the Maryland tax, was made on the 7th of March, 1819; and it was on the 7th of February preceding, that the legislature of the state of Ohio imposed a similar tax, to the amount of fifty thousand dollars annually, on the Branch Bank of the United States established in that state. Notwithstanding this decision, the officers of the state of Ohio proceeded to levy the tax, and that act brought up before the Supreme Court a renewed discussion and consideration of the legality *of *428 such a tax. It was attempted to withdraw this case from the influence and authority of the former decision, by the suggestion that the Bank of the United States was a mere private corporation, engaged in its own business, with its own views, and that its great end and principal object were private trade and private profit. It was admitted, that if that were the case, the bank would be subject to the taxing power of the state, as any individual would be. But it was not the case. The bank was not created for its own sake, or for private purposes. It has never been supposed that congress could create such a corporation. It was not a private, but a public corporation, created for public and national purposes, and as an instrument necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in the government of the United States. The business of lending and dealing in money for private purposes, was an incidental circumstance, and not the primary object; and the bank was endowed with this faculty, in order to enable it to effect the great public ends of the institution, and without such faculty and business the bank would want a capacity to perform its public functions. And if the trade of the bank was essential to its character as a machine for the fiscal operations of the government, that trade must be exempt from state control, and a tax upon that trade bears upon the whole machine, and was, consequently, inadmissible, and repugnant to the constitution. In Weston v. The City Council of Charleston, it was decided, that a state tax on stock issued for loans made to the United States, was unconstitutional. The court considered it to be a tax on the power given to congress to borrow money on the credit of the

■ Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 738.

b 2 Peters' U. S. Rep. 449.

Places ceded to the United States.

United States, and thereby to diminish the means of the United States used in the exercise of its powers, and that it was, consequently, repugnant to the constitution. By declaring

the powers of the general government supreme, the *429 constitution has shielded its action in the *exercise of its powers, from any restraining or controlling action of the local governments.a

(7.) The state governments have no jurisdiction in places ceded to the United States.

The state governments may likewise lose all jurisdiction over places purchased by congress, by the consent of the legis lature of the state, for the erection of forts, dock-yards, lighthouses, hospitals, military academies, and other needful buildings. The question which has arisen on this subject, was as to the effect of the proviso or reservation, usually annexed to the consent of the state, that all civil and criminal process, issued under the authority of the state, might be executed on the lands so ceded, in like manner as if the cession had not been made. This point was much discussed in the Circuit Court of the United States in Rhode Island, in the case of The United States v. Cornell. It was held that a purchase of lands within the jurisdiction of a state, with the consent of the state, for the national purposes contemplated by the constitution, did, ipso facto, by the very terms of the constitution, fall within the exclusive legislation of congress, and that the state jurisdiction was completely ousted. What, then, is the true intent and effect of the saving clause annexed to the cessions? It does not imply the reservation of any concurrent jurisdiction or legislation, or that the state retained a right to

* A decision upon the same principle was made in the case of Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Peters' R. 435, where it was held, that an officer of the United States was not liable to be rated and assessed for his office by state rates and levies; for this would be to diminish the recompense secured by law to the officer. In the case of Melcher v. The City of Boston, in the Sup. Judicial Court of Massachusetts, March, 1846, 9 Metcalf R. 73, it was stated as a question undecided, whether a tax assessed upon the income of an officer of the United States would not be lawful, and not within the case of Dobbins. It was decided in the Massachusetts case, that a clerk in a post office was not an officer exempted from taxation of his income.

b Const. art. 1. sec. 8.

2 Mason's Rep. 69. United States v. Davis, 5 Ibid. 356. S. P.

punish for acts done within the ceded lands. The whole apparent object of the proviso was to prevent the ceded lands from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice, for acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the state; and such permission to execute process is not incompatible with exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction. The acceptance of a cession, with this reservation, amounts to an agreement of the new sovereign to permit the free exercise of such process, as being quoad hoc his own process. This con- *430 struction has been frequently declared by the courts of the United States, and it comports entirely with the intention of the parties; and upon any other construction the cession would be nugatory and void. Judge Story doubted whether congress were even at liberty, by the terms of the constitution, to purchase lands with the consent of a state, under any qualification of that consent, which would deprive them of exclusive legislation over the place. The courts of the United States have sole and exclusive jurisdiction over an offence committed within a ceded place, notwithstanding the ordinary reservation of the right to execute civil and criminal process of the state. That was no reservation of any sovereignty or jurisdiction.

Congress, in exercising powers of exclusive legislation over a ceded place or district, unite the powers of general with those of local legislation. The power of local legislation carries with it, as an incident, the right to make that power effectual. Congress exercises that particular local power, like all its other powers, in its high character as the legislature of the Union; and its general power may come in aid of these local powers. It is, therefore, competent for congress to try and punish an offender for an offence committed within one of those local districts, in a place not within such jurisdiction or to provide for the pursuit and arrest of a criminal escaping from one of those districts after committing a felony there; or to punish a person for concealing, out of the district, a felony committed within it. All these incidental powers are necessary to the complete execution of the principal power; and the Supreme Court, in Cohens v. Virginia, held, that they were vested in congress.

6 Wheaton, 426-429.

It follows, as a consequence, from this doctrine of the federal courts, that state courts cannot take cognizance of *431 any *offences committed within such ceded districts;

and, on the other hand, that the inhabitants of such places cannot exercise any civil or political privileges under the laws of the state, because they are not bound by those laws. This has been so decided in the state courts. But if, in any case, the United States have not actually purchased, and the state has not, in point of fact, ceded the place or territory to the United States, its jurisdiction remains, notwithstanding the place may have been occupied, ever since its surrender by Great Britain, by the troops of the United States, as a fort or garrison. The Supreme Court of New-York accordingly held, in the case of The People v. Godfrey, that they had jurisdiction of a murder committed by one soldier upon another within Niagara fort. Nor would the purchase of the land by the United States be alone sufficient to vest them with the jurisdiction, or to oust that of the state without being accompanied or followed with the consent of the legis lature of the state. This was so decided in the case of The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Young.c

• Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. Rep. 72. Same v. Young, 1 Hall's Journal of Jurisprudence, 53.

b 17 Johns. Rep. 225.

1 Hall's Journal of Jurisprudence, 47. The jurisdiction of the United States over the lands within places ceded by a state, was fully and learnedly examined by Mr. Justice Woodbury, in the Circuit Court of the United States in Massachusetts, in October, 1845, in the case of The United States v. Ames, 1 Wood. & Minot's R. 76. It was adjudged, that if the United States own lands in any state, and there be no cession of the jurisdiction, the lex rei sitæ applicable to the landowners of the state, governs, as to rights and remedies, equally applying to nonresidents and citizens, when the laws of congress have not otherwise provided; such, for instance, is the case under an analogous principle, when the United States are the holders of a bill of exchange. United States v. Barker, 12 Wheaton, 561, and when liable to damages on foreign bills of exchange, as see supra, p. 297; and as to liability to a general average. See infra, vol. iii. p. 171, a.; and as to alluvions and land deposits, 10 Peters' R. 662. 717. 9; and as to set-off, see supra, p. 297. But if the ceded lands have been accompanied with a cession of the jurisdiction, the lands are subject to the laws of congress, and not to those of the state; and those state laws cannot be permitted to thwart or embarrass the object of the cession by taxes, or by overflowing the land with water, or otherwise, in any degree to conflict with what is required or provided by the general government of the United States, which may punish offences and trespasses, and remove in

(8.) The construction of the power of congress to regulate Power to recommerce among the several states.

I proceed next to examine the judicial decisions under the power given to congress to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states;" and it will be perceived, that the questions arising under this power have been of the utmost consequence to the interests of the Union, and the residuary claims aud sovereignty of the states.

The first question that arose upon this part of the constitution was, respecting the power of congress to interrupt or destroy the commerce of the United States, by laying a general embargo, without any limitation as to time. By the act of congress of 22d December, 1807, an embargo *432 was laid on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United States, and a prohibition of exportation from the United States, either by land or water, of any goods, wares or merchandise, of foreign or domestic growth or manufacture. There were several supplementary acts auxiliary to this principal one, and intended more effectually to enforce it, under certain specific exceptions. In the case of The United States v. The Brigantine William, in the District Court of Massachusetts, in September, 1808, a it was objected, that the act was unconstitutional, for that congress had no right, under the power to regulate commerce, thus to annihilate it, by interdicting it entirely with foreign nations. But the court decided, that the embargo act was within the constitutional provision. The power of congress was sovereign relative to commercial intercourse, qualified by the limitations and restrictions expressed in the constitution; and by the treatymaking power of the President and Senate, congress had a right to control or abridge commerce for the advancement of great national purposes. Non-intercourse and embargo laws are within the range of legislative discretion; and if congress have the power, for purposes of safety, or preparation, or

truders thereon. On the other hand, if congress have not provided any adequate and exclusive remedy for injuries to public property, then the common law or laws of the states apply. But the United States have jurisdiction over its territory, though the particular lands have not been ceded, inasmuch as the lands are held for special purposes, and are to be protected.

2 Hall's Law Journal, 255.

gulate commerce.