HULL v. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL. Metropolis Management Act, 1855, provision is made for the removal of any lamps, iron sign-post, showboard, window shutter, gate, fence, or any other projection or obstruction placed or made against, or in front of any house or building which shall be an annoyance in consequence of the same projecting into or being made in or endangering or rendering less commodious the passage along any street. Further, as to the point raised by the case whether the prosecution of the alleged defence is barred under section 11 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, by lapse of time, we think it is. If any offence was committed it was, we think, complete on the 20th of June, 1899, the date on which the said sign was com. pletely affixed to the premises. The case of London County Council v. Cross (supra) is, we think, in point. As to the third point, we think that, if the sign had been a projection within the meaning of section 73 of the London Building Act, 1894, and the proceedings had been taken in due time, the appellant could not have escaped liability on the alleged ground that he had no power to control or alter the position of the sign without trespass. The result of our judgment is that the conviction, determination, and order must be reversed, and we think the appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for the appellants: L. M. and J. Benson. Solicitor for the respondent: W. A. Blaxland. "Central Criminal Court to wit: The jurors for our Lord the King upon their oath present that Frederick William Miller and Margaret Anne Miller on the 9th day of April 1901 and upon divers days and times between the 9th day of November A.D. 1900 and the said 9th day of April at the parish of St. Mary Battersea in the county of London and within the jurisdiction of the said court being persons over the age of sixteen years and having the custody charge and care of Frederick Miller a boy under the age of sixteen years to wit the age of five years or thereabouts unlawfully and wilfully did neglect the said Frederick Miller in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to his health against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. "Second count: And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present that the said Frederick William Miller and Margaret Anne Miller upon and between the times aforesaid at the parish in the county and within the jurisdiction aforesaid being persons as aforesaid and having the custody charge and care of Ruby Miller a girl under the age of sixteen years to wit of the age of three years or thereabouts unlaw. fully and wilfully did neglect the said Ruby Miller in a manner likely to cause her unnecessary suffering or injury to her health against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. REX v. MILLER AND ANOTHER. "Third count: And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present that the said Frederick William Miller and Margaret Anne Miller upon and between the times aforesaid at the parish in the county and within the jurisdiction aforesaid being persons as aforesaid and having the custody charge and care of Dorothy Mabel Miller a girl under the age of sixteen years to wit of the age of eleven months or thereabouts unlawfully and wilfully did neglect the said Dorothy Mabel Miller in a manner to cause her unnecessary suffering or injury to her health against the form of the statute in such case made and provided." Arthur Hutton (Fordham with him) appeared for the prosecution. H. G. Rooth for the defence.-The defendants pleaded not guilty, and evidence was called by the prosecution with reference to the charges contained in the above indictment between the dates therein specified. Hutton then proposed to call further evidence to prove that the two children Frederick and Ruby, had been neglected by the defendants on dates antecedent to any date alleged in the above indictment.-I submit that I am entitled to call this evidence either under the authority of Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, [1894] A. C. 57, to show that what the defendants did, or neglected to do, between the dates specified in the indictment was not an accident; or under the authority of section 18 (4) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 41): "Where an offence under this Act . charged against any person is a continuous offence, it shall not be necessary to specify in the information, summons, or indictment the date of the acts constituting the offence." Rooth.-If the dates had not been specified in the indictment, perhaps the evidence might have been admissible. As the dates have been specified the prosecution are bound by them. PHILLIMORE, J.-I think it would be a little hard on the defendants to allow the evidence to be given. It had better not be given. At the close of the case for the prosecution, the defendants were called and gave evidence on their own behalf, and were cross-examined, amongst other matters, as to the allegations contained in the excluded evidence. Public health-Consolidated rate-Exemption-Land reclaimed from river Thames -New tax or assessment-7 Geo. III. c. 37, s. 51-City of London Sewers Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. clxiii.), ss. 168, 169. The exemption conferred by section 51 of 7 Geo. III. c. 37, upon land reclaimed from the river Thames under that Act only extends to taxes and assessments in existence when the Act was passed. The consolidated rate imposed by sections 168 and 169 of the City of London Sewers Act, 1848, is a substantially new assessment, and therefore does not fall within the exemption. Appeal of appellants from the judgment of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division (Grantham and Channell, JJ.), on PRESIDENT, ETC., OF SION COLLEGE V. MAYOR, ETC., OF THE CITY OF LONDON. a special case stated upon an appeal to the quarter sessions holden in and for the City of London by the appellants against the rate made by the respondents on the 23rd of April, 1899 (hereinafter described), whereby the appellants are rated as occupiers of certain hereditaments in the ward of Farringdon Without, parish of St. Bride, in the City of London, hereinafter described. By consent of the parties and by order of Darling, J., dated the 3rd day of October, 1899, pursuant to section 11 of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, it was ordered that the parties should be at liberty to state the facts of the said appeal in the form of a special case pursuant to the said statute, and that judgment in conformity with the decision of this court be entered on motion by either party at the quarter sessions holden in and for the City of London next or next but one after the decision of this court shall be given, and for such costs as this court shall adjudge. The special case was as follows: 1. On the 23rd of April, 1899, the respondents, acting in pursuance of the City of London Sewers Act, 1897, the City of London Sewers Acts, 1848 and 1851, and the Elementary Education Act, 1870, and the Acts amending the same, duly made a consolidated rate for the year 1899 at 2s. 5d. in the £ (including 18. 2d. for the school board), collectable in moieties as usual, the one being due as soon as made, and the other on the 1st of July, 1899. Scheduled in this case is the heading of the said rate and an extract therefrom, the latter showing the premises which the appellants occupy, and in respect of which they are assessed and the assessment upon them. There is annexed to this case an agreed plan (which forms part of the case) showing the appellants' premises assessed in the said rate. The appellants' premises are shown on the said plan by the hatched black lines, and the part lying within the district edged yellow and coloured brown is on land which was reclaimed under the statute 7 Geo. III. c. 37. The whole of the said district edged yellow was formerly ground and soil of the river Thames; that is to say, foreshore of the said river, and was reclaimed from the river Thames under the said Act. The residue of the appellants' premises is on land reclaimed under the Acts. The questions arising on this appeal arise solely with regard to the said part 65 J. P. 324. question arises in The assessment in coloured brown; no regard to the residue. the said rate numbered 662 is the one relating to the brown part. It is the fact that since the conveyances to the appellants hereinafter mentioned and prior to the present rate they have not in fact been assessed in respect of the said part coloured brown to the said consolidated rate. The respondents allege that this was done in error and is immaterial in law. 2. The appellants duly appealed against the said rate to the court of quarter sessions for the city of London on the ground that the portion of the said premises coloured brown is exempt by statute 7 Geo. III. c. 37, from all rates and taxes and assessments whatsoever, including the rates made under the Acts aforesaid. 3. The land and buildings in question, known as Sion College, were acquired by the appellants in the year 1886 under the Act of Parliament 47 Vict. c. v., entitled "An Act for enabling the President and Fellows of Sion College within the city of London to acquire a new site for the building of the said college from the mayor, commonalty and citizens of the city of London and for other purposes," and a conveyance to them by an indenture dated the 8th of April, 1886, a copy of which marked A is annexed to and forms part of this case. 4. The appellants contend that the portion of the said land coloured brown on the said plan and the building thereon are not rateable to the consolidated rate made under the Acts mentioned in paragraph 1 aforesaid, but are exempt from the said rate by virtue of the statute 7 Geo. III. c. 37. 5. The respondents contend that the said part coloured brown is liable to be assessed to the consolidated rate made under the said Acts mentioned in paragraph 1 aforesaid and is not exempt therefrom by virtue of 7 Geo. III. c. 37. The question for the opinion of the court is whether the said portion of the said premises coloured brown is entitled to exemption from the above-mentioned consolidated rate or any part thereof by virtue of 7 Geo. III. c. 37, or is not so exempt. The court is to make such order as may be proper to give effect to its opinion upon the questions raised by this case and to deal with all costs as to it may seem meet and just. RATES MADE BY ORDER OF THE CORPORATION OF LONDON. Consolidated Rate. For the whole year 1899. Half YEAR 1899. Amended by order Monckton. 104 15 3 867 65 J. P. 324. The divisional court held that the premises were not entitled to exemption from the consolidated rate. By 7 Geo. III. c. 37, s. 51: And be it further enacted, that the ground and the soil of the said river so to be inclosed and embanked, in the front of every such respective wharf or ground (and which shall be bounded on the east and west sides thereof by straight lines running, at right angles, to and upon the said intended front line, shall vest, and the same is hereby vested, in the owner or owners, proprietor or proprietors of such adjoining wharf or ground, according to his, her, or their respective estates, trusts, or interests therein, free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever. Horace Avory, for the appellants.-The premises are exempt by reason of section 51 of 7 Geo. III. c. 37; that exemption was conferred in consideration of the expenditure incurred in embanking the lands which up to that time formed part of the foreshore of the river Thames. The exemption is not taken away by section 169 of the City of London Sewers Act, 1848. It cannot be contended that the general words in that section operate to repeal the exemption specifically conferred by the Act of Geo. III. (Garnett v. Bradley, 3 A. C. 944; Thorpe v. Adams, L. R. 6 C. P. 125.) The fact of the consolidation of assessments from which the premises were exempt will not take away the exemption nor will the addition of a new assessment destroy it. If this rate is bad in part, that is, if it includes any items for which the appellants are not liable, they are entitled to succeed. He also referred to the following cases: Williams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2; Eddington v. Borman, 4 T. R. 4; Perchard v. Heywood, 8 T. R. 468 ; Rex v. London Gas Light and Coke Company, 8 B. & C. 54, and Liverpool Library v. Liverpool Corporation, 5 H. & N. 526. Danckwerts, K.C., for the respondents.— The Act of 7 Geo. III. c. 37 only exempts the premises from taxes and assessments which existed when the Act was passed (Williams v. Pritchard (supra), Perchard v. Heywood (supra), and Rex v London Gas Light and Coke Company (supra)), and the consolidated rate under section 168 of the City of London Sewers Act, 1848, is a substantially new assessment which does not fall within the exemption. Before the Act of 1848, sewer rates were assessed upon PRESIDENT, ETC., OF SION COLLEGE v. MAYOR, ETC., OF THE CITY OF London. premises assessed to the poor rate and land tax, and these premises being exempt from poor rate and land tax by reason of the Act of 7 Geo. III. c. 37, they were also exempt from sewer rates. Section 169 of the City of London Sewers Act, 1848, made premises assessable to the consolidated rate whether they were assessed to poor rate or not, and therefore deprived these premises of the exemption. He also referred to Eddington v. Borman (supra), Garnett v. Bradley (supra), and London and Blackwall Railway Company v. Limehouse District Board of Works, 3 Kay & J. 123. Horace Avory in reply.—At the time the exemption was conferred most of the items included in the consolidated rate were in existence. This rate is bad in part. A. L. SMITH, M.R.-The question which arises in this case is whether the appellants are liable to be assessed in respect of Sion College to the consolidated rate made under section 168 of the City of London Sewers Act, 1848. The answer to that question depends upon two Acts. It is plain that at the time the Act of 7 Geo. III. c. 37 was passed a portion of the land upon which Sion College now stands formed part of the bed of the river Thames. That Act provided that if the frontagers embanked the land at their own expense then the land should become vested in them "free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever." Then came the City of London Sewers Act, 1848, which created a body of commissioners for the purpose of making improvements and for various other purposes, with power to borrow money on the rates. They were empowered by section 168 to make a consolidated rate, and section 169 empowered them to levy it upon "every person who shall inhabit, hold, occupy, possess, or enjoy any house or building within the city, or partly within and partly without the city (whether such person shall now be liable in respect of such house or building to be assessed to the relief of the poor, or be not liable to be assessed to the relief of the poor in respect thereof by reason of such house or building being situated in any precinct or extra-parochial place or otherwise) . . ." The commissioners became entitled to do all these things which under the provisions of that Act were brought into existence for the first time. It cannot be doubted that if section 169 stood 65 J. P. 324. The alone Sion College would be liable to be assessed to the consolidated rate, but it is said that by reason of section 51 of the Act of 7 Geo. III. c. 37 Sion College is exempt from this rate. [The Master of the Rolls read the section.] It is said that by this provision there is an exemption from the rate which came into existence in 1848. We have to decide what that exemption means. Does it mean that the owners of the land there referred to are to be exempt from all taxes and assessments whether created before or after the passing of that Act, or only from those which were then in existence? This court is not without authority upon this point. In the cases of Williams v. Pritchard (supra), Pritchard v. Heywood (supra), and Rex v. London Gas Light and Coke Company (supra), section 51 of 7 Geo. III. c. 37 has been judicially interpreted as exempting the land from taxes and assessments existing at the time of the passing of the Act, but not from new taxes and assessments. substance of those decisions is that if the tax or assessment is a substantially new one which came into existence after the exemption was created then it does not fall within the exemption. In my opinion when the consolidated rate under the Act of 1848 is looked at it is a substantially new tax. I agree that it had some of the incidents of the old tax, but I cannot look at the circumstances in which and the purposes for which it was brought into existence and the persons whose duty it was to administer it without coming to the conclusion that it was a substantially new tax or assessment. It seems to me that, following the authorities to which I have referred, Sion College cannot be held to be exempt by virtue of section 51 of 7 Geo. III. c. 37, and that the decision of the Queen's Bench Division was right. With regard to the question as to whether, assuming the consolidated rate did fall within the exemption created by section 51 of the Act of 1757, that exemption was impliedly repealed by section 169 of the Act of 1848, I express no opinion upon that point. COLLINS, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. I think the decisions referred to appear to have established that the exemption created by section 51 of 7 Geo. III. c. 37 was intended to apply to then existing taxes and assessment and not to substantially new assessments. In the case of Rex v. London Gas |