only be held conclusive as to what appears on the face of them, and what is distinctly and positively determined. The courts of this country will not go into these foreign sentences further than to see what they explicitly contain; and if they do not positively negative the warranty, or condemn the ship and cargo as enemy's property, they will be disregarded.(Geyer v. Aguilar, 7 Ter. Rep., p. 681; Cornelius v. Hughes, 2 Shower, p. 232; Bernardi v. Motteux, Dougal, 575; Lord Holt's opinion in two cases— Green v. Walker, 2 Lord Raym. 893, and Ewer v. Jones, 2 Lord Raym. 935; Kindersley v. Chase, Park's Ins., 5th ed., 363; Lothian, etc., v. Henderson and others, ut supra; Stair, b. ii., tit. ii., § 6; Magens, vol. i., p. 437.) The sentence, therefore, of a foreign Admiralty Court, condemning the vessel insured, is evidence only when it is explicit, and evidence of what it positively and specifically affirms; but is not conclusive evidence as to what is not affirmed.-(Per Lord Ellenborough, in Fisher v. Ogle (1808), 1 Camp. 417.) CHAPTER XI. DEVIATION. DEVIATION from the due course of the voyage will annul the policy.-(Stevens and Co. v. Douglas, Mor., p. 7096; Bell's Pr., § 492; 1 Arnould, p. 393; Marsh, p. 138; Park, p. 619.) The due course of the voyage is that which custom has fixed and sanctioned as the usual course in any particular voyage.' It is an implied condition of every policy, that the vessel insured shall sail in that course; and any deviation from it will, therefore, vacate the policy, even though this deviation should arise from the ignorance of the captain.-(Phyn v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 7 Ter. Rep. 505; Bottomley v. Bovill, 5 B. and C. 210.) Mere intention to deviate will not vacate the policy. (Tasker v. Cuningham, 1 Bligh, 87; Kewley v. Ryan, 2 H. Bl. 343; Wooldridge v. Boydell, 1 Doug., p. 16; Thellusson v. Ferguson, 1 Doug. 360.) But the deviation, when it occurs, must be wilful. -(Graham and others v. M'Nair, 2 Paton's App. Cas. 244; 1 Bell's Com. 622; Arnould, p. 459.) Accidental or involuntary deviation will not have that effect.-(Ibid., Dunlop v. Allan, Mor., p. 7097; Bell's Pr., § 494.) So deviation occurring by the force of storms will not vacate the policy (Smith v. MacNeill, 2 Dow, 538; Delany v. Stoddart, 1 Ter. Rep. 22); or where the vessel is obliged to run for the nearest port to escape shipwreck or to refit damage (Motteux v. The London Assurance Company, 1 Atk. 545); or to run before the wind; or to run to sea out of the ship's course, in order to escape seizure (Vallejo v. Wheeler, Cowp. 143; O'Reilly v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 4 Camp. 246; Har 1 Emerigon, vol. ii., chap. iii., § 5, says, "La regle générale exige donc que le captitaine suive, la voie droite, le chemin usité et le plus sûr.” - (Targa, ch. lii., n. 22, p. 231; Veytsen, § 30; Devicq., n. 73; Straccha de Nautis, part 3, n. 8; Roccus, n. 52; Kuricke, p. 718; Valin, p. 424. - rington v. Halkeld, 2 Park's Ins. 438; Dunlop v. Allan, Mor. 7097; Emerigon, vol. ii., chap. xiii, § 5; Arnould, 459; 2 Park on Ins. 638). It will not be wilful deviation, if the captain of the vessel learn, that at the port of destination there is an embargo upon all ships of the vessel's nation, and she is obliged to sail to the nearest port (Blackenhagen v. London Assurance Company, 1 Camp. 454); or that the island or port is in possession of the enemy, and he discharges the cargo at the nearest port (Dunlop v. Allan, Mor. 7097). But if, as in the first case, instead of waiting in this nearest friendly port, she sails back to England, then there will be a total abandonment of the voyage, and the underwriters will not be liable for the capture of the vessel after sailing for England. -(Blackenhagen v. The London Assurance Company, ut supra; Driscol v. Bovil, 1 B. and P.; Hadkinson v. Robinson, 3 B. and P. 388; Hartley v. Buggin, 3 Doug. 39, Park on Ins. 313, a; Lubbock v. Rowcroft, 5 Esp. Cas. 50.) If the captain obeys orders that he was not bound to obey, in going to sea, and acts without any compulsion or force being exercised towards him, the underwriters will not be liable, as this will be deemed a deviation.-(Phelps v. Auldjo, 2 Camp. 350.) If the captain has deviated through ignorance, the policy will be void.—(Phyn v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 7 Ter. Rep. 505; Bottomley v. Bovill, 5 Br. and Cr. 210.) If a vessel arrive at her loading port of the voyage insured disabled-as, for example, on a policy "at and from Fort St George, in the East Indies, to London ;" 78 In life i as regards t the risk. T granted.-( and that sh blistered, an ministered, i which annul! muir, 21 Jul If, during there is a ma vidual-a cl concealed, it Medical Inva 25 Nov. 184: If, in an garding hea party was in ease that te fact, the as must have insurance, 7 rington v. Halkeld, 2 Park's Ins. 438; Dunlop v. Allan, Mor. 7097; Emerigon, vol. ii., chap. xiii, § 5; Arnould, 459; 2 Park on Ins. 638). It will not be wilful deviation, if the captain of the vessel learn, that at the port of destination there is an embargo upon all ships of the vessel's nation, and she is obliged to sail to the nearest port (Blackenhagen v. London Assurance Company, 1 Camp. 454); or that the island or port is in possession of the enemy, and he discharges the cargo at the nearest port (Dunlop v. Allan, Mor. 7097). But if, as in the first case, instead of waiting in this nearest friendly port, she sails back to England, then there will be a total abandonment of the voyage, and the underwriters will not be liable for the capture of the vessel after sailing for England.-(Blackenhagen 2. The London Assurance Company, ut supra ; Driscol v. Bovil, 1 B. and P.; Hadkinson v. Robinson, 3 B. and P. 388; Hartley v. Buggin, 3 Doug. 39, Park on Ins. 313, a; Lubbock v. Rowcroft, 5 Esp. Cas. 50.) If the captain obeys orders that he was not bound to obey, in going to sea, and acts without any compulsion or force being exercised towards him, the underwriters will not be liable, as this will be deemed a deviation.-(Phelps v. Auldjo, 2 Camp. 350.) If the captain has deviated through ignorance, the policy will be void.-(Phyn v. Royal Exchange As surance Company, 7 Ter. Rep. 505; Bottomley Bovill, 5 Br. and Cr. 210.) If a vessel arrive at her loading port of the insured disabled-as, for example, on a from Fort St George, in the East Indis |