The plaintiff may have judgment, therefore, for $528 (see form No. 4 of part II. of indorsements, "Foreign Judgment," in the appendix to the Consolidated Rules), and will proceed for the rest of the claim as she may be advised. The defendant appealed from the decision of the Master in Chambers, and the appeal was heard by BOYD, C., in Chambers, on the 31st March, 1908. I. F. Hellmuth, K.C., and A. R. Hassard, for the defendant. A. R. Clute, for the plaintiff. March 31. BOYD, C.-Having considered the effect of the decisions in this country, I do not think I should disturb the Master's judgment. The foreign judgment as to the arrears of alimony is explicit that they are to be paid at a given date and enforceable upon default by process of execution. The cases seem to regard that (apart from the peculiarities of the English law of divorce and alimony as incident thereto) as a final adjudication as to the past, which, by the effect of the judgment, becomes a debt enforceable by ordinary process as a legal debt. If such a foreign judgment is enforceable by action, then it may be specially indorsed under our Rules as a "debt arising upon a contract, express or implied:" Rule 138 and Re Kerr v. Smith (1894), 24 O.R. 473. Arrears of alimony are held to be a debt, though not a debt at law, in Lin on v. Lin on (1885), 15 Q.B.D. 239, 246. That, no doubt, is the view underlying the English decisions in Bailey v. Bailey (1884), 13 Q.B.D. 855, 859, and Robins v. Robins, [1907] 2 K.B. 13; but reasons are given by Meredith, J., in Aldrich v. Aldrich (1893), 24 O.R. 124, 131, for distinguishing judgments for the payment of alimony under our system. That arrears of alimony under a judgment therefor are to be regarded as a finality is evidently the view of Ferguson, J., in the same case as reported in (1893), 23 O.R. 374, 378. The Ontario law and decisions have been elaborately discussed in British Columbia, and by the judgment of the full Court it was held that an action can be maintained for arrears of alimony past due upon a foreign judgment: Hadden v. Hadden (1899), 6 B.C.R. 340. The like view appears to be involved in the decision which the Master thought binding Master in Chambers. 1908 ROBERTSON v. ROBERTSON. Boyd, C. 1908 ROBERTSON v. ROBERTSON. upon him, as it is upon me, of a Divisional Court in Swaizie v. Swaizie, 31 O.R. 324, 327. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed with costs. No affidavit is put in by the defendant, and he has no defence except the legal one. E. B. B. 1908 Jan. 21. [IN CHAMBERS.] MCFARLANE V. HENDERSON. Will-Personal Property Restraint on Alienation—Invalidity. A testator directed that his estate should be invested and the income paid to his two sons equally until they reached the age of thirty-five, when they were to receive the principal, and he further declared that "none of my children shall have power to anticipate or alienate, either voluntarily or otherwise, any portion of my estate to which they may be entitled previous to the time at which the same may become payable to them as herein declared." Notwithstanding the above, one of the sons assigned his interest under the will to various creditors: Held, that the assignments were valid, and the restriction on alienation which the testator had sought to impose invalid. The reasons for the rule of equity which enables a restraint against alienation and anticipation to be imposed on the separate estate of a married woman does not apply to such a case. THIS was a motion by the plaintiff for an order to continue the appointment of a receiver under the circumstances set out in the judgment. The motion was argued before MEREDITH, C.J.C.P., in Chambers, on December 16th, 1907. W. J. Elliott, for the plaintiff, contended that the assignments were invalid as being in contravention of the will; that the restriction on alienation was not general, but restricted as to time, and therefore good: In re Macleay (1875), L.R. 20 Eq. 186; In re Weller (1888), 16 O.R. 318; In re Northcote (1889), 18 O.R. 107; that the same rules of law as regards restrictions on alienation are applicable to a bequest of personalty as to a sale or devise of realty: Woodmeston v. Walker (1831), 2 Russ. and M. 197; In re Dugdale, Dugdale v. Dugdale (1888), 38 Ch. D. 176; Metcalfe v. Metcalfe (1889), 43 Ch. D. 633, [1891] 3 Ch. 1; Corbett v. Corbett 1908 υ. (1888), 14 P.D. 7, at p. 12; and that the attaching order granted was valid: Hunsberry v. Kratz (1903), 5 O.L.R. 635; Stuart v. Grough MCFARLANE He also referred to Blackburn v. McCallum (1887), 15 A.R. 299. (1902), 33 S.C.R. 65; Re Porter (1907), 13 O.L.R. 399; Re Martin and Dagneau (1906), 11 O.L.R. 349. Grayson Smith, for the Toronto General Trusts Corporation, submitted their rights to the Court. C. A. Moss, for Long, contended that the assignments were good, as the rules against anticipation do not apply in the case of a bequest of personalty unless there is a bequest over, and in this case there was none. January 21. MEREDITH, C.J.:-This is a motion by the plaintiff for an order to continue "the appointment of the Union Trust Co., Limited, as receiver without security to collect, get in and receive the moneys, property and effects coming to the defendant (Charles A. Henderson), from or in respect of the late John B. Henderson's estate, to which, under the will of the said John B. Henderson, the defendant is entitled, to the extent of the plaintiff's judgment and costs," an order appointing the Union Trust Co., Limited, as receiver until October 29th, 1907, or until any motion which might be made by the plaintiff on or before that date to continue the appointment should be disposed of, having been made by my brother Britton on October 17th, 1907. By the 14th paragraph of the will of John B. Henderson he provided as follows: "14. I direct my said executors to invest the balance of my estate and to keep the same invested from time to time, paying the income derived therefrom to my two sons, Charles A. Hender " (the defendant) "and John B. Henderson, equally, share and share alike, until they respectively reach the age of thirtyfive years, and to pay their respective shares of the principal then remaining to my said two sons as they respectively attain the age of thirty-five years, and I give such residue of my estate to my said two sons, Charles A. Henderson and John B. Henderson, in equal shares accordingly." By the 15th paragraph of his will the testator further provided: "15. I especially direct and declare that none of my children HENDERSON. 1908 MCFARLANE v. Meredith, C.J. shall have power to anticipate or alienate, either voluntarily or otherwise, any portion of my estate to which they may be entitled previous to the time at which the same may become payable to them as herein declared. And I declare that no document or instrument purporting to alienate or anticipate such payments and no process of law assuming to do so shall have any force or effect, but that, on the contrary, the payments herein directed to be made to my said children shall be made to them personally at the times herein provided for." ENDERSON. Paragraph 20 of the will is as follows: “20. In the event of the death of either of my said sons, either in my lifetime or before he attains the age of thirty-five years, leaving lawful issue him surviving, such issue shall represent the deceased parent and take the parent's share, but in the event of the death of either of my said sons, either in my lifetime or before he attains the age of thirty-five years, without leaving lawful issue him surviving, the share of my estate which he would have taken had he lived to attain thirty-five years of age, shall thereupon descend to and devolve upon my surviving children and the lawful issue of such of them as may have died before that time, leaving lawful issue, per stirpes and not per capita." By an earlier provision of the will (paragraph 13), the testator bequeathed, at the death of his wife, $50,000 in equal shares to his daughters, Lillian Crombie and Margaret Henderson, with a provision that if his wife died before his daughter Margaret attained twenty-five, that daughter should be entitled to the income only of her share until she should attain that age; and by a still earlier provision (paragraph 5) he bequeathed to his daughter Margaret the income of $25,000 until she attained twentyfive, and the principal to her when she attained that age. The defendant assigned his interest under the will to William D. Long as security for payment of his then and any future indebtedness to Long, and the amount now due to Long is said to be $26,463.93. The defendant subsequently assigned his interest under the will to the Sovereign Bank of Canada as collateral security for a loan of $121,500. After these assignments Holt Renfrew Company obtained an attaching order from the 10th Division Court of the county of 1908 MCFARLANE V. York, attaching all debts due from the executors to Charles A. Meredith, C.J. Henderson, to satisfy a judgment obtained by the attaching creditors against Henderson in that court on November 2nd, 1906. The receiving order made by my brother Britton is expressed to be made without prejudice to the rights of any prior incumbrancers. The applicant contends that the effect of paragraph 15 of the will is to render invalid the assignments made by the defendant to Long and to the Sovereign Bank of Canada, and that the attaching order of Holt Renfrew Company is ineffectual, because the interest of the defendant under his father's will is not an attachable or garnishable debt. I am of opinion that the contention of the plaintiff as to the invalidity of the assignments is not well founded. The restriction sought to be imposed by the testator, if valid, would deprive the beneficiaries of the power of anticipating the payments of the income to which they are entitled and all power of alienation of both the income and the corpus until the times fixed by the testator as the periods when they are to receive them. . If, as counsel for the plaintiff contended, and was said by the Lord Chancellor (Brougham), in Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197, cited by Mr. Elliott, "the rule of law which prevents a party from imposing fetters upon property is precisely the same, I apprehend, in personal as in real estate" (p. 204), Blackburn v. McCallum, 33 S.C.R. 65, is conclusive against the validity of the restriction which the testator has sought to impose upon the powers of alienation of that which he bequeathed to the defendant. The Supreme Court of Canada, in that case, determined that a restraint upon alienation general in character, though limited as to time, as is the restraint in this case, is invalid. Neither Re Porter, 13 O.L.R. 399, cited by Mr. Elliott, nor Re Martin & Dagneau, 11 O.L.R. 349, help the plaintiff, and both of them are distinguishable from Blackburn v. McCallum on a ground which is not applicable to this case, viz., that the restriction upon alienation was not general, but limited to certain modes of alienation. In Woodmeston v. Walker the Lord Chancellor, after the HENDERSON. |