from conviction of grand larceny on proof that defendant took a horse from Jewell's stable and killed and buried it in a pit. Defendant and Jewell had been on bad terms, had had several lawsuits, and one was still pending when the horse was killed. BOARDMAN, J. The court below did not properly state the legal questions before the jury. Upon the evidence it is certainly a grave question whether the act charged and proved was larceny or malicious mischief. To constitute larceny there must have been a felonious intent, animo furandi or lucri causa. The malicious killing of a horse is a misdemeanor. The offenses are quite distinct. In either case there is a trespass. In larceny the taking must be for the purpose of converting to the use of the taker. In malicious mischief no such intent is necessary. In the present case the evidence tends to show a taking of the horse to kill him, with a sole desire to injure the owner. It was incumbent on the court then to point out to the jury the legal elements in the crime of larceny, so as to distinguish it from malicious mischief. ** * This, we think, was not done. Bockes, J., concurred. "In Woodward s case there was an able and exhaustive dissenting opinion by one of the three justices, and no authorities are cited in support of the majority opinion except Whart. Cr. Law, § 1784, and certain cases therein referred to, which do not sustain the text." Per LEONARD, J., in s. v. Slingerland velow. (Eng. C. C. R., 1846.) To Avoid Report of Character. On indictment for stealing a letter, it appeared that the prisoner had applied for a position as cook for D, was told that D had written to the prisoner's former employer for a statement as to her character, and knew that an unfavorable answer would be sent; wherefore she applied at the postoffice for D's mail, received the letter in question, and burned it. The question reserved for the opinion of the judges was whether taking and destroying the letter under these circumstances was larceny. All the judges were present except Coleridge, Wightman, and Maule, JJ.; and all except Platt, B., were finally of opinion that it was larceny; for, supposing that lucri causa (which was not admitted) to be an essential ingredient of larceny, there was sufficient advantage to the prisoner in making way with the letter. R. v. Jones, 1 Den. C. C. 188, 2 C. & K. 236, 1 Cox C. C. 6, 2 B. & H. 440n, C. 346, Mi. 818. (Eng. C. C. R., 1849.) To Avoid Penalty. On indictment for stealing two letters, containing money and stamps, it appeared that the prisoner was a clerk in the postoffice, and was subject to penalty for errors in sorting and failing to deliver properly the registered letters coming to his hands in due course; that the letters in question were so received by him; and that he made error in sorting them, to conceal which, and to avoid the penalty, he deposited them in the bowl of the watercloset in the office. LORD DENMAN, C. J. As to the question of larceny, I am clearly of opinion that it is made out. We can only argue on the evidence of the caseupon the facts and circumstances before us. We find the prisoner, who had received the letter in the course of his duty, retiring to a private place and dropping the letter under circumstances that it would be probably destroyed, and this for the purpose of avoiding the penalty of previous misconduct. That is a sufficient lucri causa. It deprives the owner of the property. The letter was meant to be entirely withdrawn from him, for it cannot be gravely argued that it was intended he should find it. As to the asportavit, no doubt it occurred the moment the letter dropped from his hand. It appears to me, therefore, that the count for secreting is sustained by the evidence. The rest of the judges concurred. R. v. Wynn, 3 Cox C. C. 271, 2 C. & K. 859, 1 Den. C. C. 365, T. & M. 32, 3 N. S. C. 414, 18 L. J. m. c. 51, 13 Jur. 107, C. 352. (Nev. Sup. Ct., 1885.) Horses Taken to Harass Owner. Appellant was convicted of grand larceny for taking two horses, two |