account of dissatisfaction with B, and contracted for ice with C. Subsequently B bought C's business and delivered ice to A, without notifying him of his purchase until after the delivery and consumption of the ice. The court held that B could not maintain an action for the price of the ice against A."

It will be seen, therefore, that one may choose the parties with whom he will have business relations, and that if he supposes himself to be dealing with C, B cannot force himself into the bargain, without A's consent or knowledge, and gain any claim upon him. No contract can be implied in such case, for the mutual assent was lacking.

Mistake as to an Article.

Mistakes as to the article contracted for may invalidate a contract. Thus if the contract be for the sale of a particular horse, and some other horse be delivered, however innocent the seller may be of intent to deceive, the contract is not fulfilled thereby.

Or to take an illustration more familiar to the sex that "goes shopping," if you send a message to a drygoods establishment, asking for a certain number of yards of all-wool goods of a specified kind, and the article sent proves to be partly cotton, no contract arises, and you need not pay for it, but send it back. Or if you have already paid, either the money must be refunded, or other goods sent as ordered. But if, instead of sending a message in the first instance, you visit the store in person, and choose the particular piece of goods, even though you say to the clerk that you wish it to be all-wool, you will have to abide by your own selection, for it is supposed that you best know the material you want when you see it. It

is not even safe to rely on oral warranties, especially if given by clerks, for the question may well arise whether the clerk is authorized to bind his employer by a warranty. The only safe way is to get a warranty directly from the head of the establishment and if possible in writing.-[See further as to Warranties, Chapter 17.]

Mistakes of Identity and of Quality.

The great difficulty in these questions of mistake is this; that, though a mistake in the identity of an article will invalidate a contract for its sale, a mistake as to its quality (that is as to its fitness for the purpose intended) will not do so, except when the selection of the article is intrusted to the judgment of the person who sells it; and it is often a very difficult matter to decide under which head a mistake comes.

Thus it has been repeatedly held that one who sells or lets an unfurnished house, representing it to be fit for immediate occupation, when in reality, unknown to him, its drainage is defective, or it leaks. badly, or has just been vacated by small-pox patients, can hold the purchaser or lessee to his bargain. The mistake, the misrepresentation-is only one of quality. But it has been held in a couple of English cases, that the contrary is true of a furnished house, let for a short time, and that a warranty, either expressly given or implied, that such a house is fit for occupancy, may be relied on by the buyer or lessee.

This matter is treated in a very brief and pointed fashion in Shirley's "Leading Cases Made Easy." "Implied Warranty on Letting Furnished House, Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W.

5 BRUNSWICK PLACE, Sept. 19, 1842.. "Lady Marrable informs Mrs. Smith that it is her determination to leave the house in Brunswick place as soon as she can take another, paying a week's rent, as all the bedrooms but one are so infested with bugs. that it is impossible to remain.'

"And, in pursuance of this determination, the Marrables moved out, and Smith went to law with them, alleging that, as they had taken the house for five weeks they had no business to leave in this summary fashion, bugs or no bugs. The Marrables, on the other hand, successfully contended that it is an implied condition, in the letting of a furnished house, that it shall be reasonably fit for habitation; and that, if it is not fit, the tenant may quit without notice.

"The famous bug case, after having been spoken disrespectfully of for many years, has, in these latter days, been expressly affirmed by the case of Wilson v. Finch Hatton (2 Ex. Div.), where its principle was applied to stinks arising from defective drainage. It is to be observed that it is only in the case of furnished houses that reasonable fitness is an implied condition. In general, there is no such implied covenant by the lessor of land or houses, nor even that the house will endure during the term. Fraud and deceit, however, may make a difference."

Fraud Invalidates a Contract.

As the last sentence implies, if one should warrant an unfurnished house to be fit for immediate occupation, knowing that it is not, owing to hidden or latent defects, which the purchaser or lessee would not be likely to discover for himself, he (the owner) is then guilty of fraud, which when practised by one party

to a contract on the other, will invalidate any contract, for where one party is deceiving the other, it is clear that there can be no mutual assent. (The essentials of fraud, which will be presently given, must all be present, to invalidate a contract.)

Fraud may be practised by concealing matters of importance, as much as by spoken falsehoods. The sin of omission is nearly or quite as great as that of commission. It is important that a witness on the stand should tell "the whole truth" as well as "nothing but the truth," and so it is regarding representations by parties to a contract in dealing with each other concerning it.

Essentials of Fraud.

Not all false statements or wrongful concealments constitute fraud in a legal point of view, so as to invalidate a contract. There are certain essentials which are absolutely necessary.

First, the false statement must be one of material fact. One that concerns some point immaterial to the actual subject-matter of the contract will not affect it; neither will a statement, however false, of mere opinion or judgment.

Second, the false statement must be made with knowledge of its falsity to a party ignorant thereof, and who could not discover its falsity by the exercise of ordinary care; for both parties are bound to use care in such a matter.

Third, it must be made intending that it should be acted upon, and

Fourth, it must have been acted upon by the other party to his damage, before any cause of action for fraud arises, or any good defence to a contract

on the ground of fraud can be made. For when all these essentials combine, not only a good defence is established which will relieve one from the contract itself, but he may bring a civil action in tort, to recover damages from the party who has thus injured him. [See Action for Deceit, Chapter 38.]

It

Many fine points are constantly arising on these questions of fraud, out of which grows a very large proportion of all the litigation in our Courts, and in regard to which the best-read lawyers disagree. would be quite impracticable to attempt to go into the subject here at any length. In fact, there is no accepted definition of the very word "fraud," judges themselves having carefully avoided drawing lines by which to bound it, the fertility of human genius for deception being such that it would soon outgrow any definition that might be made.

It is amply sufficient for the purpose of this work, however, to impress upon the mind of every reader that absolute honesty and fair dealing are essential to the validity of all contracts; and if one discovers at any time before or after making a contract, any indication of deceit by the other party thereto, he should take legal advice immediately.

Mistakes of Law.

A mistake concerning the legal purport or binding force of a contract does not invalidate it, for unreasonable and often almost unjust as such a rule seems, every person is bound by law to know the general public laws of the state or country wherein he makes a contract. He is not merely presumed to know them, but bound to do so, the results of ignorance being visited on his own head-or pocket-as are those of any other