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to be put upon this statute, it would be such a snare to the ma. gistrates that they would never be safe ; for the justices do not issue their warrants of execution till they know whether an appeal will be brought or not, and they could never know when the party found himself aggrieved, if he were not to appeal at the sessions next after the conviction.”

In R. v.Justices of Pembrokeshire, 2 East, 213., a question arose where the apon stat. 13 G. 3. c. 78.; by sect. 19. of which, where an order of peal is given to justices has been made for stopping up a road, an appeal is given the session next to “the party grieved by any such order or proceeding, &c. at the

* after order

made, or proDext quarter sessions after such order made or proceeding bad,” &c. And the court of K. B. held, that at all events an appeal to the ses

ceeding had." sions next after the actual obstruction of the road was too late; the party having had sufficient notice of the order in time to have appealed to a preceding sessions, before which time the surveyors of the highways had begun to stop up the road. (See this case stated fully, infrà, under tit. Highways.)

Accordingly, in R. v. Justices of Buckinghamshire, 2 M. & S. 230., a rule had been obtained for a mandamus, commanding the defendants to enter continuances to their next general quarter sessions, upon an appeal against the inclosure, by virtue of an in. quisition, taken upon a writ of ad quod damnum, of a certain road therein described. It appeared by the affidavits on which the rule wis obtained, that the inquisition was taken on the 11th of Notember 1812, but that no inclosure or stoppage of the road took place before June 1813, when a painted board was put up at the commencement of the road, and a gate across it locked. The board was dated the 20th of April preceding, and gave notice that by virtue of a writ of ad quod damnum and inquiry before the sheriff and a jury of the county, the road in question was stopped. On the 2d of July, Bennell and Stone, as inhabitants of the parish of Radnnge, gave notice of their intention to appeal against the said inclosure to the next sessions; and their appeal accordingly came on to be heard at the last Midsummer sessions, but the sessions dismissed the appeal, thinking it out of time. The words of the statute are, that it shall be lawful for any person injured or aggrieved by any such order (of justices) or proceeding, or by the inclosure of any road or highway by virtue of any inquisition taken upon any writ of ad quod damnum, to make his complaint thereof by appeal to the next general quarter sessions, &c. after such order made, and proceeding had, on giving ten days' noiice to the surveyor, &c.” But if no such appeal be made, then such order and proceeding shall be confirmed, and the inclosure may be made and the ways stopped. The question here again was on the terminus a quo. The sessions had rejected the appeal, and the motion was for a mandamus to compel them to receive it. The court said, the difficulty of the construction arose on the words “ inclosure” and “ proceeding.” But proceeding must be understood to mean legal proceeding, and not an act done. The order to inclose under the inquisition is itself a grievance, before the inclosure be actually made. “It shall be lawful to make complaint by appeal to the next quarter session after such order made, or proceedings had." These words embrace the whole subject-matter of the appeal. It may be to the nexı session after the order, (viz. order of justices), or proceeding, (viz. proceeding under an inquisition). If there be no appeal till the inclosure, the party must

make a new highway before it can be determined whether he be at liberty to stop the old one. The appeal must, therefore, precede the inclosure or stoppage. Proceeding, then, cannot mean proceeding to stop up, but proceeding upon the inquisition; the judicial proceeding, not the inclosure in execution of such proceeding. If so, the appeal must be made to the session next after the execution of the inquisition. The rule was therefore discharged. Talf. Dick. Sess. 422. (See this case stated fully, infrà, tit. Highways.)

It appears by the case of Rex v. Justices of Staffordshire, 3 East, 151., that where an appeal is given to the party grieved by any such order or proceeding at the next quarter sessions after such order made or proceedings had, the appeal must be made to the quarter sessions next after the order nade, without reference to any notice received by the appellant of such order: for whatever hardship the parties grieved may labour under in such a case, the court can only follow the directions of the statute.

In The King v. Justices of Hertfordshire, 3 M. & S. 459., two justices, at a special sessions on the 20th of June, made an order for a public footpath to be diverted and turned, and upon the 4th of July following made another order, by which they ordered the old footway to be stopped up. Appeal against these orders was made at the next Michaelmas sessions, and not at the Midsummer, which were holden on the 11th of July; on which account the justices dismissed the appeal; and upon an application to K. B. for a mandamus, the question was, whether the appeal was in time; which, it was agreed, depended upon whether the time for appealing was to be reckoned from the date of the first or second order. It was argued, in support of the application, that the order for diverting and turning did not include the stopping up; for so long as there is only an order for diverting and turning, the public have a right to go along the old footway; and here the justices have made a separate order for the stopping up ; and the 19th section expressly gives an appeal, where any footway shall be ordered to be stopped up; so that, if the appeal be out of time for the first order, it is good for the second. And accordingly the court made the rule absolute as to the appeal against the order for stopping up; and, per curiam, the gravamen as to the public is the stopping up

Many difficult cases have arisen on the question, as to the period whence the time begins to run, in cases where an appeal is given, to be brought within a certain period “from the cause of complaint."

In Rex v.Justices of Wilts, 13 East, 353., it was provided by a local inclosure act, that if any person should think himself aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of the general inclosure act or the particular act, he might appeal to the quarter sessions “within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint shall have arisen, &c." An appeal was lodged by a party grieved by the inclosure at the October sessions, and the question was, upon an application for a mandamus, whether that was too late. The grievance stated on the part of the appellant was, that he had not so large an allotment as he ought to have had. It appeared that the allotments were made and staked out early in March, and notice given to the appellant, who immediately took possession, and

where the appeal is given within a time limited from the " cause of complaint."

cropped the land ; but that on the 6th of July an alteration in the allotment was made by the commissioners, with the express consent of the appellant, whereby an exchange was made of a quarter of an acre, out of two hundred acres, with another person. It was admitted, on his behalf, that the ground of appeal was the insufficiency of the whole allotment, and not merely the exchange of the quarter of an acre, which was made by consent. But it was denied that the mere staking out of the allotment was the grievance; for after that, it might be aitered by the commissioners, and, as it appears, it was in fact altered so late as July in the instance mentioned. Lord Ellenborough C.J. “The grievance complained of being the insufficiency of the whole allotment, which was made and staked out so long ago as March, and of which the appellant then had notice, and actually took possession of and enjoyed it ; the grievance, if any, arose in March, and therefore he was too late to appeal in October. The mere staking out of the ground by the commissioners might not be a grievance, for that might be done behind the party's back and without notice to him ; but here he took possession of and cropped the land, which was down land, and could not afterwards be restored to its original state. That makes an end of the question; for he was then clearly out of time with his appeal."

In Rer V. Justices of Gloucestershire, 3 M. & S. 127., the vicar of Tenkesbury appealed against an order of the commissioners acting under 51 G.3. c.61.(Local Inclosure Act). By that statute the party aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of the act may appeal to any quarter sessions within six calendar months “after ihe cause of complaint.The commissioners, in 1812, made an allotment upon the map to the vicar, in lieu of his tithes, which the vicar inspected at a meeting held in November 1812, and appointed an agent, who attended a subsequent meeting, when an alteration was made in the map, which the agent approved, and it was understood that all objections to the vicar's allotment were reconciled. In November 1813, the commissioners gave notice that they had ordered all tithes, &c. to cease from the 29th September then last. It was contended that the appellant came too late with his appeal, inasmuch as the time for making it was within six months after Norember 1812, when his allotment was set out. On the other hand, it was argued that nothing final as to the allotments took place in 1812, nor did it appear, as in Rex y. Justices of Wilts (see antè, p. 107.), that the appellant or any other of the proprietors took possession of their allotments at that time. And the court of K. B. was of opinion that the vicar was not out of time to appeal to the next quarter sessions after the notice of November 1813. Lord Ellenborough C. J. “What final circumstance is there in the transaction of 1812 to make the allotment conclusive upon the parties? The allotment to this appellant was not per se a grievance, nor did it necessarily become so, until there was a ceasing of the tithes. But the moment it was coupled with a determination of the appellant's right to tithes, then, if the allotment was an insufficient compensation for the benefit which he before enjoyed, and was to relinquish, it became a grievance and cause of complaint.” - Dampier J.“ By the notice of the commissioners the tithes are to cease from the 29th of September 1813, and then only the vicar can be aggrieved, and is to look to his allotment. Until the tithes ceased, the vicar could not be aggrieved by the insufficiency of his allotinent; and before that time nothing final seems to have been done by the commissioners.” (See this case more fully stated infrà, tit. 3nclosure.)

In Rex v.Justices of Middlesex (reported in Talf. Dick. Sess. 425., and 1 Chilt. Rep. 367.), an act for the inclosure of certain lands in the parish of C. in the county of Middlesex, passed with a clause of appeal in the usual terms, “ within six months from the time when the cause of complaint shall have arisen.” The commissioner (for there was only one in this case), at a meeting under the act, holden on the 18th of June 1818, shewed the map to the present appellant, with the allotment marked out upon it, which he, the commissioner, had assigned to him, the appellant. The latter raised some objections to it, and desired the commissioner to reconsider it. He did so, but did not think fit to make any alteration; and, having received no further application, on the 28th of August following sent a formal notice to the appellant that the land remained allotted to him, according to the map exhibited to him on the 18th of June previous, and on the same day the said allotinent was accordingly staked out by command of the said commissioner. According to the particular act, as well as the general act of inclosure, no allotment ought to be made till the roads have been set out ; and the roads in this case could not be staked out till the end of July, because the crops were on the ground. The appeal was lodged on the 9th of January, and respited till the 29th of April, when it was opposed on the ground of not having been lodged in time, i. e., within six months from the cause of complaint arising. The justices conceived that, as the roads were all set out on the map previous to the allotments being made in the same way, it was sufficient if they were staked out as soon as the con. venience of the occupiers of the crops permitted. They also conceived, that as the map with the allotment of the appellant was shewn to him on the 18th of June, no encouragement was given to him to believe that any alteration could be made; as no alteration whatever was subsequently made, or even any renewed appli. cation for such alteration (although there were other meetings held in the interim, on the subject of the inclosure ; and the al. lotments set out in the map were considered final, and matters of public notoriety in the parish); and as the subsequent notice was only a repetition and confirmation of what had been exhibited to the appellant as the decision of the commissioner on the 18th of June; that the cause of complaint, if any, arose on the 18th of June, when the notice was given to the appellant; and that the appeal, therefore, (on the authority of Rer v. Bucks, antè, p. 107.) ought to have been within six months from that time, and dismissed the appeal. On motion for a mandamus to compel the justices to enter continuances and hear the appeal, the court of K. B. thought “there was no actual setting out of the allotment in this case, according to the true construction of the act, till something was actually done, founded upon the plan;" and made the rule absolute.

(See further on the subject of the progressive acquisition of rights by allottees under an inclosure act, the case of Farrer V. Billing. 2 B. & A. 171., and the observations in Talf. Dick. Sess. 428.)

In Rer y. Nockolds, 1 Adol. 8. Ell. 245., a private inclosure act directed that the commissioner thereby appointed should by his award, or by some previous writing to be annexed thereto, ascer. tain the quantity of wheat equal to the annual value of the titles in the parish of W., and should afterwards determine the value of such wheat in money, and charge and apportion the amount on the lands and tenements in W., which sum was to be paid to the rector quarterly, the first payment to be on the 25th of March next after the execution of the award, or such earlier day as the commissioner by bis award or by such previous writing should appoint; and the tithes were to cease from the apportionment of such rent, or at such other time as the commissioner by any writing should appoint. The act also directed, that if any person should think himself aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance thereof, be might appeal to the sessions within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint should have arisen. The commissioner, by writing dated 3d October 1832, fixed the corn-rent in the proportions siated in a schedule which was annexed, and appointed the payments to begin from 25th December then next, and the tithes to cease from 291h September then last. This award. was not made till January 1833. The rector appealed at the Easter sessions, April 9th, 1833, on the ground that his equivalent for the tithes was assessed too low. The court of K. B. lield, that the previous writing of the commissioner was operative before the making of the award ; that the cause of complaint arose on the execution of such writing; and, therefore, that the appeal was too late.

In Rex v. Justices of Sulop, 2 B. & Ad. 145. (see antè, p. 101.), guardians and directors of the poor were incorporated by a statute, and twelve of them were to be directors. The act contained a clause, providing that any person aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of the act, inight appeal to any quarter sessions “to be holden within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint shall have arisen.” A rate-payer appealed to the sessions against certain orders which had been made and allowed, within the preceding four months, by authority of the directors. The objection alleged was, that the orders, payments, and allowances were in respect of annuities which ought not to have been granted, and of interest on parish securities for debts which had been improperiy contracted. The justices refused to go into the appeal, and one of the grounds of their refusal was, that the annuities had been granted, and the debts, on which the interest was paid, had been contracted, more than four months before the sessions. A rule nisi having been obtained for a mandamus, it was argued, on shewing cause, that the sessions were right, inasmuch as the true grievance was the original borrowing of the money, not the payment of each quarter's interest or annuity; otherwise a borrowing of money, even at a distance of twenty years back, might be cailed in question by any person coming into the parish and charged with rates, so long as interest continued to be paid for the loan. But the court was of opinion that the sessions ought to have heard the appeal. Lord Tenterden C. J. “ With regard to the time of appealing, the matter objected to is the order for payment, and the payment of interest and annuities. That seems to me the substratum of the complaint; not the borrowing of money or

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