Trent. other enactments, without any reference to a division into sections. R. v. Inh. of Much may be said on both sides of the question arising out of the Newark-uponway in which the different sections are worded. There is nothing about notice in the first section; it only comes in the second section. Many comments may be made on the phraseology of that clause, as with reference to different parts of the same clause, and also with reference to the language of the first section. But, without considering that point, it is quite clear that in a binding into a foreign district, which this is, notice is requisite in general, unless it can be said,-first, that the clause as to the notice to the overseers is merely directory; or, secondly, that the clause in § 3., that the allowance of two justices of the peace for the county within which the place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship shall be situated shall be valid and effectual, although such place may be situated within a town or liberty within which any other justices of the peace may, in other respects, have an exclusive jurisdiction, supersedes the necessity of giving notice, where the power so given to the county justices is exercised by them. I think the clause of notice to the overseers is not merely directory. The object of the clause seems to be, that the overseers of the parish, in the foreign county, shall assist the justices of the binding county with such information as they can, as to the points which the act has directed to be investigated, and, therefore, the notice to these overseers seems an essential thing to be attended to, in order to get at all the preliminary information; it must, however, be observed, that in the fifth clause, which says, that no settlement shall be gained unless certain things are done, there is no mention of notice to the overseers. The clause is, that no settlement shall be gained by any child who shall be bound by the officers of any parish, &c. by reason of such apprenticeship, unless such order shall be made, and such allowance of such indenture of apprenticeship shall be signed, as herein-before is directed;' and therefore it appears to be tantamount to saying, that if the order be made, and such allowance signed, the binding shall be effectual, though no notice be given; but inasmuch as the latter part of the second section directs, that the justices of a foreign district are not to allow the indenture till the notice be given to the overseers, and that, therefore, the notice to the overseers must precede the allowance by the foreign justices, the clause in 5., which requires the allowance of two justices, means an allowance after notice to the overseers, and embodies that as part of the allowance. Then comes the question, Whether, if justices of the county exercise the powers given by the third section, the notice to the overseers is dispensed with? The third section does not, in terms, dispense with it, and one cannot see any ground for dispensing with it, merely because the county justices put themselves in the place of the foreign district justices. They can have no more power than the foreign district justices have; but by the second section the foreign district justices are not to sign the allowance till notice has been given to the overseers, and, therefore, if the county justices are to represent the foreign district justices, they should do so in every thing, and therefore only have a conditional power to allow the indenture; that is, after notice to the overseers. It may be contended, that by this third section the separate jurisdictions are R. v. Inh. of all swallowed up and made to form part of the county, for the purposes of this act, and that the powers given to the county justices put them exactly in the same situation as if the particular district was part of their own jurisdiction, and that they may act as if it originally was so: and if that were so, it would become necessary to consider whether the act requires notice in all cases, including those of binding into the same county. But the act has not, in express terms, given the county justices any such power, and it does not appear likely it should be meant: for if the reason of notice to the overseers be, that the justices in the county where the binding parish is, have not the same means of communication, and the same facility of getting information, in a foreign county or district that they have in their own, they may by these means bind the child into a county or district where they have not full means of getting information. The third section is not compulsory on the county justices, but the foreign district justices may still allow the indenture, but they can only do it after notice to the overseers, and, therefore, there may be two children bound from the same parish into the same foreign district by different means, viz. one by county justices only (I do not speak of the binding overseers), and the other by county justices, followed up by notice to the overseers, and by the allowance of the foreign district justices, and which last would probably be after a fuller inquiry as to the circumstances directed to be inquired about, than the first; and therefore the two bindings would be accompanied by different degrees of information as to the propriety of the binding. It may be said there will be a want of full inquiry if the county justices allow the indenture, where the binding is into a foreign district, and yet the act expressly permits it. But there will be very nearly the same information as if the district justices allow the indenture, because, if notice be given to the overseers, they will collect all the information they can, which they will communicate to the county justices before the latter allow the indenture. Upon the whole, I think the want of notice to the overseers invalidates the indenture: and as I think the indenture is invalidated, it follows, if I am right, that no settlement was gained." — Holroyd J. “This is a case arising upon the binding of a parish apprentice, and the question is, whether it is a valid binding, pursuant to the stat. 56 G. 3. c. 139., so as to enable the apprentice, by service and residence under the same, to gain a settlement in the parish of Newarkupon-Trent, the parish into which the apprentice was bound? It is a binding by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of a parish within the county of Nottingham, made under the order and allowance of two justices of the peace for that county, to a master resident in the parish and borough of Newark-uponTrent, which is a borough and parish within the same county of Nottingham, but wherein other persons have an exclusive jurisdiction as justices of the peace. But by § 3. of the statute it is provided, that the allowance of two justices of the peace for the county within which the place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship shall be situated, shall be valid and effectual, although such place shall be situated in a town or liberty within which any other justices of the peace may in other respects have an exclusive jurisdiction. The objection, however, is, that notice was not given to the overseers of the poor of the parish of Newark-upon-Trent, the parish in which the child was intended to serve the apprenticeship, nor was any such notice proved or admitted before the above magistrates, pursuant to the proviso, which is printed as part of § 2. of the statute. And the question then is, whether this case, which is the case of a binding by one parish in a particular county into another parish within the same county, but in a town where other justices of the peace have in other respects an exclusive jurisdiction, is within that branch of the proviso which requires such notice or proof, or admission thereof, before the allowance of the indenture, or whether that would only have been requisite, in case this binding had been into a different county? I am of opinion that this case is within that branch of the proviso; and if so, then I think, that for want of such notice and proof, or admission thereof before the justices allowed the indenture, the binding was so invalid as to prevent the apprentice from gaining a settlement under it in the parish of Newark-upon-Trent. The proviso as to notice, or the proof or admission thereof, in cases where the same is required, appears to me not to be directory merely, but the want thereof, I think, goes to affect the settlement itself. The fifth section of the statute enacts, that no settlement shall be gained by any child who shall be bound by the officers of any parish, by reason of such apprenticeship, unless such order shall be made, and such allowance of such indenture of apprenticeship shall be signed, as directed by the statute. It is true, the statute does not also say "the settlement shall not be gained unless such notice be given," but (in cases where by the statute that notice was required), unless the notice had been previously given, the allowance would not have been such as the statute directed. The allowance itself, in such a case, would therefore be null and void for want of the notice; for where a special authority is given to magistrates or others by statute, their acts are null and void unless they proceed in the manner and under the restrictions which the statute itself imposes. In requiring the notice, the legislature may be considered as having in view two objects; the benefit and welfare of the apprentice, and the protection of the parish into which it is intended he should be bound. For both purposes, the notice to and attendance of an overseer from that parish may be useful before the binding has become conclusive, both with regard to the information he may be able to give the magistrates of the character, circumstances, conduct, and habits of the intended master, and of the state in that parish of the particular trade, and the number of apprentices to it, and to the probability of the child's being able in future to maintain himself by his trade there, after the expiration of his apprenticeship, or, instead thereof, of his becoming a burden upon the parish. This seems to be equally important, whether the binding be into a parish in the same or in a different county; and the parish, whether in the one case or in the other, may become equally aggrieved by the binding, and equally aggrieved, for want of previous notice of the intended binding, from such parish losing thereby their right of appeal, which by the seventeenth section is given (but it can be exercised within a limited time only) to any person or persons who shall be dissatisfied with any act done by any justice of the peace in the execu R. v. Inh. of R. v. Inh. of Trent. : tion of the statute. In order to remedy the grievances recited in Newark-upon- the preamble, which recites, amongst others, that many grievances had arisen from the binding of poor children as apprentices by parish officers to improper persons, and to carry into effect the ob jects of the statute, the first section (which applies to parish bindings, whether into a parish within the same or within a different county) enacts, that before any child shall be bound apprentice by the overseers of the poor of any parish, such child shall be carried before two justices of the peace of the county, &c. wherein such parish shall be situate, who shall make certain inquiries there specified; those inquiries particularly regard the fitness, circumstances, and character of the intended master, and appear to be equally material to be inquired into, both with a view to the well-doing of the apprentice, and to the considerations of justice that are due to the parish into which he is to be bound, whether the intended binding be into a parish in the same county, or into a parish in a different county, and with a view to that inquiry, as well as with a view that the parish into which he is to be bound may obtain justice by an appeal, in case the child ought not to be so bound and in case such binding will probably be injurious to such parish, the notice to the overseers of that parish appears to be equally important, whether the binding is to be into the same or a different county. And if the binding is to be into the same county, those justices are the only justices who are to make those inquiries, and to sign the allowance; but by § 2. there is also to be, where the binding is into a different county or jurisdiction of the peace, a further allowance by two justices also of the county or district within which the place shall be situated wherein such child shall be intended to serve. Then follows the proviso upon which the present question arises, and which is printed as part of the second section; but whether it be printed as part of the second section, or had been separated from it by the printer, and made into a third section, can make no difference in the construction of the statute; for in the construction of a statute, the question whether a proviso in the whole or in part relates to, and qualifies, restrains, or operates upon the immediately preceding provisions only of the statute, or whether it must be taken to extend in the whole or in part to all the preceding matters contained in the statute, must depend, I think, upon its words and import, and not upon the divisions into sections that may be made, for convenience of reference, in the printed copies of the statute. The same construction must prevail, I apprehend, in this case, as if the proviso, which has been printed as if incorporated in the second section, had been, as I think it might with as much or more propriety have been, separated therefrom and made into a different section. The proviso in question is as follows: "Provided always, that no indenture shall be allowed by any justice of the peace for the county into which such child shall be bound, who shall be engaged in the same business, employment, or manufacture in which the person to whom such child shall be bound is engaged." This part of the proviso, I think, is confined to an allowance by a magistrate of the second county, and to cases where there is a binding from one county into another; and the expression appears to me to be most correct and apt to mark it to be the intent of the legislature that the construction should here be so confined; the expression, "the county into which such child shall be bound," R. v. Inh. of appearing to me to imply another county out of which he is bound. Newark-uponThe same proviso then immediately further proceeds thus: "And Trent. notice shall be given to the overseers of the poor of the parish or place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship, before any justice of the peace for the county or district within which such parish or place shall be shall allow such indenture, and such notice shall be proved before such justice shall sign such indenture, unless one of such overseers shall attend such justice and admit such notice." Here the expression "justice of the peace for the county into which such child shall be bound," which immediately before, as I conceive, confined the first part of the proviso to a binding into a different county, is changed into expressions, both as to overseers and justices, which let in both descriptions of bindings, in requiring notice to be given, not to the overseers of "the parish or place in the county into which such child shall be bound," but "to the overseers of the poor of the parish or place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship, before any justice of the peace for the county or district within which such parish or place" (that is, the parish or place in which he is intended to serve, whether it be in the same or a different county) "shall be, shall allow such indenture." The legislature, as it intends, as I think, to restrain the first part of the proviso to cases of bindings into a different county, adopts the correct expression for that very purpose; and again, where it has not, as I think, such intent of restraint, it abandons that restraining expression which it had just adopted, and uses the more enlarged expression, which here will embrace the whole object and subject-matter of the legislature's care and regulations, namely, parish apprentices and parish bindings in general, and not merely parish apprentices bound into a different county. These circumstances shew that the legislature, in this very part of the statute, where it plainly, as I think, intends restraint, uses a corresponding restraining expression, when such restraining expression is either necessary or useful for that purpose, and it recurs again to the more enlarged one, when the expression can, according to the legislature's intent, be more extensively applied. This proviso in § 2. is immediately followed by the proviso, printed as § 3.:-" Provided always, and it is hereby declared, that the allowance of two justices of the peace for the county within which the place in which such child shall be intended to serve an apprenticeship shall be situated, shall be valid and effectual, although such place may be situated in a town or liberty within which any other justices of the peace may in other respects have an exclusive jurisdiction." This section, it is not only admitted, (but which, in order to gain a settlement in Newark-upon-Trent, must be contended and established,) does extend to and embrace parish apprentices in general, and parish bindings, whether into a different county or not, and yet the expression in this section is the same as those in question, which are contained in the proviso in the second section. For unless the third section extends to parish apprentices bound to serve in a parish in the same county, the want of an allowance of the indenture by two justices of the exclusive town and liberty of Newark-upon-Trent would be fatal to the claim of the apprentice's settlement being established there. And if this section does so extend, then, I ask, upon what prin |