that they shall not be liable further, or in any case, than common carriers would be liable; and that they shall be entitled to the benefit of every protection and privilege which then or thereafter common carriers were entitled to, so that under this section it is presumed, in cases where the Act applies, all the protection of the Carriers' Act (1 Wm. 4) would be applicable. Where the property of a Canal or Navigation is vested in shareholders, the Act (8 and 9 Vic.) does not apply until adopted by a meeting of shareholders.

Where however an inland water carrier on a Canal or any Navigation where tolls are levied by Act of Parliament, seeks protection as against his negligence or default he can only obtain it by a special contract duly signed, the conditions whereof must be just and reasonable to the satisfaction of the presiding Judge before whom the case is tried, agreeably to the tenor of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, and the cases thereon, before mentioned.

As to inland water carriers on Rivers or Nav. igation whereon no tolls are levied by authority of Parliament, or with respect to whom the 8th and 9th Vic. cap. 42, is found inapplicable, they appear to be unaffected by either the Carriers' Act or the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, and they can therefore protect themselves, even against their negligence in the same way as land carriers could before July, 1830, by express written or oral contracts, or by bringing home to a customer express or implied knowledge of a public notice limiting their liability.

In reference to undue preference Canal Companies and the Undertakers, Commissioners, or Trustees, of any Navigation or navigable River established, incorporated, or regulated by Act of Parliament, may, by Act 8 and 9 Vic., cap. 28, alter or vary their tolls, rates, and duties, not exceeding the maximum amounts

allowed by their respective Acts of Parliament; but all such tolls are to be charged equally and at the same rates to all persons under the like circumstances. In cases where such Canal or Navigation belongs to shareholders, the Act is only to be applied with the consent of a majority of two-thirds of the shareholders present personally, or by proxy, at a meeting. The Act will be found in the Appendix.

The Statute 8 and 9 Vic., cap. 42, is however of a more general nature, and applies to the Company of Proprietors, Trustees, or Undertakers of any Canal, River, or Navigation, or their respective Committees, Directors or Managers, Superintendents or Agents, and it authorizes them to act as common carriers for profit on their canals, rivers, or navigation, or railways belonging thereto, and constructed under their Acts of Parliament, or on any river or navigation communicating therewith; and to employ boats and other working stock for the purpose, and to make reasonable charges for the same, in addition to the tolls or dues authorized for their canal, navigation, or railway; but (by section 4) all charges for the carriage of any such goods, &c., or for the use of their boats or vessels, or for the supply of haulage, trackage, or other power, are to be "at all times charged equally and after the same rate," whether per mile, or per ton per mile, or otherwise, in respect of all goods, &c., of a like description conveyed or propelled in a like boat or vessel at the same rate of speed, and passing along the same portion of the navigation under the like circumstances, and ". no reduction

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or advance in any such charges shall be made "either directly or indirectly in favour of, or "against, any particular Company or person" passing along, or using, or sending goods, &c., along the same portion of the navigation under the like circumstances.

F

Such language is strong, but it is nothing more than an assertion of the ancient principles of the law.

The second section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, has already been quoted (ante chap. V.), and this, and other parts of the Act, are applicable to all canals and other navigation whereon tolls are levied by authority of Parliament, and to the wharves & landing places of such canals and navigation used for the purposes of public traffic. The expression canal company in that Act includes not only a company, but every person, owner or lessee, of, or contracting to work any canal or navigation constructed or carried on under the powers of any Act of Parliament.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHARGES-LIEN-AND

CLAUSES THEREON IN

SPECIAL CONTRACTS.

Reasonable

Tender.

A carrier is entitled to his reasonable charges, but cannot extort what he will (Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 372), and if he refuse to carry charges. upon reasonable terms the customer may tender what he believes to be reasonable, and if such tender be found to be fair, the carrier will be liable for refusing to carry, but he is not bound to carry until a reasonable sum is tendered, and then only if he has room and if the articles are such as he professes to carry. (Pichford v. Grand Junction R. C., 10 M. and W. 399; Johnson v. Midland R. C., 4 Exch. 367; see also chap. 2). Instead of tendering, and incurring the inconvenience of the delay in the transmission of the goods, the customer may pay, under protest, the unreasonable sum demanded by the carrier, and afterwards recover the excess by an action at law (Parker v. Great Action for exWestern R. C., 7 M. and G. 253).

The carrier may recover his reasonable charges in an action. The charges of Railway Companies are usually limited by their Acts, with the general power to vary the same, but all such variations must be reasonable, fair, and equal to all parties alike, without bias against, or preference for, particular individuals, classes, or companies.

cess of charge.

Packed and other parcels.

Lien.

The charge can be varied according to the trouble, expense, and responsibility attending the receipt, carriage, and delivery of the articles; and for small packages it may be reasonable that more ought to be paid than a proportionate price according to weight, of the price of larger parcels of the same commodity, by reason of the trouble in receiving, despatching, and delivering being equal, and the risk of abstraction and loss greater; but if the small packages are united in one large package and delivered to the carrier in that large package addressed to one consignee, the carrier cannot charge for each separate parcel contained in it, nor can he fix the same charge for carriage whether he delivers goods at the residence of the consignee or merely at his own terminus; nor can a Railway Company fix one charge for the same class of goods for carriers and another for the public, unless the former, as is often the case, perform some duties for themselves which the ordinary public do not, in which case a fair and reasonable difference is allouable. To grant privileges in point of charge as to packed parcels, or otherwise, to the community at large, which are withheld from carriers as a class, is also illegal, as in fact are all attempts to institute different tariffs for different classes unless the trouble or risk be less for one class than another. (Pichford v. Grand Junction R. C. 10 M. and W. 399; Parker v. Great Western R. C. 7 M. and G. 253; Edwards v. Great Western R. C. 11 C. B. 588, 21 Law J. C. P. 72; Crouch v. Great Northern R. C. 23 Law J. 148 Exch.)

A carrier has at common law the right to detain goods which have been entrusted to him to carry until his reasonable charges for carrying the same goods be paid by the owner or employer (Skinner v. Upshaw, 2 Ld. Raymond, 752), even altho' they have been delivered to him by a wrongful owner and are claimed by a rightful