11 East. 347; Laroche v. Oswin, 12 East. 131; The Sea Insurance Company v. Gavin and others, 4 W. and S. App. Cases, p. 17.)

Deviation may apply to the time as well as to the track or course of the voyage. The voyage must be completed within the given time that a vessel is commonly understood to take in performing that voyage. If she be a considerable time beyond that period, that will be a deviation.-(Laroche v. Oswin, 12 East. 131; Langhorn v. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. 511.) Delay in commencing the voyage, or delay in the course of it, will be deviation.-(Hartley v. Buggin, 3 Douglas, 39 (Lord Mansfield's opinion); Park on Ins. 652, 8th ed.; Campbell v. Russell, 3 Paton's App. Cas. 340; Henderson and Sellar v. Allan, 5 Paton's App. Cas. 736.) Delay at a port of call in the course of the voyage insured will be deviation.(Williams v. Shee, 3 Camp. 469.)

In policies with the clause, "at and from a port," any unreasonable delay at the port in commencing the voyage will be deviation.-(Palmer v. Marshall, 8 Bingh. 79 and 317.)

Deviation, when it takes place, does not wholly annul the policy. If a loss occurs before the point of deviation be reached, the underwriters will be liable for this partial loss that has occurred prior to reaching that point.-(Hare v. Travis, 7 B. and Cr. 15; Arnould, 395.)

ALTERATION OF THE VOYAGE.

There seems to be a distinction between change or alteration of the voyage and deviation from the

due course of it. C. Kent laid it down, "A deviation is not a change of the voyage." Change of the voyage occurs not only when the original place of destination is changed for another place, but also where the risk itself is altered by some emerging circumstances, which affect the risk.-(Tennant v. Henderson, etc., 1 Dow, 334.) Thus, also, where a vessel was insured to Sweden with a Privy Council license, and the vessel sailed, and being mistaken for a Dane, and captured and brought into Leith by a British cruiser, she was detained several months, and then released, and allowed to proceed on her voyage. In the interval Sweden had declared war against Great Britain, and the vessel was again taken by the enemy. The question was, whether the voyage insured was continued, or whether there was an entire alteration of the risk by the declaration of war in the interval. The Court of Session held that the underwriters were not liable, the declaration of war in the interval having operated an entire change of the risk.—(Maxwell and others v. Brown, 14 May 1822, Fac. Coll. 583.)

The same result will ensue where the ship is insured for a particular port, and she sails for another. Thus, where a vessel was insured "at and from Maryland to Cadiz," but she actually cleared out from her loading port, and sailed from Maryland to Falmouth, -this was held to be a total change of the voyage insured; and though the vessel be taken or lost before she reaches the dividing point, yet the policy will be vacated.-(Wooldridge v. Boydell, 1 Dougl. 16.)

If, however, the vessel is forced to change her

voyage, either to avoid the enemy or other peril of the sea, the underwriters will not be discharged. (Emerigon, vol. ii., chap. xiii., § 14; Dunlop v. Allan, Mor. Dict., p. 7097.)

Mere intention to change will not be enough; there must be an actual change of the voyage, in order to annul the policy.—(Wooldridge v. Boydell, 1 Doug., p. 16.) Where a policy was effected for a voyage from Virginia to Rotterdam, with liberty to call at a port in England, this liberty to call will only entitle to call at a port in England that may be within the due course of the voyage to Rotterdam, and not at any port in England out of that course; and a vessel having sailed from Virginia direct for Hull, which was not in the due course of the voyage, it was held that there was an entire change of the voyage.— (Robertson and Co. v. Laird, 3 Paton's App. Cases 443.)

In a later case the voyage insured was "at and from Antigua to England, with liberty to touch at all or any of the West India Islands, Jamaica included;" it was held that the vessel might touch at any of the West India Islands, although not in the direct course of the voyage from Antigua to England, without its being (under the liberty given in this policy) an alteration of the voyage.-(Metcalfe v. Parry (1814), 4 Camp. 123.)

Sometimes the risk is altered by alteration of the policy itself. Thus, if a vessel be insured from the Bay of Honduras to Bristol, but the policy is afterwards altered, without notice to the underwriters, from Honduras "to London," instead of Bristol, the

I

policy will be void.-(Buchannan v. Hunter-Blair, Mor., p. 7083.)

The policy may be altered with the concurrence of the underwriters, and attention to certain requisites. But if the insurance is altered in the subject-matter insured, as, for example, from "ship and outfit" to "ship and goods,"-after the risk has commenced, without getting the policy re-stamped, it will not only be void, but vitiated.-(French and others v. Patten, 1 Camp. 72; Hill v. Patten, 8 East. 373.) But the policy will not be vitiated by less important alterations, made without the consent of the underwriters. (Clapham v. Cologan, 3 Camp. 382.) Even the time of sailing may be altered, pending the risk, with the concurrence of the underwriters.-(Ridsdale v. Shedden, 4 Camp. 107.)

It follows, from what has been stated to be the law in reference to deviation, that the voyage insured must be distinctly set forth in the policy, and described so as to set forth its commencing and its terminating point, the terminus a quo, and the terminus ad quem; and this is of importance, because the loss, in order to be a loss under the policy, must occur within these two points of place and time. The port the ship sails from, the port of call, and port of destination, must therefore appear on the face of the policy. If there be any failure in the accurate description of the voyage, the policy will be vitiated; but not if the description can fairly be taken to comprehend a loss happening where the loss has actually occurred.— (Uhde v. Watters, 3 Camp. 15; Moxon v. Atkins, 3 Camp. 200; The Sea Insurance Company v. Gavin

and others, 18 Feb. 1830, 4 W. and S. App., p. 17.) And if the port of destination be left blank, the policy will be void.—(Molloy, B. 2d, chap. 7, § 14.)

FIRE.-The same principles apply to an alteration or change in the structure of a building insured against fire. If this is done without notice to, or consent of, the insurance company, and the alteration really increases the risk, the policy will be void (Glen v. Lewis, 8 Wel., H. and G. 607; Baxendale and others v. Harvey, 4 Hur. and Nor., Exch. Rep. 445); but if it does not increase the risk, the policy will not be vitiated. (Stokes v. Cox, as reversed in the Exch. Court, 1 Hurl. and Nor. 533; Pim v. Reid, 6 M. and G. 1; Sillem v. Thornton, 3 E. and B. 868-887; Barrett v. Jermy, 3 Wel. H. and G., Exch. Rep. 535.)

CHAPTER XII.

OPEN AND VALUED POLICIES.

THERE are valued policies and open policies; and the difference between them, when a loss occurs, is important. In the valued policy, the interest insured is fixed at a precise sum; whereas in an open policy the subject insured is not valued, or its value is left blank. The blank not being filled up in the policy, leaves it open to the insured to claim the real value, whatever it may be proved to be. In the valued policy, the blank is filled up with a particular sum; the effect of that being to give a right to the insured