The supreme court of Michigan decided on October 22, 1895, in the case of Shackleton v. Manistee and Northeastern Railroad Company (reported in volume 64 of the Northwestern Reporter, page 728) that, under the conditions of the case, the railroad company was not answerable for the death of an employee who, while in the discharge of his duty, was thrown from a way car and killed, by reason of the absence of a hand railing, which had been removed from the car. The circumstances of the case are set forth in the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Montgomery, which is as follows:

The plaintiff, as administratrix, sues to recover damages for the death of her husband, alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence. The deceased was a conductor on a freight train of the defendant company, and the injuries resulting in his death were caused by his being thrown off the rear end of the way car to the track and the train passing over him. The car from which he was thrown had hand rails provided on either side of the steps, the rear hand rail extending to the brake, so that a sudden lurch of the car would not result in throwing one attempting to alight from the car. On the occasion in question, however, this rear hand rail had been removed, and the testimony offered by the plaintiff tends to show that while deceased was stepping down from the car he was thrown off by reason of this defect. There is no room for attributing any negligence to the defendant, unless it be for the absence of the hand rail at this time. A few days before the accident deceased and his trainmen, when using the way car in question, allowed it to run against a car loaded with logs, which extended over the ends of the car on which they were loaded, so that, coming in contact with the hand rail, they bent it nearly against the side of the car. Deceased thereupon called the attention of a workman in the defendant's repair shops to the hand rail, and asked him to take it off and repair it. The workman replied "All right," and took it off. Deceased then started off with the car, without reporting the defect to the superintendent, as required by the rules of the company, and without making any objection to using the defective car to those in authority, or to any one connected with the defendant in any way. While on his trip that day the assistant superintendent saw the car and said to the deceased, "You want to see that that is fixed. Get it fixed." Deceased again called the attention of the workman in the repair shop to it, and he again promised to fix it, but neglected to do so. Deceased, however, continued in the use of the car without protest, until he was killed in the manner above described.

The plaintiff's counsel recognize the general rule that the servant who engages in the use of, or continues in the use of, defective machinery or appliances, assumes the risk incident to the employment-but seeks to bring this case within the exception to the rule which obtains in case the servant has been induced to continue the use of the defective appliances by reason of the master's promise to repair. The present case is not within any such exception to the rule. No one representing the master had induced deceased to continue in the use of the car in its then condition. The employee in the car-repair shop certainly gave deceased no such directions. On the contrary, he was acting under instructions received from the deceased. The statement of the assistant superintendent, so far from being authority to continue the use of the car, was more in the nature of a rebuke for using it in its then condition. The most that can be said is that the company might have been

negligent in not repairing the car sooner, but such negligence was open to the observation of the deceased, and he saw fit to continue in the use of the car. He made no objection to using it in its crippled condition; he gave no notice to anyone in authority which would indicate to defendant that he refused to take the risk, which was as apparent to him as to anyone connected with the road. The circuit judge was right in directing a verdict for the defendant.

A question of great interest, and one which has rarely been judicially passed upon, recently arose in the case of William Mattison r. The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, before the court of common pleas of Lucas County, Ohio.

The case involved the right of a discharged employee, who had been blacklisted by his former employer, to recover pecuniary damages for the injury suffered by him by reason of the blacklisting.

The facts in the case were substantially as follows: Mattison had been employed by the railway company as a conductor, at wages of $120 per month, and he declared in his petition that, having been appointed as a representative of other workmen, he made objection to certain rules adopted by the defendant company and "by all other trunk-line railroads in the United States," designated as "blacklist rules." Shortly after having made such objection, he was discharged from the service of the company, "without cause or provocation," and the company thereupon, conspiring with other railroad companies in order to prevent him from securing employment in his chosen avocation, caused the said blacklist rules to be enforced against him, thus preventing him from obtaining such employment. He was compelled to seek work elsewhere, and secured employment as a policeman, but as such had only been able to earn $720 per year, instead of $1,440 per year, which he had received as a railroad conductor.

The company demurred to Mattison's complaint, and the question arose as to whether the blacklist, resulting in injury to an innocent discharged employee, is a wrong for which such employee can obtain financial redress.

Judge Pratt, on September 25, 1895, sustained the right of Mattison to sue the company for damages. The report of the case, furnished the Department of Labor by the official stenographer of the court, shows the substance of the opinion to be as follows:

The employee's right to employment is equally sacred with the right of the employer to employ him; it is not only a serious right, affecting a man's life, but you may say that it is his life. The laboring man's employment is the only thing that stands between him and starvation, or what is little less than starvation-pauperism-and it is for the pub. lic interest and for the public good that the right of a man to his own employment, in any honest work which he may seek, should not be interfered with or violated.

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This, of course, does not meddle at all with the right of a company, or of a man, to judge himself who he will have to work for him; and it makes no difference whether he refuses to let a man work for him because he is incompetent or because he dislikes him. He has a right to seek his own employees, but, as is frequently said, one man's right ends where another man's commences, and the right of the employer to discharge ends with his own employment, and he must not trench upon the right of the employee to seek other employment by which he may support himself and his family, and it is for the public interest that the largest liberty to seek employment should be before every man, whatever may be his employment or whatever may be his business, trade, or occupation. It is also a matter of public interest to encourage men in becoming proficient in their employment. It is, of course, a matter of public policy that a railroad company should have the right to employ such men as it sees fit and to judge for itself of the competency of its employees. There is no doubt about that. It is, however, for the public interest that a man who is skilled and who has become proficient in his employment should be able to find employment, if not with one railroad, with another railroad, or some other railroad-at least that the field should be open to him, that he should have that right; and while a railroad company may discharge its men and not employ them themselves, they trench upon the rights of the employees whenever they, by one deed or another, seek to prevent their employees from getting employment of other railroad companies, or combine or conspire in any way to prevent it, as is charged in this petition, and the matters alleged in the petition are, on demurrer, to be taken as confessed.

Of course there may be an injury that is not a legal injury resulting from a company discharging one of its employees, and so long as they simply discharge him their right to make the discharge should not be questioned; but if they make a combination, as is charged in this petition, with other companies that they shall not employ him, then it seems to me they go beyond their legal right.

The matters alleged here are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, and the demurrer will therefore be overruled.

EXTRACT RELATING TO LABOR FROM THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

By act of Congress approved July 16, 1894, it was provided that the people of the Territory of Utah might call a convention to form a constitution and do other necessary things toward their becoming a State of the Union. This convention assembled in Salt Lake City March 4, 1895, and continued in session until May 8, 1895. It framed a State constitution, which was submitted to the voters of the Territory at an election held November 5, 1895, and was by them adopted. The only further action needed to constitute Utah a sovereign State of the nation was the issue by the President of the usual, formal proclamation to that effect which took place Saturday, January 4, 1896.

The following is a copy of Article XVI, relating to labor:

SECTION 1. The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to promote the industrial welfare of the State.

SEC. 2. The legislature shall provide by law for a board of labor, conciliation, and arbitration, which shall fairly represent the interests of both capital and labor. The board shall perform duties and receive compensation as prescribed by law.

SEC. 3. The legislature shall prohibit:

First. The employment of women or of children under the age of 14 years in underground mines.

Second. The contracting of convict labor.

Third. The labor of convicts outside prison grounds, except on public works under the direct control of the State.

Fourth. The political and commercial control of employees.

SEC. 4. The exchange of black lists by railroad companies or other corporations, associations, or persons is prohibited.

SEC. 5. The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.

SEC. 6. Eight hours shall constitute a day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or aided by the State, county, or municipal governments, and the legislature shall pass laws to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters, and mines.

SEC. 7. The legislature, by appropriate legislation, shall provide for the enforcement of the provisions of this article.

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NOTE REGARDING BUREAUS OF STATISTICS OF LABOR.

The following minor emendations are offered to the table relating to dates of establishment, etc., of bureaus of labor statistics printed on pages 110 and 111 of Bulletin No. 1:

MARYLAND.-February 25, 1892, a new organic act relating to this bureau was passed in which, in addition to ordinary labor statistics, provision was made for gathering statistics of agriculture, mining, transportation by railroad and other means, and of shipping and commerce. Also that reports should be made annually instead of biennially as heretofore. The new bureau is known officially as the Bureau of Industrial Statistics.

CONNECTICUT.-During the existence of the original bureau (July 12, 1873, to July 23, 1875) two annual reports were made, instead of one as stated in Bulletin No. 1, one in May, 1874, and one in May, 1875.

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