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putting the sentence of the law in force. This is done by issuing a "writ of execution" or by attachment of debts or sequestration, or in the other modes hereinafter mentioned (n). There are different writs of execution; there are writs against the judgment debtor's goods (0), and also writs against his lands (p). A writ of execution is a document issued out of the central office of the High Court, and is directed to the sheriff, and by it he is commanded to execute the judgment in the manner specified in the writ itself.

There are specific executions for specific judgments; and not all executions issue on all judgments. In an ordinary legal action, the judgment is for the recovery of money only; and the judgment is enforced by a writ of fieri facias, or of elegit, or in the manner hereinafter pointed out. In the case of detinue, however, in which the judgment is for the recovery of specific goods which are detained, or the value thereof, with damages and costs, there was a special process of execution in use, called a

(n) See further as to these, post, pp. 631-633.

(0) Until a recent period, execution on a judgment might also, in cases above 20., have issued against the person of the debtor; who might have been arrested and imprisoned, under the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. But, by the Debtors Act, 1869, no person may now be arrested or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money, except in the cases specified in sect. 4 of the Act (Chard v. Jervis (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 178; Brooke v. Edwards (1882), 21 Ch. D. 230; Debtors Act, 1878); and except that persons who (having the means) refuse or neglect to pay debts, due from them in pursuance of any order or judgment, may be

committed for a term of six weeks or until payment (Hewitson v. Sherwin (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 53). The committal order may be made either in the superior court or, where the debt does not exceed 507., by the county court (Dillon v. Cunningham (1872), L. R. 8 Exch. 23). Persons so committed (or imprisoned) are subject to the differential treatment provided for by the Prison Act, 1898.

(p) Judgments Act, 1838, s. 11. A judgment against a mortgagee (which would formerly have bound the land mortgaged, even though the mortgage was paid off and the land actually conveyed to a purchaser or another mortgagee) has no longer that effect (Judgments Act, 1855, s. 11).

distringas, to compel the defendant to deliver the goods, by repeated distresses levied upon his chattels ; and this writ was recognized by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (7), and, under the Judicature Acts, it is preserved, under the name of a "writ of delivery" (r). Again, in an action for the recovery of land, a judgment for the plaintiff therein, requiring the defendant to deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiff, may be enforced by a "writ of possession"; and by such writ of possession, the sheriff is commanded to enter on the land which is the subject of the action, and to cause the plaintiff to have possession thereof with its appurtenances (s).

As regards writs of execution generally, it should be mentioned, that the writ must be executed within a year from the date of its issue, unless it should, in the meantime, have been properly renewed; but the writ may issue (as between the original parties) at any time within six years from the recovery of the judgment, though, after that time, the party alleging himself to be entitled to execution must apply for leave to issue it (t).

The leave of the court, before issuing execution on a judgment, may also be required by reason of a change of parties to the action. This change may occur, first, by death, wherein the rule formerly was, that if either of the parties died before final judgment the action would abate, and, if the death took place after final judgment, a scire facias was necessary in order to enforce the execution. But under the present practice (u), and ever since the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, the death of either plaintiff or defendant does not cause the action to abate ; but the proceedings (supposing the right of action to sur

(7) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 78; Chilton V. Carrington (1855), 15 C. B. 730.

(r) Ord. XLVIII. (The distress now includes the defendant's lands.)

(8) Ord. XLVII.

(t) Ord. XLII. r. 23.

(u) Ord. XVII. (before final judgment); Ord. XLII. r. 23 (after final judgment).

vive) is ordered to be continued by or against the proper parties. Again, if a female plaintiff or defendant married, the action used to be thereby abated, and, where judgment had been obtained, the plaintiff was driven to scire facias to enforce the judgment (a); but, after the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, an action did not abate by marriage, though a suggestion on the record was required of the marriage. And the like suggestion was necessary, in case a plaintiff became a bankrupt, after he had obtained judgment, but before he had issued execution (). Under the Judicature Acts, the law on these matters has not been altered, but the process requisite to carry on the proceedings (at whatever stage of the action the change of parties occurs) has been made more simple, it being provided, that, in the case of the death, bankruptcy, or devolution of the estate by operation of law, of any party to an action during the pendency thereof, such order may be made, as to new parties, or as to a change in the capacity in which the original parties sued or were sued, as shall be deemed necessary by the court for a complete settlement of all the questions involved in the action; and this merely upon an ex parte application, the order being served on any party affected thereby, who, if he objects thereto, must, within twelve days of the service, apply that the order may be discharged or varied (z).

Since the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the marriage of a plaintiff has had no practical effect on an action or execution.

As regards the operation of judgments on goods, it should be observed that at common law the debtor's goods were bound as from the date of the writ of execution. The Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), section 16, provided

(x) Walker v. Golling (1843), 11 M. & W. 78; Underhill v. Devereux (1669), 2 Saund. by Wms. 72k.

S.C.-III.

2 s

(y) Winter v. Kretchman (1787), 2 T. R. 45.

(z) Ord. XVII. rr. 1—3.

that the goods should only be bound as from the date of the delivery of the writ to the sheriff. This was modified by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, which provided that, as against purchasers without notice of the writ, the goods should be bound only from the time of the actual seizure thereof under the execution. The Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), while it repeals the last-mentioned Act, contains a similar enactment, saying more specifically, that the goods shall be bound as from the time when the writ is delivered to the sheriff, except as against a purchaser in good faith and for value, who has no notice that the writ has been delivered to, and remains unexecuted with, the sheriff (s. 26) (a).

As regards the operation of a judgment on lands, the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1860, section 1, provided, that, as against a purchaser for valuable consideration, or a mortgagee, no judgment should affect any land, unless execution thereon should have been issued and registered; and the Judgments Act, 1864, section 1, provided, that no judgment should affect any land until the land should have been actually delivered in execution (b). These sections were repealed by the Lands Charges Act, 1900, which provides (s. 2) that no judgment shall operate as a charge on land until a writ or order for the purpose of enforcing it is registered. The writ must be registered in the name of the debtor against whom it is obtained, in the office of Land Registry (c).

With a view to ascertaining what property the debtor has, and so to aid the plaintiff in obtaining satisfaction of his debt, an order may be obtained compelling the debtor

(a) Hasluck v. Clark, [1899] 1 Q. B. 699, and cases there cited. (b) Kempv. Waddingham (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 355; Gardner v. London, Chatham and Dover Rail. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. App. 385;

Hatton v. Haywood (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. App. 229; Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies (1878), 9 Ch. D. 275.

(c) Land Charges, etc. Act, 1888, ss. 5, 6; Land Charges Act, 1900.

to attend and be examined, and to make discovery as to his property (d).

The following are the writs of execution by which a judgment for the recovery of money is enforced.

1. A Fieri Facias.-This is a writ of execution against the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor, and it is so termed from the words of the writ, whereby the sheriff is commanded, that he cause to be made of the goods and chattels (quod fieri facias de bonis) of the party, the amount of the judgment debt and costs. From this writ neither peers nor any other privileged persons are exempt; and it lies against executors or administrators, with regard to the goods of their deceased testators or intestates (e). In executing this writ, the sheriff may not break open any outer door, but must enter peaceably (), and may then break open any inner door in order to take the goods (g); and he cannot execute the writ on a Sunday (h), or within the precincts of a royal residence (). The sheriff may sell the goods and chattels of the debtor (), including even his estates for years, or his growing crops, till he has raised enough to satisfy the judgment (1). The exercise of this power of sale in the sheriff is subject to certain safeguards and limits. By the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1709, the landlord must be first paid his rent, due before the execution, to the extent of one year's arrears (m) ; and

(d) Ord, XLII. r. 32.

(e) Fenwick v. Laycock (1841),

2 Q. B. 108.

(f) 5 Rep. 92.

(g) Palm. 54; Morrish V. Murrey (1844), 13 M. & W. 52.

(h) Arch. Practice (14th ed.), p. 810.

(i) Att.-Gen. v. Dakin (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 338; Combe v. De la Bere (1882), 22 Ch. D. 316.

be by public auction, unless an
order is obtained specially autho-
rising a sale by private contract
(Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 145;
Bankruptcy Act, 1890, s. 12).
(/) 3 Bl. Com. 417.

(m) Rissley V. Ryle (1843), 11 M. & W. 17; Wollaston v. Stafford (1854), 15 C. B. 278. It is, however, provided by the Execution Act, 1844, s. 67, that no landlord of any tenement let at a weekly rent shall have any

(k) When the execution is for a sum exceeding 207., the sale must

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