2 & 3 W. 4. c. 75. this act. § 18. "Any person offending against the provisions of this act in England or Ireland shall be deemed and taken to be guilty of Offences against a misdemeanor, and, being duly convicted thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or by a fine not exceeding 50l., at the discretion of the court before which he shall be tried; and any person offending against the provisions of this act in Scotland shall, upon being duly convicted of such offence, be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or by a fine not exceeding 50l., at the discretion of the court before which he shall be tried." § 19. "And in order to remove doubts as to the meaning of certain words in this act, be it enacted, that the words 'person and party' shall be respectively deemed to include any number of persons, or any society, whether by charter or otherwise; and that the meaning of the aforesaid words shall not be restricted although the same may be subsequently referred to in the single number and masculine gender only." Interpretation of certain words in this act. Commencement of act. § 20. "This act shall commence and take effect from and after the first day of August in the present year." 29 G. 3. c. 41. 56 G. 3. c. 53. Certificates of lives of nominees abroad, required. Annuities. [29 G. 3. c. 41.56 G. 3. c. 53.] BY stat. 29 G. 3. c. 41. § 27., and other acts respecting lifeannuities, oath of an annuitant's life may be made before a justice of the peace, who shall give a certificate thereof, without fee or stamp duty, in order to entitle such person to receive his annuity. And by stat. 56 G. 3. c.53., passed to amend the acts of 48 G. 3. c. 142., 49 G. 3. c. 64., and 52 G. 3. c. 129., for enabling the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, to grant lifeannuities: § 2. "It is enacted, that in case any person who shall have been named as a nominee, on the continuance of whose life any annuity is to depend, shall, after his or her nomination, become resident in any kingdom or state in Europe in amity with H. M., or if he or she shall become resident in any other kingdom, state, or place beyond the seas, then and in every such case, a certificate that such nominee was living on the day specified therein, (being some day after any annuity depending upon his or her life shall have become due,) granted under the hand and seal of the chief magistrate of any city, town, or place, or any other magistrate acting at the time as such, or for and in the place of any such chief inagistrate, where such nominee may be then living, shall be deemed sufficient and effectual for proving the continuance of the life of such nominee, and for the purpose of enabling the person entitled to the annuity dependent upon the life of such nominee, to receive the same; provided no British minister, or consul, or governor, or person acting as such, shall be resident in such city, town, or place, although a British minister, or consul, or governor, or per son acting as such, may be resident in the kingdom, state, or settlement wherein such nominee shall be then living." § 3. Provided always, that to every such certificate as aforesaid, Identity to be there shall be annexed an affidavit or solemn affirmation, made verified by affibefore any justice of the peace or magistrate in England or Scot- davit or affirmland respectively, or if in Ireland before one of the barons of the ation before exchequer there, by the person or persons entitled to the said justices in Engannuity, or by the person applying to receive the same on his, land, and before her, or their behalf, that the matters contained in such certificate a baron in Ireare, to the best of his or her belief, true; and that the person land. described or certified therein, is the nominee or one of the nominees on whose life or lives the annuity whereof such half-yearly or other payment shall be claimed, doth depend. Apothecary. See Physicians. Apparel. See Assault, Vol. III. (Criminal Law), p. 48. land and Scot Appeal. THE word appeal has two significations: it is either, 1. An appeal of murder or other felony, i. e. a prosecution against a supposed offender by the party's own private action; prosecuting also for the crown in respect of the offence against the public. 2 Haw. c. 23. § 1. Or, 2. More generally, the removal of a cause from an inferior court or judge to a superior; as from one or more justices to the quarter sessions. 1. Appeals of Purder, &c. abolished by stat. 59 G. 3. 59 G. 3. c. 46. c. 46. This mode of prosecution, which had almost fallen entirely into disuse, has been recently abolished by stat. 59 G. 3. c. 46., passed 22d June 1819; which, after reciting, "whereas appeals of murder, treason, felony, and other offences, and the manner of proceeding therein, have been found to be oppressive; and the trial by battel in any suit, is a mode of trial unfit to be used; and it is expedient that the same should be wholly abolished;" enacts, "that from and after the passing of this act, all appeals of treason, murder, felony, or other offences, shall cease, determine, and become void; and that it shall not be lawful for any person or persons, at any time after the passing of this act, to commence, take, or sue appeal of treason, murder, felony, or other offence, against any other person or persons whomsoever, but that all such appeals shall, from henceforth, be utterly abolished; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding." Appeals of murder or other and determine. offences to cease 2. "From and after the passing of this act, in any writ of right No tenant shall now depending, or which may hereafter be brought, instituted, or commenced, the tenant shall not be received to wage battel, nor be received to wage battel, nor any trial be had by battel in any writ of right. Appeal not of common right but of special provision. shall issue be joined nor trial be had by battel in any writ of right; any law, custom, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding." 66 The last case of an appeal of murder was that of Ashford v. Thornton. In M. T. 58 G. 3., 1817, William Ashford, the eldest brother and heir-at-law of Mary Ashford, spinster, deceased, brought a writ of appeal against Abraham Thornton, for the murder of his said sister, of which offence the defendant had been tried and acquitted at Warwick summer assizes preceding, under circumstances of strong suspicion (though not absolutely conclusive) of his having ravished and afterwards thrown her into a pit of water, where the body was very recently found. The appelle, upon being called upon to plead, pleaded not guilty; and I am ready to defend the same by my body:" and thereupon taking his glove off, he threw it upon the floor of the court. The appellant afterwards delivered in a counterplea, to which there was a replication, a general demurrer, and joinder therein. After very long and elaborate arguments, the court of K. B. held that the appellee had a right to wage his battel, the appellant not having brought himself within any of the established cases which entitle him to decline the wager of battel; namely, where the appellant is an infant, or a woman, or above sixty years of age, or where the appellee is taken with the mainour, or has broken prison, or where great and violent presumptions of guilt exist against the appellee, which admit of no denial or proof to the contrary. The appellee was afterwards discharged. Ashford v. Thornton, E. T. 1818, 1 B. & A. 405. Df Appeals to the Quarter Sessions. I. In what Cases an Appeal lies, p. 98-104. III. Within what Time an Appeal must be preferred, p. 105 -112. IV. Of giving Notice of Appeal, p. 113-130. V. Of the Trial of Appeals, p.130–134. It is proposed in this place to treat generally of the subject of appeals from the orders or convictions of justices out of sessions, to the judgment of the court of quarter sessions. The right of appeal, and the particular regulation of it, as it regards individual subjects, will be found discussed in the respective divisions of this work where these subjects are separately considered. I. In what Cases an Appeal lics. An appeal from the proceedings of justices out of session to the court of sessions, is not a matter of common right, but of special provision. 1 M. & S. 448. Herein the remedy by appeal differs from that by certiorari; not being, as the latter is, a common-law right for the purpose of obtaining the judgment of a superior tribunal, but a qualified right given by special provision of statute. Accordingly, in R. v. Hanson, 4 B. & A. 521., Abbott C. J. said, "the rule of law is, that although a certiorari lies, unless expressly taken away, yet an appeal does not lie, unless expressly given by statute." The privilege of appeal, which now usually accompanies the power of summary conviction given by statute, does not seem to have been introduced till after that mode of judicature had been in use for some time. The first mention of an appeal is found in the stat. 12 C. 2. c. 23. § 31., imposing duties on beer, ale, and other liquors, which, in case of the refusal of two justices to proceed upon complaint, authorizes the sub-commissioners of excise for the district to take cognizance of it, and gives an appeal from their judgment to the next quarter sessions. The same provision is repeated in the excise act, 12 C.2. c. 24. § 45. The next statute which allows an appeal in the case of a summary conviction, is the conventicle act, 22 C. 2. c. 1. § 6. (repealed by 52 G. 3. c. 155.) It is worthy of remark, that the appeal provided by that statute is not to the justices in sessions, as is usual, but to a jury to be there summoned to try the facts. This is the only instance of an appeal of that nature, in regard to summary convictions. In the game act, 22 & 23 C. 2. c. 25. (repealed 1 & 2 W. 4. c. 32.), which immediately followed, and in all the other acts since that time, which give an appeal from the conviction of justices out of sessions, it is to the judgment of the justices in quarter sessions, without the intervention of a jury. Paley Conv. 268. 2d ed. The right of appeal must be given by express enactment, and Must be given cannot be extended by an equitable construction to cases not by express endistinctly enumerated. Thus, in Rex v. Justices of Surrey, 2 T. R. 504., a question arose whether any appeal lay against a conviction by two justices, on the stat. 25 G. 3. c.72. § 9. (which imposed a duty on cottons, &c.) for certain offences committed against that act. By the 33d section, it was enacted, (as is usual in any new act relating to the duties of excise) that all powers and authorities, rules, penalties, forfeitures, clauses, matters and things in and by the 12 C. 2. c. 24., (which is called the hereditary excise act), or by any other law now in force, relating to the revenue of the excise, or inland duties under the management of the commissioners of excise, are provided or established for securing, enforcing, managing, &c., mitigating or recovering, adjudging or ascertaining, recovering and paying the several duties thereby granted, shall be applied in and for the managing, mitigating, adjudging, ascertaining, recovering, and paying the several duties hereby granted, as fully and effectually as if all and every the said powes, &c. were particularly repeated and again enacted in this act. The question came before the court, on a rule for a mandamus to the justices of Surrey in sessions, to receive an appeal against a conviction made by two justices on the above statute. It was contended in support of the application, that an appeal was virtually given by the 33d clause above mentioned, which, by reference, incorporates all the remedies given by any excise laws, and that the power of appeal, and of mitigating penalties, are given by some of the excise laws; on the other hand it was contended, that no appeal lies but where it is given by express words. With this latter opinion the court agreed, and accordingly gave judg ment against the existence of the right of appeal. The fair construction of the clause in question, in 25 G. 3. c. 72., was pronounced to be, that all the general powers and provisions given in acts actment. Construction of clause giving appeal. made in pari materiá, should be virtually incorporated into that act; but, that such provisions as are always considered as special provisions should not; and the power of appealing from the judgment of the justices, being of the latter description, did not attach without being expressly given. Paley Conv. 270. See also the case of R. v. Skone, 6 East, 514. R. v. Hanson, 4 B. & A. 519. post, tit. Excise. It remains to consider how clauses by which appeals are given, are to be construed. It has been decided, that if an order of commitment be excepted out of the appeal clause, a conviction and commitment comprised in one instrument cannot be made the Exception of or subject of appeal. In R. v. The Justices of Staffordshire, 12 East, der of commilment includes conviction. 572. (Paley Conv. 274. 2nd edit.), a rule nisi for a mandamus was obtained, commanding the defendants to cause continuances to be entered upon the appeal of Joseph Thompson, against a record of conviction of him as a hired servant to E. Sheldon, for having absented himself from the service of his master, without his consent, down to the next general quarter sessions to be holden for the county of Stafford, and at such sessions to hear and determine the matter of such appeal. The affidavits set out the instrument itself at large, viz.: "County of Stafford, To the constables, &c. and to the keeper of the house of correction at Stafford, in and for the said county. Whereas Joseph Thompson, a hired servant to E. S. of the parish of Tipton, in the said county, collier, is this day brought before us, two of his majesty's justices of the peace for the said county, and is lawfully convicted, as well by the oath of the said E. S. as otherwise, of being his lawful hired servant, and of having absented himself from his service in the parish of T. &c., without his consent, before the expiration of the term of his contract to serve-These are therefore, in his majesty's name, to charge and command you the said constable to take and convey the said J. T. to the house of correction aforesaid, and deliver him to the keeper; and you the said keeper to receive the said J. T. into your custody, and safely him there keep two months from the date hereof. Given under our hands and seals, this 29th day of January 1810." It further appeared that Thompson gave notice of his intention to appeal against the conviction, and duly gave a recognizance, and entered his appeal at the sessions; but no conviction being returned by the magistrate, the appeal was dismissed without trial. By stat. 6 G. 3. c. 25. § 5. upon which the proceeding was founded, it is provided, "That, if any person shall think himself aggrieved by such determination, order, or warrant of any justice as aforesaid, except an order of commitment, every such person may appeal to the next sessions, &c." In support of the rule for a mandamus, it was contended, that a conviction and commitment, being distinct things, could not, in legal contemplation, be united by being blended in one instrument; and that the latter only being excepted out of the appeal-clause, by the designation of an order of commitment, an appeal ought to lie against the conviction, under the general terms of that clause; and that, unless an appeal lay to get rid of the conviction, the party grieved would be without redress; for, so long as the conviction remains in force, it is an answer to any action of trespass. But by Ld. Ellenborough C. J.-"It is not for us to say, whether it may be convenient and proper to provide a remedy |