1919 C.J. charge of his public duty under the statute as the governing officer of the force. The members of the Board are Judgment. not the same from year to year. There is nothing to show Mathers, that the individual defendants were members of the Board when the order of 25th February, 1914, was issued. The individual defendants might have sanctioned something that was done before they became members of the Board, but the onus was upon the plaintiff to show that they had done so. It is contended that they are culpable if they did not know that such an order had been issued. In other words, that they are estopped from denying knowledge of what the Chief of Police had done. If the Chief of Police were the servant of the Board and had issued this order within the scope of his authority as such servant (which for reasons already given I think he was not), the Board would probably not be heard to deny responsibility for his act. Whatever the relationship between the Chief of Police and the Board, there is no pretence that he was the servant of the individual members so as to make them vicariously liable. They could only be held liable if it were shown that they individually associated themselves with the act complained of. There is not a tittle of evidence that all or any of them did anything of the kind. I can see no ground whatever upon which any liability can attach to the individual defendants. For these reasons the action must be dismissed as against all the defendants with costs if costs are asked for. Action dismissed with costs. 1919 Statement. BRUNELLE V. BENARD. Before PERDUE, C.J.M., CAMERON, HAGGART, FULLERTON and Bills and Notes-Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 119, s. Dominion Trust Co. v. New York Life [1919] A.C. 254; Montgomerie & Co. v. Wallace James [1904] A.C. 73, followed. ARGUED: 7th April, 1919. DECIDED: 28th April, 1919. APPEAL from a judgment of Prendergast, J., in favor of plaintiff for $2,754 on two promissory notes. The defend. ants, endorsers, claimed that no notice was given of dishonor. The appeal was dismissed. A. E. Hoskin, K.C., and E. R. Siddall for defendants, appellants. W. L. McLaws and J. T. Beaubien for plaintiff, respond ent. FULLERTON, J.A. The learned trial Judge has found that the defendant O. Benard signed the promissory notes sued on for the accommodation of his co-defendants Aime Benard and Auguste Martineau. I think that the finding is fully supported by the evid ence and it follows that, under section 108, s-s. (c), of the Bills of Exchange Act, notice of dishonor is dispensed with. I would dismiss the appeal with costs. DENNISTOUN, J.A. Judgment has been entered against the defendants in this case for $2,754 and costs upon two promissory notes each for $1,000 made by the defendant DENNIS TOUN, J.A. O. Benard and endorsed by the defendants Aime Benard 1919 and A. Martineau. These notes were payable at the Bank Judgment. of Hamilton, Main Office, Winnipeg. The defendants Benard have had no account at that bank at any time. When the first of the notes fell due an attempt was made to protest it for non payment but by reason of the illegibility of the signature notice of protest did not reach the endorsers. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that this note was duly protested but it is not necessary to decide the point in view of the findings of the learned trial Judge, Prendergast, J., with which I agree. The circumstances leading up to the making of these notes, which were part of a series of seven, each for $1,000, have to do with the sale of a hotel property of which the plaintiff's were vendors. The agreement to purchase was signed by the defendant Martineau. The defendant Aime Benard refused to sign this agreement or to appear on the notes as maker, giving as his reason that he did not wish his name to appear in any transactions having to do with a liquor license in Saskatchewan. He and Martineau endorsed the seven notes, Martineau executed a mortgage on the premises to certain brewers and wine merchants, and Aime Benard guaranteed payment of the mortgage. Although Aime Benard refused to appear as purchaser of the property or maker of the notes, the learned trial Judge finds as a fact that he and Martineau, acting for him, were the real purchasers of the property and the real makers of the notes, and that the ostensible maker, O. Benard, was an accommodation maker only. A. Benard and Martineau paid the first five notes of $1,000 each as they came due and A. Benard promised to pay the first of the notes sued on after dishonor, but subsequently 1919 withdrew from that position when he discovered that Judgment. notice of dishonor had not been given. DENNIS- The learned trial Judge had the witnesses before him and was able to observe their demeanor and judge of their veracity in a way that no appellate tribunal can do, and the greatest weight should be attached to his findings of fact for that reason. Moreover, he draws inferences from the facts so found with which I agree, and arrive at the same conclusion with regard to the real position and obligations of the defendants. His finding that Aime Benard and A. Martineau were the markers of these notes and that O. Benard was an accommodation party is concurred in: Dominion Trust v. New York Life, [1919] A.C. 254; Montgomerie & Co. v. Wallace-James, [1904] A.C. 73. That fact being established, are these makers released from liability through lack of notice of dishonor? I do not think so. Sec. 108, Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C., reads as follows: "Notice of dishonour is dispensed with as regards the endorser, where, (c) the bill was accepted or made for his accom modation." It was These notes were made by O. Benard for the accommodation of A. Benard and Martineau the endorsers. their duty to have had funds ready at the Bank of Hamil ton to take up these notes on presentation. The fault was their own that the notes were not paid on the due date, and notice of dishonor was unnecessary: Bickerdyke v. Bollman, 1 T.R 410; Carter v. Flower, 16 M. & W. 743; Wirth v. Austin L.R. 10 C.P. 689; Corpus Juris, vol. 8, Bills and Notes, p. 285, sec. 447. I would affirm the judgment appealed from and dismiss the appeal. PERDUE, C.J.M., CAMERON and HAGGART, JJ.A., con- 1919 curred. Judgment. Appeal dismissed with costs. REX V. RUSSELL ET AL. Before CAMERON, J.A. Criminal law-Bail-Criminal Code, s. 698-Misdemeanour- Section 698 of the Criminal Code applies to offences which were R. v. Fortier, 6 Can. Cr. Cas. 191, not followed. Bail was refused in this case because the accused had broken their undertaking, given on their release from custody after their arrest, to refrain from continuing to make public utterances of a character similar to those charged against them at the preliminary hearing, and did not offer a new undertaking of the same kind. ARGUED: 12th August, 1919. APPLICATION for bail on behalf of the accused on the ground that in cases of offences formerly classed as misdemeanours the accused are entitled to bail as a matter of right. The application was refused. E. J. McMurray and Marcus Hyman for the accused. CAMERON, J.A. The accused are charged: "For that they did in the years 1917, 1918 and 1919, conspire and agree with one another, and with other persons to the informant unknown, to carry into execution a seditious intention, to wit: To bring into hatred and contempt and to excite disaffection against the government and constitution of the Dominion of Canada and the Government |