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granting annuities. An appeal, therefore, within four months of the order, is in due time. What the sessions may decide on such appeal, is another question. We have only to determine whether or not they should have heard the appeal; and I think they should." ---Littledale J. “I think the “cause of complaint' was the making the order, not the borrowing or granting the annuities. Whatever the sessions might determine when they came to hear the appeal, I think they ought to have heard it."— Parke J. “ I am of opinion that the appeal was in time, and that it is immaterial when the annuities were granted or debt incurred. The grievance is, the being burthened in respect of the payments. If this were not so, a debt might be contracted privately by the directors, and if no interest were called for till the expiration of four months, the parishioners would have lost their right of appeal.” – Patteson J. concurred.
There are other analogous cases on the meaning of the words cause of complaint,” which have been decided on the construction of statutes requiring that notice of the appeal shall be given to certain persons within a limited period “after the cause of complaint.” Thus in Rex v. Justices of Devon, 1 M. & S. 411., a party assessed to a highway rate refused to pay, and a warrant of distress was signed and granted by two justices on the 4th of De. cember, which was executed upon his goods on the 12th. The party thereupon gave notice of appeal within six days after the 12th of December. The statute under which the distress was granted, 13 G. 3. c. 78. 980., requires notice to be given within six days after the cause of complaint” shall have arisen. The only question, therefore, was, whether the “ cause of complaint" was the issuing of the warrant, or the distress under it: and the court of K. B. thought that the appellant was in time, inasmuch as he was within six days after he was actually damnified. It was not necessary he should appeal on the warrant, for non liquet that it will be proceeded upon. By Lord Ellenborough C. J.
Again, in Rex v. Justices of Lancashire, 8 B. & C. 593., two justices had made an order, under 4 G. 1. c. 95., upon
the surveyors of the roads in a township, to perform a certain part of the statute duty on a turnpike road running through the township, and to pay to the surveyor of that road a certain part of the money received, as a composition for statute duty. By section 87. of the statute, a right of appeal is given in certain cases, if the party gives notice within six days after the cause of complaint shall arise.” The question was, whether the six days should be reckoned from the 5th of March, when the order was made, or from the 10th of March, when a copy of the order was served on the surveyors of the township. And it was holden by the court of K. B. that the “cause of complaint" did not arise until a copy of the order had been served, and that notice of appeal within six days from that time was valid. (See this case stated more fully, infrà,
tit. Highways.) As to the ter- The remaining question with respect to the construction of the minus ad quem: expression “next session,” regards the terminus ad quem. It has
been established, by a great number of decisions, that where a « next session" statute directs the appeal to be “to the next session," the next means the next practicable sessions is intended. These cases have principally practicable ses- been decided with respect to appeals from orders of removal, or sion.
from overseers' accounts, or from poors' rates; and they will be found collected in their proper places under the title Poor.
It may, however, be observed, in this place, that, generally when it is not speaking, in cases where it is not practicable to try the appeal at practicable to the actual dext sessions, it is not incumbent on the appellant to cessary to enter enter and respite his appeal at those sessions. Thus in Rex v. the and respite at Justices of Devon, 8 B. & C. 640. note (a), an order of removal the actual dext was served on the 8th of April — the sessions were held on the sessions. 15th of April ; and by their practice, eight clear days' notice of the intention of the appellant to try his appeal is required ; but an appeal may be entered and respited without any notice. The appeal was not entered at the Easter sessions; but eight days' notice of the intention to try the appeal at the July sessions was given by the appe!lants. The sessions refused to hear the appeal, on the ground that it ought to have been entered at the April sessions. The question was argued in K. B. upon an application for a mandamus, and in support of the decision of the sessions it was urged that, according to the general rule, an appeal against an order of removal must be made to the next sessions, to which the party can by possibility appeal after the order made. Here the parish officers might clearly have entered their appeal at the April sessions, although, in consequence of the rule requiring eight clear days' notice of trial, they could not have tried it; and Rex v. Justices of Herefordshire, 3 T. R. 504. and Rez v. Justices of West Riding of Yorkshire, 4 M. & S. 327. were cited. But by Ld. Tenterden Č.J.: “ The entry for the mere purpose of adjournment is a useless act, and only occasions unnecessary expense. I think, therefore, that he was not bound to enter it at those sessions. One inconvenience only can follow from our holding that it is not necessary under such circumstances to enter the appeal at the first sessions ; viz., where the removal is made within eight days of the sessions, so that the parish to which the pauper is removed cannot try their appeal at those sessions, the removing parish may not know of the intention of the other parish to appeal until eight days before the second sessions. If that should prove to be an inconvenience, the court of quarter sessions may remedy it by requiring, under such circumstances, a longer notice. We think that the court of quarter sessions ought to have heard the appeal, and that the rule for a mandamus must be made absolute," See also S. P. Rex v. Justices of Southampton, 6 M. & S. 391. S. C. 8 B. & C. 641. note (a). Rex v. Justices of Kent, 8 B. & C.639.
IV. De giving potice of Appeal. The right of appeal being only derived from the express provisions of some statute, may be, and generally is, granted on certain conditions, as of notice (a) to the magistrate making the order of conviction, or to the parties at whose requisition it is made; and recognizances (6) to prosecute the appeal. Talf. Dick. Sess. 418.
(1.) In that cases notice of appeal is necessary.
(a) See a general form of notice, post, p. 134.
(2.) To whom and by uhom notice must be given.
(1.) In what Cases Notice of Appeal is necessary. Where no no.
Where the act of parliament, which gives the appeal, does not tice of appeal require any notice of appeal, but only provides that any party is required by aggrieved by a conviction under the act, shall have liberty to the statute,
appeal to the next sessions, upon entering into a recognizance to none need be given, not
prosecute such appeal with effect, this dispenses with the neceswithstanding sity of any notice of appeal. And, although by the general rule of the practice of the sessions, eight days' notice of appeal may be required in all sessions.
cases, yet that rule cannot be applied to the case of an appeal where the statute which gives the appeal requires no notice. (See, however, infrà, p. 116. as to notice of Trial.)
Thus in Rex v. Justices of Kent, 6 M. & S. 258., a rule for a man. damus was obtained, commanding the defendants to hear an appeal against a conviction under the act 55 G. 3. C. xcix. (local and personal), which imposes a penalty on bakers baking on Sundays. By sect. 19., it is provided that “any person convicted of any offence punishable by this act, shall have liberty, from time to time, to appeal to the justices at the next general or general quarter sessions of the peace, the person so convicted entering into a recognizance at the time of such conviction, or within twenty-four hours after the same shall be made, with two sufficient sureties in double the sum forfeited, upon condition to prosecute such appeal with effect, and to be forthcoming to abide the judgment and determination of the justices, who are hereby authorized to hear and finally determine the matter of such appeal.” It appeared that the appellant, at the time of the conviction, had declared to the convicting magistrate, and to the informer, his intention to appeal against the same, and that he was thereupon required by the magistrate to enter into the recognizances required by the act, which he did immediately; that at the sessions at Maidstone, on the 11th of January, he entered his appeal, and instructed counsel that the same might be there heard (he then having his witnesses), or that it might be lodged and respited; but the sessions refused to hear and determine, or to enter and respite, on the ground that eight clear days' notice had not been given to the convicting magistrate and the informer. The affidavit then stated, that the omission to give the notice arose purely from a want of knowledge that such notice was necessary. The justices returned to this mandamus, that at the sessions holden, by adjournment, at Maidstone, on the 11th of January 1816, the conviction was certified and returned ; and at the same sessions, being the next sessions after the conviction, Barrett exhibited an appeal, (he having, on the 1st of January, entered into a recognizance,) and required them to hear and determine the same. That by an order of sessions, made the 15th of April, 2 G. 2., it was ordered, that all notices of appeals made to the court should be given by the parties concerned eight days before the sessions begin, exclusive of the first day of the sessions ; and that this order was still in force, and formed, with respect to notices, the practice of the sessions in all cases of appeal, except where the time of notice was otherwise prescribed by statute. That Barrett did not give due notice of appeal as required by this Rex v. Justices order, although he might have so done, a sufficient time having of Kent. intervened, between the date of the conviction and the adjourned sessions, to enable him so todo. However, this return was quashed by the court of K. B.-Ld. Ellenborough C. J. “How can it be maintained that this is an order in form requiring a notice of appeal to be given, when in its language it professes only to be an order for the regulating the time of giving notice. The words of it are, “ All noti. ces of appeal made to the court shall be given by the parties eight days before the sessions begin." Does this language import that upon all appeals notice shall be given eight days before the ses. sions ; and this, without reference to whether the statute which gives the appeal requires notice or not? I should answer in the negative ; and if not, does the order apply to the present case, unless a notice of appeal be required by the act ? Now, with regard to the act, it seems to me as if a sufficient notice were afforded to the prosecutor by means of the recognizance ; he is entitled by 12., to such part of the penalty as the justice shall think proper, together with costs, to be levied by distress, if not paid within fourteen days. Therefore, at the expiration of twentyfour hours, the time allowed for entering into the recognizance, if the same be not entered into, the right of the prosecutor to costs and part of the penalty attaches; and he may know, by in. quiring, if a recognizance exists, and whether this right has attached. The appellant has complied with all the terms specified in the act as requisite to make good his appeal, and it would be hard after this to deprive him of the benetit. But supposing the sessions might, for the more convenient administration of justice, engraft supplementary regulations upon the act of parliament, does the appellant come within the letter of those regulations. As to this I repeat my original question, Does the order of sessions profess to relate to any cases, but those wherein some notice is required to be given ? The act does not require any notice, and it seems to me, that the party has sufficient means of knowledge without it.”- Bayley J. " If the prosecutor follow up his conviction as he ought, he cannot but know whether the defendant means to appeal; for, in pursuing his remedy for a distress, he would be stopped if the defendant had entered into a recognizance."—Holroyd J. “Upon turning to the twentieth section, I find it provides, that if the conviction is made within six days before the sessions shall be held, the party may appeal, either to the then next, or the next following sessions. Suppose then, a conviction to be made within seven days of the sessions ; the party has no choice but to appeal to the next sessions; and in that case how could be comply with the order requiring an eight days' notice, or is he, in such case, to be deprived of his appeal altogether. This shews, as it seems to me, that the order cannot possibly be applied to an appeal under this act.”
Again, in R. v. Justices of Essex, 4 B. & A. 276., a rule nisi for a mandamus was obtained, commanding them to hear an appeal against the conviction of a magistrate under 50 G. 3. c. 48. $ 4. (repealed by stat. 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 120.), by which the appellant had been convicted of a penalty for carrying more luggage than is allowed by the act. The appellant had, within fourteen days, entered into a recognizance, as required by the act, to prosecute his appeal against the
Rex v. Justices conviction, and had given notice of appeal to the magistrate, but not oi Essex. to the informer. By the practice or the sessions for the
county of Essex, eight days' notice of appeal is required to be given, in all cases, by the appellant to the respondent. It was objected at the sessions, that the practice not having been complied with in this particular, the appellant was not entitled to be heard ; and the sessions allowed the objection, and dismissed the appeal.
On moving for the rule nisi, the case of Rex v. The Justices of Kent was relied on, and it was contended that the entering into the recognizance before the magistrate dispensed with the necessity of giving notice of appeal. And accordingly the court of K. B. made the rule for a mandamus absolute.-Bayley J. “I am of opinion that the sessions ought to have heard this appeal. Wherever the legisla. ture has deemed a notice of appeal to be necessary, they have in express terms prescribed such notice; but here, by the 50 G. 3. C. 48. § 25. it is expressly provided, that any party aggrieved by the conviction, who shall, within fourteen days, enter into a recognizance to appear at the next sessions, shall be at liberty to appeal at the next general quarter sessions of the peace to be holden for the county. The act of parliament, therefore, does not require any notice of appeal; and inasmuch as the party convicted had entered into a recognizance to prosecute his appeal at the next sessions, the informer must have known that it was the intention of the party convicted to appeal, and any further notice was therefore unnecessary. I think, therefore, that this rule ought to
be made absolute." —Best J. concurred. But when an
It should seem, however, that though where a statute gives a appeal, where party aggrieved a right of appeal, on giving security to a specified no notice of ap, amount, he may enter and respite his appeal at the next sessions, peal is required, after having given such security, without notice of appeal to the is entered and respited, the
other side; yet, after the appeal has been respited, he must give the appellant must usual notice of trial, in conformity with the practice of the sessions. give the usual Thus in Rex v. Justices of Salop, 2 B. & A. 694., a rule nisi was notice of trial. obtained for a mandamus to the sessions to enter continuance and
hear the appeal of John Rogers against the conviction of a magistrate, under 52 G. 3. c. 93. sched. L. rule 12. The defendant was convicted in the penalty of 101. for using greyhounds, for the purpose of killing a hare, not having taken out a certificate. Immediately upon his conviction, he entered into the recognizance required by the act, to prosecute his appeal against it. At the next sessions he accordingly entered his appeal, and it was respited by the court. At the following sessions he again appeared for the purpose of trying the appeal, but it being objected that there had not been eight days' notice given to the convicting magistrate, as was required by the rule of the sessions, the magistrates dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the conviction. On moving for the rule nisi, the case of Rex v. Justices of Leeds (4 T. R. 583. post, p. 118.) was relied on, and it was contended that the entering into the recognizance before the magistrate dispensed with the necessity of giving the usual notice to him of trying the appeal. -W. E. Taunton shewed cause. The sessions have done right in dismissing this appeal. There was an appeal respited from the January to the Easter sessions. It was therefore incumbent on the appellant to comply with the rule of the sessions, and give the requisite notices. But none were given. In Rex v. Justices