in writing given signed by the person by whom the same is payable or his agent (ƒ); and then only within twelve years after such payment or acknowledgment (g). And as regards such charges on land, although the same should be secured by an express trust, the time is not to be enlarged (h).

(5) No arrears of rent or of interest, in respect of any sum of money charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, or in respect of any legacy, or any damages in respect of any such arrears of rent or interest, will be recoverable, but within six years after the same shall have become due, or been acknowledged in writing to the person entitled thereto or his agent; excepting that where a prior mortgagee, within one year next before action, has been in possession, the second mortgagee may in his action recover the arrears of his interest for the whole period (although exceeding six years) that the prior mortgagee has been in possession (i).

(6) As regards claims by a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole, the period of limitation for the recovery of any land or rent is the period during which two persons in succession shall have held the office or benefice in respect whereof the land or rent is claimed, together with six years after a third person shall have been appointed thereto, if the times of such two incumbencies and six years (taken together) shall amount to the full

(f) In re Viscount Clifden, [1900] 1 Ch. 774; Bradshaw v. Widdrington, [1902] 2 Ch. 430; Kirkland v. Peatfield, [1903] 1 K. B. 756.

(g) Act of 1874, s. 8; Jay v. Johnstone, [1893] 1 Q. B. 25, 189; Barnes v. Glenton, [1899] 1 Q. B. 885. The part payment must be one from which an acknowledg ment of liability, and a promise to pay the residue, can be implied

period of sixty years; and if not, then during such further number of years as will make up the sixty years (k).

(7) As regards patrons seeking to recover rights of advowson or of presentation, the period of limitation is the period during which three clerks in succession shall have held the living, all having obtained possession thereof adversely to the right of the plaintiff; but if such three incumbencies taken together shall not amount to the full period of sixty years, then sixty years is appointed as the period of limitation (1). On the other hand, if the three incumbencies should exceed one hundred years, then the plaintiff's right to sue is at once barred on the expiration of one hundred years, unless, of course, the adverse possession shall, in the meantime, have been interrupted (m).

(8) As regards land, the title to which has been registered under the Land Transfer Act, 1897 (n), adverse possession has ceased to be a mode of acquiring title to land (s. 12); but when the registration is for a possessory title only, and the adverse possession had already commenced at the date of the first registration of the title, that adverse possession does not cease to continue, but may afterwards mature, equally as if the title were not registered at all. And, even when the first registration was for an absolute title, such adverse possession so commenced as aforesaid will continue and may mature, so as to confer a title as against anyone other than and except a purchaser

(k) Act of 1833, s. 29; and regarding the time within which the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England may (as successors of the estates of ecclesiastical corporations) sue for the recovery of land, see Ecclesiastical Commissioners V. Rowe (1880), L. R. 5 App. Ca. 736; and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act, 1840, therein cited.

(7) Sect. 30.

(m) Sect. 33. The periods thus limited as above, for enforcing a right to present to or bestow an ecclesiastical benefice, extend to the case where a bishop claims as patron; but the Act does not affect the right of any bishop to collate by reason of lapse. (See Limitation of Actions Act, 1843, s. 5.)

(n) 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65.

for value who has purchased under the registered proprietor, and who has also registered (s. 12).

II. The Statutes of Limitation as Applicable to Things other than Land.—(1.) The period of limitation, with respect to most personal actions, was fixed by the Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. I. c. 16), s. 3 (o), whereby actions of trespass (other than trespass to the person), and of detinue, trover (p), and replevin; and actions for an account (other than between merchants) (q); and actions upon the case, except for verbal slander; and actions of debt on simple contract, or for arrears of rent not due upon specialty (r), were limited to six years after the cause of action accrued. Actions of trespass to the person (ie., for assault, menace, battery, wounding, and imprisonment) are limited to four years; and actions on the case for verbal slander are limited to two years. And these limitations still apply, there being the usual exceptions, of course, in favour of persons labouring under disability(s); for if the person entitled to sue should (when the cause of action accrues) be an infant or non compos, may sue within the same period after the removal of the disability (t). But married women are not now under disability by reason merely of their coverture; and imprisonment, or being beyond the seas, is no longer a disability (u) in a plaintiff; although, as regards a defendant beyond the seas, the 4 & 5 Anne (1705), c. 3, section 12,

(0) Collinge v. Heywood (1839), 9 A. & E. 633; Bonomi v. Backhouse (1861), 9 H. L. C. 503; Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Company (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 125.

(p) Wilkinson v. Verity (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 206; Spackman v. Foster (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 99.

(7) This exception was repealed by the statute 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97,

s. 9.

he

Cottam v. Partridge (1842),

4 Man. & G. 271.

(r) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3.

(8) Sect. 7.

(t) Le Veux v. Berkeley (1844), 5 Q. B. 836; Townsend v. Deacon (1849), 3 Exch. 706.

(u) Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s. 10; Cornill v. Hudson (1857), 8 E. & B. 429; Pardo v. Bingham (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 735.

stays the running of the statute in his favour (c). As regards co-defendants, the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), section 11 has enacted, that where the cause of action lies against two or more joint debtors, the person entitled to sue, although entitled to an extension of time as against the one of them who is beyond the seas, shall not be entitled to any extension of time, against the other or others of them who were not beyond the seas when the cause of action accrued (y).

The operation of the statute of James, with respect to actions upon simple contract, was at one time considerably narrowed, by the doctrine which prevailed, that not only a payment on account of principal or interest, but any mere verbal acknowledgment made before action brought, to the effect that the debt was due, would suffice to take the case out of the statute, by raising an implied promise to pay the debt; upon which promise, (as upon a new cause of action,) the same time for instituting proceedings would again have been allowed as upon the original contract (≈). But the law on this subject has been since materially altered. For, by the Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828 (9 Geo. IV. c. 14, s. 1), it was enacted, that, in actions grounded upon any simple contract, no acknowledgment, or promise, should be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of the Limitation Act, 1623, unless such acknowledgment or promise was contained in some writing, containing or amounting to a promise to pay (a), signed by the party to be charged, or by his duly authorized

(x) By the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s. 12, no part of the United Kingdom, Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, and Sark, nor the adjacent islands, being part of the dominions of his Majesty, is to be deemed "beyond seas" within the meaning of the 4 & 5 Ann. c. 3.

(y) Towns V. Mead (1855), 16 C. B. 123.

(z) Bateman v. Pindar (1842), 3 Q B. 574; Maber v. Maber (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 153.

(a) Spong v. Wright (1842), 9 M. & W. 629; Hart v. Prendergast (1845), 14 M. & W. 741; Willins v. Smith (1854), 4 El. &

agent (b); and that, where there were two or more joint contractors, no joint contractor should be chargeable, in respect only of the written acknowledgment of another. And, by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, section 14 (c), it has been since provided, that no co-contractor or co-debtor shall lose the benefit of the limitation of the statute of James, by reason only of any payment by the other or others (d).

(2) The Limitation Act, 1623, was inapplicable to debts arising on instruments under seal, that is to say, to specialty debts; but it became the practice, upon the trial of actions for specialty debts, for the judge to recommend the jury, where no payment on account of principal or interest had been made or demanded within twenty years, to presume that the specialty had been satisfied. And it was afterwards enacted, by the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, section 3, that all actions of debt for rent upon any indenture of demise, or of covenant, or of debt on any bond or other specialty, and all proceedings on recognizances, should be brought within twenty years after the cause of action or proceeding accrued ; and that all actions of debt upon an award, (where the submission was not under seal,) or for a copyhold fine, or for an escape, or for money levied upon any writ of fieri facias, should be brought within six years, it being, however, provided (as regards disabilities existing at the time of the accrual of the right of action), that the twenty years (or, as the case might be, the six

B. 180; Cornforth v. Smithard (1859), 5 H. & N. 13; Tanner v. Smart (1827), 6 B. & C. 603; Lee v. Wilmot (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 364; Chasemore v. Turner (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 500; Quincey v. Sharpe (1876), 1 Ex. D. 72; Skeet v. Lindsay (1877), 2 Ex. D. 314; Meyerhoff v. Froehlich (1878), 3 C. P. D. 333; Banner v. Berridge (1881), 18 Ch. D. 254; Sanders v. Sanders (1881), 19 Ch. D. 373; Curwen v. Milburn (1889),

42 Ch. D. 424; Green v. Humphreys (1884), 26 Ch. D. 474; Langrish v. Watts, [1903] 1 K. B. 636.

(b) Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s. 13.

(c) Jackson v. Woolley (1858), 8 E. & B. 778; Cockrill v. Sparkes (1863), 1 H. & C. 699.

(d) Cleave V. Jones (1851), 20 L. J. Exch. 238; Dick v. Fraser, [1897] 2 Ch. 181; Astbury v. Astbury, [1898] 2 Ch. 111.