to confirm it, subject to certain modifications immaterial to NORTH J. this action. 1897 FIELD V. RAVENS THORPE URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL. Then the question is as to this provision, "that on and after HUDDERSthe appointed day all the rights, liabilities, and obligations CORPORATION attaching to the Mirfield Urban District Council, in respect of the added area, shall pass to and vest in the Ravensthorpe Urban District Council." It is said, therefore, that the disabilities of the Mirfield Council passed to the Ravensthorpe Council; but I do not see in what way the Mirfield Council were under any liability and obligation to take their water from the Huddersfield Corporation; and, if they were not, no obligation passed to the Ravensthorpe Council to do so. But supposing it could be said that immediately before the transfer the Mirfield Union were under a liability and obligation not to construct any waterworks without giving notice to the Huddersfield Corporation-suppose that that is a liability which passed, and that the Ravensthorpe Council cannot do so any more than the Mirfield Council can do so without giving such notice then the old point that I dealt with comes up again : they are not constructing waterworks; what they are doing is merely extending the existing waterworks, which is not a construction of waterworks within the 52nd section. It was said on behalf of the plaintiffs that if the construction I have put upon the Act is right, they may have a poaching upon their area by the defendants to an extent which would take away something like 40007. a year from them. That can only be so if the boundary of the defendants' district was extended to the prejudice of and by taking away from the plaintiffs' district. I do not think that is very likely to happen, because the boundaries have been adjusted, and it is not likely that there will be occasion to adjust them again; and in the next place the plaintiffs have the advantage of being in possession that always gives them an advantage over persons who are merely coming into a district where they have not been before. But whether it is so or not, I cannot help it; if that is the effect of the law-that the plaintiffs may be interfered with by the defendants by reason of some alteration of NORTH J. boundaries hereafter,-I cannot help it; it does not affect 1897 HUDDERS FIELD CORPORATION V. RAVENS- URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL. the case. Under these circumstances, it seems to me that the plaintiffs have mistaken their rights, and that they are not entitled to the order they ask for. The motion, therefore, must be dismissed. Solicitors for plaintiffs: Riddell, Vaizey & Smith, for F. C. Lloyd, Huddersfield. Solicitors for defendants: Jaques & Co., for Watts & Son, Dewsbury. D. P. BELL v. BALLS. [1895 B. 5225.] Principal and Agent-Sale by Auction of Real Estate-Implied Agency of Auctioneer-Memorandum of Contract-Signature by Auctioneer's Clerk on behalf of Purchaser-Revocation-Statute of Frauds. The authority of an auctioneer, upon a sale by auction of real estate, to sign a memorandum of the contract as agent for the purchaser does not extend to the auctioneer's clerk. Such a memorandum, in order to bind the purchaser, must be signed by the auctioneer himself and at the time of the sale, unless the purchaser has, by word, sign, or otherwise, authorized the clerk to sign as his agent. Where the auctioneer had signed a memorandum as agent for the purchaser a week after the sale, and the purchaser had repudiated the purchase at the time : Held, that the auctioneer's authority had ceased, and that there was no memorandum in writing sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. THIS was an action by the plaintiffs as vendors of certain freehold property known as "The Riddings," No. 73, Tulse Hill, for specific performance of an alleged agreement by the defendant to purchase the same. The plaintiffs caused the property in question to be put up for sale by auction by Messrs. Herring, Son & Daw, a firm of auctioneers, at the Mart, Tokenhouse Yard, on November 25, 1895, upon the terms expressed in printed particulars and conditions of sale, at the end of which was a memorandum of agreement in blank. The defendant, in company with a friend named Wyatt, attended the sale. Upon Mr. Daw, a member of the firm of auctioneers, entering the room a short conversation took place with reference to "The Riddings" between him and the defendant, who was known to him personally, and just before he entered the rostrum he asked the defendant to "give him a bid." The sale was then begun of five different properties, among which “The Riddings" came third. The reserve price was 16007. The defendant bid 1550l., and, after communications had passed between Mr. Daw and the vendors, the property was knocked down to the defendant at that price. The sale of the two STIRLING J. 1897 Feb. 11, 12; March 10. 1897 BELL V. BALLS. STIRLING J. remaining properties was then proceeded with, and at the close the defendant left the room. Upon the auctioneer's clerk calling Mr. Daw's attention to the circumstance that the defendant had not signed the memorandum of agreement, a messenger was sent after him, and he returned. He was then asked to sign the memorandum, but refused, on the ground that he had made the bid for Mr. Daw in compliance with his request, and not for himself. The auctioneer's clerk had in the meantime filled up the memorandum of agreement on a copy of the printed particulars and conditions of sale in the appropriate manner. The memorandum, as filled up, ran as follows: "I, George Balls, of Brixton Hill, S.W., do hereby acknowledge that I have this day purchased the property described in the within particulars of sale for the sum of one thousand five hundred and fifty pounds, and having paid into the hands of Messrs. Herring, Son & Daw, the auctioneers, the sum of one hundred and fifty-five pounds as a deposit, and in part payment of the purchase-money, I hereby agree and bind myself, my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, to pay the balance of the said purchase-money, and complete the said purchase in all respects according to the within conditions of sale. As witness my hand this 25th day of November, 1895." Then followed a recapitulation in figures of the amount of the purchase-money, the deposit and balance owing, and the document concluded with these words: "As agents for the vendors, Peter Bell and William Dickson, we hereby ratify this sale, and as auctioneers acknowledge to have received the deposit. Abstract to be sent to ." This memorandum was not signed either by the defendant, the auctioneer, or his clerk. A week later, however, on December 2, 1895, Mr. Daw, at the instance of the vendors, filled up and signed, in the name of his firm, and as agent for the defendant, another copy of the memorandum, striking out, however, all reference to the deposit which the defendant had not paid. The defendant persisted in his refusal to complete the purchase, and the action was brought to compel him to do so, the plaintiffs relying upon both the above-mentioned documents as memoranda of the contract sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of STIRLING J. Frauds. Grosvenor Woods, Q.C., and Ingpen, for the plaintiffs. (1.) Where an auctioneer's clerk is visibly employed in the auctionroom in taking down the names of the purchasers and the amounts of the purchase-money, he is as much the agent of the purchaser as the auctioneer himself, and the purchaser must be presumed to have assented to his employment. The general rule expressed in the maxim "Delegatus non potest delegare" is subject to exceptions where the nature of the particular business requires it. There is no authority precisely in point, but the question has been discussed in several cases: Bird v. Boulter (1); Peirce v. Corf (2); M'Mullen v. Helberg (3); Dyas v. Stafford (4); Sugden on Vendors and Purchasers, 14th ed. p. 147; De Bussche v. Alt (5); Sims v. Landray (6); Fry on Specific Performance, § 531. (2.) Assuming that the memorandum signed by the clerk does not bind the purchaser, the later memorandum signed by the auctioneer himself binds him. It may be said that the purchaser had in the interval revoked the authority, and we do not dispute that the auctioneer could perform no new act after the sale so as to bind the purchaser to any other contract than that entered into at the fall of the hammer; but why should he not bind him to a document which is a mere record of the contract? After the property has been knocked down it is too late for the purchaser to revoke his authority: Dart on Vendors and Purchasers, 6th ed. vol. i. p. 209; Day v. Wells. (7) That was a case of a vendor; but for the present purpose there is no difference between a vendor and a purchaser. (3.) The defendant is not entitled to relief on the ground of mistake. If the defendant was deceived, he deceived himself: Tamplin v. James. (8) Hastings, Q.C., and Stallard, for the defendant. The question is whether the auctioneer's clerk can be regarded as the agent of the purchaser except under special circumstances. (1) (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 443. (5) (1878) 8 Ch. D. 286, 310. (7) (1861) 30 Beav. 220. 1897 BELL v. BALLS. |