into a public-house and the barmaid refused to serve them. He again reminded the jury of the penalties which attached to a drunken person being served on licensed premises, and said if the barmaid acted up to the best of her belief, not only was she justified in refusing to serve, but she was bound to do so.

Tickell, replying, said that the case for the prosecution was that Barnes and the three men who went in with him-not Dickaty who was left outside-were sober and behaved quietly; that they asked for drinks and were refused, not because they were behaving badly, but because they were soldiers in uniform. At that time Dickaty had nothing to do with the case, and whether he was sober or drunk was perfectly immaterial, because he was outside the house at the time Barnes was refused drink. After they were refused the men did about the wisest thing they could have done in going to Mr. Shore at the "Railway Hotel" in the way that had been detailed, and so made him available as a witness as against the defence that had been set up. If the defence that had been put forward was a real, genuine defence, why did not the defendant at once state it by way of explanation in reply to the most polite letter from Captain Norton, and so have given an opportunity for inquiries to be made. The defendant admitted he himself refused Hammon, whilst he also now admitted Hammon was sober.

The CHAIRMAN, in summing up to the jury, said that a person who was the keeper of an inn was bound by law to supply a traveller with lodging, victuals, and anything he might need to send him on his way. He had no right to select his customers, but he was bound to serve any traveller who presented himself in a reasonable and orderly manner, and conducted himself properly, with such refreshments as he required and was willing to pay for, and which were on sale and were being sold to other guests in the inn. There was ample evidence that this bar formed part of and came within the definition of an inn, and also that the men were travellers according to the legal meaning of the term. He went through the evidence, and left it to the jury to answer the questions which he submitted to them in writing, which were- -1. Were they travellers? 2. Was this bar, at which they asked to be served, part of the inn? 3. Were they,

65 J. P. 521.

or

when they asked to be served, behaving in a proper manner, not merely not drunk, but not behaving in a disorderly manner offensive to other guests? 4. Were they refused reasonable refreshments and without sufficient cause?

The jury retired, and returning after an hour's absence the Foreman said: "We are agreed that they were refused refreshments without sufficient cause, but we cannot agree that they were refused because they were in uniform."

Temple Cooke repeated his submission that the whole of the case put by the Crown was that they were refused because they were soldiers in uniform. Whether there was sufficient ground for refusing apart from that had nothing to do with the case. He submitted they could not find a verdict on that.

Tickell argued that there could not be any doubt that the verdict was tantamount to one of guilty. Being soldiers in uniform had nothing to do with it; the question was whether they were refused without reasonable cause. There were several counts in the indictment in which soldiers in uniform were not mentioned at all.

The CHAIRMAN: According to my view the jury have agreed to what is practically a verdict of guilty on the second, third and fourth counts.

Verdict: Guilty. Sentence: Fine 101.

Solicitors for the prosecution: Foster and Wells, Aldershot.

Solicitors for the defendant: C. and W. Trimmer, Alton.

65 J. P. 548.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

April 23.

SNEATH v. TAYLOR.

Sale of food and drugs-Certificate of analyst-Omission to state weight of sample-Sufficiency of certificate-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 18.

The appellant was summoned for selling adul terated butter to the prejudice of the purchaser. The analyst's certificate followed the form in the schedule of the Act, but omitted the words "which then weighed."

Held, that the omission to state the weight of

the sample only invalidated the certificate where the correctness of the analysis of the article depended upon the weight of the sample.

Case stated by justices in and for the parts of Kesteven, in the county of Lincoln, and acting in and for the petty sessional division of Sleaford.

At a petty sessions holden at Sleaford, in and for the petty sessional division of Sleaford, in the parts of Kesteven, in the county of Lincoln, on the 14th of January, 1901, an information preferred by William Taylor (hereinafter called the respondent) against Alfred Petchel Sneath (hereinafter called the appellant), charging that the said Alfred Petchel Sneath on the 13th of November, 1900, at New Sleaford, in the petty sessional division of Sleaford, did unlawfully sell to the prejudice of the said William Taylor (the purchaser) a certain article of food, to wit, butter, which was adulterated with 15 per cent. of margarine, and was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the purchaser, contrary to section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), was heard and determined by us (the parties respectively being present), and upon such hearing the appellant was duly convicted before us of the said offence, and we adjudged that he

65 J. P. 548. should pay a penalty of 40s. and the costs of the prosecution, subject to the following

case:

1. The appellant is an assistant in the employ of Edward Allen and Sons, Limited, wholesale and retail grocers carrying on business at Sleaford, in the county of Lincoln, and the respondent is a duly appointed officer or inspector under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63).

2. On the 13th of November, 1900, the respondent purchased or caused to be purchased from the appellant at the shop of the said Edward Allen and Sons, Limited, at Sleaford, 1 lb. of butter for the purpose of analysis.

3. The pound of butter purchased by the respondent for the purpose of analysis as herein before stated was divided into three parts, and one part thereof was submitted by the respondent to the public analyst to be analysed in accordance with the provisions of the said statute in that behalf.

4. At the hearing of the information before us on the 14th of January, 1901, at Sleaford, as aforesaid, the certificate of the public analyst purporting to be the result of his analysis of the portion of butter submitted to him, as hereinbefore stated, was produced by or on behalf of the respondent and tendered in evidence in support of the prosecution, but was objected to by or on behalf of the appellant on the ground that the weight of the sample of the said butter received by the public analyst to be analysed was not stated in the certificate, and therefore the said certificate was not in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63).

5. The following is a copy of the said certificate of the public analyst produced and tendered in evidence as herein before stated :

"Form A.

No. of Certificate 19. No. of Sample 94 S.K. "Lincolnshire-Kesteven County Council. "To Mr. Superintendent W. Taylor, Sleaford Division.

"I, the undersigned, public analyst for the administrative county of the parts of Kesteven do hereby certify that I received on the 15th of November, 1900, from Mr. W. Taylor a sample of butter (No. 94 S. K.)

SNEATH v. TAYLOR.

for analysis, and have analysed the same and declare the result of my analysis to be as follows:

"I am of opinion that the said sample contained the parts as under :

"15 per cent. of margarine
"85 per cent. of butter.

66 OBSERVATIONS.

"No change had taken place in the constitution of the said sample that would interfere with the analysis or affect the result as stated.

"As witness my hand this 30th day of November, 1900.

"(Signed) CHARLES E. CASSAL. "At Brenne House,

"Wandsworth Common, London."

6. No evidence of adulteration was given or tendered by or on behalf of the respondent or in support of the prosecution other than the certificate of the public analyst as hereinbefore set out. A copy of this certificate was served with the summons.

7. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the sample of butter could have been conveniently weighed. That the weight of the sample not being stated the certificate was not in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), and that it was invalid and inadmissible in evidence. It was further contended that as the certificate was not in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), the respondent had not complied with section 19 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51), which provides that a copy of the analyst's certificate must be served with the summons.

8. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the omission in the certificate of the weight of the sample was immaterial, that the certificate was in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), and that it was valid and admissible in evidence. It was also contended that the service with the summons of a copy of this certificate was a compliance with section 19 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51).

9. The contention on behalf of the appellant that the sample of butter could have been conveniently weighed was not contested on behalf of the respondent. There was no expert evidence before us that it

65 J. P. 548.

could have been conveniently weighed, but there was uncontested evidence before us that there was approximately about a third of a pound of butter sent for analysis.

10. The appellant also alleged other matters by way of defence that it is not necessary to refer to for the purpose of this

case.

11. We held that the omission in the certificate of the public analyst of the weight of the sample was immaterial; that the certificate was in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), and that it was valid and admissible in evidence. We also held that the service of a copy of this certificate with the summons was a compliance with section 19 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51).

12. The question for the opinion of the court is whether upon the facts stated we were right in law in holding that notwithstanding the omission of the weight of the sample the certificate of the public analyst as hereinafter set out was in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), and that it was valid and admissible in evidence ; and whether having regard to the form of the certificate we were right in holding that section 19 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51), had been complied with by the service of a copy of this certificate with the summons.

13. If the court should be of opinion that the certificate of the public analyst as hereinbefore set out was not in the form required by section 18 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), and that it was invalid or not admissible in evidence, or that by reason of the form of such certificate the service of a copy thereof with the summons was not a compliance with section 19 of the Sale of Foodand Drugs Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51), the conviction is to be quashed.

If the court should be of opinion that we were right in holding as herein before stated, the conviction is to stand.

Given under our hands this 4th of April, 1901.

N. H. REEVE-KING. HY. SMITH.

J. A. COLE.

G. W. LLOYD.

F. A. PEACOCK. WILLIAM A. CRAGG.

SNEATH v. TAYLOR.

Bonsey for the appellant. The certificate was invalid and ought not to have been received in evidence by the justices. It omitted to state the weight of the sample which was handed to the analyst, and was therefore not in accordance with the form in the schedule to the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875. Section 18 of the Act provides that the certificate is to be in the form set out in the schedule to the Act or to the like effect. The form is as follows:-"I, the undersigned, public analyst for do hereby certify that I received on thea sample for

—day of -from analysis, which then weighed &c." All reference to the weight is omitted in this certificate. The omission cannot be justified on the strength of the note to the form, which says that when the article cannot be conveniently weighed the passage may be erased or the blank may be left unfilled, as there is no evidence in the present case that there was anything to prevent the sample of butter being weighed. The condition precedent, therefore, to the certificate of the analyst being received in evidence has not been fulfilled, and the certificate is therefore insufficient. By the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899, s. 19 (2), a copy of the certificate has to be served with the summons, so that the court and defendant may know that a sufficient quantity of the article was taken to ensure a proper analysis being made. This is a penal Act and must be construed strictly against the prosecution, for under it a person may be convicted, though he acted in good faith and was in ignorance that the article sold by him was adulterated. He referred to Fortune v. Hanson,[1896] 1 Q.B.202; 60 J.P.88; Bridgev. Howard, [1897] 1 Q. B. 80; 60 J.P.793; Peart v. Barstow (1880), 44 J. P. 699.

W. H. Leese for the respondent.-The omission to state the weight of the article sent for analysis does not invalidate the certificate. The fact that the analyst did analyse the sample and gave the result of his analysis is prima facie evidence that there was a sufficient quantity of the article to enable him to do so. If the defendant is dissatisfied with the certificate he can, under section 21 of the Act require the analyst to be called as a witness. The weighing of the sample is in the discretion of the analyst. [He was stopped.]

Bonsey, in reply.-Section 21 of the Act was not intended to enable the analyst to correct any mistake that he might have made

65 J. P. 548.

in his certificate, the object of the section was to enable the defendant to call the analyst as a witness in order that he might be cross-examined as to the correctness of his analysis. The analyst cannot be the judge as to whether the sample should be weighed or not, as in that case there would be no appeal from his decision.

Lord ALVERSTONE, L.C.J.-The question raised in this case is whether the words "which then weighed " in the form of the analyst's certificate given in the schedule to the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, are obligatory, so that the certificate is invalid if they are omitted, or whether they are merely directory. It is very plain that where the weight of the sample is material the words must not be omitted and the weight must be filled in, but it is impossible to decide as a matter of law that where it is not shown to the justices that the weight of the sample is in any way material it is necessary to fill in the words. A certain latitude is of necessity given to the analyst, for a note at the foot of the form says, "When the article cannot be conveniently weighed the passage may be erased or the blank may be left unfilled." On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the words must be filled in unless the sample cannot be conveniently weighed, and that as butter, the article in question, can be conveniently weighed, the weight ought to have been filled in in the certificate. If in my opinion the accuracy of the analysis of the butter depended in any way upon the weight of the sample, and if the certificate did not give the necessary information to enable the court to judge of the accuracy of the analysis, I should have come to a very different conclusion to that which, in fact, I have come to in this case. The direction as to the insertion of the weight is intended to apply to ordinary cases, but I cannot say that the mere omission of the weight of the sample in the present case, having regard to the discretion given to the analyst, necessarily renders the certificate invalid. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

LAWRANCE, J.-I am of the same opinion. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for the appellant: Trass and Enever, for Godson, Sleaford.

Solicitors for the respondent: Peacock and Goddard, for Phillips, Lincoln.