for the execution of articles relating to the boundaries of two provinces in America, held under letters patent from the King, the cause was ordered to stand over for the same purpose. In like manner in Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, (t) in which the parties claimed under two distinct grants from the Crown, each reserving a rent but of different amounts, it was held that inasmuch as the rights of the Crown were concerned, the Attorney General ought to be before the Court. (u) In Barclay v. Russell, (x) the Lord Chancellor (Lord Loughborough) dismissed the bill, because a title appeared upon the record for the Crown, although no claim had been made on its behalf. In that case the question arose as to the right to a sum of Bank stock which had been purchased by the government of the province of Maryland before the American war, and vested in the names of trustees for the discharge of certain bills, in respect of which no claim was ever made. After the peace by which the independence of the American colonies was acknowledged, a bill was filed by certain persons who claimed the stock under an assignment by the new government of the State of Maryland, in opposition to which, claims were set up by the surviving trustee, who, as there were no claims under the bills for the payment of which the trust had been created, insisted upon being beneficially entitled to the whole fund; a claim was also made by the proprietary under the old government, who insisted on a lien upon the stock, in consequence of the confiscation of their property, which took place during the war by the authority of the then legislature of the province, in consequence of the trustees [ *180 ] having refused to transfer the stock according to the provisions of an Act of that Legislature. The Court, however, upon the hearing, was of opinion that none of these parties had any claim upon the stock, and that it was a trust without any specific purpose to which it could be applied, the consequence of which was, that it was for the King to appoint for what purpose the stock should be applied. Upon the same principle, in Dolder v. The Bank of England, (y) Lord Eldon refused to order the dividends, which had been received before the filing of the bill, of stock purchased by the old government of Switzerland, to be paid into court by the trustees, on the application of the new government which had not been recognized by the government of this country, until the Attorney General was made a party to the suit. But although, in cases where a title in the Crown appears upon the record, the Court will not make a decree unless the Attorney General is a party to the suit, yet it seems that the circumstance of its appearing by the record that the plaintiff has been convicted of manslaughter, and that a commission of attainder has been issued, will not support a plea for not making the Attorney General a party, because an inquisition of attainder is only to inform, and does not entitle the Crown to any right. (z) It seems, however, that in this respect an inquisition of attainder differs from a commission to enquire whether a person under whom the plaintiff claims was an alien, the former being only for the sake of informing the Crown, but the latter to entitle. (a)

The necessity of making the Attorney General a party, is not confined to those cases in which the interests of the Crown in its own right are concerned, but it extends also to cases in which the King is considered as the protector of the rights of others. Thus, as we have seen before, the grantee of a chose in action from the Crown may either institute proceedings in the name of the Attorney General, or in his own name, making the Attorney General a defendant to the suit; and so in suits in which the Crown may be interested in its

(t) 2 Sch. & L. 610.

(u) Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & L. 617.

(x) 3 Ves. 436.

(z) Burk v. Brown, 2 Atk. 399.

(y) 10 Ves. 352.
(a) Ibid.

*character of protector of the rights of others, the Attorney Gen[ *181 ] eral should be made a party. Thus, the Attorney General is a necessary party to all suits where the subject matter is either wholly or in part money appropriated for general charitable purposes, because the King as parens patriæ is supposed to superintend the administration of all charities, and acts in this behalf by his Attorney General. Where, however, a legacy is given to a charity already established, as where it is given to the trustees of a particular foundation, or to the treasurer or other officer of some charitable institution, to become a part of the general funds of such foundation or institution, the Attorney General need not be a party, because he can have no interference with the distribution of their general funds; (b) upon this ground where a legacy was given to a charity, and upon a bill filed against the executors for an account, an objection was taken because the Attorney General was not a party, the objection was over-ruled, and a decree made for an account, because upon such a decree the Master would report that there was such a legacy, and the parties might come in and claim before him. (c) And it seems that there is a distinction where trustees of the charity are appointed by the donor, and where no trustees are appointed but there is a devise immediately to charitable uses; in the latter case there can be no decree unless the Attorney General be made a party, but otherwise where trustees are appointed by the donor; (d) therefore, where a bill was filed to establish a will, and to perform several trusts, some of them relating to charities in which some of the trustees were plaintiffs, and other trustees and several of the cestui que trusts were defendants, an objection, because the Attorney General was not made a defendant, was over-ruled, it being considered that some of the trustees of the charity (e) being defendants, there might be a decree to compel the execution of the trusts relating to these charities. (f) In that case, it was said by the Lord Chancellor (Parker,) that if there should be any collusion between the parties relating to the [ *182 ] charity, the Attorney General might, notwithstanding a decree, bring an information to establish the charity and set aside the decree, and that he might do the same though he were made a defendant, in case of collusion between the parties; but it seems that the mere circumstance of the Attorney General not having been made a party to the proceeding, will not be a sufficient ground to sustain an information for the purpose of setting aside a decree made in a former suit, unless the decree is impeached upon other grounds. (g)

When it is said that in cases where a legacy is given to the trustees of a charity already in existence, for the general purposes of the charity, it will not be necessary in a suit concerning it, to make the Attorney General a defendant; the rule must be understood to apply only to those charities which are of a permanent nature, and whose objects are defined, for it has been determined, that where legacies are given to the officers of a charitable institution which is not of a permanent nature, or whose objects are not defined, it will be necessary to make the Attorney General a party to a suit relating to them. Thus, in the case of Wellbeloved v. Jones, (h) where a legacy was given to the officers, for the time being, of an academical institution, established at York for the education of dissenting ministers, which officers, with the addition of such other persons as they should choose, (in case they should think an additional number of

(b) Wellbeloved v. Jones, 1 S. & S. 41. (c) Chitty v. Parker, 4 Bro. 38. (d) 4 Vin. 500, Pl. 11, notis; 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 267, Pl. 13, n.

(e) It appears from a subsequent part of the case that one of the trustees of the charity was abroad.

(f) Monil v. Lawson, 4 Vin. 500, Pl. 11; 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 267.

(g) Attorney General v. Warren, 2 Swanst. 291.

(h) 1 S. & S. 43.

trustees necessary,) were to stand possessed of the money upon trust, to apply the interest and dividends for the augmentation of the salaries of dissenting ministers, a preference being given to those who should have been students in the York institution; and in case such institution should cease, then upon trust that the persons in whose names the fund should be invested, should transfer the same to the principal officers for the time being, of such other institution as should succeed the same, or be established upon similar principles; the Vice Chancellor, (Sir J. Leach,) upon a bill filed by the officers of the institution, praying to have the fund transferred to them, to which the Attorney General was no party, ordered the case to stand over, with [ *183 ] leave to amend by making the Attorney General a party; his Honor observing, that the Court would never permit the legacy to come into the hands of the plaintiffs, who happened to fill particular offices in the society, but would take care to secure the objects of the testator by the creation of a proper and permanent trust; and upon hearing the cause would send it to the Master for that purpose, and that it would be one of the duties of the Attorney General to attend the Master upon the subject.

It is to be observed also, that the Attorney General is a necessary party only where the charity is in the nature of a general charity, and that where it is merely a private charity, it will not be necessary to bring him before the Court; thus, where the suit related to a voluntary society, entered into for the purpose of providing a weekly payment to such of the members as should become necessitous, and their widows, Lord Hardwicke over-ruled the objection that the Attorney General was not a party, because it was in the nature only of a private charity. (i)

The Attorney General qua such is always supposed to be in Court; (k) therefore if he is made a defendant as an officer of the Crown, the bill must pray, instead of the usual writ of subpœna, that he being attended with a copy, may appear and put in an answer. (1) If the Attorney General does not, upon being attended and served with a copy of the bill, appear, the Court will not make an order for him to appear, as no attachment can issue against him to enforce it. In such case, however, the plaintiff is entitled to justice, and the non-appearance of the Attorney General will be considered as a nil dicit. (m) If after appearance the Attorney General delays putting in his answer beyond a reasonable time, it is the ancient practice of the Court of Exchequer for the plaintiff to move the Court to appoint a day for the Attorney General to answer the bill, or in default that it should be taken pro confesso. (n) This practice has been followed in a recent case; in which it was ordered, [ *184 ] that unless the Attorney General put in his answer within a week, the bill should be set down to be taken pro confesso. (0) In that case it was alleged by the counsel who appeared on behalf of the Attorney General, that it was the intention of the Attorney General to file a cross information, and that the intricacy of the proceedings had been the only cause which had prevented its being sooner done, in consideration of which, and in order to give the Crown the benefit of the discovery to be sought by the cross information, it was made part of the order that the plaintiff should undertake not to pass publication until he should have put in a full answer to the cross information of the Attorney General, which was to be filed on or before a day named in the order. When the Attorney General is made a defendant to a suit, it is entirely in

(i) Anon. 3 Atk. 277.

(Lord Red. 31.

(k) Barclay v. Russell, 2 Dick. 729.
(m) Barclay v. Russell, ubi supra.

(n) 1 Fowl. Ex. Pr. 401; Peto v. Attorney General, 1 Y. & J. 509.
(0) Peto v. Att. Gen. 1 Y. & J. 509.

VOL. III.-L

his discretion whether he will put in a full answer or not. (p) The usual course is for him to put in a general answer, stating merely that he is a stranger to the matters contained in the bill, and that he hopes the interest of the Crown will be taken care of. (4) In cases, however, in which the interest of the Crown, or the purposes of public justice require it, a full answer will be put in, (r) as in Crawford v. The Attorney General, (s) in which case the Lords of the Treasury had directed that the question might be brought before the consideration of a court of justice, and it would therefore have been unbecoming in the Attorney General to urge any matter of form which might prevent the case being properly submitted to the Court, before whom it was brought. (1)

In Errington v. The Attorney General, (u) the Attorney General being one of the defendants to a bill of interpleader, put in the usual general answer, upon which the other defendants moved that the bill might be dismissed, and the injunction dissolved, the Attorney General opposed the motion, and at the same time prayed that he might be at liberty to withdraw his general answer, and [ *185] put in another, insisting "upon the particular right of the Crown to the money in question, which was granted.

The answer of the Attorney General is put in without oath, and is usually signed by him. And it seems that such an answer is not liable to be excepted to, even though it be to a cross bill, filed by the defendant in an information for the purpose of obtaining a discovery of matters alleged to be material to his defence to the information. We have, however, seen before, (x) that where a cross bill is filed against the Attorney General, praying relief as well as a discovery, he cannot protect himself from answering by means of demurrer ; (y) but whether he could by such means protect himself from answering a mere bill of discovery, does not appear to have been decided; it is most probable that he might, and that the Court would in such a case, if a discovery were wanted from the Crown, put the party to prefer his petition of right. (z)

The right of the Attorney General to receive his costs, where he is made a defendant to a suit, has been before noticed; (a) it will suffice therefore here to repeat, that there seems to be no rule against the Attorney General receiving his costs, where he is made a defendant in respect of legacies given to charities; and that in Moggridge v. Thackwell, (b) costs were given to all parties, including the Attorney General, as between solicitor and client, out of the fund in Court. It appears also, that he frequently receives his costs where he is made a defendant in respect of the immediate rights of the Crown, in cases of intestacy. (c)

During the vacancy of the office of Attorney General, the Solicitor General may be made a defendant to support the interests of the Crown; (d) and it has happened, that where there has been an information by the Attorney General, the object of which has been to set up a general claim on behalf of the Crown at variance with the interests of a public charity, the Solicitor General has been made a defendant, for the purpose of supporting the interests of such charity against the general claim of the Attorney General.

(z) Ibid.

(b) 7 Ves. 88.

(a) Ante, p. 12, 13.

(c) Attorney General v. Earl of Ashburnham, 1 S. & S. 397.

(d) Lord Red. 81.

The Attorney General to the Queen Consort, and Prince of Wales.

THE Queen Consort must be sued by her Attorney or Solicitor General, in the same manner as the King; and it is presumed that the Prince of Wales, as Duke of Cornwall, has the same prerogative, although no cases appear in the books wherein that point has been decided or discussed.

SECTION IV.
Corporations.

IT has been stated before (a) that corporations aggregate must be sued by their corporate name; that is, if they are corporations existing by Royal charter, they must be sued by their name of foundation, though it has been said that if a corporation be known by a particular name, that it is sufficient to sue it by that name. (b) This, however, must be confined to the case of a corporation by prescription; for it is said that if a corporation is created by the King, and the commencement of it appear by the record, it can have no other name by use, nor be named otherwise than the King by his letters patent has appointed, and the Court will not permit it be sued by any other name.

A corporation aggregate which has a head, cannot be sued without it, because without its head it is incomplete. (c) It is not however necessary to mention the name of the head; (d) nor is it in general proper to make individual members of aggregate corporations parties by their proper Christian and surnames, though cases may occur where this will be permitted for the purpose of compelling a discovery from them of some fact which may rest in their own knowledge. Thus in the case put by Lord Eldon, in Dummer v. The Corporation of Chippenham, (e) of an individual corporator whose [ *187 ] estate was charged with a rent or payment to a charitable institution, of which the corporation had the management, and who had obtained possession of the deed, his Lordship was of opinion that upon an information for the purpose of having the estate of the charity properly administered by the corporation, it would be perfectly competent to call upon the mayor, if he was the individual implicated in that conduct, not only to answer with the rest under their common seal, but also to answer as to the circumstances relative to the deed supposed to be in his hands. So also in the principal case, which was that of a bill by a schoolmaster against a corporation (f) who were trustees of a charity, to be relieved against a resolution of the trustees by which he was deprived of his office of schoolmaster, on the ground that the resolution had been pronounced by five of the members of the corporation, from improper motives with reference to a parliamentary election, to which bill the five members were made parties, for the purpose of obtaining from them an answer upon oath as to their alleged improper conduct, a demurrer which had been put in by these five members, on the ground that no title was shown to the discovery against them, was over-ruled by Lord Eldon.

(a) Ante, p. 25.

(c) 2 Bac. Ab. tit. Corp. [E.]e; pl. 2. (e) 14 Ves. 255.

(b) Bro. Corp. 40.

(d) 3 Salk. 103; 1 Leon. 307.

(f) Dummer v. The Corporation of Chippenham, ubi supra.