REG. v. KANE. accompanied by a direction in writing how to apply it." And in Re Bellencontre, [1891] 2 Q. B. 122, Cave, J., at p. 137, says: "There are two sections in the Act of 1861 which deals with crimes against property, namely, sections 75 and 76, which also contain provisions for the punishment of fraudulent bailees in certain cases, and of fraudulent bailees of particular kinds. Where a man is a bailee of a particular kind—a banker, a merchant, an agent, or a factor-and receives property with written instructions "how he is to dispose of it, and he misappropriates that property, then under section 75 he is punishable, but our law requires what the French law does not require, written instructions." That is the meaning Cave, J., gives to the word "direction." Here there are no written instructions at all; a man cannot instruct himself. This document is merely a receipt. RIDLEY, J.-I think this is a direction in writing within the section, but the point ought, if necessary, to be decided by the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved. Verdict: Guilty. The jury found also as a fact that the above receipt was given by the defendant to the prosecutrix as part of the same transac tion in which the cheque was given. The defendant was released on his own recognisances in 100l. to come up for judgment at some future sessions of the Central Criminal Court if he was called upon so to do. Solicitor for the prosecution: J. Stanley Kent. Solicitors for the defence: Osborn and Osborn. 65 J. P. 10. CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. [Before RIDLEY, J.] December 14, 1900. REG. V. PIPER. Criminal law-Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 80-Trustee-Indictment. In an indictment against a person, under section 80 of the Larceny Act, 1861, for fraudulently disposing of trust property, it is sufficient to allege that such person was a trustee; it is not necessary to allege that he was a trustee on some express trust created by some instrument in writing. The defendant was indicted as follows:"Central Criminal Court to wit: The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present that Frederick John Piper on the 17th day of February A.D. 1900 in the parish of Fulham in the county of London and within the jurisdiction of the said court being a trustee of certain property to wit of the sum of 141. Os. 6d. for the use and benefit of James John Hovey and others the members of the Walham Green Mutual Advance Society unlawfully and with intent to defraud did convert and appropriate the same property to and for his own use and benefit against the form, &c. "Second count: And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present that Frederick John Piper on the 17th day of February A.D. 1900 in the parish of Fulham in the county of London and within the jurisdiction of the said court being a trustee of certain property to wit the sum of 141. Os. 6d. for the use and benefit of James John Hovey and others members of the Walham Green Mutual Advance Society unlawfully and with intent to defraud did convert and appropriate the same property to and for the use and benefit of a person other than the said members of the Walham Green Mutual Advance Society for whom he was such trustee as aforesaid against the form, &c." There were six other counts having reference to three other sums of money. REG. v. PIPER. Symmons, for the defence, moved to quash the indictment. No offence is disclosed in any of the counts. The defendant is indicted in each of the counts simply as "being a trustee." Section 1 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), says: "The term 'trustee' shall mean a trustee on some express trust created by some deed, will, or instrument in writing, &c." A person to be liable on an indictment framed under section 80 of the Larceny Act, as is the case here, must be a trustee on some express trust created by deed, &c., and the indictment should allege that he is such trustee on such express trust. The Larceny Act does not say that in an indictment the word "trustee" shall mean a trustee on some express trust, it only has that meaning in the Act itself. The form in Archbold's Criminal Pleading (22nd edit.), p. 554, is wrong. The word "trustee" alone might mean a trustee not on any express trust created in writing. At the least the indictment ought to allege that the defendant was a trustee within the meaning of the Larceny Act, 1861. Guy Stephenson, for the prosecution, was not called upon to argue the point. RIDLEY, J.-I think this is a technicality which ought not to prevail. The jury, after hearing the opening of the case for the prosecution and the expression of the judge's opinion, acquitted the defendant. Verdict: Not Guilty. 65 J. P. 26. CROWN CASES RESERVED. December 20, 1900. REG. V. KANE. Criminal law-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75Agent-Direction in writing. Section 75 of the Larceny Act, 1861, does not apply to a person who merely happens to act on one occasion as an agent for another person. Reg. v. Portugal, 16 Q. B. D. 487, followed. 65 J. P. 26. The prisoner, Louis Kane, was tried before me on the 13th of December, 1900, at the Central Criminal Court on an indictment containing four counts charging him in the first count for that he, having been entrusted as an agent by Elizabeth Mary Williamson with a certain security for the payment of money, to wit, with an order for the payment of the sum of 607., with a certain direction in writing to apply such security to a certain purpose specified in such direction, to wit, for the application of 60 shares in the Bakerstreet and Waterloo Railway, unlawfully, in violation of good faith, and contrary to the terms of such direction, did convert such security to his own use and benefit contrary to the provisions of the first branch of section 75 of the Larceny Act, 1861. The other counts of the indictment varied the charge by describing the thing converted to be "the proceeds of such security," and the conversior to be to the use and benefit of a person other than the said Elizabeth Mary Williamson. The prisoner was stated to be a conjurer and a thought reader, and in the month of November, 1900, made the acquaintance of the prosecutrix at the Tudor Hotel, Oxfordstreet, where they were both staying, and on the 13th of November, about 2.30 p.m., he called her attention to an advertisement relating to the Baker-street and Waterloo Railway Company in which, he said, he was himself going to invest, and that it was a safe thing and would pay good interest. He further said that he was going to apply for 60 shares for himself, and advised the prosecutrix to make an application for a similar number. The prosecutrix got her cheque book, and in the prisoner's presence wrote out a cheque for 60., which ran as follows: No. B. 192,064. 14, High Street, W., London, Nov. 13th, 1900. Parr's Bank, Limited-Notting Hill Branch. Pay L. Kane or order sixty pounds only. 601. Os. Od. E. M. Williamson. Head office, Bartholomew-lane, London, E.C. (Reverse side)-Ludwig Kane. Whilst the prosecutrix was writing the cheque the prisoner asked her not to cross it, as he said the application list closed that afternoon, and it was necessary to pay cash with the application in order to secure the shares. Upon these representations the prosecutrix handed the cheque to the prisoner, and ou REG. v. KANE. the same afternoon asked him for a receipt for the 601. represented by the cheque, when the prisoner wrote out a receipt in the following words : "Received of Mrs. Williamson 601. for the application of 60 shares in the Baker-street and Waterloo Railway, to be returned if these shares are not obtainable. "Prof. L. Kane, "13th November, 1900." On this document was a receipt stamp cancelled by the figures 13-11-00 being written by the prisoner upon it. It was clearly proved that the prisoner made no application for the shares in the company, and that he himself had cashed the cheque across the counter at the branch of the bank in which it was drawn at or about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 13th of November, 1900, and that he used the proceeds for purposes of his own, and the substantial question raised at the trial was whether the document signed by the prisoner, when taken together with the cheque given to him by the prosecutrix, was such a direction in writing as to bring the offence of the prisoner within the first part of section 75 of the Larceny Act. On the part of the prosecution it was contended that the prisoner was an agent, but no case was cited in support of this contention, and on the part of the prosecution it was further contended that if the cheque signed by the prosecutrix and the document signed by the prisoner were taken together, or even if the document signed by the prisoner stood alone, there was such a direction in writing as to bring the prisoner's offence within the first part of section 75 of the Larceny Act, and in support of this con. tention the case of Reg. v. Christian, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 94, was cited. On the part of the prisoner it was contended that the document signed by the prisoner, whether it was read with or apart from the cheque signed by the prosecutrix, constituted no such direction in writing as to bring the case within the first part of section 75 of the Larceny Act, and in support of this contention the cases of Reg. v. Brownlow, 14 Cox 216, and Re Bellencontre, [1891] 2 Q. B. 122, were cited. I left the case to the jury, directing them that the prisoner was an agent, and that the document signed by the prisoner was a sufficient direction in writing, whether taken 65 J. P. 26. with or apart from the cheque drawn by prosecutrix, to satisfy the requirements of the section. The jury found the prisoner guilty, adding, in answer to a question put by me, that the document signed by the prisoner was an intrinsic part of the transaction in which he received the cheque. Whereupon I admitted the prisoner to bail on his own recognisance to come up for judgment if called upon, and reserved the question for the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved whether my direction was right. If the court should be of opinion that the prisoner was an agent within the first part of section 75 of the Larceny Act, and that the document or documents above specifically referred to constitute such a direction in writing as is required by the first part of that section, the conviction is to stand; otherwise it is to be quashed. Lord ALVERSTONE, L.C.J.-Although this court is not bound by Reg. v. Portugal (supra) we think we ought to follow that decision. The section does not apply to a person who happens to act upon one occasion in the capacity of agent for another. Speak. ing for myself I desire to say that if it were not for this point there would be a very substantial question to be argued. BRUCE, RIDLEY, BIGHAM, Darling, JJ., concurred. Conviction quashed. Solicitor for the prosecution: J. Stanley Kent. Solicitors for the defence: Osborn and Osborn. 65 J. P. 27. MANCHESTER ASSIZES. November 10, 1900. REG. v. KNOWLES. Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, ss. 4, 5-" Convicted upon indictment of assault"-Throwing corrosive fluid-Order for separation. Where a husband was convicted at assizes upon indictment of throwing a corrosive fluid on his wife with intent to burn, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding two months, an order, on the application of the wife, was made by the judge presiding at the trial under sections 4, 5 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), that she be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband. At the Manchester Assizes, before Darling, J., and a jury, Harry Knowles was indicted for that at Burnley, on the 4th of August, 1900, he unlawfully and maliciously did cast and throw at and upon one Mary Knowles, his wife, a certain corrosive fluid, to wit, oil of vitriol, with intent thereby to do grievous bodily harm, and in a second count with intent to burn. The prisoner pleaded not guilty. William Mackenzie for the prosecution. After evidence the jury found the prisoner guilty of throwing vitriol with intent to burn. DARLING, J., sentenced the prisoner to 18 calendar months' imprisonment with hard labour. Mackenzie, on behalf of the wife, applied for an order of separation under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, ss. 4, 5. Section 4 of that Act gives power to the court before whom a husband is convicted on indictment to make an order, thereby avoiding the necessity of going before a court of summary jurisdiction. The prisoner has been convicted upon an indictment of what amounts to an assault upon his wife. Throwing vitriol with intent to burn is an "assault" in law. The case therefore comes within the scope of section 4 of the Act of 1895, and under section 5 an 65 J. P. 27. order may be made that the wife be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband. Due notice of intention to make this application has been served upon the prisoner. DARLING, J., held that the case came within section 4 of the Act, and made an order of separation under section 5 accordingly. Application granted. Solicitor for prosecution: Steele Sheldon, Burnley. 65 J. P. 39. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. October 30, 31, 1900. JONES v. DAVIES. Bastardy-"Single woman"-Wife living with her husband-Right to lay information-Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 65), s. 3. A married woman conceived a child during her husband's absence at sea. On his return he became aware of her condition, but continued to live with her. Held, that the woman was not a single woman within the meaning of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act (35 & 36 Vict. c. 65), s. 3, and was not entitled to lay an information against the putative father of the child. Case stated by justices upon the hearing of an information preferred by the appel lant against the respondent under the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act (35 & 36 Vict. c. 65), s. 3. Upon hearing it was proved that the appellant at the time of the birth of the child mentioned in the information, and for some years previously, was a married woman, the wife of Benjamin Jones (hereinafter called the husband), who JONES v. DAVIES. is still alive. The appellant deposed that the respondent was the father of the child, which was born on the 3rd of December, 1899. Some evidence (other than the appellant's or her husband's evidence) was called to show that the husband, who was a seafaring man, was from home from the 23rd of February, 1899, to the 6th of July, 1899. It was proved that the husband became aware of the appellant's pregnancy about four months after conception, and notwithstanding that fact he returned to his wife, who had throughout remained at his home, in July, 1899, and September, 1899. On each of these occasions the husband and wife lived and cohabited together. The next time the husband returned to his wife at his home was on Saturday, the 27th of January 1900 (which was after the birth of the said child), and they continued to cohabit as husband and wife, though the husband alleged he did not sleep in the same house with the appellant during this visit. On the 31st of January, 1900, while the husband and wife so cohabited together, as mentioned in the last paragraph, the appellant, accompanied by her husband, laid an information, in which she described herself as a "single woman," and applied to a justice for a summons under section 3 of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 65), to be served on respondent as putative father of the said child, and such summons was issued and served. That subsequently, on the 7th of February, 1900, while the said husband and wife cohabited together as husband and wife, as above mentioned the appellant, accompanied by her husband, attended upon the solicitor, who appeared for the appellant at the hearing on that day, namely, the 7th of February last, she, after being advised by her said solicitor that it was necessary for her and her husband to separate, then left the office, and immediately afterwards, and on the same day, she laid an information, in which she described herself as a "single woman," and applied for another summons under section 3 of the beforementioned Act to be served on the respondent as putative father of the said child, and such summons was duly issued and served. That at the hearing on the 28th of February, 1900, the first above mentioned summons, namely, the one issued on the 31st of January, 1900, was withdrawn, and the 65 J. P. 39. matter proceeded on the second summons issued on the 7th of February, 1900. The solicitor who appeared for the appellant at the hearing admitted that he advised the appellant that she could not obtain an order upon the respondent unless the appellant and her husband lived apart, and that thereupon the appellant and her husband, it was said in evidence, separated, the appellant returning to her husband's house at a village called Aberarth, and her husband going to the appellant's father's house at New Quay, both in the county of Cardigan, and about seven miles apart. The husband and wife alleged that from the time the appellant and her husband separated as aforesaid on the 7th of February, 1900, to the 28th of February they had not again seen each other, but that on the latter date they both attended the hear. ing of the application, and the husband at such hearing sat by and instructed the solicitor who appeared for the appellant. That thereafter the wife went to the union workhouse at Aberayron, and the husband returned to his home at Aberarth. The husband in his evidence admitted that on the occasion when the second summons was issued, namely, the 7th of February, 1900, he was told by the appellant's solicitor that he (the husband) and his wife should live apart, and that he thereafter lived apart for the purpose of the affiliation proceedings. The following question was put to the husband by the chairman of the justices :-"It has been stated here that you mean to live with your wife after these proceedings are over." The husband, in reply, stated, "Yes, I think I will; that is, according as she behaves and she gets her rights"; and immediately after he added, "No, I don't think I will." It was contended that the appellant was not a single woman within the meaning of section 3 of 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, and that an order to affiliate the child could not under the circumstances be made on her application. We found as facts (1) That the husband became aware of the pregnancy of his wife in about four months after conception; (2) that with such knowledge he lived and cohabited with her for lengthened periods in July and September, 1899, and January and February, 1900; (3) that the summons applied for and issued on the 31st of January, 1900, was withdrawn because |