Kingdom. The readmission will only operate from its date, and will be subject to a qualification similar to that mentioned in § 266. Naturalization Act 1870, s. 8.

§ 270. The legislature of any British possession may make laws "for imparting to any person the privileges or any of the privileges of naturalization, to be enjoyed by such person within the limits of such possession." Naturalization Act 1870, s. 16.

Generally, the question of a person's being a British subject or an alien must be decided by the law of the United Kingdom; but if he thus prove to be an alien, his rights and those of others will be affected by that fact to the extent and in the manner determined by the law of that part of the British dominions which is concerned. Donegani v. Donegani, 1835, 3 Knapp 63, Shadwell; Re Adam, 1837, 1 Mo. P. C. 460, Erskine. If a qualified naturalization should be conferred by a colonial law under this §, its operation would be in effect the same as though privileges were given in the colony to aliens under certain conditions.

Declarations of Alienage and Expatriation.

§ 271. "Any person who by reason of his having been born within the dominions of her majesty is a natural-born subject, but who also at the time of his birth became under the law of any foreign state a subject of such state, and is still such subject;" also

"any person who is born out of her majesty's dominions of a father being a British subject;

"may, if of full age and not [an infant, lunatic, idiot or married woman], make a declaration of alienage,"

"and from and after the making of such declaration shall cease to be a British subject."-Naturalization Act 1870, s. 4, the words in brackets from s. 17.

§ 272. British nationality acquired by naturalization is also lost by making a declaration of alienage, where this country has a convention with the country of origin, permitting the subjects of that country who have been naturalized as British subjects to divest themselves of that status. Naturalization Act 1870, s. 3.

~§ 273. Any person not an infant, lunatic, idiot or married woman, loses his British nationality by voluntarily becoming naturalized in

a foreign state, while in that state. Naturalization Act 1870, ss. 6, 17.

§ 274. If a person entitled to make a declaration of alienage under § 271 omits to do so, but proves by his conduct that he chooses his foreign nationality; or if a person entitled to make a declaration of alienage under § 272 omits to do so, but proves by his conduct that he desires to divest himself of the status of a British subject; and if in either case the foreign country in question accepts the person as its subject, but without naturalizing him, so that § 273 does not apply: it may be proper to treat the person as an alien for the purposes of public international law.

Drummond's Case, on the award of the commissioners for liquidating the claims of British subjects in France, 1834, 2 Knapp 295, Shadwell. See the Countess de Conway's Case, on the same award, 1834, 2 Knapp 364, Parke, as to the circumstances under which the protection due to a British subject may be claimed by one not strictly such.

But he must still be considered as a British subject, for the purpose of transmitting that character to his children under any

statute.

Fitch v. Weber, 1847, 6 Ha. 51, Wigram.

§ 275. The loss of British nationality does not discharge from any liability in respect of any act done before such loss. Naturalization Act 1870, s. 15.

Effect of the Family on Nationality.

§ 276. "A married woman shall be deemed to be a subject of the state of which her husband is for the time being a subject." Naturalization Act 1870, s. 10, (1).

§ 277. "Where the father, or the mother being a widow, has obtained a certificate of naturalization in the United Kingdom, every child of such father or mother who during infancy has become resident with such father or mother in any part of the United Kingdom shall be deemed to be a naturalized British subject." Naturalization Act 1870, s. 10, (5).

§ 278. "Where the father, or the mother being a widow, has obtained a certificate of readmission to British nationality, every child of such father or mother who during infancy has become resident in the British dominions with such father or mother shall be deemed to have resumed the position of a British subject to all intents." Naturalization Act 1870, s. 10, (4).

§ 279. "Where the father being a British subject, or the mother being a British subject and a widow, becomes an alien in pursuance of" § 271, 272, 273 or 276, or of this §, "every child of such father or mother who during infancy has become resident in the country where the father or mother is naturalized, and has according to the laws of such country become naturalized therein, shall be deemed to be a subject of the state of which the father or mother has become a subject, and not a British subject." Naturalization Act 1870, s. 10, (3).

Transfer of Nationality in cases of Cession.

§ 280. The cession of a British territory, or the acknowledgment of its independence, causes the loss of their British nationality by all persons domiciled within it at the date of the cession.

Doe v. Acklam, 1824, 2 B. & C. 779, Abbott and (?).

§ 281. Unless they transfer their domicile to some territory which remains British, either within the time limited for that purpose by the treaty, or immediately, if no such time be limited.

Doe v. Mulcaster, 1826, 5 B. & C. 771, Abbott, Bayley and Holroyd; Doe v. Arkwright, 1833, 5 C. & P. 575, Parke; Jephson v. Riera, 1835, 3 Kn. 130, Erskine.

The judgment in Re Bruce, 1832, 2 C. & J. 436, 2 Tyr. 475, Bayley and Lyndhurst, is expressed as if the court thought that a youth, who was nineteen at the date of the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, could elect his nationality either then or on attaining his majority two years afterwards, the treaty limiting no time. But this can scarcely be so, and the question in the case did not require such a decision.

CHAPTER XVI.

CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS.

BESIDES the natural persons with whom we have hitherto been chiefly concerned, private international law has to do with those artificial persons to which the law of every country gives a technical existence. One class of these is composed of corporations, in which natural persons called corporators or members, and their successors, are united as a body having legal personality and perpetual succession. The general rule of Roman law appears to have been that three members were required for a corporation; Neratius Priscus tres facere existimat collegium, et hoc magis sequendum est: Dig. 50, 16, 85. But a corporation was not dissolved by being reduced to a single member; sed si universitas ad unum redit, magis admittitur posse eum convenire et conveniri, cum jus omnium in unum reciderit et stet nomen universitatis: Dig. 4, 4, 7, 2. In England however we are familiar with corporations never having more than one member, corporations sole as distinguished from corporations aggregate. Another class of artificial persons was presented in Roman law, and is presented now in that of many countries, by institutions for public purposes, as colleges or hospitals, enjoying legal personality without so much as a single corporator, and therefore said persona vice fungi. In England we do not possess this kind of artificial person, the property of such institutions being always vested either in corporations or in unincorporated trustees. With regard to both classes the same international principles rule. of any artificial person, in matters concerning only itself or the relations of its members, if any, to it and to one another, must depend on the law from which it derives its existence. That law is its personal law, or in other words it is domiciled in the country of that law.

The regulation

If in other countries it enters into relations with outside parties, the first question to be asked is whether by the laws of those countries it is permitted to do so in its artificial character. In case of the affirmative, its dealings with outside parties must stand on the same footing as those of a natural person domiciled abroad. If its artificial personality is not recognized for the purpose in question, no natural person can be liable on the dealing except on the ground of agency or of holding out; and on discussing any such ground it must be borne in mind that the corporators, if any, and as such, associated together on the footing of no other law than that of the domicile of the corporation.

The desirableness of treating in one place the questions which arise out of administration in bankruptcy has led us to consider certain applications of these principles, in §§ 123, 124. No more direct consequence can be drawn from the principles than that a company which derives its incorporation or other legal existence from another law than that of England cannot be dissolved in an English winding up, though the previous stages of such a winding up may be employed for the purpose of making its English property available for the payment of its debts. In pursuing further the subject of artificial persons, we will commence with a § relating to those public institutions which in most countries are organized as or by means of such persons, and the rest of the chapter will relate chiefly to corporations.

§ 282. Where the English court, in administering a will, finds that money is given for a charitable purpose intended to be domiciled abroad, it must first be assured that the purpose can be lawfully accomplished in the country in question, and then it will hand over the money to the trustees or other parties indicated by the testator, to be applied by them subject to the law and jurisdiction of that country. The court will not settle a scheme for the government of the foreign charity.

Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubery, 1754. Ambler 236, Hardwicke; Oliphant v. Hendrie, 1784, I Bro. C. C. 571, Thurlow; Att.-Gen. v. Lepine, 1818, 2 Sw. 181, 1 Wils. Ch. 465, Eldon, reversing Grant, who in 1815 had settled a scheme, 19 Ves. 309; Minet v. Vulliamy, 1819, 1 Russ. 113, note, Plumer; Emery v. Hill, 1826, 1 Russ. 112, Gifford; Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company,