The expenditures incurred on works in aid of the unemployed for the twelve months ending February, 1896, is set down at £201,591 4s. 1d. ($981,043.60). This was used in the prosecution of public works, such as grading, road construction, forest thinning, etc., the payment of railway and steamer transportation, the furnishing of rations, special grants to municipalities for necessary works, and to benefit local destitute unemployed.

Fifth Annual Report of the Department of Labor of New Zealand for the year ending March 31, 1896. Hon. R. J. Seddon, Minister of Labor. xxxiv, 46 pp.

This report, like that for the preceding year, deals with the condition. of the labor market; assistance rendered by the department in finding employment for persons out of work, and wages and employees in railway workshops and factories; the effect of certain features of the factory inspection and shops acts, and reports of factory inspectors. In addition to these topics the present report touches briefly upon the effects of the truck act; industrial conciliation and arbitration; the servants' registry offices; foreign immigration; cooperative works, and publishes the minutes of the proceedings of the board of conciliation. Much space is devoted to the operations of the employment bureau of this department. During the year 2,871 persons obtained employment through this bureau, 1,880 of whom were married. Of the total number, 708 were sent to private employment, and 2,163 to Government works.

Since the organization of the department, June, 1891, 15,739 men have been assisted, and these with their dependents make a total of 53,579 persons who have been directly benefited by this branch of the labor department during the five years of its existence.

The number of factories registered under the factories act increased during the year from 4,109 to 4,647, and the number of factory hands. from 29,879 to 32,387. This increase is partly due to a more complete registration of small establishments.

The other topics treated in the report are of local interest.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, will be continued in successive issues, dealing with the decisions as they occur. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space immaterial matter, needed simply by way of explanation, is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Frazier. 34 Southwestern Reporter, page 664.-Suit was brought in the district court of Hamilton County, Tex., by Etta Frazier, widow of J. W. Frazier, for herself and minor child, Freddie Frazier, against the Texas Central Railway Company to recover damages for the death of her husband. From a judgment in her favor the railway company appealed the case to the court of civil appeals of the State, which rendered its decision March 4, 1896, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The opinion of said court was delivered by Judge Key, and the following, containing a statement of the facts in the case, is quoted therefrom:

On the 15th of April, 1893, a freight train was wrecked on appellant's road near the town of Aquilla, in Hill County, Tex., one result of which was the death of appellee's husband, J. W. Frazier, who was employed and serving as a brakeman on said train.

That appellee was the wife of J. W. Frazier; that the minor, Freddie Frazier, was their only child; that the wreck occurred at the time and place alleged; and that J. W. Frazier was a brakeman on the train, and received injuries in the wreck, which caused his death in a few hours thereafter, were clearly shown, and these facts are not disputed. But appellant's contention is that the testimony fails to show the alleged negligence of the engineer, and fails to show that said engineer, if negligent, was other than a fellow-servant of J. W. Frazier, for whose negligence appellant would not be responsible. It is also contended that the death of Frazier resulted from one of the ordinary risks of the service in which he was engaged, and, therefore, that appellant is not liable.

As to the question of negligence on the part of the engineer, it may be that, if we were trying the case as jurors, we should reach a different conclusion, and return a different verdict; but, after a careful consideration of the statement of facts, we can not say that the verdict is without evidence to support it. By the verdict under consideration, twelve men, presumably disinterested and honest, have decided that on the occasion in question the engineer did not exercise all the care that a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised; and that decision is not so clearly unsupported by testimony as to justify us in setting it aside.

The act approved March 10, 1891, defining who are and who are not fellow-servants, declares "that all persons engaged in the service of any railway corporations, foreign or domestic, doing business in this State, who are intrusted by such corporation with the authority of superintendence, control, or command of other persons in the employ or service of such corporation, or with the authority to direct any other employee, are vice principals of such corporation, and not fellow-serv ants with such employee." (Laws 22d Leg., p. 25.) The evidence in this case shows that Neal, the engineer, had authority from appellant to direct the deceased, who was head brakeman, to put on the brake, and that it was the duty of the deceased to obey such direction. This made the engineer a vice principal, under the statute above cited, and the doctrine of fellow servants does not apply.

As to the question of Frazier's assumption of risk, it is sufficient to say that, while it is true that he assumed the risks ordinarily incident to his employment as brakeman, such assumption would not shield appellant from injuries resulting from its negligence; and, under the court's charge, the jury were not authorized to find for the plaintiff unless they found that the engineer was guilty of negligence in the respect charged, and that he was appellant's vice principai.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-ANNULMENT OF STATUTE BY ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION→Crisswell v. Montana Cent. Ry. Co. 44 Pacific Reporter, page 525.-This case was originally brought in the district court of Cascade County, Mont., by Charles G. Crisswell against the railroad company to recover damages for injuries received while in the company's employ. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed the case to the supreme court of the State, which rendered its decision November 25, 1895, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Said decision was reported in 42 Pacific Reporter, page 767, and was published in part on page 433 of Bulletin No. 4 of the Department of Labor, issued in May, 1896. Subsequently the supreme court granted a rehearing in the case upon the question as to what effect section 11 of article 15 of the State constitution had upon the statute (section 697 of the Compiled Statutes of 1887) on which the former decision in the case hinged. Section 697 of the Compiled Statutes of 1887 reads as follows:

That in every case the liability of the corporation to a servant or employee acting under the orders of his superior shall be the same in case of injury sustained by default or wrongful act of his superior, or to an employer not appointed or controlled by him, as if such servant or employee were a passenger.

The material part of section 11 of article 15 of the constitution of the State is as follows:

And no company or corporation formed under the laws of any other country, State or Territory, shall have, or be allowed to exercise, or enjoy within this State any greater rights or privileges than those possessed or enjoyed by corporations of the same or similar character created under the laws of the State.

Upon this rehearing the supreme court rendered its decision April 13, 1896, reversing its former decision and declaring that section 697 was annulled by section 11 of article 15 of the constitution.

The opinion of said court was delivered by Judge Hunt, and in the course of the same he states, in effect, that section 697 of the Compiled Statues is to be found first as section 20 of "An act to provide for the formation of railroad corporations in the Territory of Montana," passed over the governor's veto on May 7, 1873 (Laws Mont., 1873, ex. sess., p. 93 et seq.), and that an examination of the various sections of the act, taken in connection with its title above quoted, showed that the act applied to domestic railroad corporations only. The judge then continues, and the following is quoted therefrom:

Holding, therefore, that section 697 applied to domestic railroad corporations only, what effect did the adoption of the constitution have upon that section? No comment is necessary to demonstrate that a rule of liability by which a domestic railroad company may suffer heavily for negligence of an employee, where another, but foreign, railroad corporation can not be made liable at all for like negligence, is the imposition of a burden upon the former, and not upon the latter. Whether the legislature of the State may impose such different burdens is immaterial to the question under consideration. Without deciding that question, it may be here assumed they can. Still, our examination will not go beyond the point of ascertaining whether the constitution by section 11, article 15, supra, has annulled section 697, or whether it has extended it so that it has become applicable to all railroad companies, foreign and domestic.

The learned counsel for the respondent argues that section 11 is selfexecuting. We agree with him in that contention, but not to the extent he would apply the doctrine of self execution. The prohibition lays down a principle of protection to domestic corporations that at once, upon the adoption of the constitution and the admission of the State, became a sufficient rule by means of which the rights and privileges possessed, by domestic companies were and are protected against legislative or other discriminations extending the possession or enjoyment of rights or privileges to foreign corporations greater than those already possessed or those that may be attempted to be granted by any future action. To this extent the provision was completely self-executing, and no legislation was required to give the prohibition full force and operation. Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 99.

But we can not assent to respondent's position that the object of the constitutional provision was to establish uniformity with respect to the two classes of corporations by making laws that were appli cable only to the domestic class at the time of the adoption of the constitution extend to the foreign class, in order to make an equal liability for all, or that the clause does establish uniformity by so operating upon such Territorial laws. As said, the inhibition at once, by itself, prevented the discriminations; but there is no affirmative language, and no intent, by the words used, to extend to foreign companies the burdens, rights, and privileges imposed or granted by law to domestic corporations. In this respect legislation must be had to affect such corporations by force of law. By section 1 of the schedule of the constitution all laws enacted by the legislative assembly of the Territory and in force at the time the State was admitted into the Union, and not

inconsistent with the constitution, should be and remain in full force as the laws of the State until altered or repealed, or until expired by their own limitation. This provision is likewise self-executing. By it, rights were preserved. It operated of itself to keep in force a system of laws for the government of the State, unless such laws were inconsistent with the constitution. But, as to any such repugnant statutes, it operated as an effective repeal, for, when the constitution became the fundamental law, acts in conflict with it yielded, and when the question of a conflict is presented to the court, and the conflict clearly appears, the statute must be decided to be inoperative and void. Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 58. As the supreme court of Illinois has very recently said, by way of repetition of one of its earlier decisions:

"The understanding with all persons is that a law passed, either before or after the adoption of the constitution, which is repugnant to its provisions, must be held to be of no valid force, and precisely as if it had been repealed before the performance of the act." Washington Home of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 157 Ill. 414, 41 N. E., 893.

From these views it follows that the prohibition clause against any discrimination against a domestic corporation is self-executing as a prohibition but not as an affirmative imposition upon or securement to foreign companies of the rights or privileges expressly only accorded by the State laws to domestic companies. It also follows that by section 697 a greater burden was put upon appellant than was placed upon a foreign company of a similar character. The statute therefore, being inconsistent with the constitution, was annulled by the adoption of the constitution.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-FELLOW-SERVANTS-Gulf, C. and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Warner. 35 Southwestern Reporter, page 364.-This action was brought by Charles C. Warner against the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff while in the employ of said company. Judgment was given for the plaintiff in the lower court, and the defendant appealed to the court of civil appeals of Texas, and said court certified the case to the supreme court of the State, which rendered its decision April 27, 1896.

The opinion of the supreme court was delivered by Judge Denman, and contains a statement of the facts in this case, and a clear and definite interpretation of the fellow-servants act of 1893 (chap. 91, acts of 1893), which repealed the fellow-servants act of 1891 (chap. 24, acts of 1891), and upon which the result of this action hinged. Said opinion, practically in full, reads as follows:

The court of civil appeals have certified to this court a question and explanatory statement, as follows:

"On the 7th day of October, 1893, appellee, an employee of appellant, at that time, while engaged with his duties as switchmau in the railroad yards of appellant, in Cleburne was injured by a car passing over and crushing his leg. The car that inflicted the injury was being pushed by a locomotive in charge of a switch engineer, who was an employee of appellant, and while switching was being done by a switch crew of which both appellee and the switch engineer were members.