ency of water, without any such accident or force.— (Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 28 April 1815, 4 M. and S., p 77; Hearne v. Edmonds, 1 Bro. and Bingh. 338; Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bingh. 458; Thomson v. Murison, 8 June 1844, S. and D., p. 1120.)

What is a stranding, within the meaning of the memorandum clause, is best illustrated by reference to the facts of each particular case.

Stranding is well defined by Lord Ellenborough, in Herman v. Vaux, 3 Camp. 429, thus: "It is not merely touching the ground that constitutes stranding. If the ship touches and runs, the circumstance is not to be regarded. There, she is never in a quiescent state. But if she is forced ashore, or is driven on a bank, and remains for any time upon the ground, this is a stranding, without reference to the degree of damage she thereby sustains." In the case in which Lord Ellenborough so laid it down, the vessel, on leaving Limerick, on her voyage to Oporto, was forced ashore and struck the ground, and lay fast for two hours, until the returning tide floated her, when she immediately proceeded on her voyage, with no apparent damage sustained. On arriving at Oporto, part of the barley was found to be damaged by sea-water; and it was held that the insured was entitled to recover that partial loss, as this was a stranding in the sense of the memorandum clause.

On the other hand, it will not be a stranding if the vessel merely touches the ground, or a rock, but does not remain fast. -(Calder v. Mitchell and Gray, 7 Feb. 1822, Fac. Coll. 538.) Thus, in the

On

case of M'Dougle v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 4 Camp. 283, where a vessel, in the course of her voyage, was forced to put into the harbour of New Grimsby, and in coming out thence, with a pilot on board, she struck on a rock about a cable's length from shore, and she fell over on her beam ends, but only remained on the rock a minute and a half. She then proceeded on her voyage. arrival at her port, it was discovered that she had made a great deal of water, and a plank of her bottom was shattered where she had struck on the rock. Lord Ellenborough laid it down: "I am of opinion that this was not a stranding ex vi termini; stranding means lying on the shore, or something analogous to that. To use a vulgar phrase, which has been applied to this subject, if it is 'touch and go' with the ship, there is no stranding.

Taking the ground in a tidal harbour, on the ebb of the tide, in the place and manner she was expected to take the ground, is not a stranding.(Magnus v. Buttermer, 11 C. B. 876, 16 Jur. 480; Corcoran v. Gurney, 1 El. and Bl. 456 (1853); Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bingh. 458.)

But, where the vessel is forced by the perils of the sea to enter a harbour at low tide in an unusual and extraordinary manner, and, in doing so, takes the ground, this will be a stranding. (Per Lord Campbell, in Corcoran v Gurney (1853), 1 El. and Bl. 456, deciding in conformity with the principles laid down in Wells v. Hopwood, 3 Bar. and Ad. 34; and Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bingh. 464.)

If the vessel take the ground in a tidal harbour,

at the precise place where it was intended she should take the ground at the ebbing of the tide, and is not prevented from doing so by any accident or fortuitous cause, or force of the weather, it will not be a stranding, if, in so taking the ground, she comes upon a hard substance, from natural causes, by which a hole is knocked in her bottom, whereby the cargo is damaged. -(Kingsford v. Marshall, 8 Bingh. 458.)

On the other hand, if the taking the ground in a tidal harbour be attended with accidents, such as the wind forcing the ship to deviate from where it was intended she should take the ground, by the cable stretching, or by the wind blowing strongly in a certain direction, or where, on the tide ebbing, in taking the ground, she strikes on an anchor, or settles down partly on a bank of stones and partly in the mud, instead of grounding entirely in the mud, as was expected, and damage is sustained, this will be a stranding in the sense of the memorandum clause.— (Wells v. Hopwood, 5 Bar. and Ad., p. 20; Carruthers v. Sydebotham, 4 M. and S., p. 77; Barrow v. Bell, 4 B. and C. 736; Bishop v. Pentland, 7 B. and C. 219.) So, in the case of Calder v. Mitchell and Gray, 7 Feb. 1822, Fac. Coll., p. 538, where an insurance of a cargo of salt was effected on board the ship "Naughton" from Liverpool, warranted "free from average, unless general, or the ship be stranded," the question was, whether there was a stranding so as to entitle the insured to a partial loss within the meaning of the warranty.

The vessel, in the course of her voyage, and while she was at Loch Strangford, and under the care of

the pilot, got aground on shore. The captain immediately procured assistance, and got her off without any apparent damage. She then proceeded on her voyage; and when she got to Lochendale, the vessel was making such a great deal of water, that they had constantly to use the pumps, and to run before the wind. She took again the ground, and swung round on her keel. She afterwards struck the ground several times. The Judge-Admiral held, generally, that there was a stranding; and on suspension brought of his decree, the Court of Session held that there was a stranding at Strangford, but none at Lochendale.

The other exception in the memorandum clause, as to general average, will be afterwards adverted to.1

CHAPTER III.

INSURABLE INTEREST.

IN fire insurances, it is necessary that the party who insures should have either some interest or property in the subject, both at the time of insuring and also at the time of the loss.-(Per Lord Hardwicke, in the Saddlers' Company v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554.) The principle on which this seems to proceed is, that these policies are not assignable.

But this rule does not apply to marine insurance on ship and goods. It is immaterial that the insured should have, in such cases, an interest at the time of 1 Vide Chapter XIII., "General Average."

effecting the policy. It is enough if he have an interest in the subject insured at the commencement of the risk.(Rhind v. Wilkinson, 2 Taunt., p. 237.) Even where the insurance is taken in name of a party or parties named "as well in his name as for and in name of all and every person or persons to whom the same might belong, lost or not lost," it will be sufficient that the party has, subsequently to the commencement of the risk, acquired an interest. (Sutherland v. Pratt and others, 11 Mee. and Wel., p. 296.)

But, in the insurance of freight, the party who insures must have an insurable interest at the time the policy is effected. The insured, in order to entitle him to insure, and to recover for a loss under the policy, must have a present existing title vested in him at the time of the insurance, and at the time of the loss.-(Camden v. Anderson, 5 Term. Rep. 709.) This proceeds on the principle that the right to freight depends on the ownership of the vessel, as established by the registry; and, accordingly, the party insuring or claiming a loss on a policy on freight must show his title to the ship. It is possible, however, that, after the sailing of the vessel insured, she may be sold during the currency of the voyage, whereby the legal right to freight and its accessories would pass to the purchaser, provided he register his transference; and on a loss of the vessel and cargo, the sum insured on freight would go to him in place of the freight.

In regard to the several kinds of interest which are insurable, the general principles applicable to this