fortified places, "have for many years had their due weight with the great powers of Europe, and have induced them to form and keep up, as integral portions of their military strength, every necessary auxiliary for the reduction of fortresses; and sieges have in consequence become certain and comparatively bloodless. But England, constitutionally jealous of permanent military establish ments, has always discountenanced military organization and military preparation till the hour of need, and with respect to sieges, which are rare, and exclusively offensive operations, has even carried her jealous feelings beyond the bounds of rational prudence; for, possessing a corps of officers professionally educated and well grounded in the science of attack and defence, she has denied them every requisite establishment to render their acquirements availing, and has most unreasonably expected her arinics to reduce the skilfully fortified and well-covered places of the 19th century with means inferior to those used against the exposed and ill-constructed places of the 16th and 17th centuries"

And what was the immediate consequence of this irrational jealousy and niggardly parsimony? Contrary to all ordinary calculation, the fortresses garrisoned by the French in Spain were reduced; but at what a prodigious expenditure of life was this effected! In the several attacks upon I lajoz, two of which from extrinsic circumstances proved abortive, a little army was sacrificed; as many men, in short, as would have been sufficient for ten sieges undertaken with adequate means, and conducted according to the ordinary rules of science. But this is not to be understood as involving any reflection on the military talents of the general or the professional ability of the engineers. General Foy, in his work on the war in the Peninsula, has indeed made such a charge, condemning the mode of attacking fortresses adopted by the British in Spain as unskilful and inefficacious, and bringing it forward as indisputable proof of the low state of their military knowledge. But it should be recollected that the adoption of this mode was not a matter of choice, but of necessity, and that, if it was in its nature rash, hazardous, and inefficient, the fact of its having been directed against Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz with such rapidity of development and certainty of result as to outstrip the calculations of the French marshals, deceive the vigilance of French' governors, paralyse the science of the French engineers, and baffle every defensive effort of the French garrisons, is surely no evidence of deficiency in military talent and professional skill. The objections to this mode of attack are insurmountable and decisive; that it succeeded in the instances referred to is merely a proof of what British soldiers, even when acting ander the greatest disadvantages, are capable of accomplish2ng. These remarks are, however, no longer applicable. Since the Crimean war great attention has been bestowed upon the education and training of sappers and miners, and though England has neither the numbers of men nor the quantities of stores possessed by Continental nations, yet what she has of each is of the best Every advance in science, if applicable, has been at once adopted into the military service, and as our civil engineers are as a body admittedly without superiors in the civil world, it may be confidently stated that in the military world our military engineers hold no inferior position.

Having thus given a general description of the methods of attack, we shall now subjoin, on high authority, a view of what is considered necessary for the proper defence of fortified places. An order issued by the French minister of war in 1813 contains directions on the subject which are almost universally applicable, and therefore deserve a place here. Every commander is directed to consider his garrison as liable to be unexpectedly attacked, and to pass at once from a state of peace into a state of war or sioge, either by rebellion, by unlawful assemblies, by the presence of an enemy, by surprise, or by sudden assault,-in a word, by unforseen causes, of which the history of war offers numerous examples. He is therefore ordered, even in time of peace, to fix his plan and arrangement for defence, accord

ing to such supposed attacks as may appear most probable, and to determine, for the principal cases which may be likely to occur, the necessary posts, reserves, and movements of the troops, and to take measures to ensure the due and active co-operation of every corps of the garrison. He ought, particularly, to make himself thoroughly ac quainted with (1) the ground beyond the place which may be within the circle of action, of investment, and of attack; (2) the fortifications of the place, its interior, its buildings, its military edifices or establishments; (3) the gar rison, the means of the place in artillery, in ammunition, and in other stores of every kind; (4) the population to be maintained in time of siege, the men capable of bearing arms, the master and journeymen artificers fit to be employed either on the works or in case of fire; and (5) the provisions, materials, tools, and other resources which the town itself and surrounding country can furnish, and which it might be necessary to secure in case of siege, In order to enable governors and commanders to comply with these instructions, which are clear and precise, the minister proceeds to detail their principal duties, according to the circumstances in which they may find themselves placed; but for these we must refer to the general order itself, which is a masterpiece of its kind, and in all proba bility emanated directly from Napoleon himself. Its object appears to have been to inspire a governor with hopes that, by taking proper precautions, and making a full use of means previously provided, the defence might be rendered equal, if not superior, to the attack; and whether this be so or not, the importance of the directions embodied in the order is not diminished, and where they are duly observed the nature and extent of the resistance must be materially increased.

The protracted and able defence of Sebastopol led many to imagine that the Russians by new defensive arrange ments had solved the problem so long under discussion, and had again restored to the defence much of its former superiority over the attack. But the real merits of the Russian engineers consisted not in the discovery of new principles, but in the skilful application of those principles which, recognized at an early period, have been by degrees matured and enlarged. In estimating the comparative results of the attack and defence of Sebastopol, it inust be remembered that neither can be judged by strict rules, as neither conformed to such rules. The north side being left open by the impossibility of investing both sides, the south became a detached line of powerful intrenchments, to the defence of which the whole force of an army, not a garrison, could be directed at will. The strength of the garrison, continually renewed from without, permitted the fullest use of detached works, which, when backed by a line in rear sufficiently strong to resist a coupde-main, constitute one of the most powerful modes of de

FL. 67.-Lunette of Darcou.. fence. Such a fort or work was the celebrated Malakoff Tower, and the redoubt enveloping it, the type of which may be found in the lunette of Darçon, of which fig. 67 is a plan. In this lunette, intended to be prepared before

hand, T is a powerful tower, LL a lunette, which in this case is revetted, but might have been made, as at the Malakoff, a simple earth-work- an underground communication to 9,9, loopholed galleries for flanking the ditches. This sketch will show the general principle of defence involved in such works, but of course the forin must vary in the hands of an able engineer, to suit the peculiarities of the ground. At the Malakoff the redoubt was made circular, but in principle it was strictly analogous to the lunette.

Siege of the Citadel of Antwerp.

We shall now, as an example, give a sketch (abridged from the United Service Journal) of the attack on the citadel of Antwerp in 1832-first, because this was the most regular and scientific siege which had taken place for many years; and secondly, because as a practical operation an account of it must be more interesting and more instructive than any description of the formal theoretical plans which are usually drawn in the military schools. See Plate XI. Without entering into any detail of the complicated circumstances out of which the siege arose, in a time of general peace, it may be stated here that Great Britain and France, as joint guarantors of the integrity and independence of Belgium, having failed to procure the evacuation of Antwerp by means of negotiation, were obliged to have recourse to force. Hence the siege is to be viewed as an ejectment executed against the king of Holland, who had refused to renounce possession, unless compelled to do so.

The French army employed to cover and conduct the attack of the citadel of Antwerp in November and December 1832 was placed under the command of Marshal Gerard, and amounted to 66,450 men, viz.:-54,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 6450 engineers, artillery, and pontonniers, with 14,300 horses, and 144 pieces of siege and 78 of field artillery. On the 24th of November Marshal Gerard established his headquarters at the village of Berchem, about 2500 yards from the citadel, and issued orders to commence operations in the evening as soon as it became dark. The garrison of the citadel, under General Baron Chassé, amounted to 4470 men, with 144 pieces of ordnance of all calibres, and abundance of ammunition and stores. It will be observed that a garrison of about 5000 men was opposed to the attack of a besieging army thirteen times its strength.

At eight o'clock P. M. on the 29th November, the French troops destined for this service, consisting of 18 battalions, 900 artillery, and 400 sappers, in all about 17,140 men, assembled at the depôts of intrenching tools. The flank companies of these brigades, supported by twelve eight-pounders and a strong piquet of cavalry, formed the covering party under the direction of General Haxo, by whom and the officers of his department (the engineers) the first parallel and approaches were traced out, whilst General Niègre and the officers of artillery marked the sites of the projected batteries. The first parallel leaned on the covered-way of the right face of Montebello, and extended towards Kiel, its nearest point being about 325, and its farthest 435 yards from the advanced front of the citadel. The extent of the first parallel was 1870 yards, and that of the approaches 3750 yards. The communications from the right and centre debouched from the Malines Chaussée, in the village of Berchem, parallel to the road leading from that village to the Harmony and St Laurent; the communication from the left commenced near the garden called Heinrich's; whilst a fourth, on the extreme right, sprung from the covered-way of the left flank of Montebello, opposite to the first traverse.

On the second night, from 30th November to 1st December, five approaches were pushed on in front of the first parallel,-two in the direction of the capital of the Toledo bastion, two upon that of the Lunette St Laurent, and one, being the fifth, terminating in a place of arms on the extreme left. From the 1st to the 2d December two zig-zags were added to the approaches,- -one from the centre, in the direction of the gorge of St Laurent, and the other on the right, diverging towards the curtain, between the Toledo and Fernando bastions. The badness of the weather sadly incommoded the workmen, and prevented the artillery getting the guns into battery. Between the 2d and 3d December four zig-zags were made in front of the approaches on the right and centre, and half a parallel was formed to complete the place of arms constructed on the left during the night of the 30th November. The heads of the zig-zags were advanced to within 135 yards of the glacis. The batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 (see Plate XI.), with two for mortars in the rear, were armed, and ready to be unmasked at a moment's notice. The

arming of Nos. 7, 8, and 10, on the extreme left, was impeded by the difficulties of the ground. From the 3d to the 4th December, the second parallel was traced and commenced, its right leaning on the foot of the glacis of the counterguard, its centre and right 130 yards distant from the place of arms in the covered-way of the Toledo bastion, and its left towards the right of the covered-way of the St Laurent, at 90 yards from the crest, and 15 from the foot of its glacis. The length of the second parallel was 1250 yards, and with its approaches from the first parallel it occupied 3025 yards of ground. By the greatest exertions batteries Nos. 7, 8, and 10 were armed during the night. This completed the armament, and, at 11 A.M. on the 4th, the embrasures were unmasked, and the batteries opened their fire from centre to flanks, and maintained it steadily during the day.

From the 4th to the 5th of December an approach was pushed on from the second parallel, directly upon the salient angle of St Laurent, and an entry was made into the covered-way by a return to the left. The garrison discovered this, and opened a sharp fire from the lunette; a lodgment was, however, effected near the spot usually occupied by the first traverse. At this time the garrison suffered much from the fire of the besiegers. From the 5th to the 6th the lodgment made the previous night in the covered-way of the salient place of arms of St Laurent was prolonged as far as the first traverse. But the besieged kept up so vigorous a fire that the French engineers were obliged to renounce the flying and adopt the full sap. The zig-zag in the counterguard, being about three feet in width and four in depth, was conducted along the parapet, nearly to the extremity of the right flank, and within 180 two lodgments, blinded with fascines, were made in the parapet yards of the counterscarp of bastions Toledo and Fernando; and for six guns to enfilade the covered-way of the Toledo bastion. In the meantime a steady fire was kept against Kiel, the ravelin in its rear, aud the Paciotto bastion. From the 6th to the 7th a battery of 24-pounders near the village of Burcht on the left and Hoboken on the right opened on the gun-boats which flanked the French post at the Melk Huys. It was intended to assault St Laurent this evening; but as the lunette was found to be well protected by trous-de-loup, the project was abandoned, and the regular method of descent, passage, and mine determined on.

Between the 7th and 8th of December a shell penetrated the blindage of the laboratory, and, setting fire to the combustibles in it, caused considerable havoc. A battery for six mortars, E, on the right, now opened its fire; another, F, also for six mortars, was traced behind the centre of the parallel; and platforms for four mortars were laid near Montebello. The fire of these batteries was directed on the Toledo bastion and the buildings within it. previous day jets of flame had been seen to issue from the Great Barracks, and, in spite of every exertion, the building was entirely consumed by the evening of the 8th.

On the

From the 9th to the 10th of December the operations against St Laurent were renewed with great activity, and the sap advanced to the crotchet of the second traverse, whilst that intended to debouch upon it from its right was likewise pushed on. The third parallel was opened 130 yards in advance of the second, its right debouching beyond the Boom Chaussée, from the branch running into the covered-way of the counterguard, and its left uniting with the boyau parallel to the foot of the glacis of St Laurent. The garrison suffered much from the vertical fire of the mortars and howitzers, especially the great mortar and the new-model eightinch howitzers. Until the year 1822 the eight-inch howitzer in common use in France measured 3 feet 6 inches French, and weighed 1096 fb, or twenty-three times the weight of the loaded projectile, whilst its calibre was equal to a solid shot of 80 b, and contained 65 ounces of powder. The new-model howitzer was an improvement on the Russian licorne and the Spanish heavy howitzer, perfected by Colonel Paixhans. The raft for the blinded descent into the ditch was brought up to the lodgment, and a second descent à cicl couvert was commenced to the left of the first. The third parallel was improved and widened. A little after dusk on the 10th the besieged made a sortie, which was driven in, but not until damage enough had been done to occupy the French all the night of the 10th and the morning of the 11th in repairing it. From the 11th to the 12th three rafts were got ready, and placed in the descents to the ditch; they were about 12 feet by 8. At dusk the miners returned to the escarp, and, in an excavation made the previous night, fixed two petards, which, by their explosion, produced a fissure in the wall, and a serjeant having immediately entered the hole, commenced a gallery under the centre of one of the arches. At 11 A.M. on the 12th the battery H, on the extreme right of the second parallel, opened fire, which, combined with that from the others, told severely on the Toledo bastion. The miners still continued their work under the lunette St Laurent, and commenced chambers for three mines. The fourth parallel was widened during the day.

Between the 12th and 13th of December the miners were at work in the chambers under St Laurent, which were not yet completed On the right the covered-way of the left face of the Toledo bastion