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they were printed. It may be more difficult to establish the fact of their signatures; but, if shown, the effect is the same. Such being the effect of such form of executing like contracts, it would seem to follow that any counterfeit of it, in the similitude of it, would be making a false writing, purporting to be that of another, with the intent to defraud. It is further insisted that this indictment cannot be sustained against the present defendant because he did not personally aid in the actual, manual operation of engraving, printing or lithographing the alleged spurious railroad ticket. It is conceded that it was done by his procuration; that he procured the stereotype plate from which the ticket was printed, and that he carried the plate to a printer, who, at his request and on his behalf, printed the tickets, and delivered them to him. These facts are quite sufficient to charge the defendant. Verdict set aside.

C. v. Ray, 3 Gray 441, F. 321.

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(Eng. C. C. R., 1857.) Name on Picture. COCKBURN, C. J. If you once go beyond a writing where are you to stop? Could there be a forgery of a sculpture? The prisoner was indicted on a charge of having sold to one Fitzpatrick a picture as and for an original picture painted by Linnell, when in truth it was only a copy, and that he had passed it off by means of having the name "J. Linnell" painted in the corner of the picture in imitation of the original, which bore such signature. There were three counts in the indictment. The first was for obtaining money by false pretenses, on which the prisoner was acquitted. The second was for a cheat at common law; and the third for a cheat by means of forgery at common law. As to the third count, we are all of opinion that that was no forgery. A forgery must be of some document or writing; but the name of Linnell in this case can only be regarded as an arbitrary mark put upon the picture by the painter to enable him to recognize his own work. Conviction quashed. R. v. Closs, 7 Cox C. C. 494, Dears. & B. 460, 27 L. J. m. c. 54, 3 Jur. n. s. 1309, 6 W. R. 109, C. 486, Ke. 184.

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(Eng. C. C. R., 1858.) Imitating Trade Label. Smith was indicted and convicted of forgery. It was proved that he went to a printer and obtained 10,000 labels as nearly representing those used on Borwick's baking and egg powders as possible, put them on packages of powder put up to resemble Borwick's, and sold a great many of them. The judge instructed the jury to convict if the labels were similar enough to deceive persons of common understanding, and were uttered to deceive. WILLES, J. I agree in the definition of forgery at common law, that it is the forging of a false document to represent a genuine document. That does not apply here, for it is quite absurd to suppose that the prisoner was guilty of ten thousand forgeries as soon as he got these wrappers from the printer; and if he had distributed them over the whole earth and done no

more, he would have committed no offense. The fraud consists in putting inside the wrappers powder which is not genuine, and selling that. If the prisoner had had one hundred genuine wrappers and one hundred not genuine, and had put genuine powder in the spurious wrappers and spurious powder into the genuine wrappers, he would not have been guilty of forgery. This is not one of the different kinds of instruments which may be the subject of forgery. It is not made the subject of forgery simply by reason of the assertion of that which is false. In cases like the present, the remedy is well known: the prosecutor may, if he pleases, file a bill in equity to restrain the defendant from using the wrapper, and he may also bring an action at law for damages; or he may indict him for obtaining money under false pretenses. But to convert this into the offense of forgery would be to strain the rule of law. BYLES, J. Every forgery is a counterfeit. Here there was no counterfeit. The offense lies in the use of it. [Pollock, C. B., and Bramwell, B., gave similar opinions. Channell, B., concurred.] Conviction quashed. R. v. Smith, 8 Cox C. C. 32, Dears. & B. 566, 27 L. J. m. c. 225, 4 Jur. n. s. 1003, 6 W. R. 495, C. 488, Ke. 186, Mi. 934.

§ 165. "Might Apparently be of Some Legal Efficacy."

(Eng. C. C. R., 1800.) Will Void on Its Face. The conviction was on an indictment for forging a will of all the premises belonging to J. S., which he bought of T. W. & S. H. The will was attested by only two witnesses and was, therefore, void as a devise of a freehold; but would have been good as a bequest, if the pretended testator's interest had been but a term for years. It was suggested to be the latter; but no such fact appears to have been averred in the indictment; and it was not in proof at the trial. The judges, on conference, held the conviction wrong; for as it was not shown to be a chattel interest, it was presumed to be freehold. Wall's Case, 2 East P. C. 953, Mi. 937.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1802.) Raising Void Bill. On indictment for forging and counterfeiting a bill of exchange and for uttering it knowing it to be forged, it was shown that defendant erased the ten and wrote fifty in the words and figures of a bill of exchange for £10. The bill was written on a 16d. stamp and had been reissued twice after payment. The jury found guilty of uttering knowing it to be forged. After which it was objected that it was not forgery because there was no warrant in law for reissuing a bill of exchange after it had been paid, without a new stamp. At a meeting of the judges they all held that it was the same thing as forging or uttering a forged bill with a wrong stamp, which had been heid to be felony; and therefore the conviction was right. R. v. Teague, Russell & R. 33, 2 East P. C. 979, Mi. 937.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1787.) Moffatt was convicted of forging and uttering as true a forged acceptance on a bill of exchange, which bill was void on its face by St. 17 Geo. III. c. 30, § 1, for want of a stamp; and, on case reserved, all the judges held the conviction wrong; for if it had been a genuine instrument, it would have been absolutely void; and nothing could have made it good. Moffatt's Case, 2 East P. C. 954, 1 Leach C. L. (Ed. 3) Case 190.

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(New York Ct. of Oyer and Terminer, 1829.) Promise to Work, Showing No Consideration. Indictment for forging the following: "Three months after date, I promise to pay Sebastian I. Shall, or bearer, the sum of three dollars, in shoemaking, at cash price; the work to be done at his dwelling-house, near Simon Vrooman, in Minden. Minden, August 24th 1826. David W. Houghtaling." Defendant moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the writing was void on its face, no consideration being mentioned, and the indictment averred no extrinsic matter to make it good. After reviewing the decisions at some length, COWEN, J. I have shown that the paper forged, if genuine, would be a mere nullity. for any purpose; nor, to my mind, could it be made good by any possible averment. It could not be made the foundation of liability, like the letter of credit. It does not come within any of the cases sustaining indictments; but to me it appears to be directly within the cases cited holding that an instrument purporting to be void on its face, and not shown to be operative by averment, if genuine, is not the subject of forgery. How is it possible, in the nature of things, that it should be otherwise? Void things are as no things. Was it ever heard of, that the forgery of a nudum pactum, a thing which could not be declared on or enforced in any way, is yet indictable? It is the forgery of a shadow. I grant that on coupling a genuine note, like the one in question, with a consideration, a cause of action would be made. But you must aver the consideration in your declaration, and show it in proof on the trial. Had

this paper been used as a token, and thus made the medium of actual fraud by the defendant, he would be punishable as for a cheat. The instrument might, in that relative sense, become the subject of an indictment. It here stands alone. * Judgment arrested. P. v. Shall, 9 Cowen 778, F. 324.

UTTERING FORGED INSTRUMENT.

§ 166. In General. To utter a forged instrument is a distinct common-law misdemeanor.

(Eng. C. C. R., 1844.) Exhibiting a Receipt. Radford was a stonemason and purchased stone to the amount of over £5, for which invoices were sent him and payment frequently demanded and prom

ised. Finally he claimed that the bill had been paid, and produced a receipt purporting to be signed by the former manager of the quarry. He refused to part with the receipt, but it was taken from him and he was arrested. On conviction of uttering a forged instrument, a question was reserved as to whether the proof showed an uttering. On argument before eleven judges they were of opinion that the conviction was right, though he had not parted with the receipt out of his hand. R. v. Radford, 1 Den. C. C. 59, 1 Car. & K. 707, 1 Cox C. C. 168, 1 B. & H. 397, C. 508.

(Mich. Sup. Ct., 1872.) Uttering Forged Mortgage. Defendant was convicted on information of uttering as true a false and forged writing for the payment of money, in the likeness of a mortgage; and brings error. COOLEY, J. It is also objected that there was no evidence of the uttering and publishing to go to the jury. We think that, on the testimony of Mr. Elwood, the jury would have been warranted in finding that a negotiation for the sale of the mortgage was entered upon with him, and that the forged paper was put into his hands as a genuine instrument, ready for his acceptance as such, had he been prepared then, on behalf of the bank, to close the transaction. And these facts, if found, we think, would have constituted an uttering. To constitute an uttering, it is not necessary that the forged instrument should have been actually received as genuine by the party upon whom the attempt to defraud is made. To utter a thing, is to offer it, whether it be taken or not; Jervis, Ch. J., R. v. Welch, 2 Den. C. C 78, 15 Jur. 136. It is to declare or assert, directly or indirectly, by words or actions, that it is good: Tilghman, Ch. J., C. v. Searle, 2 Binn. 339. A receipt may be uttered by the mere exhibition of it to one with whom the party is claiming credit for it, though he refuses to part with the possession: R. v. Radford, 1 C. & K. 707. In P. v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 528, Cowen, J., says, "not only a sale or paying away a counterfeit note or indorsement, but obtaining credit on it in any form, as by leaving it in pledge: R. v. Birkett, Russ. & R. C. C. 86-or indeed offering it in dealing, though it be refused: R. v. Arscott, 6 C. & P. 408; R. v. Shukard, Russ. & R. 200; R. v. Palmer, 2 Leach (Ed. 4) 978-amount to an uttering and publishing." There are no decisions detracting from the force of these. We do not think it an important circumstance that it may have been contemplated that the board would be consulted by Elwood before closing the negotiation. * * Judgment ordered. P. v. Caton, 25 Mich. 388, Kn. 297.

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Forging in one state and uttering in another: Lindsey v. S.. § 87. Having forged bank notes intending to utter: C. v. Morse, § 10. Giving counterfeit coin for illicit intercourse is uttering it: R. v., § 24.

OBTAINING BY FALSE TOKENS.

§ 167. "In General.

Statute 33 Hen. VIII. (1541), c. 1. A bill against them that counterfeit letters or privy tokens to receive money or goods in other men's names. Forasmuch as many light and evil-disposed persons, not minding to get their livings by truth, according to the laws of this realm, but compassing and devising daily how they may unlawfully obtain and get into their hands and possession goods, chattels and jewels of other persons, for the maintenance of their unthrifty living, and also knowing that if they come to any of the same goods, chattels, and jewels, by stealth, that then they, being thereof lawfully convicted according to the laws of this realm, shall die therefore; have now of late falsely and deceitfully contrived, devised, and imagined, privy tokens, and counterfeit letters in other men's names, unto divers persons their special friends and acquaintances, for the obtaining of money, goods, chattels and jewels of the same persons, their friends and acquaintances, by color whereof the said light and evil-disposed persons have deceitfully and unlawfully obtained and gotten great substance of money, goods and jewels into their hands and possession, contrary to right and conscience. § 2. For reformation whereof, be it ordained and enacted by authority of this present parliament, That if any person or persons, of what estate or degree soever he or they be, at any time after the the first day of April next coming, falsely and deceitfully obtain or get into his or their hands or possession, any money, goods, chattels, jewels, or other things of any other person or persons, by color and means of any such false token or counterfeit letter made in any other man's name as is aforesaid, that then every person and persons so offending, and being thereof lawfully convict, shall have and suffer such correction and punishment, by imprisonment of his body, setting upon the pillory, or otherwise by any corporal pain (except pains of death) as shall be unto him or them limited, adjudged or appointed by the person or persons before whom he shall be so convicted of the said offenses, or of any of them.

(Eng. King's Bench, 1704.) What is Token-Pretended to Be Sent. Indictment for cheating. Defendant obtained £20 of A by pretending that B sent him for it, which was false. Per CURIAM: It is not indictable unless he came with false tokens; we are not to indict one man for making a fool of another. Let him bring his action. R. v. Jones, 1 Salk. 379, 2 L. Raym. 1013, Mi. 845.

(Pa. Sup. Ct., 1780.) Same-Marked Weight. Certiorari. This was an indictment against the defendant, a baker employed by the army of the United States, for a cheat, in baking 219 barrels of