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popular and semi-political considerations as those on which international law has been hitherto interpreted. Its theory shall be strictly legal and practical, not political, not speculative, but adaptable to the actual state of international relations. The radical change to be effected will be to treat the relations of states in a condition of peace only, and to introduce a notion of legal relationship, of legal right, legal duty, legal accountability, and of legal penalty, enforceable by an international judicial law clothed with all the power and attributes necessary for the purpose of independent judicial administration. The "state of war "should never have a place in its curriculum. No international dispute should be admitted to be a matter for settlement by war, but all disputes should go to an international court of justice. Any state which declared war should be treated as an international outlaw, and the international police of all other nations should co-operate to put it down. (Applause.)

Every observable fact shows that international law follows a course of development similar to that of municipal jurisprudence. Logically this is as it should be. It should not be any more difficult to harmonize the claims of justice amongst states than among individuals, the difference being not in principles but in premises only. It is quite practicable for many legal principles already developed in modern municipal jurisprudence to be applied to international purposes. In both international and municipal law we are concerned with a person or state group of persons, and their rights are recognized in different aspects.

The rules to be provided for the purpose of international law should be nothing but these common, practical rules governing human relations, applied mutatis mutandis to juridical relations between states instead of individual persons. The application of them would be merely a modification, which change I should describe as the universal administration of municipal law and the socialization of the law, which has been in process of transformation in municipal jurisprudence from the individualistic conception of justice to a newer ideal of social justice.

The principles and practice of federated republics can furnish many precedents for the organization, jurisdiction, and administration of an international court of justice. The wisdom and knowledge accumulated by your Bar in the course of the last century constitute a rich store of learning adequate to serve all modern international needs.

There is only one earth, and its limited material goods are now pretty nearly appropriated. Only natural energy seems inexhaustible. It is not enough that each state keep itself within the physical boundaries of its own Dominion, in the same way that individuals keep within their respective domains. The relations and interests of different states must be considered as one and mutually adjusted accordingly.

How far to make the material goods go in the use and enjoyment of nations, and to have the natural energy fairly utilized without friction and without waste so that each state may use and enjoy all that is possible with the least sacrifice of its interest, and to have its infinite wants satisfied for the purpose of the whole human race, should be the fundamental question to be settled by means of a commonly accepted standard of international justice. Such a standard has been furnished by the Root Magna Charta for China. Its principles, as modified by circumstances, would appear to apply logically to similar cases in the inter-relationship of other nations.

The doctrine of equal opportunity should be modified and enlarged to apply to all parts of the globe, civilized or semicivilized, regulated in such manner as may be legally determined by the International Bar Association, observing all such principles as have been touched upon in the present address and other principles to be developed hereafter.

There is coming a time when there must be a stock-taking and marshalling of the world's material assets if the society of nations is to live in peace and in the joint enjoyment of the material goods of our small earth. How far and when these rights and their relations will be really respected, even by the most advanced of modern governments, seems still almost a theoretical question in the field of international politics.

The spirit of the new international law shall be the supremacy of law as administered according to judicial precedents and by contentious procedure the same as in common law jurisprudence.

The guardianship of international jurisprudence should be left to International Bar Association devoted to the cultivation of the science of international law. The majesty of international law shall be upheld by an international court of justice to ordain that nations and all their agencies shall obey the new rules of international law and shall act upon principles of reason and not according to the arbitrary will of single nations.

In this connection I want to add that I have followed what Lord Shaw and Mr. Davis have had to say and I agree with the principles enunciated in their addresses, and the spirit of my address now is in full accord with the principles which they have explained to us. (Applause.)

The Bar alone can determine or discover how far human justice can serve for securing the peace of the world, and what principles and rules can sustain them also determine international law. The modern Bar can surely assist in maintaining the validity and independence of international justice and judicial institutions. The law lives and is as spontaneously developed as any other social force, and it requires to be cared for and nurtured. The Bar as ministers of justice can and should render that service to the law.

The lawyers of English speaking states, as the leaders of the common law, should form close alliance with those of other schools of jurisprudence to establish enlightened international jurisprudence and serve the international court of justice. The International Bar Association should be the efficient instrument in encouraging the co-operation and unselfish endeavours of the nations to contribute to the civilization and universal entente cordiale which sustain the security and happiness of the human race.

If once for all the members of the Bar of the world shall come to be of one mind as to the principles and leading rules of which international law should be composed and shall support one interpretation and one only by reducing all to definiteness and certainty, there will be no longer any danger of an ambitious and reckless state endeavouring to twist its interpretation in its own favour, and every outrage committed by an estate will stand out in plain colours to be condemned by the public opinion of the world. International law will then stand forth as an embodiment of the loftiest justice, having for its sole end such an adjustment of the relations of the several states of the world as may best enable each to contribute its share to the moral and economic well being of all.

I am appearing here before you, my brethren of the Canadian Bar Association, only as an individual member of the International Bar Association. Its president this year is the president of the Chinese Bar Association, but my enthusiasm for the cause moves me warmly to present the prospect of an extension of the first principles of international law all over

the world and to ask your co-operation in this new movement to further the course of justice between nations.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your indulgence in listening so patiently to one who has addressed you so imperfectly in the language of his adoption, but I have spoken to you, however, haltingly, in the language of the common law and I ask you, as my brothers in the common law, to come over and help us in the great work which we have set out to do in the International Bar Association. Again, I thank you. (Applause.)

1

ADDRESS BY THE HON. MR. JUSTICE ANGLIN.

66

ON SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LAW OF QUEBEC AND THE LAW AS ADMINISTERED IN THE OTHER

PROVINCES OF CANADA."

Mr. Chairman, Sir James Aikins, and Gentlemen-Ladies and Gentlemen, unless I am to use "Gentlemen" in the embracing sense suggested by Lord Shaw

After the flood of eloquence and of oratory to which you were treated yesterday, you must not be too much disappointed if in the paper that I am about to read to you I bring you down to matters of fact and questions of law which may be described as "dry as dust." There will be no eloquence and no oratory.

On the invitation of Sir James Aikins, I shall have the honor of reading for you portions of a paper prepared last winter for presentation to the Junior Bar Association of the City of Quebec. During the past thirteen years, in the course of my work as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, many striking differences between the law of the English speaking provinces of Canada and the law of the Province of Quebec have come under my observation. You may perhaps be interested to hear something of them. I shall take the liberty of discussing the several points on which I touch quite discursively, and without pretending to deal with them at all exhaustively.

When we consider the sources of English law and equity and those of the civil law as it exists in Quebec, the surprising thing is not that there are many marked differences between them to-day, but rather, perhaps, that the similarities are not more numerous. Roman law has exercised an enormous influence in the development of both systems. It may perhaps be regarded as more distinctly the foundation of the civil law of France and Quebec; yet undoubtedly English common law judges derived from it the principles on which they decided cases for which the customary law of England did not provide. In Lane v. Cotton (12 Mod., 472, 482), decided in 1701, Chief Justice Holt is reported to have said:

"It must be owned that the principles of our law are borrowed from the civil law and therefore grounded upon the same reason in many things."

Mr. Justice Jones, another judge of comparative antiquity, is quoted in Irving's Civil Law as having said that

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