to pay office expenses, dividends, advertising, etc., and the balance put in the banks, or other deposits. No trading on the exchange was done. The crisis was inevitable, as the dividends increased and deposits did not grow in much greater proportion. Defendant made an assignment, took $100,000 in cash and as much more in U. S. bonds and went to Canada. The prosecutrix was one of his victims. She testified that she put in $100 of her own accord, and drew $10 a week on it for several weeks, then conceived the idea that it would be a good thing to put in $1,000 and get $100 a week; that she took it to defendant herself, asked him if he would insure the money against loss, and was told that the coupon was insurance enough, but was not asked to put the money in, nor was any representation made as to how it would be used, but she understood that the money of the Goulds and Vanderbilts was made in Wall St., and thought this money would be used in this way for her benefit. Was this larceny? Was it obtaining money by false pretenses? Was it embezzlement ? Was it any crime? P. v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418, 88 Am. St. Rep. 546; same case, 64 N. Y. App. Div. 450, 72 N. Y. Supp. 253. Compare R. v. Hodgson, § 163, as to intent to defraud. § 175a. In General. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF. Definition and criminality: See several cases under § 16; R. v. Kelly, § 43; R. v. Pembliton, § 44; Dobbs's Case, § 115. Distinguished from larceny: P. v. Woodward, § 145. Mere noises as: C. v. Taylor, § 180. CHAPTER X. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE. § 176. General Statement, 551. COMMON BARRATRY, MAINTENANCE, AND CHAMPERTY. § 177. Common Barratry, 551. § 178. Maintenance, 551. § 179. Champerty, 552. SIMPLE BREACHES OF THE PEACE. § 180. Noises, etc., 552. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND FORCIBLE DETAINER. § 181. Defined, etc., 553. AFFRAY. § 182. Defined, etc., 554. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY, ROUT, AND RIOT. § 183. Defined and Distinguished, 555. LIBEL. § 184. Defined, etc., 556. § 176. General Statement. Since the prime purpose of government is to maintain peace and tranquility to enable the people to live in comfort and security, any disturbance of sufficient magnitude for the law's notice is criminal. Chief among crimes of this class are: stirring up strife by common barratry, maintenance, and champerty (prosecutions for which are very rare and their criminality now doubtful); various simple breaches of the peace, as eavesdropping, common scolding, and making noises to the disturbance of the community; forcible entry and forcible detainer; affray; unlawful assembly, rout, and riot; and libel. Let us examine these separately. COMMON BARRATRY, MAINTENANCE, AND CHAMPERTY. § 177. "Common Barratry is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels between his majesty's subjects, either at law or otherwise." 4 Bl. Com. 134. § 178. "Maintenance is an offense that bears a near relation to the former, being an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it. A man may, however, maintain the suit of his near kinsman, servant, or poor neighbor, out of charity and compassion, with impunity." 4 Bl. Com. 134. * : § 179. "Champerty, campi-partitio, is a species of maintenance and punished in the same manner; being a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant campum partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them if they prevail at law; whereupon the champerter is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense." Common law not adopted on this offense in Pennsylvania: James v. C., § 5. SIMPLE BREACHES OF THE PEACE. § 180. Noises, Etc. (Pa. Sup. Ct., 1812.) Making Disturbance at Night. Taylor was indicted and convicted of entering the house of J. Strain at 10 p. m., and making a great noise. The court arrested judgment on the ground that no crime was charged. The record comes here on writ of error. TILGHMAN, C. J. It is contended on the part of James Taylor, that the matter charged in the indictment is no more than a private trespass, and not an offense subject to a criminal prosecution. On the other hand it has been urged for the commonwealth that the offense is indictable; 1st, as a forcible entry; 2nd, as a malicious mischief. I incline to the opinion that the matter charged in the indictment does not constitute a forcible entry, although no doubt a forcible entry is indictable at common law. There must be actual force to make an indictable offense. The bare allegation of its being done with force and arms does not seem to be sufficient, for every trespass is said to be with force and arms. There is another principle, however, upon which it appears to me that the indictment may be supported. It is not necessary that there should be actual force or violence to constitute an indictable offense. Acts injurious to private persons, which tend to excite violent resentment, and thus produce fighting and disturbance of the peace of society, are themselves indictable. To send a challenge to fight a duel is indictable, because it tends directly towards a breach of the peace. Libels fall within the same reason. A libel even of a deceased person, is an offense against the public, because it may stir up the passions of the living and produce acts of revenge. Now, what could be more likely to produce violent passion and a disturbance of the peace of society, than the conduct of the defendant? He enters secretly after night into a private dwelling-house with an intent to disturb the family, and after entering makes such a noise as to terrify the mistress of the house to such a degree as to cause a miscarriage. Was not this enough to produce some act of desperate violence on the part of the master or servants of the family? It is objected that the kind of noise is not described. No matter; it is said to have been made vehemently and turbulently, and its effects on the pregnant woman are described. In the case of R. v. Hood, Sayer 161, the court refused to quash an indictment for disturbing a family by violently knocking at the front door of the house for the space of two hours. It is impossible to find precedents for all offenses. The malicious ingenuity of mankind is constantly producing new inventions in the art of disturbing their neighbors. To this invention must be opposed general principles calculated to meet and punish them. I am of opinion that the conduct of the defendant falls within the range of established principles, and that the judgment of the court below should be reversed. [Yeates, and Brackenridge, JJ., filed concurring opinions.] C. v. Taylor, 5 Binney 277, Mi. 44. Shooting dog on porch of owner to terror of members of family is: Henderson v. C., § 18. Shooting a wild goose near a house, so that a woman had a fit: C. v. Wing, § 18. Mere trespass: R. v. Bake, § 18; R. v. Turner, § 61. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND FORCIBLE DETAINER. § 181. Defined. "Forcible entry or detainer, which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements with menaces, force, and arms, and without the authority of law." 4 Bl. Com. 148. (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct., 1849.) What Constitutes at Common Law. Indictment for forcible entry and detainer. Defendant demurred. Demurrer overruled. Verdict, guilty. He excepts, among other things, to the sufficiency of the indictment. DEWEY, J. * We apprehend that both before and since the enacting of the various statute provisions in England, the remedies for a forcible entry unlawfully made have been twofold, one by indictment at common law, and the other by proceedings under the statutes. In R. v. Bathurst, Sayer 225, it was held, that an indictment lies at common law for a forcible entry into a dwelling-house and expelling the occupants. In R. v. Bake, 3 Burr. 1731 [§ 18], Justice Wilmot says, "Undoubtedly an indictment will lie at common law, for a forcible entry, though the proceedings are generally under the acts of parliament." In R. v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 357, 362, Lord Kenyon says, "There is no doubt that the offense of forcible entry is indictable at the common law, though the statute gives other remedies to the parties aggrieved." 3 Chit. Crim. Law 1131; Rosc. Cr. Ev. 374, are also authorities to the same effect. * This must be so upon sound principles, as the preservation of the public peace requires that the offense should be punished criminally. Individuals are not to assert their claims to real estate, and especially to a dwelling-house, in the actual possession of another, by force and violence, and with a strong hand. The peace of the commonwealth forbids it. This principle does not in any degree interfere with the making of a formal entry upon land, preparatory to the bringing of an action at law, and which may be necessary to give a legal seizin to the party, but which leaves those in possession undisturbed as to the actual occupation. Nor does it embrace the case of a mere trespass upon land, as to which the civil remedy is alone to be resorted to. To sustain an indictment for a forcible entry, the entry must be accompanied with circumstances tending to excite terror in the owner, and to prevent him from maintaining his right. There must at least be some apparent violence; or some unusual weapons; or the parties attended with an unusual number of people; some menaces, or other acts giving reasonable cause to fear, that the party making the forcible entry will do some bodily hurt to those in possession, if they do not give up the same. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances, connected with the entry, that removes it from the class of cases of civil injury, to be redressed in actions of trespass or other civil proceedings, and holds the party thus making an unlawful entry amenable to the public as for a public wrong. Does the present indictmeut charge such an offense, as we have above described as that of a forcible entry? Charging the entry to have been unlawfully made with force and arms, and with a strong hand, is a sufficient allegation to constitute the offense a forcible entry. The words "with a strong hand" mean something more than a common trespass. By Lawrence, J., in R. v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 362, these words are said to imply that the entry was accompanied with that terror and violence. which constitute the offense. See Rastall's Entries, 354; Baude's Case, Cro. Jac. 41. It seems to us, therefore, that this indictment does well charge the offense of a forcible entry, and that such forcible entry is an offense at common law. Exceptions overruled. C. v. Shattuck, 4 Cush. 141, Kn. 324. * "Force and arms" does not imply breach of peace sufficient to sustain indictment: R. v. Bake, § 18; Kilpatrick v. P., § 16; C. v. Taylor, § 180. A common law offense: R. v. Bake, § 18. AFFRAY. § 182. Defined, Etc. "Affrays (from affraier, to terrify) are the fighting of two or more persons in some public place, to the terror of his majesty's subjects: for, if the fighting be in private, it is no affray but an assault." 4 Bl. Com. 145. (Ga. Sup. Ct., 1853.) Proof of Joining in Affray-Mere Words. WARNER, J. The defendants were indicted for an affray, which is defined by our code, to be "the fighting of two or more persons in some public place, to the terror of the citizens, and disturbance of the public tranquility." Prince, 643. Where two are indicted for an affray, the successful defense of one will operate as an acquittal of both; as where the evidence shows that one of |