made on the parent or guardian, or the trustee or other person liable.

(iii.) As regards contentious business, where no special agreement as to the solicitor's remuneration has been entered into, the provisions and rules applicable are of too minute and detailed a character to admit of any condensed statement; we can only refer to Order LXV. of the Orders and Rules of 1883, and to the more or less casual references to the costs of litigation in general, and in certain particular kinds or classes of actions, which will be found in our treatment of Civil Injuries, in Book V. of this treatise.

IV. The Remedies for and against Solicitors, Civil and Criminal. It has already appeared incidentally, that either the solicitor (t) or the client may obtain an order for the taxation of his costs; and such order is, in the ordinary case, obtained on an ex parte application. If the application therefor is made within a year from the delivery of the bill of costs, the order is made as a matter of course, or almost as a matter of course; and if made in the Chancery Division, the order provides also for payment; but if made in the King's Bench Division, the order is merely for taxation. No order for taxation will be made of costs relating exclusively to business done by a solicitor otherwise than as a solicitor (u).

Where the order for taxation is not obtainable as of course, it must be obtained on a special application by summons, duly served by the applicant upon the other

(t) But the solicitor who presents a petition for the taxation of his own costs is at this disadvantage, that (unless the client attends at the taxation) he has to pay the costs of taxation in any event (see Act of 1843, s. 37, and In re Woollett (1844), 12 M. & W. 504; but see dictum of BYRNE, J.,

in Re Kingdon and Wilson, [1902] 2 Ch. 251); whereas, if the petition be presented by the client, and less than one-sixth be taxed off the amount of the bill, the costs of taxation are payable by

the latter.

(u) In re Baker, Lees & Co., [1903] 1 K. B. 189.

party, such special application being, in general, necessary after the lapse of the year, or after payment, or when the retainer is disputed; and generally, when there is any special circumstance affecting more or less the right to payment.

Speaking generally, there are four ways in which a solicitor can compel payment of the amount due to him for costs (i.) He may enforce the submission to pay, contained, as we have seen, in the order for taxation, when such order has been made in the Chancery Division ; (ii.) he may obtain a "charging order," under sect. 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860, upon any property that may have been recovered or preserved as the result of any proceeding in any court, in which proceeding he has been employed (a); (iii.) he may enforce his lien (y); and (iv.) he may bring an action against his client (). Conversely, it may happen that an action is the only remedy of the client against the solicitor, but this is only in very exceptional cases; for, in general, the court exercises over solicitors a very wide summary jurisdiction, on applications intituled in the matter of the solicitor, and sometimes on applications not so intituled (a), but of which notice has been duly given to the solicitor (b). But it is to be remembered, that this summary jurisdiction is exerciseable only in matters affecting the solicitor as such, e.g., for any misconduct, or breach or failure of his duty as a solicitor (c). In all other cases an action must be brought against him in the ordinary way.

The court also exercises a punitive, or disciplinary,

(x) See Ex parte Tweed, [1899] 2 Q. B. 167; and also Goodfellow v. Gray, [1899] 2 Q. B. 498; and In re Cook, Ex parte Cripps, [1899] 1 Q. B. 863.

(y) In re Taylor, Stileman, and Underwood, [1891] 1 Ch. 590.

(z) Lumley v. Brooks (1889), 41 Ch. D. 323.

(a) Re Ward (1862), 31 Beav. 1; Re Dangar's Trusts (1889), 41 Ch. D. 178; Swyny v. Harland, [1894] 1 Q. B. 707.

(b) Slater V. Slater (1888), 58 L. T. (s.s.) 149.

(c) Ex parte Edwards (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 158; but see In re Carroll, [1902] 2 Ch. 175.

jurisdiction over solicitors, when their conduct is of a fraudulent character (d); or when they are guilty of any contempt of court (e); or when convicted of a felony (ƒ). The punishment may be by commitment to prison or by attachment, or (in the graver classes of cases) by suspension from practice, or by striking off the rolls (g), the latter punishment not being in general inflicted, save after a report, formerly of the Master, but now of the Law Society (h). It remains to be added, that being struck off the roll of a colonial court does not per se entail being struck off the roll of solicitors in England (i).

set out in the Law Times, vol. cv., p. 62. Formerly, when a solicitor had been struck off the rolls under sect. 32 of the Solicitors Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), there was no means by which he could be reinstated (In re Lamb (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 477); but this has now been altered by the Solicitors Act, 1899 (62 Vict. c. 4); R. v. Incorporated Law Society, [1896] 1 Q. B. 327.

(i) In re a Solicitor, Ex parte Incorporated Law Society, [1898] 1 Q. B. 331.

BOOK V.

OF CIVIL INJURIES.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE REDRESS OF INJURIES (I.) BY THE MERE ACT OF THE PARTIES; AND (II.) BY THE MERE ACT OR OPERATION OF THE LAW.

WE now proceed to the examination of wrongs, an inquiry evidently posterior in its nature to the inquiry into rights. And wrongs being of two sorts,-civil injuries and crimes, we shall in this present Book consider only the first of these species of wrongs, with their appropriate remedies; reserving till the sixth and concluding Book the consideration of the other class of wrongs.

The remedies for civil injuries are principally to be obtained by application to the courts of justice, i.e., by action; but, there being certain injuries which require a more speedy remedy than can be had by action, certain extra-judicial or eccentrical remedies are provided. Of these latter we shall first treat, before we consider the remedy by action.

First, we have to consider Redress by the Mere Act of the Parties; and, Secondly, Redress by the Mere Act or Operation of the Law. There fall to be considered under the first of these two divisions the following

varieties of redress, namely,-(1) Self-defence (2) Recaption or Reprisal; (3) Entry; (4) Abatement; (5) Distress; and (6) the Seizure of Heriots; and to these may be added (although of a somewhat dissimilar character), (7) Redress by Accord and Satisfaction; and (8) Redress by Arbitration. And there fall to be considered under the second division (viz., Redress by the Mere Act of the Law) the two following varieties, viz., (1) Retainer ; and (2) Remitter.

1. REDRESS BY THE MERE ACT OF THE PARTIES.

[(1) Self-defence, that is to say, the defence of one's self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of people who stand in the relation of husband and wife, or of parent and child, or of master and servant. If a man be forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force, any breach of the peace which may ensue being chargeable upon him only who began the affray (a). And the law only requires that no more force be used than is necessary; for, if the resistance exceed the bounds of mere defence, then the defender himself becomes the aggressor (b). And what a man may do in his own defence, he may also do in defence of his wife, or of his child, or of his servant; also, a child may defend his parent, and a servant his master, and, probably, a wife her husband.

(2) Recaption or Reprisal.—This mode of redress may be resorted to when any one deprives another of his property in goods, or wrongfully detains his wife, child, or servant. In all these cases, the owner of the goods, or the husband, parent, or master, may lawfully retake them, wherever he happens to find them; retaking them peaceably, and not in a riotous manner, or with unneces

(a) 2 Roll. Abr. 546; 1 Hawk. P. C. 131: Bac. Abr. Master and Servant (P).

(b) 1 Hale, P. C. 485, 486. Vide post, bk. VI. c. IV.