rect one, and adhered to wherever the question has been adjudicated. Henderson v. S., 14 Tex. 503; Billings v. S., 107 Ind. 77, 6 N. E. 914; 2 Bish. Cr. L. § 543, and notes. It has also been held that he who signs the name of a person who had or has no legal capacity to make the instrument is guilty of forgery. P. v. Krummer, 4 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 217. Brewer v. S., 32 Tex. Cr. R. 74, 22 S. W. 41, 40 Am. St. Rep. 760.

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Affirmed.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1847.) Assumed Authority to Sign. The prisoner indorsed a bill of exchange, "per procuration, Thomas Tomlinson, Emanuel White." He had no authority to make the indorsement, but the twelve judges held unanimously that the act was no forgery. R. v. White, 2 Cox C. C. 210, 1 Den. C. C. 208, 2 Car. & K. 404, C. 495.

Acc. S. v. Taylor, 46 La. Ann. 1332, 16 So, 190, 49 Am. St. R. 351, 25 L. R. A. 591.

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(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1858.) Pretended Authority to Sign. Indictment for forging a note, signed "Schouler, Baldwin & Co." by defendant. It was proved, that the note was given in payment of an overdue note of defendant; that in reply to inquiry at the time of signing it, he said the firm consisted of himself and William Schouler; and that in fact if such partnership ever existed it had been dissolved before the note was given. Defendant was convicted and excepts. The question was whether so executing the note with intent to defraud was forgery. THOMAS, J. It would be difficult perhaps by a single definition of the crime of forgery to include all possible cases. Forgery, speaking in general terms, is the false making or material alteration of or addition to a written instrument for the purpose of deceit and fraud. It may be the making of a false writing purporting to be that of another. It may be the alteration in some material particular of a genuine instrument by a change of its words or figures. It may be the addition of some material provision to an instrument otherwise genuine. It may be the appending of a genuine signature of another to an instrument for which it was not intended. The false writing, alleged to have been made, may purport to be the instrument of a person or firm existing or of a fictitious person or firm. It may be even in the name of the prisoner, if it purports to be, and is desired to be received as the instrument of a third person having the same name. The writing alleged to be forged in the case at bar was the handwriting of the defendant, known to be such and intended to be received as such. It binds the defendant. Its falsity consists in the implication that he was a partner of Schouler and authorized to bind him by his act. This, though a fraud, is not, we think, a forgery. Exceptions sustained. C. v. Baldwin, 11 Gray 197, 71 Am. Dec. 703, C. 495, F. 319, Kn. 294, Mi. 940.

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(Pa. Sup. Ct., 1853.) Signature Induced by Fraud. Indictment for forgery. BLACK, C. J. The defendant wrote a note payable

to himself, for $141, and got an illiterate man to sign it, by falsely and fraudulently pretending that it was for $41 only. On a special verdict finding these facts, the court gave judgment in favor of the accused. The act was a forgery according to all the text writers on criminal law, from Coke to Wharton. But their doctrine is not sustained by the ancient English cases, and is opposed by the modern ones. Only three American decisions were cited on the argument; and we take it for granted that there are no others on the point. Two of these, Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45, 3 Am. Dec. 206, and Hill v. S., 1 Yerger (9 Tenn.) 76, 24 Am. Dec. 441, are wholly with the defendant; and the other, S. v. Shurtliff, 18 Me. 371, supports the argument of the commonwealth's counsel. The weight of the judicial authorities is in favor of the opinion that this is no forgery. We think that the arguments drawn from principle, and the reason of the thing, preponderate on the same side. It must be admitted that, in morals, such an imposture as this stands no better than the making of a false paper. But even a knave must not be punished for one offense because he has been guilty of another. Forgery is the fraudulent making or altering of a writing to the prejudice of another's right. The defendant was guilty of the fraud, but not of the making. The paper was made by the other person himself, in prejudice of his own right. To complete the offense, according to the definition is requires a fraudulent intent and a making both. The latter is innocent without the former, and the former, if carried into effect without the latter, is merely a cheat. If every trick, or false pretense, or fraudulent act by which a person is induced to put his name to a paper which he would not otherwise have signed, is to be called a forgery, where shall we stop, and what shall be the rule? Is it forgery to take a note for a debt known not to be due? Or to procure a deed for valuable land by fraudulently representing to the ignorant owner that it is worthless; or to get a legacy inserted in a will by imposing on a weak man in his illness? All these would be frauds-frauds perpetrated for the purpose of getting papers signed-as much as that which was committed in this case. But no one thinks they are forgeries. * * Affirmed. C. v. Sankey, 22 Pa. St. 390, 60

Am. Dec. 91, Mi. 943.

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(Eng. C. C. R., 1865.) False Entry by Bookkeeper. Habeas corpus on application for extradition. Windsor was clerk in a New York bank, and was charged with embezzling large sums of that bank's money and making false entries in the books to conceal his crime. BLACKBURN, J. * The only power that the extradition treaty gives to surrender a prisoner is that derived from the statute; and that statute, as far as I see, does not enact that all fugitives from justice shall be given up, but only those who have committed certain enumerated crimes-it provides for the delivery of any person charged with the crime of murder, assault with intent

to commit murder, the crime of piracy, arson, robbery, and forgery; these, both in the treaty and the statute passed to give effect to it, are the defined cases given by those high contracting parties to the treaty on which to deliver over prisoners to each other. Now the charge that is made out against this person is that he, being a clerk in a bank, did steal a large sum of money, and in order to conceal it did make an entry in a book, which entry, as I make it out, was an entry stating on his behalf that a certain quantity of specie had been deposited in the vaults, whereas, in point of fact, the statement was wilfully and fraudulently false, with the intention to conceal and embezzle. But though he was guilty of that crime, it did not amount to forgery. Forgery is the false making of an instrument purporting to be that which it is not; it is not the making of an instrument which purports to be what it really it, but which contains false statements. Telling a lie does not become a forgery because it is reduced into writing. The guilt of the thing which he has done is by no means more than that. He has not made any statement that is purported to be made by the authority of any person on behalf of that person. Now this man has made a false statement, falsely stating a fact which purports to be what it is. It is quite true that the state of New York by statute has enacted that those guilty of this offense shall, on conviction, be deemed guilty of forgery in the third degree. I pass by, without entering into them, the various observations that have been made to show that this did amount to this crime within the New York state; I am inclined to think it would be certainly a crime in the New York state. But then if this is not forgery, how does the fact that the local state of New York in the United States has declared in effect that he shall be deemed guilty of forgery, make it forgery within the meaning of the extradition statute? That, I think, we cannot do. Cockburn and Shee, JJ., concurred. Petitioner released. Ex Parte Windsor, 10 Cox C. C. 118, 6 B. & S. 522, 34 L. J. m. c. 163, 11 Jur. n. s. 807, 12 L. T. 307, C. 493.

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(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1873.) True Name With Intent to Cheat. Foster was indicted for uttering a forged note signed "Little & Co." He was indebted on notes for a large amount to one Chaddock. There was a Little & Co. in Boston, of known financial standing, doing a large manufacturing business. There was also a George P. Little, who had done a brokerage business in a small way and had sometimes done business under the name of Little & Co. Foster gave him $10 to sign a large note, by the name of Little & Co.; and Little testified that he knew of no fraudulent purpose. When Chaddock called to adjust his accounts, Foster gave his this note, and for it obtained return of other notes of his and some stock, at the same time representing that the note was executed by the Little & Co. doing a large manufacturing business in Boston. The court refused to instruct that if the note was signed by Geo. P. Little, and he had

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done business as Little & Co., Foster could not be convicted of uttering a forged paper, however false his statements concerning it may have been. The jury found him guilty, and on exceptions the judgment was affirmed. The court said: "Forgery is not necessarily counterfeiting. * It matters not by whom the signature is attached, if it be not attached as his own. If the note is prepared for the purpose of being fraudulently used as the note of another person, it is falsely made. The question of forgery does not depend upon the presence upon the note itself of the indicia of falsity. If extrinsic circumstances are such as to facilitate the accomplishment of the cheat without the aid of any device in the note itself, the preparation of a note with intent to take advantage of those circumstances and use it falsely is 'making a false instrument.'" C. v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311, 19 Am. Rep. 353, C. 503.

(Cal. Sup. Ct., 1900.) Same. Edwin Geddes had a deposit by the name of "E. Geddes" in the Fresno Loan & Sav. Bank when it suspended, and he assigned the account to the First Nat. Bank for collection. Later Rushing obtained from one Elmer Geddes a power of attorney signed and acknowledged by the name of "E. Geddes' by virtue of which Rushing assigned the deposit to one Levy for 65 cents on the dollar, much less than its value, received from him a check for the amount, $1,103.70, payable to the order of "E. Geddes," and on the check obtained the money, indorsing it "E. Geddes, by his attorney in fact, W. E. Rushing." Being convicted. of uttering a forgery and being denied a new trial, Rushing appealed; and the judgment was affirmed. The court said that the jury having found that he knew Elmer Geddes who gave the power of attorney had no interest in the account, he was guilty of the offense charged. P. v. Rushing, 130 Cal. 449, 62 Pac. 742, 80 Am. St. Rep. 141.

§ 162. "Materially Altering."

(Minn. Sup. Ct., 1895.) Middle Initial. An indictment for forgery alleged that Marion F. Higgins agreed by contract signed "M. F. Higgins" to build a church, and thereafter, with intent to make it appear that the contract was made by his wife, Martha Jane, changed the "F" to a "J." A demurrer on the ground that no material change was alleged, was overruled; and on case certified the order was affirmed. Buck, J., dissenting. The court said that if the first name had been signed in full the alteration might have been immaterial; but that when initials only are used, the middle letter is commonly relied on to fix the identity. Demurrer overruled. S. v. Higgins, 60 Minn. 1, 61 N. W. 816, 51 Am. St. Rep. 490, 27 L. R. A. 74.

§ 163. "With Intent to Defraud."

(Eng. C. C. R., 1856.) College Diploma. On indictment for forging and uttering a diploma of the college of surgeons, it appeared that Hodgson procured a diploma that had been issued to another, substituted his own name, changed the date, etc., hung it up in his room, stated that he was a member of the college, produced the paper to prove his statement, became a candidate for vaccinator at the poorhouse, and offered to produce his diploma to prove his qualification for the office. By statutes, members of the college were entitled to numerous privileges concerning vaccination, jails, asylums, serving on juries, etc. After conviction under these circumstances it was objected that no particular intent to defraud any individual was shown, and he had no intent to utter and publish to defraud or wrong any individual. This objection was held to be fatal, and the conviction was quashed. R. v. Hodgson, Dears. & B. 3, 25 L. J. m. c. 78, 2 Jur. n. s. 453, 7 Cox C. C. 122, 4 W. R. 509, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 626, Ke. 202, Mi. 946.

Cheating one in intent to defraud another is sufficient: R. v. Sheppard. § 44. Though the indictment should allege the name of the person intended to be defrauded, proof of intent to defraud in general and that the person named was deceived would be sufficient: Barnes v. C., 101 Ky. 556, 41 S. W. ` 772.

§ 164. "Of Any Writing."

(Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1855.) Counterfeit Ry. Ticket. Forgery. Defendant was indicted for fraudulently and without authority procuring innocent engravers and printers, in his absence, to engrave and print facsimiles of the tickets used on the N. Y. Central Ry. for passage from Boston to Albany, and selling them to be used for passage between these points. Verdict, guilty. He excepts. DEWEY, J. The instrument here set forth as the subject of the alleged forgery is not one included in the enumeration in Rev. St. c. 127, § 1. It is not, therefore, a statute offense. But many writings not enumerated in the statute are yet the subjects of forgery at the common law. The definition of forgery at common law is quite sufficient to embrace the present case. Take that in 4 Bl. Com. 247, "the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right." * It is said that this instrument does not import a contract or promise of any kind. We think otherwise. It is then objected that the crime of forgery cannot be committed by counterfeiting an instrument wholly printed or engraved, and on which there is no written signature personally made by those to be bound. In the opinion of the court, such an instrument may be the subject of forgery, when the entire contract, including the signature of the party, has been printed or engraved. It has never been considered any objection to contracts required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, that

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