company's initials; that afterwards these brasses were discovered labeled with defendant's shipping mark, who then acknowledged that he had shipped them; and that the foreman of the railroad company's shops nad warned defendant not to buy any car brasses, as some had been missing from time to time. Affirmed. Frank v. S., 67 Miss. 125, 6 So. 842, Mi. 901.

(Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., 1892.) Same. Murio was convicted of receiving stolen goods worth $20. Three witnesses testified that one Nestoro was indebted to defendant and told him he had some coffee taken on a debt, that defendant could sell on commission to pay himself; and that Nestoro delivered it for that purpose. It was not denied that the coffee was stolen from the I. & G. N. Ry. depot, but Nestoro denied delivering it. The only question was sufficiency of the testimony to sustain the conviction. The court held that guilty knowledge at the time of receiving was essential to a conviction; but that if the defendant received the goods under circumstances sufficient to satisfy a man of ordinary prudence and caution that they were stolen, guilty knowledge might be inferred; and in this case the facts that defendant asked Nestoro where he got the coffee, received it at night unboxed, arranged the packages in the form of a bed, and covered them, were circumstances ample to justify the verdict. Affirmed. Murio v. S., 31 Tex. App. 210, 20 S. W. 356, F. 315, Kn. 292.

(Iowa Sup. Ct., 1895.) Suspicion. There was held to be no error in trial for receiving stolen goods, in instructing the jury, as follows: "If you find that all the facts and circumstances surrounding the receiving of the goods by defendant were such as would reasonably satisfy a man of defendant's age and intelligence that the goods were stolen, or if he failed to follow up such inquiry so suggested, for fear he would learn the truth and know that the goods were stolen, then the defendant should be as rigidly held responsible as if he had actual knowledge." Affirmed. S. v. Feuerhaken, 96 Iowa 299, 65 N. W. 299.

§ 157. "Shall be Taken and Deemed an Accessory.'

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(N. Car. Sup. Ct., 1852.) Naming Principal-Receiving from Receiver. Ives was convicted of receiving a barrel of tar and a bale of cotton, knowing them to have been stolen. He appealed. PEARSON, J. A receiver of stolen goods is made an accessary by the statute of Anne; and it is provided, by another section of that statute, that, if the principal felon escapes and is not amenable to the process of the law, then such accessory may be indicted, as for a misdemeanor. This statute was so construed as to require, in the indictment for a misdemeanor, an averment that the prin

cipal felon was not amenable to the process of the law. Foster, 373. Our statute, Rev. Stat. c. 34, §§ 53 and 54, is taken from the statute of Anne, and has received a similar construction. Groff's case, 1 Mur. (5 N. C.) 270, and see the remarks of Henderson, judge, in Good's case, 1 Hawks (8 N. C.) 463. The objection taken to the indictment, is the absence of an averment, that the principal felon is not amenable to the process of the law; and it is insisted that, as the principal felon is alleged to be some person to the jurors unknown, it could not be averred that he had "escaped and eluded the process of the law," in the words used by our statute, and it was urged that the statute did not apply to a case of the kind. The attorney general in reply took the position, that the averment that the principal felon was some person to the jurors unknown, necessarily included and amounted to an averment, that he had escaped and eluded the process of the law, so as not to be amenable to justice. This would seem to be so; but we give no definite opinion, because there is another defect in the count, which is clearly fatal. After averring that the cotton and tar had been stolen by some person to the jurors unknown, the indictment proceeds: "Afterwards, etc., the said Josiah Ives, the said bale of cotton and the said barrel of tar feloniously did have and receive, well knowing the said bale of cotton and barrel of tar to have been theretofore feloniously stolen," etc. There is no averment from whom the defendant received the cotton and tar. We cannot imply that he received them from the person who stole them. It may be that he received them from some third person; and this question is presented: A steals an article, B receives it, and C receives it from B. Does the case fall within the statute? We think not. The statute obviously contemplates a case where goods are received from the person who stole them; he is termed the principal felon. In the case put above, A is the principal felon, B is his accessory, but C is a receiver from a receiver an accessory of an accessory. In fact, it cannot be said whether A or B is the principal felon in regard to him. The statute does not provide for such a case. It makes the receiver an accessory; and in case the principal is not amenable to the process of law, such accessory may be prosecuted as for a misdemeanor. Consequently it is necessary to point out the principal, and the matter is involved in the doctrine of "principal and accessory." This and many other omissions are, in England, remedied by the statutes, W. III. and G. II., by which "the act of receiving" is made a substantive felony without reference to the person who stole. Judgment reversed and arrested. S. v. Ives, 13 Ired. (35 N. C.) 338, B. 775, C. 460.

Acc. U. S. v. DeBare, 6 Biss. 358, Fed. Cas. 14, 935, 5 L. 662.

(Neb. Sup. Ct., 1883.)

Same. LAKE, C. J. The plaintiff in

error stands convicted of receiving stolen goods, and he seeks to reverse the judgment.

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In this state, the receiving or buy

ing of stolen goods is not an accessory, but a substantive offense, as will be seen by reference to the statute by which it is governed. Crim. Code, § 116, provides that "if any person shall receive or buy any goods or chattels, of the value of $35 or upwards, that shall be stolen or taken by robbers with intent to defraud the owner,

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* every person so offending shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than seven years, nor less than one year." (C. S. 681.) The jury found the value of the stolen property, which consisted of a lot of copper and brasses, to be $50; and this finding is fully justified by the evidence. The prisoner bought and received it from one Bierbaum, but from whom the latter obtained it was not shown. Therefore, the point is made that inasmuch as it was not shown affirmatively that Bierbaum stole the property the receiving of it from him was not within the statute. In other words, that to make the crime of receiving stolen property, it must be shown that it was received from the person guilty of the larceny, and not from another receiver; and in support of this view we are referred to 1 Whart. Cr. L. (8 Ed.) § 990; 2 Bish. C. L. § 1140; and Desty Am. C. L. § 147. The first of these citations does not sustain the position taken; and even the other two, although seeming to do so, if we look to the text of the works alone, in view of our statute, really do not, as will appear from an examination of the cases referred to by the authors in support of that doctrine. One of these cases, S. v. Ives [above]. 13 Ired. 338, was decided under a statute which, as the court said, contemplated a receiving of the goods from the person who stole them, who was the principal felon. these cases have no application here. S., 14 Neb. 1, 14 N. W. 543.

Affirmed.

Clearly
Levi v.

Ace. Kirby v. U. S., 174 U S. 47. 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574, 43 L. Ed. 890: Anderson v. S., 38 Fla. co 20 So. 765; Campbell v. S. (1895 Miss.), 17 So. 441; Curran v. S., 12 Wyo. 553, 76 Pac. 577.

CHEATING AT COMMON LAW.

§ 158. Defined, etc. "The common law cheat is important to be understood, though practically it is nearly superseded by the statutes against false pretenses. It is a fraud wrought by some false symbol or token of a nature against which common prudence cannot guard, to the injury of one in any pecuniary interest." 1 Bish. Cr. L. 571. See also, to same effect, C. v. Warren, § 4, getting credit by lies; R. v. Wilders and R. v. Wheatley, § 16, short delivery; R. v. Bower, § 16, selling inferior gold chain for sterling. Cheating by false weights and measures (R. v. Burgaine, 1 Sid. 409), or with false dice (R. v. Maddocke, 2 Rolle 107; Leeser's Case, Cro. Jac. 497), were held to be indictable common law cheats.

FORGERY.

§ 159. Definition. "Forgery is a species of common-law cheat, which early was separated from the rest under this distinctive name; and it includes as well the unsuccessful attempt as the accomplished fraud. It is the false making or materially altering, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of some legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal liability." 2 Bish. New Crim. L. § 572.

§ 160. "It Includes as Well the Unsuccessful Attempt.'

(Eng. King's Bench, 1726.) What Instrument-PublicationActual Fraud Shown. Ward, being chargeable to deliver 31514 tons of alum to Duke Edmund, fabricated a schedule, and indorsed upon it a direction to himself in the name of the duke, to charge 6604 tons of alum to the duke's account, part of the quantity mentioned in the schedule; and out of the proceeds of sales of alum in Ward's hands, to pay himself £10 for every ton according to agreement, and for so doing the indorsement should be his (Ward's) discharge. This was held forgery at common law. In answer to an objection taken in arrest, that no publication of the instrument, or actual fraud upon the duke, was averred in the information, the court said that the crime was complete by the act of forgery; publication or actual fraud were not necessary; but it was sufficient that the duke might have been defrauded. An objection in arrest was also taken, that the information did not allege that at the time of making the writing he was bound to deliver, and so, perhaps, nobody prejudiced. This time was held sufficiently certain, and the information was sustained against every objection. R. v. Ward, 2 L. Raym. 1461, 1466, 1469, 2 Strange 747, 2 East P. C. 861, Mi. 932.

This is a leading case. It underwent great examination and, in the course of the discussion, almost every authority upon common-law forgeries, then extant, appears to have been considered.

§ 161. "It is the False Making."

By innocent agent: Gregory v. S., 74. Separately by several: R. v. Bingley, § 74.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1772.) Fictitious Name. Charles Lockett was convicted of knowingly uttering a forged order for the payment of money in these words: "Messrs. Neal, Fordyce & Down, pay to William Hopwood or bearer £16 1s. 6d. Rt. Vennest," with intent to defraud John Scoles. The case was that the prisoner applied to Scoles, a colorman, and agreed to purchase goods to the amount of £10 6d., which he was to send for. He came again, pretending to

be in a hurry, and presented this note, which he said was a good one, and Scoles gave him £6 10s., being the difference. No such person as Rt. Vennest kept cash with Neal & Co., nor did it appear that there was any such man existing. The question submitted to the judges was, whether this were an order within the statute 7 Geo. 2, c. 22, being in the name of a fictitious person? the doubt arising on what is said in Mitchell's Case, Foster C. L. 119. The judges, after very long consideration, at last agreed, in Trin. term, 1774, that this was forgery. They thought it quite immaterial whether such a man as Vennest existed or not; or if he did, whether he had kept cash at the banking house of Neal & Co., it was sufficient that the order assumed those facts, and imparted a right on the part of the drawer to direct such a transfer of his property. R. v. Lockett, 2 East P. C. 940, 1 Leach C. C. (Ed. 3) Case 53, C. 498, Mi. 939.

Acc. P. v. Warner, 104 Mich. 337, 62 N. W. 405. Compare C. v. Drew, § 171, banking in false name. Having dies to stamp coins: R. v. Sutton, § 10. R. v. Heath, § 10.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1777.) Same. On indictment for forgery, the jury found that Tuft picked a bill of exchange and other property out of the pocket of the owner, and took the bill to a banker to be changed; and the clerk, knowing the bill to be good, said he could not pay it till indorsed by the person presenting it for payment; whereon defendant indorsed it "John Williams," and obtained the cash for it. The judges were unanimously of opinion that this was forgery, though the fictitious signature was not necessary to obtain the money, and his intent in writing a false name was probably to conceal himself, yet the owner thereby lost the chance of tracing his property and the discounter his indorser. R. v. Tuft, 1 Leach C. C. (Ed. 3) Case 88, C. 500.

Approved R v. Marshall (1804), Russell & R 75, C. 497.

(Ore. Sup. Ct., 1890.) Same. Ed. Wheeler drove a team of horses up in front of Milner's office, applied for a loan of $85.50, and offered to give a mortgage on the team to secure it. Milner did not know him, but looked at the team and then drew up the note for the amount desired, which Wheeler signed "John Williams," and thereon obtained the $85.50. Conviction of forgery on allegation and proof of these facts was affirmed on appeal after reviewing the decisions at some length. S. v. Wheeler, 20 Ore. 192, 25 Pac. 394, 23 Am. St. Rep. 119, 10 L. R. A. 779.

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(Tex. Ct. of Cr. App., 1893.) Name of Dead Man. Appellant was convicted of forgery. DAVIDSON, J. It is contended, inasmuch as Hathaway was dead at the time his name was signed to the check, that therefore the making of the false instrument cannot constitute the crime of forgery. The authorities do not sustain this position. On the other hand, so far as we have been able to ascertain, the contrary doctrine has been held to be the cor