the scepticism which examines every principle, only to be sure that inquiry has not terminated too soon, and that which examines them, only to discover and proclaim whatever apparent inconsistencies may be found in them. Astonishment, indeed, is thus produced; and it must be confessed, that there is a sort of triumphant delight in the production of astonishırent, which it is not easy to resist, especially at that early period of life,* when the love of fame is little more than the love of instant wonder and admiration. But he who indulges in the pleasure, and seeks, with a sportful vanity of acuteness, to dazzle and perplex. rather than enlighten, will find, that though he may have improved his quickness of discernment, by exercises of nice and unprofitable subtlety, he has improved it at the expense of those powers of patient investigation, which give to dialectic subtlety its chief value.

The perpetual consideration of the insufficiency of all inqui ry, as deduced from inconsistencies which may seem to be involved in some of our principles of belief, is more encouraging to indolence than to perseverance. By representing to us error, as the necessary termination of every speculative pursuit, it seems, at every moment, to warn us not to proceed so far; and tends, therefore, to seduce the faculties into a luxurious slothfulness of occupation, which prefers a rapid succession of brilliant paradoxes, to truths of more extensive and lasting utility, but of more laborious search.

To shew that it is not from any logical inference, or direct induction, we have derived many of those opinions which, by the very constitution of our nature, it is impossible for us not to hold, and which have been formed without any thought of their origin, requires indeed superior perspicuity, but does not require any process of long continued reasoning. The very habit of ratiocination is thus apt to yield to a love of briefer exercises of discursive subtlety; and this tendency, when the scepticism relates to moral and religious subjects, is still increased by the popular odium attached to infidelity, in those great articles of general belief,-an odium, which may naturally be supposed to induce the necessity, in many cases, of exhibiting subjects only by glimpses, and of hinting, rather than fully developing and enforcing a proof.

A mind that has long been habituated to this rapid and lively species of remark, and that has learned to consider all inquiries as of doubtful evidence, and their results therefore as all equally or nearly equally satisfactory or unsatisfactory, does not readily

* We are told by Mr. Hume, that the Treatise on Human Nature was projected by him before he had left college.'

submit to the regularity of slow disquisition. It may exhibit excellencies, for which we may be immediately led to term it, with the justest commendation, acute, or subtle, or ingenious: but it will not be in many cases that there will be reason to ascribe to it that peculiar quality of intellect, which sees, through a long train of thought, a distant conclusion, and, separating at every stage the essential from the accessory circumstances, and gathering and combining analogies as it proceeds, arrives at length at a system of harmonious truth. This comprehensive energy is a quality to which acuteness is necessary, but which is not itself necessarily implied in acuteness; or rather it is a combination of qualities, for which we have not yet an exact name, but which forms a peculiar character of genius, and is, in truth, the very guiding spirit of all philosophic investigation.

That a long indulgence in the ingenuities of scepticism, though it may improve mere dialectic acuteness, has a tendency to deaden, if I may so term it, the intellectual perception of the objects on which it is wisdom to rest, and, by flinging the same sort of doubtful light over truth and error, to make error often appear as worthy of assent as truth, at least if the error happen to be in any doctrine of the sceptic himself,-is, I think, what our knowledge of some of the strongest principles of the mind might naturally lead us to expect. That the evil, of which I speak, is truly to be found in the metaphysical speculations of Mr. Hume, I may be wrong, indeed, in supposing; but, if any part of his abstract writings be marked with it, there is none, I conceive, in which it is so conspicuous, as in those which relate to the subject that has been now under review. While he appears only as the combatant of error, in exposing the inadequacy of perception or mere reasoning to afford us directly any notion of the necessary connexion of events, it is impossible not to feel the force of the negative arguments which he urges, and equally impossible not to admire the acuteness and vigor of intellect which these display. But when, after these negative arguments, he presents to us opinions on the subject, which he wishes us to receive as positive truth, a very slight consideration is all that seems necessary to show, how strong the self-illusive influence must have heen, that could make these opinions, unwarranted as they are by the evidence of observation or consciousness, appear to his own mind worthy of the credit which he expects to be given to them. It is fortunate for his intellectual character, that it is not as a dogmatist only, he has given us opportunities of knowing him. The minor theories involved in his doctrine of the origin of the notion of power, would certainly give a very unfavourable impression of his talents as a metaphysical inquirer; if his reputa

tion as a metaphysician were to be founded wholly on this or other positive doctrines maintained by him, and not on the acuteness with which, in many brilliant exercises of sceptical subtlety, he has exhibited what he wishes to be considered as errors in the systems of popular and scientific faith.' p. 338.

Before dismissing our author, we shall venture to offer one or two strictures on the leading doctrine and definition in his book.

We apprehend that both himself and Mr. Hume have overlooked an essential element which enters into our idea of a cause, and which, if introduced into their definition, would at least have made it more easily comprehended and received. A cause, Dr. Brown defines to be, that which immediately precedes any change, &c. This definition involves only immedi ate succession, or proximity in time. Is not contiguity in place equally a part of our notion of causation? Must not the antecedent in our idea be locally present with the consequent ? It is an axiom, which, at its very first announcement, every body,-child-peasant-philosopher-believes and acknowledges, that no power can act where it is not present. It is true we have an idea of remote causes, as well as proximate causes. But every remote cause is always supposed to act upon something immediately near, and then that something to act upon another as immediately near it, and so on, till we arrive in idea to the proximate cause, which, to produce the last effect, is believed to be near it, even to immediate contiguity. We think that the omission of this idea has led Dr. Brown as well as Mr. Hume into considerable embarrassment, when they came to apply their principle to the innumerable coexisting sequences of phenomena, which at every moment are taking place throughout nature. They have both left that point in an unsatisfactory state, Mr. Hume to Dr. Brown, and Dr. Brown to us. If nothing more than immediate precession in time is admitted into our idea of causation, then, why is not the acorn, which is planted at the same time with the cherry-stone, regarded as the cause of the fruittree, as much as it is of the oak? Admit into your definition the necessary circumstance of immediate contiguity in place, as well as immediate precession in time, and you escape from this objection. We are aware that Dr. Brown has in a manner provided against it by a somewhat cumbrous and not

very easily comprehended paraphrase. After beginning his definition, by declaring a cause to be that which immediately precedes any change, he adds, and which, existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change. We would not exclude this portion of the definition, but would only submit, whether the introduction of contiguity of place as well as proximity in time would not have imparted to the definition more precision, universality, and tangibility.

That this circumstance of immediate contact always forms part of our strict and simple notion of causation, the more we reflect upon it, the more we are inclined to believe. We wish, therefore, that Dr. Brown had called in this idea,* and wrought it up throughout his treatise in his own admirable manner. It is possible, that in so wishing, we do not look round and through the subject with the comprehensive survey of thorough-going theorists. Yet we cannot but think, that the proposed improvement would have materially assisted him in keeping his main object in view, and prevented many laborious circumlocutions in fortifying his positions against a throng of difficulties and objections, that perpetually arose upon him as he advanced.

Our author in the definition before us, seems to us to have revealed just so much of the truth, as is conveyed in telling a man in what parallel of latitude his ship is sailing on the ocean. Had he brought in the circumstance of contiguity in place, we think that this would have been like drawing his line of longitude; it would have reduced the difficulty to a specific certain point, and given to our floating, mysterious idea of a cause a fixed, intelligible, and definite relation. Observe too, that the obnoxious notion of an invisible link would be equally excluded by this as by the other form.

What then would be our definition? A cause is that which immediately precedes and is immediately present at any change. If very hardly pushed, we might call in the closing phraseology of our author's definition. Yet we think we could do without it.

Will our readers briefly analyse this our definition along

When our author speaks of the term bond of connexion as being adopted to express proximity in time, it is remarkable that he did not perceive how much more appropriate it is to imply proximity in place. See page 407.

with us? Think of any change, any phenomenon whatever. Think now of an object or event which is in so close a proximity to it as to exclude the contact of every thing else existing. If this object or event exist in this closest contiguity immediately previous to the change; what else is your idea of a cause?

We had intended to couple with this article a Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Part First, comprehending the Physiology of the Mind.' This work constitutes the outlines of a part of Dr.. Brown's Lectures, and was printed last year for the use of his pupils. But had time and the length of the foregoing article permitted us to notice this original and curious volume, an advertisement in England, announcing, as we have been informed, the publication of the author's Lectures at large in four volumes, would have induced us to postpone our design.

E. Excrett,

ART. XXIII.-Ensayo de la historia Civil del Paraguay, Buenos-Ayres, y Tucuman, escrita por el doctor D. Gregorio Funes, dean de la Santa Iglesia Catedral de Cordova.—Tom. 3. 8vo. Buenos-Ayres, 1816-1817.

CAUSES, into which we have not time now to enter much in detail, have prevented the momentous drama performing in South America from engaging its due share of the public interest in this country. It might have been thought that, to us at least in the United States, few subjects of a political nature would have awakened a wider sympathy, than the character and probable results of the contests for independence in the South. But it must not be forgotten that the practical statesman has very little concern with those feelings and associations, which belong, in a considerable degree, to the region of sentiment. That Buenos Ayres and Mexico are a part of our continent may suggest fine themes for general declamation and poetry is true; but if, notwithstanding this, our political and commercial relations with them are insignificant, compared with those we stand in with the European states; if it is of far more importance to us to command the respect of those, who bear sway on the banks of the Thames or of the Neva, than to be hailed as brethren along all the banks of the Amazon and the La Plata; and