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it, and then gave the details of the murder: the judges were unanimously of opinion, that this confession was receivable in evidence. R. v. Gilham, Ry. & M. 186. So, where a man, committed with others for murder, told the chaplain of the prison that he wished to see a magistrate, and asked if any proclamation had been made, and any offer of pardon; and the chaplain answered that there had, but the prisoner must understand that he could not hold out to him any inducement to make any statement, as it must be his own free and voluntary act; and when the prisoner afterwards saw a magistrate, he told him that no inducement had been holden out to him to confess anything, but that what he was about to say was his own free and voluntary act, and he then made a statement: it was holden by Pollock, C. B., that this was receivable in evidence against the party, upon his subsequent trial with the others for the murder. R. v. Dingley et al., 1 Car. & K. 637. So, where a boy of ten years of age, after being enjoined by a clergyman to speak the truth in the face of God," inade a disclosure of his guilt to a policeman, it was holden to be admissible in evidence against him upon his trial. R. v. Risborough, 11 Shaw's J. P. 280. Where a constable told a prisoner "if you will tell where the property is, you shall see your wife," Patteson, J., held that this was not such an inducement as to exclude evidence of what the prisoner said. R. v. Lloyd, 6 Car. § P. 393. So, a statement made by a person as a witness before a committee of the house of commons, and under compulsory process, was received in evidence by Abbot, C. J., upon an indictment afterwards preferred against the witness for perjury. R. v. Merceron, 2 Stark. 366. So, where a prisoner in gaol, on a charge of felony, asked the turnkey of the gaol to put a letter in the post for him, directed to his father, and the turnkey, instead of putting it into the post, sent it to the prosecutor: Garrow, B., held that the letter was admissible in evidence against the prisoner, notwithstanding the manner in which it had been obtained. R. v. Derrington, 2 Car. & P. 418.

But where a threat or promise is thus used, it must appear to have been used by some person concerned in apprehending, examining, or prosecuting the prisoner, or by the person to whom the confession is made, to have the effect of preventing such confession from being given in evidence. Thus, where, upon a man being apprehended for larceny, several of his neighbours admonished him to tell the truth and consider his family, and he therefore made a confession to the constable : the judges held this confession to be receivable in evidence, because the inducement to confess was not holden out or sanctioned by any person who had any concern in the business. R. v. Row, R. & Ry. 153. Upon the trial of a girl for the murder of a bastard child, it appeared that a woman who was present when the surgeon was attending her, mentioned that

she had advised her to confess, and the girl then made a confession to the surgeon: Parke, J. and Hullock, B., held that the confession was receivable in evidence, because the inducement to confess was holden out by a person who had no authority whatever to do so; if it had been by the constable, prosecutor, or the like, it would have been otherwise. R. v. Gibbons, 1 Car. & P. 97. And see R. v. Tyler, Id. 129. But where a married woman was apprehended for felony, and her husband being present told her that if she knew anything about it, to tell the truth: this was holden not to be receivable in evidence, as the inducement, being holden out in the presence of the constable, was the same as if it had been holden out by him. R. v. Laugher, 2 Car. & K. 225. So, where a girl, being apprehended for the murder of her child, was left by the constable in the custody of a woman, who told her she had better tell the truth, otherwise it would lie upon her, and the man would go free; upon which she made a confession to the woman: Parke and Taunton, JJ., held this confession not receivable, as it was made in consequence of an inducement held out to the prisoner by a person who had her in custody. R. v. Enoch, 4 Car. & P. 539. And where the committing magistrate told the prisoner, that if he would make a disclosure, he would do all he could for him, and the prisoner afterwards made a disclosure to the turnkey of the gaol: Parke, J., held that it was not receivable in evidence after the promise holden out by the magistrate, more especially as the turnkey had not given any previous caution to the prisoner. R. v. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 535.

If, however, after an inducement by threat or promise has been holden out to a prisoner to confess, and, before any confession actually made, the prisoner be undeceived as to the promise or threat, and assured that he has nothing to hope from the one or fear from the other, any confession he makes afterwards will be receivable in evidence. Where a man, committed for murder, was told by a magistrate, that, provided he was not the person who struck the fatal blow, he would use all his endeavours and influence to prevent any ill consequences to him, if he would disclose all he knew of the murder; and the magistrate wrote upon the subject to the secretary of state; but upon learning from him that mercy could not be extended to the prisoner, he informed the prisoner of it; afterwards the prisoner made a confession before the coroner, but he was previously told by him that any confession or admission he should make would be given in evidence against him at the trial, and that no hope or promise of pardon could be held out to him: Littledale, J., beld clearly, that this confession was receivable in evidence. R. v. Cleeves, 4 Car. & P. 221. So, upon the trial of a girl for administering poison, it appeared that she was threatened by her mistress, that, if she did not tell all about it that night, a constable should be sent

for the next morning, to take her before the magistrates; and she made a statement accordingly, which the judge refused to receive in evidence; but it appeared, also, that the constable was actually sent for the next morning, and took her into custody, and that whilst on the way to the magistrates, in his custody, she made another confession to him: Bosanquet, J., held this latter confession to be admissible in evidence, for, at the time the prisoner made it, the inducement was at an end. R. v. Richards, 5 Car. & P. 318. So, where the constables had induced a prisoner to confess, by telling him that his companions had "split," and he might as well do so; but afterwards, upon this appearing before the magistrate who took the examination, he informed the prisoner that his confessing would do him no good, but that he would be committed to prison to take his trial: Denman, C.J., held, that a confession by the prisoner to the magistrate, after this caution, was receivable in evidence. R. v. Howes, Car. & P. 404. See stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 18, post, pp. 132, 133.

But even in cases where the confession of a prisoner is not receivable in evidence, on account of it having been obtained by means of some threat or promise, any discovery made in consequence of it may be proved; 2 Hawk. c. 46, s. 38; and in such a case, the counsel for the prosecution is merely allowed to ask the witness, whether, in consequenoe of something he heard from the prisoner, he found anything, and where, &c., and the witness in answer can only give evidence of the fact of the discovery. In one case, indeed, the judges are reported to have gone further. The case was thus:-the prisoner was indicted for stealing a guinea and two bank notes for 5l. each; the prosecutor in his evidence was about to state a confession of the prisoner, but admitting that he had previously told the prisoner that it would be better for him to confess, Chambre, J., who tried the case, would not allow the confession to be given in evidence; but he allowed the prosecutor to prove " that the prisoner brought him a guinea and a 57. bank note, which he gave up to the prosecutor as the guinea and one of the notes that had been stolen from him: " and a majority of the judges (Lord Ellenborough, Mansfield, Macdonald, Heath, Grose, Chambre, and Wood,) held that this evidence was properly receivable. R. v. Griffin, R. & Ry. 150. On the very same day, the judges appear to have decided another case, which was thus:-the prisoner was indicted for stealing money, to the amount of 11. 88. ; when he was apprehended, the prosecutor went to him, and asked him what he had done with his money which he had taken out of his pack, saying at the same time "that he only wanted his money, and if the prisoner gave him that, he might go to the devil if he pleased;" the prisoner therefore took 11s. 6}d. out of his pocket, and said it was all that was left of it: a majority of the judges (Macdonald, Chambre, Lawrence, Le

Blanc, and Heath,) held, that this was not receivable in evidence; Wood, Grose, and Mansfield were of a different opinion, Lord Ellenborough dubitante. R. v. Jones, R. & Ry. 151. There is also another case upon the same subject, decided at a later period; the former cases were decided in 1809, the following case in 1822: the prisoner was indicted for stealing several gowns and other articles; he was induced, by promises of the prosecutor, to confess his guilt, and after that confession he took the officer to a particular house, as the house where he had disposed of the property, and pointed out the person there to whom he had delivered it; that person denied having received it, and the property was never found the confession was not admitted in evidence, but the taking of the officer to the house above mentioned was, and the prisoner was convicted; Bayley, J., who tried the prisoner, entertaining a doubt whether the latter evidence was properly receivable, submitted the matter to the judges, who held that it was not, and that the conviction therefore was wrong: that the confession was excluded, because being made under the influence of a promise, it could not be relied on; and the act of the prisoner, under the same influence, not being confirmed by the finding of the property, was open to the same objection; the influence which produced a groundless confession, might also produce groundless conduct. R. v. Jenkins, R. & Ry. 492. The above case of R. v. Jones, however, shows that the finding of the property makes no difference. There is no doubt that if the goods in Jenkins's case had been found at the house, the officer might prove that he found them there in consequence of something he learned from the prisoner; but whether that would also let in evidence of the prisoner's act in accompanying the officer to the house, is another question.

Before a magistrate.] A confession made by a party charged with felony [or misdemeanor], on his examination before a magistrate, or before a secretary of state upon a charge of treason, has always been allowed to be given in evidence against the defendant upon his trial. 2 Hawk. c. 46, ss. 31, 32. And by a recent statute, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 18, we have seen (ante, p. 42), that where a prisoner is brought before a justice of the peace, charged with an indictable offence,-after the examination of the witnesses on the part of the prosecution has been completed, the justice, or one of the justices, by or before whom such examination shall have been so completed, shall read or cause to be read to the accused the depositions taken against him, and shall say to him these words, or words to the like effect: "Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say anything in answer to the chage? You are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in

writing, and may be given in evidence against you on your trial;" and whatever the prisoner shall then say in answer thereto, shall be taken down in writing, and read over to him, and shall be signed by the said justice or justices, and kept with the depositions of the witnesses, and shall be transmitted with them to the proper officer of the court where the defendant is to be tried; and afterwards, upon his trial, the same may, if necessary, be given in evidence against him, without further proof thereof, unless it shall be proved that the justice or justices purporting to sign the same, did not in fact sign the same. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 18. Such is the humane provision of the English law, to prevent a prisoner from committing himself, by any unadvised admission, which otherwise, in his confusion and agitation arising from the proceedings against him, he might make, without calculating on its consequence. It is in the true spirit of fairness towards the prisoner, which distinguishes the administration of criminal justice in this country, from its administration in any other country in Europe.

The prisoner's statement, when required by the prosecutor for the purpose of being given in evidence before the grand jury or at the trial, is merely produced from among the depositions, and proves itself. R. v. Sansome, 19 L. J. 143 m. And as the usual form of such statement recites the charge against the prisoner, and that after examination of the witnesses against him the magistrates addressed to him the caution above mentioned, setting it out in the very words of the statute, the written statement itself, purporting to be signed by the magistrate, and accompanying the depositions, proves all that recital, as well as what the prisoner said upon the occasion. But if the usual form have not been adopted, then the caution, the prisoner's statement, and the magistrate's signature, must be proved as at common law, (per Alderson, B., in R. v. Boyd, 19 Law J. 141,) namely, by the magistrate or his clerk, or by some person who was present at the examination. R. v. Hearn, Car. & M. 109. R. v. Wilshaw, Id. 145.

But although the prisoner be thus cautioned before he makes his statement, yet if his statement amount to a confession, and he were induced to make it by any previous promise of favour or threat, as already mentioned, ante, p. 126, it cannot be read in evidence against him,-unless, indeed, before he make the statement, he have been undeceived as to the threat or promise, and told that he has nothing to fear from the one or hope from the other. See ante, p. 129. To meet this difficulty, the same section of the statute which directs the above caution to be given, contains also this proviso, "that the said justice or justices, before such accused person shall make any such statement, shall state to him and give