UNION.

actual value in that year; and it is the duty of the overseers to arrive as nearly at this as they can." That appears to me to be exactly in point on this case, and also to show that Blackburn, J., could not have intended to lay it down as law, that because in the preceding year a certain profit or rent had been got out of the cemetery that that would be the standard of rating supposing all the land had been disposed of, and that there was no possibility or expectation of getting the same receipts from it in another year, which is the case which Channell, J., puts to himself, and answers in the affirmative. On these grounds, I think the decision of Bucknill, J., in this case, and of the quarter sessions is right, and therefore this appeal ought to be dismissed.

STIRLING, L.J.—I agree.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor for the company: E. A. Jackson, Farnham.

Solicitors for the assessment committee: Johnson, Weatherall, and Sturt, for Potter and Crundwell, Farnham.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

July 10, 12, 1900.

CAMBERWELL ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE v. ELLIS.

Poor rate-Metropolis - Provisional valuation list-Alteration in value of hereditament-Public-house-Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 67), s. 47.

The Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869, provides that there is to be a quinquennial valuation of all hereditaments in the metropolis. By section 47 "if in course of any year the value of any hereditament is increased by the addition thereto or erection thereon of any building or is from any cause increased or reduced in value" a provisional valuation list may be made increasing or reducing (as the case may be) the valuation of such hereditament.

Where there was evidence that there had been since the date of the last quinquennial valuation a general appreciation of publichouses thoughout the metropolis, and that a large premium had been paid for the lease of a public-house,

Held, that this was not enough to justify the making of a new provisional list increasing the rateable value of such public-house. The decision of the Court of Appeal, 63 J. P. 820, affirmed. What may constitute any cause increasing or reducing the value of hereditaments for the purposes of the provisional list considered.

This was an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal reported at 63 J. P. 820.

The special case is set out at length in the report at 63 J. P. 820. The two main points in the appeal were whether, for the purposes of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869, when there is evidence of a general appreciation of all public-houses in the metropolis since the making of the last quinquennial valuation list and of a large premium paid for a lease of a public-house, this is enough to justify the making of a provisional list increasing the value of such public-house.

The Court of Appeal (Lord Russell, C.J., A. L. Smith, L.J., and Vaughan Williams, L.J.), reversing a decision of a divisional court (Lawrence and Channell, JJ.), held that it was not. As will be seen infra this decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the House of Lords.

Balfour Browne, Q.C., Macmorran, Q.C., and Ryde for the appellants, the assessment committee, contended that the finding of fact by quarter sessions (see 63 J. P. 820), that there had been "an alteration in the value in the premises by way of increase" in the 12 months preceding the making of the supplemental list, was conclusive if there was evidence to support it. The alteration in value within section 47 may be due to "any cause." Here there was such evidence. A general rise in value of all public-houses in the metropolis and the fact of the payment of large premium (16,4007.) on the taking of the lease constituted such cause. "Any cause" ought to be construed in its widest sense and not confined to structural additions or alterations or to causes ejusdem generis. (Reg. v. St. Mary, Islington, Assessment Committee, 19 Q. B. D. 529; 51 J. P. 789; Reg. v. New River Company, 4 Q. B. D. 309 ; 43 J. P. 349.) The cases Reg. v. Poplar Assessment Committee, 13 Q. B. D. 364; s. c. East and West India Dock Company v. Poplar Union, 48 P. 564, and Reg. v. St. Mary, Islington, Assessment Committee (supra) are illustrations of reduced assessments. The principle contended for was affirmed in Cartwright v. Sculcoates Union, [1900] A. C. 150; 64 J. P. 229.

Littler, Q.C., Page, Q.C., and W. Russell for the respondent were not called upon to argue.

Earl of HALSBURY, L.C.-In this case I am of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is right. The questions which are propounded to your lordships seem to me to get rid of some of the difficulties which would arise if one were to give a theoretical opinion upon what the whole effect of the statute is, because the questions which are reserved for your lordships are questions of law, as, indeed, they properly ought to be. With questions of fact your lordships have nothing to do. Indeed, if the quarter sessions had simply found that this public-house had increased in value from any cause, although they did

65 J. P. 132.

not specify what the cause was, and not reserved these questions of law for us. I do not suppose that there would have been any process by which, if it were wrong, that finding could have been set right. Dealing with it as a question of fact the sessions would have been perfectly independent of any other tribunal, and if they had found as a fact that there was an alteration of value within the meaning of the statute, and that that amounted to an additional 100l. a year, there would have been no power to alter that judgment and set it right. But the sessions have in this case, as they should have done, asked your lordships questions on the facts that came before them. The first question they ask is this: "Whether the alteration in value which took place during the twelve months preceding the making of the said supplemental valuation list was in law an alteration within the meaning of section 46 (1) of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869," Now" the alteration in value which took place " assumes that there was an alteration in value. That evades the real question which it is intended to ask by putting it in a compendious form. But when the sessions have reserved that upon the case submitted to us, it appears to me there was no evidence whatever which would have justified them in saying that there was any alteration within the meaning of the statute even if, as a matter of fact, the value of the house was greater in the one year than it was in the other. The Legislature, by the Act of 1869, for very obvious reasons, wishing to have a uniform assessment in the metropolis, and nothwithstanding that from time to time the same questions should at great expense to the parish and at great vexation to the ratepayers be re-opened year after year, determined that for a period of five years the assessment, once made, should continue in force and that it should not be competent to raise again the question which would be very properly and appropriately raised at the period of assessment. That is the meaning of the Assessment Act. It having once been ascertained what the value is, the statute proceeds to point out exceptional and peculiar difficulties which might arise if it was unalterable altogether, and it proceeds to say that if there is any alteration in value in one particular hereditament, and that

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v. ELLIS. hereditament is either increased in value by the addition or erection of any building (and then they add the words) or from any cause," the proposition that the assessment is to last for five years is not to be so inflexible as to prevent, upon a proved alteration in the value either from a structural alteration or any other cause whatever, an inquiry into that circumstance. The words which follow the provision as to structural alterations are very wide words indeed, and it is very intelligible that the statute should not have attempted to define the circumstances under which such an alteration should be properly inquired into. But still, if you give the construction to them which some words occasionally used by a learned judge might be supposed to give them, namely, that you should not inquire into any alteration in value unless the value is altered, what would be the meaning of the statute altogether? Unless there is some circumstances beyond the mere fact of alteration in value to give rise to the inquiry, the statute has done nothing, because in every case where the overseers said, "Oh, this has been assessed at too low a value, and I want it assessed at a higher value "-in every case, without reference to any alteration of circumstances, the mere alteration of that which was put down as the value would justify a fresh inquiry. That, of course, would be an extremely absurd proposition, because the statute would enact with one hand a power which it took away with the other; and one cannot suppose that the statute would be so foolishly conceived. It would be disrespectful to the Legislature to suggest that it had, really, elaborately enacted nothing. On the other hand, to lay down as a rule a broad proposition which should embrace every case would be extremely dangerous, even if it were not, as I think it would be, impossible. Each case must depend upon itself, and in dealing with this particular matter, I protest that I am not laying down any other general principle than this, that I think there must be something beyond the mere suggestion of the valuer that the house is worth more than it is assessed at. If there is nothing more than that it seems to me there is nothing upon which a court ought to act-because that would be, in effect, to repeal the statute. Therefore, I say, in answer to the first ques

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65 J. P. 132. tion, that as a matter of law the mere giving of evidence that the house is worth more than it was assessed at at the quinquennial valuation is not evidence of an alteration in law which ought to be received. Now, it is remarkable to observe that, giving the narrowest interpretation to those words, there is no evidence in this case at all of what was the supposed value at the period of the quinquennial valuation. The reason for that is obvious enough, because that valuation is conclusive on the parties conclusive, that is to say, in any attempt to say that it was wrong; that is absolutely the valuation which has been arrived at. But I should have thought that, even if the mere alteration in value was the thing relied upon, the evidence ought to have been somewhat of this character: "Such and such was the value of the house at that date; the value of the house now is a great deal more, and therefore I have proved an alteration in the value of this public-house." I do not say that that would have been sufficient, but it would have given some colour to the argument; but here there is absolutely nothing. The gentleman who is called as an expert witness is called to say, "I had a premium paid when this man entered." That might be evidence. I think the second question must be answered in the affirmative, that it is evidence; but although it is evidence it comes to nothing unless you establish a comparison between the two periods and show that you have got an enhanced premium given; but nothing of that sort is suggested. I decline to go into the curious ratiocination by which it was suggested that there must have been a less premium given before than was given then, because it seems to me to be rather reducing it to an absurdity. I say that there was no evidence at all of comparison, and it is only if there is a comparison that this is relevant or useful evidence. Of course, the fact of what was given by way of premium is evidence, and the sessions were right in receiving it, but what I point out is that, unless there is a term of comparison, although it is admissible evidence it comes to nothing. The third question is "whether the amount of such premium was in law any evidence of an alteration within the meaning of the subsection." By itself it is no evidence in law of anything. It may be it shows what is the value of the public-house at that moment.

I do not mean to say that it is not relevant evidence to show what is the value of the public-house, but as a term of comparison, when you have nothing to compare it with, it establishes nothing whatever as a matter of law. Under those circumstances, it appears to me there was no evidence at all upon which any tribunal would be entitled to come to the conclusion that there was an alteration of circumstances such as I think was pointed out by Cockburn, C.J., as giving rise to the permissibility of a fresh inquiry as to the value of the house. I have said that I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeal is right, but I hesitate very much to adopt all the reasoning of Vaughan Williams, L.J., because, although there are some illustrations which his lordship gave with which I concur, yet where he deals with the question of increased trade in the cycle industry, or such general propositions as that a war might affect the value of premises licensed for the purpose of carrying on the manufacture of gunpowder, and so on, I hesitate very much to say that those are circumstances which could be properly referred to, looking at the statute, which contemplates an alteration of circumstances in respect of the particular hereditament that is to be rated. That is the guiding line; and although I agree that the opening of a bridge, the opening of a new street-all these things which have relation to the particular hereditament to be rated-might be properly applicable and properly considered in relation to an alteration of circumstances to allow the hereditament to be valued again, when we are dealing here with the alteration contemplated by the statute it appears to me that the topics referred to by the learned judge are too wide and too much outside the particular hereditament in respect of which the inquiry is to be held to be properly applied and considered for the purpose of establishing the proposition sought to be proved. Under these circumstances I move your lordships that this appeal be dismissed with costs. will only say that in giving judgment in this case I am simply endeavouring to give judgment upon these facts alone. I lay down no general proposition of law beyond this-that the statute has to be construed in each case and applied to the circumstances of each case. It appears to me that anything more

I

65 J. P. 132. dangerous, even if it were possible, than to lay down exactly where you are to draw the line it would be difficult to conceive. I therefore say that I think this judgment of the Court of Appeal is right in this case for the reasons I have given, and I move your lordships to affirm it accordingly.

Lord SHAND.-I have come, after listening to the very able argument which has been addressed to us, to the same conclusion with your lordships that this appeal ought to be dismissed. It appears to me that the argument maintained by the learned counsel for the appellants is substantially contradictory to the principle of quinquennial valuation. The statute undoubtedly lays down the rule that there is to be a quinquennial valuation, and that it is only in the case of alterations in the value, which, I think, must be clear and rested on grounds which the 'statute will admit of, that there is to be an alteration afterwards made in the valuation during one of the years of the current period of five years. It is required that the alteration must be proved. In that case the first clause of section 47 comes into operation, and that is really what has to be construed in the present case: "If in the course of any year the value of any hereditament is increased by the addition thereto or the erection thereon of any building, or is from any cause increased or reduced in value, the following provisions shall have effect." If you are to read those words "is from any cause increased or reduced in value" in the wide sense which is contended for by the appellant, it appears to me that you would have no longer a quinquennial valuation-it would come to be substantially an annual valuation by the mere proof that the value of the subject had from some cause or other (I do not care what it may be) either appreciated or depreciated. I do not think that can be the sound reading of the statute. The cases have perhaps gone rather far in that direction. I am of opinion that it must be something analogous-not necessarily closely analogous, but still analogous to the case that is there put of "the addition thereto or the erection thereon of any building," or for some similar cause such as would affect the appreciation or depreciation of the particular building with which you are dealing. In this case the evidence alleged, as affecting apparently the mind of one witness only, of a large premium paid in the year before this

v. ELLIS. attempted revaluation took place really, so far as that goes, drops out of the case. It was a scrap of evidence suggesting that a large premium meant an increase in value, but without a comparison with some other standard such as the premium paid in the previous year, and the grounds on which each premium was fixed, it is of no value. The case, therefore, now before the House rests entirely on the statement contained in the special case, which is to this effect, that "evidence was given by a valuer on behalf of the respondents that there had been since the date of the quinquennial valuation list a general appreciation of licensed premises throughout the metropolis, and that in his opinion the annual value of the said publichouse had between April and October, 1896, increased by about 1007." But it is added: "It was, however, admitted that there had been no structural alteration to the said public-house. No evidence was given of any circumstances specially affecting the annual value of the said public-house. The respondents contended that they were not bound to give any such evidence, but that it was enough for them to show that the value had in fact increased." As I have already said, if it is enough for them to show only what is here stated you destroy the quinquennial valuation and substitute for it an annual valuation, which is against the principle of the statute. It appears to me to be clear that if "alteration" is alleged to have occurred either in the way of depreciation or in the way of appreciation, the onus is upon the person making the statement to prove it. Some circumstances, I think, specially affecting the particular subject, must be shown, as, for instance, as has been put by his lordship on the Woolsack, the building of a bridge which has greatly increased the traffic and produced large profits in comparison with what had been obtained before from, in some respects, really a new locality; or the addition, as has been suggested by my noble and learned friend Lord Davey, of a large factory in the neighbourhood which has brought in a large amount of custom to the particular house or the particular place; or, to take another illustration, the addition of pleasure grounds to the particular house which, although there has been no additional building, has brought much increased profits to the occupier of the

65 J. P. 132. house. In all those cases there has been an increased value plainly arising from circumstances affecting the particular house. In the same way the value may be depreciated by the shutting up of a road, or by the erecting of a new house next door in competition, or by some other special circumstances of the kind. I think it must be taken generally that in each case some circumstances analogous to those I have now put must be proved to have caused either appreciation or depreciation. In this particular case nothing of the kind has been shown, but there has simply been evidence that the value has risen. I am not prepared to form a final judgment upon the cases which have been put by the Court of Appeal, the case of a taste for cycling causing a rise in value in the whole of the cycle factories and their profits, or a rise in the price of gunpowder causing a rise in all premises where gunpowder is manufactured. I doubt very much whether such circumstances would warrant any change of valuation; but it is not necessary to express a final opinion on that question at present. In this case I am clearly of opinion that there are no circumstances proved or stated specially affecting the property in question which can entitle the assessor to raise the value during the currency of what I may call the quinquennial period.

Lord DAVEY.-I am of the same opinion. The first thing, of course, that we have to do is to construe section 47: "If in the course of any year the value of any hereditament is increased by the addition thereto or the erection thereon of any building, or is from any cause increased or reduced in value," then the provisions which follow in the section apply. I agree with the learned judges in the Queen's Bench Division that those words cannot be confined to structural alteration or addition or anything of that kind, but I think that the words "from any cause are to be read as ejusdem generis

in this sense-that it must be a cause which affects the value of the particular property. The point is very well put in the judgment of Vaughan Williams, L.J., that it lies upon those who desire to alter the assessment to prove the nature and cause of the alteration in value. It is not sufficient to say that there has been an alteration in value, but you must also point to some definable cause to which that alteration is due, and that cause must be one which affects the