Such a draining blister, co operating with so violent a dysentery, will soon bring the most robus constitution to the last stages of debility. For, you must observe, too, this is ail expense without any return, all outgoings without any incomings; you will never get the most insignificant sugar-island to increase your means, not the plunder of the poorest sea port town in France to assist you; scarcely, after the first six months, a single prize on the seas to enrich your sailors. -2. I am to prove that no defensive system, as a defensive system, can defend this country. This may seem paradoxical, but I assert it is nevertheless true. For omitting to urge, (no very small or unimportant observation, however) that it is physically impossible to have all our coasts so defended by batteries, and lined with soldiers, as in every spot, where an attack could be made, to ensure success; and, that if the enemy should happen to hit upon the weak point, may give us a mortal blow before we have had time to collect a thousand men to oppose him; omitting all this, I ask what we shall have gained, supposing we repel with the most signal success any given number of attacks which he chooses to make? The number repelled shall be as great, and the success as complete as any one can wish to state it; and then we shall have gained nothing at all, except the destruction of so many men, and of so many vessels; which, to the enemy, is nothing at all; and which, besides, will probably be compensated by a proportionate loss on our side. I put this in this way, because I find that people, who, a very few days ago, reprobated any one who mentioned the bare possibility of an invasion as gloomy and desponding; these people. are now become all at once so valorous, that nothing will now content them, but that the enemy, and Buonaparté himself in person should come; that, say they, he may get a good dressing, and be convinced that he has no chance of succeeding in any at tack on this country. Now I, who was one of those desponding persons before, but who was very desirous that some measure should be adopted to prevent the attack, am now left far far behind by these courageous knights, and am very ready to state, that instead of wishing them to come, I by all means wish them to stay away; and am most anxious that they should be prevented from coming. These gentlemen are so desirous of having a tussle with them, that I rather think that they would wish our cruizers, instead of attacking them, to convoy and assist them to come in safety. I confess, I never wish to see a French soldier on British land. For,

putting out of the question, which by no means should in point of reason be forgotten, viz. all the bloodshed and calamity, that such an event, even terminating in the way these gentlemen wish, would create; and supposing, (and the thing is certainly possible) the event should not be that, and, that instead of Buonaparté getting a dressing, we should get half a dozen counties plunder ed and ravaged, I think those who are now so desirous of an invasion being tried would look a little sheepish. But, after all, the reason for this wish is the most foolish and the most ridiculous part of the whole: viz. that the enemy might be convinced, that he has no chance of success. How will he be convinced of this? Will any man in his senses be one jot more convinced of this after that event, than he is now? I say no. He will be convinced, for he will know, that this attempt has failed; but, will that prove that a larger expedition, better timed, made on a better plan, under other circumstances, with better generals, would be equally unsuccessful? And where, I pray, have these gentlemen learned that Buonaparté or any jacobin chief is so easily turned away from his projects, (and from projects, too, the accomplishing of which is so necessary to his safety and credit, and to the existence of the sect as the destruction of Eng. land is now become) as to be afraid of making a second attempt when the first has failed! Oh! say they, but then we shall prevent the second; the new-raised men will doubtless, all volunteer themselves for general service, and we will immediately begin offensive operations. This is very well, but it is another castle in the air, when there is no provision made for any bad throw. Suppose they should not volunteer, (and if they do, some little time may chance to be lost by complying with all the legal forms of proceeding,) or suppose we should not know where or how to send them, (and to judge from the past to the future, I dare say, his Majesty's present ministers will never begin thinking about that till the very moment,) or, lastly, suppose the enemy should not let us, but should force us to keep every man and musquet at home by rumours of new expeditions, or by an actual attack in another quarter. And who will say that this will not happen, or who will say that this may not go on so, for ever, till either the troops are all destroyed which can be furnished by a population of 70 millions, or till his means of building boats are exhausted, which will happen about the same time; or, lastly, till the power of Buonaparté is destroyed? For, I believe, that this is what people reckon

upon; and, if they had good ground to expect it, I should think they reckoned very well indeed; and it is ground too, as I shall presently show, which might be made as solid and as firm as a rock, if people choose to set about it in the right way, but which, as they pretend to use it, is a mere morass in which any edifice they may build upon it will soon sink and disappear. They rec kon truly on the unpopularity, which these frequent failures of his expeditions will occasion, and the anger that they will raise in the breasts of the soldiers against him, as if he was less popular amongst the French troops, or in France in general, for the complete and entire failure of, and for his desertion from the expedition to Egypt, as if he were less popular on account of the complete failure (as we are told it is) of the expedition to St. Domingo, or less able to send more troops to them, because all these who have hitherto gone there have miserably perished. This is a foundation of sand, indeed, which will, I fear, in the hour of danger, when the winds blow and the storms beat, miserably disappoint those who rely upon it.It is, then, perfectly reasonable to look forward with very confident hope to the effect of the destruction of the power of the present First Consul of France. But before you look to the effect of that destruction, you must first consider the means of destroying it. Now the means these gentlemen have in view are most fallacious. I think, however, I can point out some to you perfectly good and valid. The following opinions are neither perfectly new nor originally mine, but being broached in public very little of late, and, I think, in general, very much lost sight of, I shall state them to you at some length. They had never recurred to my mind since the breaking out of the present war, till, one day, meeting with our friend whose

politics are still as different from mine as ever, we had, as usual, a discussion on that subject; in the course of which he told me, that he had been the preceding day in the House of Commons, where he had heard some of Mr. Burke's old doctrines about the King of France broached, I believe, by Lord Folkestone. "All these Burkites and "Windhamites," says he, "must certainly "be mad. What do you think Lord F. said "in the House last night ?-That the best

way of defending the country and pre"venting an invasion would be to make a "declaration of our intention to support "the claim of the King of France." Since that time I have thought a good deal upon the subject, and am quite convinced of the

truth of the above proposition.---I think a great deal of the success of such a measure would depend on the manner of doing it; particularly after the events of the last war, and especially after the late disgraceful treaty of Amiens. The best mode in my mind, would clearly be, the most frank, most open, most unequivocal, and most undisguised. This would be the most honourable, and, I think, upon principles less praise-worthy, the most efficacious. It would give the best pledge of our sincerity and truth; of which I am sorry to say I fear, there would be entertained much doubt, and doubt founded on good reason too; if the declaration were not of that description. If there was the least opening left for quibble or doubt, if every thing was not as fair, as it could by any possibility be made, you may rest assured, that, after the treachery of which this country was guilty by the peace of Amiens, there is not a statesman in Europe who will not believe, that that omission is purposely designed as a loop-hole, in case our interest should incline us to take advantage of it. The de. claration must then, of absolute necessity, be of the description I have mentioned. Being of that description I ask, what will be its consequences? And I maintain-1. It will astonish, and by astonishing raise admiration for our disinterestedness and courage, give confidence in our promises and esteem for our character in every Cabinet in Europe These things we once possessed by the treaty of Amiens they were completely lost, and it is absolutely neces sary for our well-being, that we should regain them.--2. It would give spirit and energy to the people of this country. I know there is a common cant that the people would not bear to fight for the family of the Bourbons. In the first place I deny, that it would be what this seems to assume, a gratuitous favour to the House of Bourbon; we are fighting against a mortal enemy who wishes to destroy us; his victims would therefore, naturally, be our friends; but, beyond all doubt, those whose name, or influence, or situation, makes them most formidable to him, when brought forward, it is for our interest to bring as forward as possible. But, besides this, I deny that any one has any right to assume the indisposition of the people to replace King Lewis XVIII. on the throne. I for one, for the sake of the country, should be very willing to contribute my share towards doing it, and I know not why any one should not, except those who think that monarch would be as formidable

a foe, as the revolutionary, jacobinical usurper Buonaparté! This is assuredly not my opinion, even if the king were on the throne, commanding all the millions of men, and wielding all the power of Buonaparté. And this is meant as no compli ment to the Consul, or slur upon the King: of the latter I have some reason to have the highest opinion, both of his head and his heart; of the other I have the meanest and most contemptible opinion possible: he is, I believe, the poorest and least formidable man on the face of the earth, but it is the power of the revolutionary government which is formidable. "C'est la revolution "qui marche," said Mallet du Pan, six years ago, and so it is to the present day it is not this man or that man that rules, "c'est

la revolution qui marche," and the figures that appear on the stage are mere automata, mere machines moved about and directed by hidden springs. But, as I shall show by and by, I think the question would be between the Consul with his present power, and the King with that power greatly diminished; and then, I think, even those who hesitate about the answer in the first case, would not hesitate in the second But to return from this digression: I maintain that it would give spirit and energy to the people of this country, in as much as it would be a desirable object. The advantage of having such an object, I believe, immense. Every one knows how difficult it is to walk in a straight line, unless he has something in view to which he may direct his steps. The ablest pilot could not steer straight across the narrowest streight, without some point in view before him

so is

it in the affairs of nations, and in war. If you have no defined object you deviate from the straight course; if you have one, then all your views and all your attention are directed to it. A very distant object in sight is always much more animating than one much nearer that you knew nothing of. But it will be said, we have an object without this, our own security. True: that is tee ultimate end, no doubt; but there is no defined point, at which you will be sure to have attained that end. The mariner too lias an object, to get to the opposite shore, but that will not prevent him from wandering from his track unless he has in view something more discernable. I protest 1 do not see the slightest difference between the two cases.-—— -3. The effect it would have in France, first, on the people of that country, and, secondly, upon the government, is not the least important consequence of such a declaration as I propose. On the people,

if they are so harrassed and so tyrannized over as they are represented to be; if they are so galled by the yoke of the tyrant, and so goaded by the idea that that tyrant is an usurper, a foreigner, and a Corsican, must they not be ready to rise in support of the claim of their old and respected monarch. I assure you that I have good reason to believe, that if his standard were once erected, manfully and firmly, we should see no less than half the population of France ready to join it. He would of course be joined by every royalist in the country, every good, and loyal and faithful subject remaining in France; he would be joined by all those who are discontented with the present tyrannical government, it would immediately decide the wavering and doubtful, insure the co-operation of many whom former crimes must exclude from all hopes of pardon, but on the score of later and eminent. services. I repeat that I do not doubt that half the population of France would join the royal standard. The effect it would bave on the ruler of France would be no less striking and important. It would at once disturb all his operations, and palsy all his exertions. Conscious of the abhorrence in which he is held, he would be afraid to trust any man. His favourite re. giment, his dearest aide-de-camp, his most confidential general, would become to him objects of suspicion and fear. What assure ance could he have that any one of them might not feel some qualm of conscience for his rebellions, treasons and blasphemies, and betray him? What security would he feel against the anger of an injured and insulted people, or the fury of a disappointed arany? One enthusiastic loyalist throwing bis hat in the air and crying "Vive le Roi would be more formidable to him than 600,000 men drawn up, not on the coasts of Britain, but landed on the shores of France. What expeditions do you think he would then send out? Could he send reinforcements to St. Domingo? Could he have invaded Hanover if this measure had been attempted in time?" What would it "profit him, if he gain the whole world, "but lose his own soul?" But, above all, would be in this case think of an invasion against this country, when he knows, that we are active in ppholding the rights and asserting the claims of his lawful sovereign, the legitimate monarch of those whom he sends to invade us? Or, would not they be very apt to suffer their hatred against England to be smothered by their hatred against him, and by their love for their lawful prince, and to be much more ready to join

his standard and return under his banners to assert his cause, and wreak their vengeance on the Corsican, than to expose themselves to destruction by assisting an iniquitous and unjust cause.--These, I doubt not, would be the effects of the measure if properly adopted. The manner in which I would do it, I must reserve for another opportunity, as I find this epistle swelled almost to the size of a volume. I cannot, however, delay saying a word or two on the common objection against such plans, as the one just mentioned "That it is all romance and "chivalry, and, though very honourable to "its advocates, very ill adapted to the pre"sent times and present manners." I confess that, for myself, I do not like it the less, if it partake a little of that romantic spirit of chivalry, which was nothing more nor less than a high and spirited sense of honour, but I deny, that this plan is necessarily liable to such an imputation, or rather to such a commendation. It certainly may be taken up on that ground: I should be very willing to take it up on that ground myself, and to applaud any other person who did so. and I think, the more it were so taken up, the better it would be for the country and the more effectual in itself. But, romantic as I may be, I am not romantic enough to expect that. I am not mad enough to expect of the country one expression of sympathy, or of honourable feeling towards the unfortunate victims of jacobin rage; but, I do think, that it is not too much to expect of the country when it can be proved, and it is proved to it, that the method pointed out is the best and the wisest, and the cheapest mode of doing the work in which they are engaged; when it is proved, that it will perfectly defend them from the attacks against which they are making so much preparation, that it will provide them with allies without subsidies or the delays of negotiation, now that we are so much in need of them, and with anxiliary troops of the best kind and in the greatest abundance, without either pay or bounty, now that we are so much in want of soldiers; when this is proved, I say, I do not think it is too much to expect, that they will not reject the plan merely because it is honourable, that they will not refuse to follow the path pointed out by their own interest, only because it is likewise that which leads to glory, that, in short, they will not refuse to benefit themselves merely because there is also a chance that they may benefit an unfortunate and excellent prince, than whom none is more deserving of esteem and respect.- -I am, &c.

INQUISITOR.

ST. DOMINGO.

SIR,I have already expressed my ideas, as to the means to be taken of separating that immense and invaluable Colony St. Domingo, for ever from France; and, I should hope, that if government should not have already taken this most important subject into consideration, no further time will be lost in carrying into effect some such measures as those which I have pointed out. -To you, Sir, I need not say that France still cherishes the hope of being hereafter enabled again to cope with the navy of this country; because, it is a fact which you well know; yet without foreign commerce, and a great commercial marine, she will never be able to accomplish this project; unless, indeed, we sink into a state of indolence and voluptuousness, which, from the present rage for luxury and dissipation, there is but too much reason to fear. The first and principal source of French navigation, before the late war, was that which she derived from St. Domingo, consequently, every rational effort should now be made on our part to deprive France for ever of it; and there certainly appears to me to be no mode better calculated to effect that end, than the one I have pointed out in my former letter. In an account you published soon after the Preliminary Treaty of London, you stated the population of St. Domingo, before the war, at 578,023; the ships employed in carrying on the trade with that Island at 1640, making 318,015 tons, navigated by 26,770 men; so that by this statement, compared with the statement you gave at the same time of the population of the whole of the British West India Islands, and of the shipping, tonnage, and men trading thither, the single Island of St. Domingo exceeded the whole of our possessions, in population, by 57,734 souls; in tonnage by 20,763, and in seamen navigating that tonnage by 3,709. Although your statement respecting St. Domingo is taken from good authority, yet I am strongly inclined to believe, that the number of men employed in the French St. Domingo trade, was considerably more (great as you have stated it to be) than what appears by your account; but, admitting that you have given the total number, and that my opinion is not correct, you will perceive, that the seamen formerly employed by France in that branch of her navigation, was, reckoning 600 seamen for a ship of the line, more than sufficient to man 44 sail of line of battle ships, which, at the commencement of the late war, was just one half of her fleet, and just the whole of what she

D 4

now possesses.

-It is true, that the de

structive and sanguinary warfare that has been carried on, almost without intermission, for these last ten years in St. Domingo, has very much diminished the population of that country, for so it may be called from its vast extent, value, and importance. In addition to this circumstance respecting the population, there is not scarcely a sugar work remaining; these works were destroyed by the Blacks, principally by Christophe, who murdered the white inhabitants on the plantations; of course, for some few years to come, and until the sugar works and the plantations should be restored to their former state, even supposing Buonaparte's efforts to subdue the negroes crowned with success, the navigation could not be brought to the extent and magnitude it had reached previous to the late war.--Let it also be - remembered, that prior to the late war, France possessed only one half of St. Domingo, but that upon the Definitive Treaty of Amiens, she became the acknowledged sovereign of the whole island, in conformity to the cession made to her by Spain of the half which that nation possessed before the conclusion of the peace of Basle in 1795, when Spain ceded the entire sovereignty of St. Domingo to France. Since, therefore, as it evidently appears, France employed such an immense navigation with only the one half of St. Domingo, how much more may it not be fairly imagined she would employ in the space of ten or even five years, in her intercourse with the whole of that extensive and fertile country should she be enabled but once more to reduce the blacks to subjection.--I have been led to expatiate on the subject of St. Domingo in the hope of impressing more strongly the absolute necessity of exerting our utmost endeavours to deprive France for ever of it. As to any danger of establishing a black empire, that seems now to be considered as it ought to have been five years ago, at which time Toussaint was in the plenitude of his authority, and when we might, had we but seen our true policy, have confirmed him in the government of the whole island, and thereby not only have secured to ourselves, almost the whole of the advantages to be derived from a commercial and maritime intercourse with St. Domingo, but have entirely deprived France, both of the sovereignty and of any share of the trade of it. I only now pray that we may profit by experience, and that this opportunity, (like the former) may not be suffered to escape. My great apprehension, however, is, that Buonaparté, foreseeing the

utter impossibility of prosecuting his views of conquest in St. Domingo, while engaged in hostility against this country, may have concluded the treaty with the blacks, to which I have alluded in my former letter ;* but even this ought not to prevent our immediately entering into a communication with the black chieftains, who might easily be convinced, from the superiority of our navy, and by all intercourse being cut off between St. Domingo and France, that it is to Great Britain they must look for supplies of money, of cloathing, of manufactures, and of provisions, in return for the produce of their country, and that we neither look to the possession of their seaports or to any other advantages than those to which we shall be justly entitled as fair traders and as their best friends.

A Friend to my Country.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Explanatory Note of the avish of the Commander in Chief.

Bremen, June 6. The General in Chief commauding the French Army in Hanover, relying on the amicable dispositions of the City of Bremen towards the French Republic, conceives he may place implicit confidence in the Senate for the execution of the following dispositions :-He demands. 1. That an Embargo be immediately put on all English vessels. II. That all English Officers and Sailors be immediately sent to the French Army, III. That the Merchants of the City make a declaration of the merchandize belonging to the English, which are consigned to them. Also their situation with regard to their English Correspondents.

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Notice of the Blockade of the Elbe by Great-Britain. Dated Downing-Street, July 2d.

The King has been pleased to cause it to be signified by the Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministers of Neutral Powers residing at this Court, that the necessary measures having been taken by His Majesty's command for the Blockade of the entrance of the river Elbe, in consequence of the forcible occupation of parts of the banks of that river by the French troops; the said river is declared to he in a state of blockade; and that from this time all the measures authorised by the law of nations and the respective treaties between His Majesty and the different Neutral Powers will be adopted and executed with respect to all vessels which may attempt to violate the said blokade. Lord Hawkesbury has been further commanded by His Majesty to signify to the Ministers of the Neutral Powers, that whenever the French troops evacuate the positions which they now occupy on parts of the Elbe, and will remove at such a distance from them as to leave the course of that river perfectly free and secure to the vessels of his subjects, as well as of other nations, His Ma

*See Register, present volume, P. 33.