CHAPTER II, LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY, INDEPENDENTLY The limitations of a carrier's common law liability to receive and carry, and to ensure the safe transit and delivery to the consignee against all risks, are numerous. Some of the principal modifications are as follow: 1. Such insurance does not extend to loss The Act of arising from the act of God, and the King's God., The enemies. Act of God. It must be the act of God, as distinguished from the act of man. Thunderstorms, earthquakes, hurricanes, snowstorms, and unusually violent tempests, or any other inevitable atmospheric or physical cause would be deemed an act of God, and excuse him; but the breaking down of a bridge, or fire, or violence of robbers, would not. Delay or loss arising from a snowstorm would be held excusable, on the au-. thority of Briddon v. The Great Northern R. C. 32 Law J. rep. 94. Acts of King's enemies are strictly confined to acts done by a nation with whom England is at war, and does not include piracies, robberies, riots, nor violence of mobs, altho' armed (Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27). King's Enemies. between 2. The courts have recognised a distinction be- Distinction tween the liability of carriers, especially railway. Goods and companies, as regards goods and passengers. Passengers, Want of not usually sal of rate, &c. The carrier only insures the latter as far as reasonable care and foresight can do so, and is only liable for negligence. (Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp.; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 11 Moore, 138; Carpue v. London and Brighton R.C. 5 Q.B. 747; Skinner v.Same, 5 Exch. 789; Rigby v. Hewett, 5 Exch. 240; Grote v. Chester and Holyhead R. C. 2 Exch.251). But even as to passengers, Railway Companies are bound to provide safe carriages (Sharp v. Gray, 9 Bing. 457; Bremer v. Williams 1 C. & P. 414), and such engines, drivers, breaks, bridges, way, station and other lights as are safe and necessary (Martin v. Great Northern R. C. 16 C, B. 179, 24 Law J. C. P, 209; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. 321; Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark, 493; Grote's Case, 2 Exch. 251), and the onus of finding ground for discharge lays upon the Company (Carpue's Case, ante; Pigott v. Eastern Counties R. C. 15 Law J. C. P. 235; Skinner v. London, Brighton, &c. R. C. 5 Exch. 787). 3. He is relieved from all liability for refusroom-goods ing to accept, where he has not convenience to taken-refu- carry the goods, (Johnson v. Midland R. C. 4 Exch.; Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. 127; Batson v, Donovan, 4 B. and Ald. 28, 32), or to carry valuable goods with security, or if he has not usually carried, or held himself out to carry, a particular kind of traffic (York, Newcastle, and Berwick R. C. v. Crisp, 14 C. B. 529; Johnson v. Midland R. C. 4 Exch., 367), or if they be offered to him at an unreasonable time, or before he is ready to convey them (Pickford v. Grand Junction R. C. 12 M. and W. 766), or with a refusal to pay a reasonable price for carriage (Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; Batson's Case, ante; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. and W. 443, 458; Basan v. Sandford, 1 Show. 327; Pickford v. Grand Junction, 8 M. and W. 372, 399). 4. Although a Carrier cannot refuse goods Criminals, of the class he professes to carry, nor passen, Diseased gers if he ordinarily carries passengers, yet he persons, may decline to receive persons in a state of Dangerous mental or bodily disease, drunkenness, persons. goods, &c. of ill-fame, or in the case of Railways, who persist in smoking (Story on Bailments, s.s. 591, 591a); but if the Company take the fare of and admit any persons of ill-character, who nevertheless do not misconduct themselves during the journey, they cannot turn them out (Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Turner, 875; Pendergast v. Compton, 8 Jurist, 454.) Railway Companies may refuse dangerous articles, as Aquafortis, Gunpowder, Oil of Vitriol, Lucifer Matches; and any persons sending such without marking their nature on the package, or otherwise giving notice in writing of their contents to the Book-keeper, or other servant of the Company with whom the same is left at the time of sending, shall forfeit to the Company £20. for every such offence; and the Company may require packages suspected to contain such articles to be opened to ascertain the facts (8 and 9 Vic. c. 20, s. 105). If a parcel, however, does not contain such articles, or any of the goods mentioned in the Carriers' Act, 1 Wm. 4, c. 68, and the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854, there is no necessity to inform him, but he cannot insist upon being informed of their contents before accepting them (Crouch v. London & North Western R. C. 2 C. Law Rep. 210, 23 Law J. C. P. 73). He can demand the opening of a package if he suspects it to contain the dangerous articles referred to in 8 and 9 Vic. c. 20, supra; but in other cases he must be content with the limitation of liability given him by statute or otherwise, if he be deceived. deceit. 5, He is not liable for the loss or injury to Fraud and goods in respect of which fraud or deceit is practised on him by the rendor-for in Imperfect packing, &c. Damage by natural deterioration, stance, if the real value of goods be misrepresented, or fraudulently concealed from him, whereby he is induced to consider them of trifling value (Kewzig v. Eggleston, Alexan. 93; Titchburn v. White, 1 Stra. 145; Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr, 2298; Mayhew v. Earnes, 3 B. and C. 601; Walker v. Jackson, 10 M. and W. 161; Tyley v. Morice, Carth. 485). 6. He cannot be called upon to pay for injury arising from the imperfect packing of goods, or the insufficient securing of animals, unless he has the means of observing these, on or before acceptance of the goods, or is informed thereof; but if a cask of liquor leak during the journey, he should endeavour to do what he reasonably can to prevent as much of the leakage as possible (Beck v. Evans, 16 East. 244; Stuart v. Crawley, 2 Stark, 323). 7. A Carrier is not liable for losses arising from the ordinary deterioration of goods in vermin, &c. quantity or quality in the course of carriage, or from inherent infirmity or tendency to decay, or which arises from the neglect or default of the consignor; though the Carrier knowing the goods and their tendency, must do what he can to preserve them by airing, ventilation, stopping leakage, or whatsoever else is reasonably within his power (Farrer v. Adams, Bull. N. P. 69; Bull v. Robinson, 24 Law J. Exch. 165; Beck v. Evans, 16 East.244; Davison v. Grynne, 12 East. 381). But a Carrier is liable to damage arising from goods entrusted to him being injured whilst in his care by rats or other animals or vermin (Laveroine v. Drury, 8 Exch, 163; White v. Humphrey, 11 Q. B. 43; Story on Bailments, s. 513). 8. So far as they limit their liability, Railway Companies must be proceeded against as special Carriers for hire and not as common Carriers, 9. Of course in all cases of alleged liability who Delivery in an unauthor it is presumed that the articles are properly entrusted to the Carrier's care; and they must be delivered to the Carrier, or some person can be proved to be his servant or agent, for ized manner. the purpose. A delivery of a parcel at any office, warehouse, or receiving house, used or appointed for the receiving of the parcels, is sufficient under the Carriers' Act to render the Carrier liable for its loss or injury if the nature and value are declared; so is delivery to a servant by the Carrier on the road, or his bookkeeper, and the porters. Warehouse receivers, and the officials at a Railway Station, would be generally considered persons to whom a good delivery might be made, unless the parties knew that the course of business of the Company was to the contrary; for instance where a Company notified that they would not carry catile unless a ticket were attached signed by their clerk, it was held that a porter had not authority to receive without giving such signed tickets, and that where he did so the Company was not liable for the loss of cattle so received from parties acquainted with the notice (Slim v. Great Northern R. C. 2 Com. Law Rep. 864, C. B. 14, C. B. 647; Taff Vale R. C. v. Giles, 2 Ell. and B. 823; Hyde v. Trent and Mersey Navigation C. 5 Term Rep. 389; Gilbard v. Dale, 5 Ad, and E. 543; Burrell v. North, 2 Carr and P, 281). But the Carrier is not held responsible where the goods are given to the servant for his own private gain (Butler v. Bazan, 2 C.P. 213); or merely left at an inn-yard whence the Carrier set out, or left at a wharf (Galway v. Hollower, 1 Lord Passengers' Raymond, 46; Buckman v. Levy, 3 Camp. 414); and the Carrier will be exempt if the owner specially undertake to watch the goods, or refuse to place confidence in the Carrier in the matter (Brind v. Dale, 2 M. and W. 275; East India Co. v. Pulleine, 1 Stra. 690). This Luggage. |