the censorship exercised by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London. But the censorship did not protect from punishment; any one libelling the queen was, for the first offence, placed in the pillory, and had his ears cut off; for the second offence he was punished as a felon. By a law temporarily enacted under Philip and Mary, an author named John Stubbs, and his publisher, had each a hand cut off, in the reign of Elizabeth. Those judges who questioned the applicability of the respective acts, were either sent to the Tower or dismissed from office. No books could be introduced from beyond seas. A book entitled the "Russian Commonwealth," condemnatory of Russia, by one Giles Fletcher, was suppressed by Elizabeth.

In the reign of James I., the Star Chamber decided that a libel against an officer is a libel of a special nature. Deceased persons also might, in the opinion of the Star Chamber, be libelled, as little question was made of the "truth" of the facts alleged as of the reputation of the party libelled. A libel might be committed either by printing, writing, pictures, or the like signs. If directed against an officer, every one who obtained knowledge of such publication was bound to give information. The punishments were penalty and imprisonment. In cases of graver

moment, the cutting off the ears and the pillory were allowed.*

Under the Commonwealth Milton strove in vain, by his celebrated publication, to combat against the censure of the freedom of the press.†

After the Restoration the old enactments of the Tudors were renewed. An act of 1662 introduced temporarily the censorship, and forbade the erection of printing-presses saving in the corporate towns of London and York. An act of 1666 pretended that, according to the common law (sic.), the king hath a general prerogative against the printing of books; and that no one can print books without his license. This act expired in 1679, and with it

* Crabb, 544.

+ From the celebrated Areopagitica we extract the following leading passages:

"Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself— kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye."

"Bad books to a discreet and judicious reader, serve in many respects to

discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate."

"What advantage is it to be a man, over it is to be a boy at school, if we have only escaped the ferula, to come under the fescue of an Imprimatur? If serious and elaborate writings, as if they were no more the theme of a grammar-lad under his pedagogue, must not be uttered without the cursory eyes of the temporizing and extemporizing licenser ?"

the censorship. Recourse was had, however, to the confiscation of books. In 1685 the licensing act was revived for seven years, and in 1692 for two years longer. But though frequent attempts were made by the government to revive it, the parliament resisted it so strongly that it finally expired, and the press became properly free in 1694, and has ever since so continued.

The Continent at that period had not any further privilege or exemption in matters relating to the press in England than the English monarch himself. When the Danish ambassador appealed to William III. for a prohibition against an unfavourable pamphlet, which Lord Molesworth had published against his country, exclaiming, "If a Dane had done the same with the King of England, he would, on complaint being made, have his head taken off." "That I cannot do," replied the sovereign; "but, if you like, I will tell the author what you say, and he shall put it in the next edition of his book."*

Hostility to a free press had not, however, subsided, for we find both houses of parliament, in 1751, declaring a publication entitled "Constitutional Questions," as "infamous," and ordering it to be burnt by the hand of the common hangman. On the 21st February, 1764, on the motion of Lord Lyttleton, the Upper House declared that the pamphlet published by the pettifogging attorney Brecknock, ander the title of "Droit le Roi," was Jacobinical, hostile to the Bill of Rights and to the Revolution, worthy to be burnt by the hangman, and the author condemned to imprisonment. Even in 1834, Mr. Bittlestone, editor of the "Morning Post," was consigned to the custody of the Usher of the Black Rod, and imprisoned by the Upper House, for libelling the Lord Chancellor Brougham. Such resolutions were frequently passed by both houses of parliament without observance of any of the forms of ordinary legal process, in violation of Magna Charta, viz., the trial by one's peers; and, at any moment, may still render the freedom of the press a mere fiction. The right of communicating to the public the proceedings of parliament has, after prolonged struggles, been at last achieved. The publication of parliamentary reports was formerly strictly forbidden. Even in 1738, Pulteney spoke violently against "members being made responsible outside the house for

* D'Israeli, Cur. Lit. ii. 192.

what they had spoken inside." The reports formerly given were of no value whatever, as they were based on the mere recital and communication of the members.* Since 1771 parliamentary reports have been permitted, but the reporters durst not take any notes in the house, and had to write their reports from memory. Even in 1807 a reporter of the Lower House was prosecuted for having taken notes. Reporting is now fully allowed; but the report of parliamentary proceedings remains still a breach of privilege. A member of parliament occasionally avails himself thereof in order to prevent the appearance of some unfavourable reports. Only in the face of violent opposition, and ultimately by the intervention of an act of parliament, has the printing and publishing of parliamentary papers been protected against legal proceedings (3 and 4 Vict. c. 9).

The law courts were not more favourably inclined towards the liberty of the press than parliament itself. Even Lord Mansfield understood by the liberty of the press the mere right to publish without being subject to censorship. Lord Brougham observes that most of the judges of the present day have held views not more liberal.‡

Even the barbarous penalties which the Tudors and the Stuarts enacted against offences of the press remained in force after the "glorious Revolution." Under George I. a printer was punished by loss of his ears for libelling his Majesty.§ Daniel Defoe, as it is well known, stood in the pillory for libel. A similar punishment for a like offence was incurred by a Dr. Shebbeare, who was condemned to three years' imprisonment.|| In Scotland, indeed, so late as 1794, Muir and Palmer were sentenced to fourteen years' transportation for the publication of Paine's "Rights of Man," and similar works. The last general attack on the liberty of the press took place consequent upon Lord Sidmouth's notorious circular under George IV., whereby he invited justices of the peace to endeavour to seize all satirical publications. Two acts of Queen Victoria now regulate the material rights of the press.

* May, Const. Hist. i. 428. + May, Const. Hist. i. 431.

Brougham, Const. 201.-In 1790, Mr. Walter, of the Times, was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for libelling the Prince of Wales, merely because he stated "that he had had differences with his father." Archenholz, Brit. Ann. v. 121.

§ Horace Walpole, Mem. Introd. 6.

Horace Walpole, Mem. i. A servant stood by his side while in the pillory, and held an umbrella over him to protect him from the rain. Geo. III. gave him and Smollett a pension.

ch. 37.

Hughes, Continuation of Hume.

According to 11 and 12 Vict. c. 12, every public invitation, whether by printing, writing, or speaking, which tends to dethrone the Queen, to levy war against her, to employ force against her or the parliament, or to cause an invasion, is punishable as felony, in other words, with death or transportation for life. By sec. 5 of the late act for amending the law respecting defamatory words and libel (6 and 7 Vict. c. 96) it is provided that if any person shall maliciously publish any defamatory libel he shall be liable to fine or imprisonment, or both, as the court shall award, such imprisonment not to exceed one year. By sec. 4, if any person shall maliciously publish any defamatory libel, knowing the same to be false, he shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding two years, and pay such fine as the court shall award. The person instituting the suit, and failing to prove his case, incurs all the costs.

Nothing is, however, more difficult in the English law than to define the meaning of the word "libel." "For my part, I could never learn what is a libel," says Pitt the elder. According to Cox, "a libel is a publication without justification or lawful excuse, which tends to injure the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule."*

The vagueness of the meaning of the word "libel" is thus illustrated by O'Connell :† "Lord Redesdale having been called ' a stout-built special pleader,' it was held to be a libel; and Lord Hardwicke having been called 'a sheep-feeder from Cambridge,' that, too, was held to be a libel; and he would pledge himself that he never yet read a newspaper which did not contain something which, under the existing law of libel, could not be construed into a libel. If it were a ministerial paper, it libelled the people and if what was called a 'popular' paper, it libelled the ministry; and if a neutral paper, the chances were it libelled both."+

Before the Revolution of 1688, it was assumed at Westminster that every publication which blamed or criticized the government was a libel, and might be suppressed. Chief-Justice Holt, in Tutchin's case, says, "To possess the people with an ill opinion of

*British Commonwealth, 237.

+ Hansard, Ser. iii. vol. xxi. 470.

Libel consists in the publication by the defendant of matter defamatory to the plaintiff, by means of printing, writ

ing, pictures, or the like signs-Bl. Com. iii. 125. Slander consists in the publication by the defendant of matter defamatory to the plaintiff by means of words spoken.-Bl. Com. iii. 123.

the government, that is, the ministry, is a libel." And the Attorney-general urged, "that there .could be no reflection or those that are in office under her majesty, but it must cast some reflection on the queen who employs them."* Lord Mansfield even punished libels against the dead in case any evil reflection had thereby been cast indirectly upon the living.

The Court of Common Pleas in 1812 ruled that a libel was a writing whereby a person was exposed to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Blackstone is of opinion that any writing which provokes any one to wrath is a libel.† Other lawyers even go so far as to declare that to be a libel which may generally bring damage to another.† In 1840 the Justices Erle, Barons Parke, Alderson, and Gurney held, "that every citizen has a right to make observations on the acts of public officials which concern him as a subject of the realm, provided he do not make his commentary a cloak for malice and scandal; but every imputation of a base or vile motive is a libel." Formerly, on an indictment for libel, the defendant was not allowed to allege the truth of it; as, even if true, it tended to a breach of the peace;§ the dictum of Lord Mansfield is well known, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel." By 6 and 7 Vict. c. 96, the proof of the truth exempts from punishment when the matters charged have been made known "for the public benefit." Though the definition of them eaning of the word "libel" is, according to English practice, so vague, defamatory words spoken are interpreted narrowly and strictly.

A parole imputation which merely offends a man's feelings, but does not cause any damage, is not punishable. Imputations concerning matters punishable by an ecclesiastical court must be prosecuted before such court; for instance, calling any one an "adulterer," etc. The words "rascal, liar, fool, knave," and such like, may be spoken without inducing punishment; to render a parole imputation punishable, one must give expression to defamatory imputations and accusations which, if based on fact, would expose the offender to punishment. It is punishable, accordingly, to call a man a "highwayman," for highway-robbery falls within scope of the laws; but to say to a man, "You are worse than a

* Hallam, C. H. iii. 229.

Bl. iv. 150.

Hansard, Ser. iii. vol. xxii. 412. § Hallam, C. H. iii. 229.

In an action for libel the "truth"

of the matter published always affords a justification; on an indictment for libel the truth of the defamatory matter does not constitute a valid defence.

Bl. iii. 312.